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ABSTRACT
The army with which Alexander the Great conquered the 
Persian empire was "built around the Macedonian Companion 
cavalry and the Macedonian heavy infantry. The Macedonian 
nobility were traditionally fine horsemen, hut the infantry 
was poorly armed and badly organised until the reign of 
Alexander II in 369/8 B.C. This king formed a small royal 
standing army; it consisted of a cavalry force of Macedonian 
nobles, which he named the 'hetairoi' (or Companion]! cavalry, 
and an infantry body drawn from the commoners and trained to 
fight in phalangite formation: these he called the »pezetairoi» 
(or foot-companions). Philip II (359-336 B.C.) expanded the 
kingdom and greatly increased the manpower resources for war. 
Towards the end of his reign he started preparations for the 
invasion of the Persian empire and levied many more 
Macedonians than had hitherto been involved in the king's 
wars. In order to attach these men more closely to himself 
he extended the meaning of the terms »hetairol» and 'pezetairoi 
to refer to the whole bodies of Macedonian cavalry and heavy 
infantry which served under him on his campaigning. In 
addition to these bodies, he formed an elite infantry force 
of Macedonians, distinct from the regular levy, and named 
them 'hypaspists*. Philip was killed as he was about to 
begin the invasion of Asia and his son inherited the army and 
the expedition.
During the early years of the Asian campaign, which was 
begun in 334 B.C., Alexander made few changes in the 
structure of the army: the Companion cavalry was organised 
into seven territorial squadrons and a royal guard, all
under a single commander; the foot-Gompanions consisted of 
six territorial "battalions, organised together with the 
Greek hoplites under an overall commander; the hypaspists 
also were grouped together into one command. One "battalion 
was added to the foot-Companions in 331 B.C. "but there was 
no major reorganisation until'the hard fighting against the 
scattered tribes of Iran was encountered. Then, faced "by a 
different style of opposition, Alexander adopted a more 
flexible structure. In 330 B.C. the overall commander of the 
pezetairoi was removed and the battalions became fully 
independent command units: later in the same year the 
commander of the hypaspists died and was not replaced; the 
Companion cavalry also lost its commander in this year and 
was divided into two independent parts. In the winter of 
328/7 B.C., in preparation for the Indian campaign, the 
Companion cavalry was further divided to form six independent 
commands in addition to the royal guard. No Macedonian 
reinforcements were received by Alexander after the end of 
331 B.C., until his return from India in 324 B.C. Buring 
this time the strength of the pezetairoi was maintained by 
reinforcements of Greek mercenaries, and from 328/7 B.C. 
Iranian cavalry was introduced to the Companion cavalry to 
reinforce the strength of that body.
In the final year of his life, after his return from 
India, Alexander set about establishing the structure of the 
imperial armies. He discharged many veterans and received 
fresh troops from Macedonia and his subjects in the Persian 
empire. Many of these forces he dispatched for service
under satraps and garrison commanders, but he maintained 
a large main army directly under his command and prepared 
for a major expedition into Arabia. At the core of the 
cavalry was the Companion cavalry consisting of Macedonian 
and Iranian nobility: the nucleus of the infantry was the 
Macedonian hypaspists and pezetairoi and beside them were 
ranged Iranian guards, called *melophoroi*, and Iranian 
archers.
The political relationship between Alexander and his 
Macedonian soldiers was of the most primitive nature. The 
Macedonian commoners had no background of political involve­
ment and had no consciousness of defined roles for themselves 
or their king. On the Asian campaign they were intimately 
involved in the king*s policies and their opinions 
influenced the conduct of affairs, but they showed no sign 
of being aware of their role and their powers as a political 
body.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been no full study of Alexander's expeditionary 
army since the monumentai work of Berve was published in 1926. 
Much of his work has found general acceptance and can hardly 
he improved upon, hut his conclusions concerning the 
Macedonian element in the army have been challenged, notably 
by Tarn. The question of the organisation and attitudes of 
these Macedonians is far from settled, but no accurate assess­
ment of Alexander as general and statesman is possible until 
the nature of his army is understood; and at the heart of the 
army were the Macedonians. In this thesis I intend to review 
the evidence on the Macedonian units, taking advantage of 
recent research on the sources to offer fresh interpretations 
of much discussed passages, in the hope of making some 
contribution to the better understanding of Alexander and his
achievement.
2CHAPTER I
THE MACEDONIAN ARMY UNTIL THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP II
It is generally-recognised that the army which Alexander 
took with him to Asia in 334 B.C. was essentially the creation 
of his father, Philip. Little attention, however, has been 
given to the development of the armed forces of the Argead 
kingsiprior to Philip: yet this is a necessary background to 
an understanding of Philip*s army, and, therefore, of that of 
Alexander. It is desirable to begin this study with a 
discussion of the little evidence that exists concerning the 
army prior to Philip’s accession.
3The first reference to Macedonian troops occurs in the 
context of the Persian invasion of 4-80/79 B.C., where 
Herodotus (8,35) says that Macedonian troops garrisoned 
Boeotian cities when Xerxes moved through to Athens. No 
details, however, are recorded and the first evidence of any 
importance refers to the year 429 B.C., when Sitalces, king 
of the Thracians, invaded Macedonia. Thucydides (2,98-101) 
describes how Sitalces, with 150,000 men, a third of them 
cavalry (98,4), swept over Crestonia, Mygdonia and Anthemous, 
meeting with little resistance (100). Some of the Thracian 
troops were good (98,4) and the Macedonians could not stand 
against them. The Macedonian infantry did not even join 
battle but, Thucydides tells us, the cavalry,-which was of 
good quality and wore breastplates, put up a good fight, 
although greatly outnumbered. They soon gave up, however, and 
Sitalces and the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, came,to an agree­
ment. Six years later a Macedonian force, with. Spartan and 
Chalcidian support, invaded Lyncestis. Thucydides (4,124,1) 
records the content of the army. Under Perdiccas were his 
subject Macedonians and the hoplite force of Greeks resident 
in his kingdom: under Brasidas were Peloponnesians, Acanthians 
and other Chalcidians. In all there were about 3,000 hoplites, 
a little less than 1,000 cavalry, consisting of Macedonians 
and Chalcidians, and a great mass of barbarians in addition to 
these. After one small battle between the cavalry and hoplites 
of each side (4,124,3), the Macedonians heard that the 
Illyrians had joined Arrhabaeus and they withdrew, leaving
4Brasidas and, his forces in the lurch.
Taking these two passages together, it is possible to 
arrive at some idea of the composition of the Macedonian army. 
The most important part was the cavalry, which was heavily 
armed, with breastplates,, and was of a high standard: it was, 
undoubtedly, made up of the Macedonian nobility, which had a 
tradition of horsemanship. Perdiccas was able to call upon 
his allies of Upper Macedonia,^ where there was a similar 
tradition of good cavalry, but the force was, nevertheless, 
small, at any rate in comparison with the Thracians. No 
mention is made by Thucydides of allied cavalry on the 
lyncestian expedition, and perhaps the allies could not be 
relied upon to support an attack, upon their northern neighbour. 
The strength of the cavalry can only be guessed at from 
indications in the second passage of Thucydides: together with 
the Chalcidians they numbered just under 1,000. The Chalcidic 
cavalry oannot have numbered many hundreds, as, despite the 
fact that the cities of Chalcidice were strong in cavalry, no 
city of any size, other than Acanthus, took part in the
pexpedition. In addition, forces were needed at home and they 
would not have denuded themselves of troops for the benefit of 
Perdiccas. Rather more than half of the cavalry, therefore, 
is likely to have come from Perdiccas himself, perhaps as 
many as 7 0 0 : this, I have suggested,did not include the 
allies of Upper Macedonia.
The Greeks living in the kingdom of Perdiccas were called
upon to serve as hoplites in the Lyncestian campaign,^ though
their contribution can have been only small, as, together with 
the Peloponnesians of Brasidas and his Chalcidian allies, they
5numbered only 3,000. Brasidas had Brought 1,700 infantry from
the Peloponnese (Thuc. 4,78,1), of which 300 were left in
Mende and Scione (Thuc. 4,123,4) and others elsewhere, so
perhaps there were a little fewer than 1,000 of these. There
is no check upon the Chalcidic contribution hut it was
probably no greater than the Peloponnesian,^ which gives a
total for the Greek hoplites of Perdiccas of something over
1,000. This is the only occasion upon which we hear of a
hoplite force of the Greeks in Macedonia serving an Argead
king, and it is not possible to be sure how regular a force
it was. Kahrstedt argued that it was a unit that was formed
between 429 and 423 B.G., inspired by the return of Therme
5and Strepsa to Macedonian control. . It seems more likely, 
however, that Perdiccas merely took advantage of the Spartan 
support, which made his position strong, to make the Greeks 
in Macedonia serve him. As we hear of no other occasion on 
which the Greeks served, we might justifiably doubt that 
there was a regular arrangement by which the Greeks were ; 
expected to fight for the Macedonian king. Perhaps, rather, 
when the king was strong enough to coerce them they served, 
otherwise they did not.
The mass of barbarians was, presumably, made up totally
fiof Perdiccas* subjects and was the national levy: if no 
allied cavalry was called on, it is likely that no allied 
infantry was used.- The nature and strength of the levy is 
not recorded and in both passages Thucydides implies that 
they made no substantial contribution. They were almost 
certainly only lightly armed and in a most irregular way,
6"being little more than retainers of the cavalrymen. It might 
he expected that Perdiccas himself had a royal footguard 
which was well armed,' hut it would have been small and, 
apparently, not worth mentioning. Thucydides says that 
Arrhabaeus put hoplites into the field (4,124,3), and Hammond 
suggests that this is evidence that lyncestis was more 
advanced than Perdiccas* kingdom, which produced no native 
hoplites.^ This seems unlikely, however, and Best’s 
suggestion (p.141) that the lyncestian hoplites were not 
natives hut Greeks in the service of Arrhahaeus is more 
attractive. The mass of the harharians receive no mention 
during the narrative of the campaign, the major battles being 
primarily the concern of the hoplites and cavalry (4,124,3)» 
This is all the information we have on the military 
forces at the disposal of Perdiccas. There was a good but 
small cavalry foroe, and he could draw on more cavalry from 
Upper Macedonia: a small force of Greek hoplites could some­
times he called on from the Greeks on.the borders and coast of 
the kingdom; finally, there was a mass of poor, lightly armed 
infantry. The forces were clearly inadequate for the defence 
of the country hut there was some progress in the reign of 
Archelaus according to Thucydides (2,100,2). While describing 
the Thracian invasion of 429 B.C. he contrasts the situation 
under Perdiccas with that under Archelaus: ’there were not 
many (sc. strong places and fortifications), but afterwards 
when Archelaus, the son of Perdicoas, became king, he built • 
the fortified places which now exist in the country and 
generally organised other resources for war, with horses, arm3
7and other materials, making them better than all the eight 
preceding kings had done.*
O
Some scholars, notably Geyer, have argued on the strength 
of this evidence that Archelaus introduced the phalangite 
system of fighting to the Macedonians. Thucydides, however, 
makes specific reference to only two areas of improvement, 
namely the fortification of strongpoints and the cutting of 
straight roads. The rest of the sentence is vague in its 
significance: the words *horses, arms and other materials* 
form a stock expression used by Thucydides to cover military 
equipment and resources in general.^ in the Macedonian 
context it could be interpreted in many ways,, but it seems 
most unlikely that it describes the arming and organisation 
of Macedonians as phalangite soldiers. It is improbable that 
Macedonia was sufficiently developed socially and economically 
to support such an advance in military power, even under a 
strong king such as Archelaus.10 Clearly there was some 
improvement in military resources during his reign, but 
Thucydides* evidence is not explicit enough for us to be able 
to determine any details. Nor do the events of Archelaus» 
reign or of the years immediately following his death give a 
hint of any increase in the strength of the armed forces. 
Argaeus is said by Polyaenus.(2,1,17; 4,1,1) to have been 
weak in infantry, and his military capability generally shows 
no improvement over that of Perdiccas II. Archelaus exerted 
strong central control over his kingdom, as is shown by his
measures against the city of Pydna:11 this in itself would 
have made greater military resources available to him, but
8there is no evidence of any far reaching reforms being 
successfully carried through.
The first king after Archelaus who established himself 
for any length of time was Amyntas. He was quite weak for 
many years, under pressure from the Illyrians and Olynthians, 
and although he seems to have had some garrison troops at 
strategic points in Macedonia, these may have been mercenary
TOand were quite inadequate against the enemies he had to face. 
Towards the end of the 380*s he took part in a war against 
the Olynthians to recover some of his land, which he had lost 
to them, and to resist further encroachment. Our source for 
this war is Xenophon (Hell. 5,2,37-3,26). Xenophon*s 
evidence supports the view that the Macedonian infantry con­
tinued to make no contribution to the military strength of 
the Argead king. The cavalry of Derdas of Elimeia, an ally of 
Amyntas, was four hundred strong and of good quality, and 
Amyntas* own cavalry was probably not inferior. But there is 
no mention of any Macedonian infantry under Amyntas or Derdas. 
Xenophon records Teleutias* advice to Amyntas to raise 
mercenaries, and it would appear that he was dependent upon
these and any Greeks resident in his kingdom whom he could
- 13levy.
Following the defeat of the Olymthians, Amyntas became 
much more securely established and,.with Athenian backing, 
could concentrate upon consolidation. It is evident that the 
general condition of the kingdom grew much stronger, and it 
was a period of growing trade and prosperity.1 "^ He played an 
active role in Greek politics, interfered in Thessaly, and
9established himself securely in the cities on the coast and 
borders of the kingdom. Geyer has argued convincingly that 
Amyntas began to use the developing urban centres for 
administrative headquarters.  ^ This would have made possible 
a much better organisation and utilisation of resources.
The effect of this general improvement in the king's 
position should have had some influence upon the military 
power of the kingdom, but the paucity of source material 
makes it impossible for us to uncover any details. Amyntas 
continued to have close associations with mercenary forces; 
in particular, he had extensive contact with the great 
Athenian mercenary commander, Iphicrates, whom he adopted as 
his son.^ As well as being a mercenary commander, Iphiorates 
was a great military tactician, but the association does not 
appear to have had much influence upon the organisation of 
the Macedonian army until the time of Amyntas* son,
Alexander II.
Amyntas had established his position sufficiently 
securely for the succession of Alexander II to be unusually 
smooth.1^ It is at this stage that I wish to discuss the 
most important piece of evidence we have concerning the 
Macedonian army prior to the time of Philip II. Harpocration, 
the grammarian, records a comment of a scholiast upon 
Demosthenes Olynthiao II 17. In this passage there appears 
the unusual word 'pezetairoi' and in order to explain the 
usage the scholiast made a note. 'Anaximenes in Book 1 of 
the Philippics, speaking of Alexander, said:'then he made the 
most eminent men used to serving as cavalry and called them
10
»hetairoi», and the common people, the infantry, he divided
into lochoi and decades and the other archai and called them
»pezetairoi«, in order that both elements, through sharing in
the king»s hetaireia, might remain loyal and enthusiastic for
18the king»s oause.« The two main Macedonian units of
Alexander the Great*s campaign force in Asia were the hetairoi
cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry, and Anaximenes is clearly
referring to the foundation of these units. It is, therefore,
a very important text, but the interpretation of it by modern
scholars has been a point of dispute. A brief review of some
of the different views will be a useful starting point.
19Plaumann  ^accepted the evidence of. Anaximenes but 
suggested that Philip II was the subject and not Alexander: 
Philip extended the name »hetairoi1, which already applied to 
the council lors, to apply to the cavalry force and at the 
same time or not much later, formed and named the pezetairoi 
infantry. Geyer argued that Alexander I formed and named the 
hetairoi cavalry: but Archelaus organised the infantry into a 
keavy-armed articulate body and named it the »pezetairoi». 
thus giving its members a position similar to the nobles, and
creating for his own support a counterweight against the
?0nobles. Berve interpreted Anaximenes» passage to mean that 
some king, probably Alexander II, extended the name »hetairoi« 
to apply to the whole noble cavalry of the land, overriding 
regional divisions and attaching them directly to the king.21 
The formation and naming of the heavy-armed pezetairoi 
infantry, he suggested, took place sometime after the naming 
of the cavalry ' (369/8 B.C.), and before 350 B.C. Momigliano
11
suggested that the first part he ignored altogether because
the hetairoi cavalry had existed from earliest times and was
not the result of an act of institution by some king: the
pezetairoi infantry was formed and named by Alexander I, who
thus increased his own power at the expense of the nobles by
22using the infantry against them. hammert, who discussed
only the part on the pezetairoi, accepted Anaximenes* 
evidence and interpreted it to mean that Alexander II formed 
an infantry body guard and named it *pezetairoi*. The name 
was later extended to embrace the greater part of the heavy 
infantry.  ^ Tarn rejected Anaximenes* evidence on the 
hetairoi for the same reasons as Momigliano (they were coeval 
with the monarchy), and suggested that the second part referred 
to the naming of the national levy of infantry. This, he 
suggested, was done by Philip to keep them loyal and counter­
act any hostility caused by the privileged position of the 
PAhypaspists. Kahrstedt also discussed only the second part
and saw the passage of Anaximenes as evidence for the
25organisation of the infantry force: although there was
already a large force of infantry, its parts were distinct in 
their separate district divisions under local leaders, 
irregularly organised and armed. Anaximenes, he argued, was 
referring to an act which gave the force cohesion and 
uniformity and the name *pezetairoi*; this was done during the 
early years of his reign by Philip, who benefitted the 
peasants by bringing them into urban settlements and 
generally organised them in his support. Finally, Griffith, in 
discussing the pezetairoi, said that Alexander II must have
12
been the one to organise the infantry and name it «pezetairoi*. 
thus creating the beginnings of'the Macedonian phalanx.26
There i s n o  agreement among modern scholars and the 
lack of evidence against which to check Anaximenes* passage has 
led to widely divergent views of its meaning. Certainty is 
not possible, but a re—examination of the passage might throw 
some more light on the difficulties. The passage is drawn 
from the first book of Anaximenes* history of Philip, which he 
wrote probably in the 330«s.27 Though the work is devoted to 
Philip, this passage could come from an introductory part of 
the work, which traced Macedonian history at least from the 
reign of Perdiccas Il(ca. 450-413 B.C.).28 Before discussing 
the content of the passage it is convenient to look at the text.
The word is difficult in this context: the
meaning required here is »divisions* or ‘sections* of infantry, 
a meaning which it has only in the Septuagint.29 Thi3 is not 
good enough authority for us to accept it in this meaning from 
Anaximenes, and I take it as certain that this is not what 
Anaximenes wrote. It may be that the text should be emended 
to read some more acceptable word, such as r , but
the text appears to be sound50 and it is difficult to explain 
how the substitution could have taken place. It should be 
remembered that the words of Anaximenes come to us at third 
hand, through a scholiast of Demosthenes and through the 
grammarian of the first or second century A.D,, Harpocration.
It seems possible, perhaps even probable, that what we have is 
a summary of Anaximenes* passage, which contained originally a
13
much fuller description of the organisation of the infantry. 
The. scholiast was not primarily interested in the details of 
the sections of the infantry, hut rather in explaining the 
word «pezetairoi*, and he may well have used a word of 
general meaning to cover several specific words in Anaximenes.
y SIn this way, the late word • f X *  could have been U3ed by 
him for several words describing infantry sections of specific 
strength, The possibility that what we have is, in fact, a 
summary of Anaximenes* evidence must be borne in mind through­
out our discussion of this passage.
Before the contents of the passage are analysed, it is
hecessary to consider the identity of the king who is its
subject. According to the text his name was Alexander, but
this has been questioned by many scholars. Many have thought
it more likely that Philip II is the subject, relying upon
the passage of Diodorus (16,5,1) which states that Philip,
«having improved the organisation of his forces and equipped
the men suitably with weapons of war, held constant manoeuvres
of the men under arms and competitive drills. Indeed he
devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx,
imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields
of the warriors at Troy, and he was the first to organise the
■51Macedonian phalanx.* I shall have cause to discuss the 
passage again later, but for the moment it is sufficient to 
point out that the similarity between this passage and that 
of Anaximenes is not marked enough to allow us to assume that 
the same actions are referred to in each case. Diodorus 
makes no mention of the forming and naming of the king*s
14
forces, «the hetairoi» and »the pezetairoi», and the whole 
passage is so vague that it could refer to almost any 
military reform. The same criticism can Toe made of -Geyer*s 
view that Archelaus is the subject of the second part of the 
passage, which deals with the infantry. He thought that the 
passage of Thucydides 2,100 (quoted above p. 6) and the 
second part of Anaximenes» fragment described the same 
action, but the only similarity between the passages is that 
they both refer to some organisation of military resources.
The theory that Anaximenes has conflated the actions of 
two kings in this passage, that one king was responsible for 
the hetairoi and another for the pezetairoi, has been 
proposed by some scholars, e.g. Berve and Geyer. No evidence 
or satisfactory argument support such a theory and it should 
be rejected. It must be recognised that our knowledge of 
Macedonian army development is so scanty that we are not in 
a position to go against the ancient evidence unless there 
are cogent reasons for doing so. No convincing reason for 
doubting the information concerning the subject of the passage 
has ever been presented, and it must be accepted that a 
Macedonian king called Alexander was responsible for the 
reforms. This leaves two possibilities, Alexander I (ca.485- 
450 B.C.) and Alexander II (369-8 B.C.): the more attractive 
of these alternatives is Alexander II. Anaximenes is more 
likely to have dealt in detail with events which occurred t e n  
years before the subject of his work, that is, the reign of 
Philip II', than with those which occurred one hundred years 
before. Also, any organisation of Macedonian infantry into
15
lochoi and decades surely "belongs to the fourth century B.C. 
rather than the fifth, when Thucydides tells us (2,100), there 
was no good, well organised Macedonian infantry. The arguments 
against Alexander II "being the subject of the passage are 
"based on the "brevity of his reign and the established existence 
of good cavalry in the-fifth century B.C. The argument that 
Alexander II was not.in power long enough to carry out the 
reforms described cannot be conclusive: I shall suggest below 
that the extent of the reform may have been exaggerated by 
many scholars. The argument that the hetairoi cavalry must 
have been formed and named in the fifth century B.C. because 
Thucydides stated that there was good Macedonian cavalry at 
the time of the Peloponnesian war, also carries no weight.
Good cavalry existed from tbe earliest times of the Argead 
kingdom and was not dependent. Upon any act of institution by 
a king, either of the fifth century or of the fourth century 
B.C. The hetairoi cavalry, however, is not known to have 
existed until the reign of Philip, and it is to this specific 
institution that Anaximenes refers. That there was good 
cavalry in the fifth century B.C. is no indication that the 
hetairoi cavalry was formed and named before the reign of 
Alexander II. Alexander I did much to unify the Argead • 
kingdom and, undoubtedly, improved the Macedonian military 
resources, but the indications are that he was not the king 
to whom Anaximenes was referring, but rather Alexander II, 
the eldest brother of Philip II.
I ‘shall now look at the contents of the fragment of 
Anaximenes. There are four separate actions detailed:
16
Alexander made the most eminent used to serving as cavalry; 
named them »hetairoi*; divided the commoners (i.e. the 
infantry) into lochoi and decades and the other sections; 
named the commoners »pezetairoi». The purpose of these names 
was to give them a share in the hetaireia of the king and so 
keep them enthusiastic and loyal.
V p ^ ^ fI have translated rouf o'ru'rou* as *tho most
eminent*: the word is sometimes associated with TrAo»/«rtor 
to describe men within a state, and Aristotle use3 it with 
o\<.^oL . In the Macedonian context, such a term could
only be applied to members of the hereditary class of the 
large landholding nobility, whose traditions went far into 
the past. This class, it' is generally agreed, was 
traditionally proud of its horses and horsemanship33 and, as 
Berve says, it was the oldest element of the army muster.3 -^ 
This being so, the words about a' king getting members of this 
class accustomed to serving as cavalry cannot be aoourate: it 
was a cavalry class, and service in the army as horsemen was 
of the essence of their class.
.The second part of the text refers to the naming of the 
cavalry force *hetairoi*: that is the force made famous by 
their exploits on Alexander‘s Asian campaign. There is 
general agreement among scholars about this and there can be 
little doubt that this interpretation is correct. As Plaumann 
suggested, the term »hetairoi1. which previously had honoured 
the councillors, was extended to refer also to the force of 
cavalry.55 Some scholars, notably Tarn,36 have assumed that 
the name *hetairoi* had always been held by the cavalry, but
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in view of the evidence of this passage and the fact that the 
word is not known to have been used of cavalry until the 
middle of the fourth century B.C., this theory can he 
rejected.
The content of this cavalry force has also been the 
subject of some discussion. It has been held by some that the 
whole cavalry class, that is the whole nobility, was honoured 
with-the-name »hetairoi*. This view, held, for instance, by 
Berve,^ seems to be based upon a misunderstanding of the first 
part of this passage, where Anaximenes says that Alexander 
accustomed *the most eminent* to serve as cavalry. Thi3 could 
be taken to mean that the whole nobility was called into 
service, but this is by no means a necessary interpretation, 
and, in view of other evidence, it seems likely that the 
rather vague expression *the most eminent* means simply ‘some 
of the nobility*. The word evgofor-piTos , as I have 
indicated from parallels from Plato and Aristotle, is an 
adjective with no such precise meaning, but simply describes 
rich and privileged members of a state. There is no instance 
of the term *hetairoi* being used to apply to any group except 
the councillors or the Macedonian cavalry serving with the king. 
There is no evidence to support the commonly held view that 
the Macedonian cavalry left with Antipater in 334 B.C. was also 
called «hetairoi*, and_indeed there is positive evidence that 
all the cavalry class was not called by this name. Theopompu3, 
in reference to the 340*s, wrote that there were not more than
70
800 hetairoi (see Appendix I). Since in 382 B.C. Derda3 of 
Elimeia alone could raise 400 cavalry for a war outside of his
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territory,^ it is impossible that in the 340*s the whole of 
Philip's kingdom contained only 800 of the cavalry class.
Not all the noble3 of Macedonia received the title 
»hetairoi», and it is clear that Anaximenes io describing the 
selection and naming of some of the cavalry cla33, who wero 
formed into a cavalry force and attached closely to the 
person of the king. This seems a justifiable conclusion in 
the light of Anaximenes' comments about the purpose of the 
name, and the subsequent development of the force. The error 
involved in the statement that it was Alexander who first 
accustomed them to serve as cavalry io a strange one, for it 
is difficult to believe that Anaximenes thought that the 
nobility did not serve as cavalry until about ten years before 
Philip II came to power. It may well bo that Anaximenes did 
little research upon the history of Macedonia before Philip, 
and I shall argue below that all the Macedonian cavalry 
serving under Alexander in Asia were hetairoi. which might 
have misled him. However, it seems more likely that the 
meaning of Anaximenes' passage has suffered by being summarised, 
as I have suggested might be the situation. . A reference to 
some nobles being organised into a cavalry force could have 
easily been summarised in such a way as to give the impression 
that they were serving as cavalry for the first time.
The third and fourth parts of Anaximenes' passage concern 
•the common people'. It is impossible that all the common 
people were organised into lochol and decades and there is, 
in fact, specific evidence that the pezetalroi was a oolect
body. Demosthenes makes a clear distinction between the
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Macedonians in general,who derived no benefit from Philip*s 
po^ -icy^  and the pezetairoi, who, along with the mercenaries, 
were the king*s special force and shared the benefits of the 
campaigning.^ This evidence is confirmed by Theopompus, who 
says that the tallest and strongest of all the Macedonians
............40acted as the king's guards and were called «pezetairoi*.
These important pieces of evidence show that these reported 
words of Anaximenes also are imprecise, and in this case the 
imprecision is so outrageous that it is difficult to believe 
that it has not been caused by inaccurate summarising by the • 
scholiast or by Harpocration. It is impossible that 
Anaximenes could have thought that all the infantry were 
organised into lochoi, decades and *th'e. other sections* and 
called «pezetairoi*, for it must have been plain for him to 
see that they were not. It must be accepted that these words 
cannot be accurate, yet many scholars have accepted that the 
term «pezetairoi* was applied to the whole infantry levy, and 
have suggested that the king was trying to win the allegiance 
of the infantry and use it as a political force against the 
nobility. This goes right against the evidence of Demosthenes
A'Kand Theopompus. It is clear, as Lammert stated, that the 
pezetairoi was a select body formed to be a household guard, 
alongside the hetairoi cavalry, and it is to the creation of 
this unit that Anaximenes is referring.^
The text is precise about the division of the infantry into 
sections, which is perhaps odd in view of the obvious-brevity 
of the summary. The formation of any infantry force required 
divisions and such organisation seems hardly worth mentioning.
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The fact that Anaximenes seems to have been so precise implies 
that the divisions have a special significance, that they 
marked an important advance in the Macedonian army. This
advance was surely the beginnings of the Macedonian phalanx
4.5 . . . .  .............
system. The pezetairoi infantry of Alexander the Great was
divided into lochoi and decades, ^  and it seems logical to
assume that this organisation stemmed from the division
described by Anaximenes, and that the organisation of the
pezetairoi and the phalanx originated in the time of Alexander
II. lThe other archai* referred to in the text ban hardly be
used in this discussion because we cannot know what was in the
original. There were, of course, other sections in a phalanx
besides the lochos and the decas: the file was divided into
half files and quarter files to make for smooth
manoeuvrability, and there were, no doubt, larger divisions 
47as well. 1 But whatever the precise wording of Anaximenes, 
there can be little doubt that he gave much detail about the 
division of the infantry, which strongly indicates that he 
was describing the formation of the Macedonian phalanx.
Against the view that Anaximenes is here describing the 
beginnings of the Macedonian phalanx, the passage of Diodorus 
(16,3,1) can be quoted:2*"8 he says specifically that Philip 
was the first to introduce the Macedonian phalanx. Diodorus, 
however, shows himself unreliable in this passage, because as 
well as attributing to Philip the introduction of the 
Macedonian phalanx, he credits him with the invention of the 
close order fighting system, whi'ch is certainly false.
Griffith has already argued that Diodorus is mistaken
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concerning the introduction of the Macedonian phalanx.
Philip made improvements and developed phalangite tactics to 
a degree that some G-reeks, who had little contact with the 
Macedonian phalanx before Philip, could easily have been 
misled into thinking that Philip was its originator. It 
seems best to interpret Anaximenes1 evidence to mean that 
Alexander II was the king who introduced the phalanx system 
to Macedonia, and he did this by organising a select body of 
infantry and training them in phalangite tactics. This unit 
was the kingrs own household troops.
I have now completed the discussion of the text and I 
can summarise the results. Anaximenes is referring to the 
formation of a small personal army, similar to those
50collected by Dionysius of Syracuse and Jason of Pherae, 
which could act as body guard to the king and form a well 
trained core for the forces of the state. The cavalry was, 
no doubt, drawn from loyal elements of the nobility, which 
already had a tradition of cavalry service. Nothing is 
recorded of any changes in armament and tactics for the 
cavalry, and probably there was little need for any, as the 
Macedonian cavalry had always been strong. . One can only guess 
at the size of the cavalry unit. Philip had a force of no 
more than 800 according to Theopompus, probably referring to 
a time in the 340*s B.C., so perhaps anything much over 400 
may be thought too high for Alexander II*s time. That it was 
a standing force is indicated by its name and by its smallness 
and it seems certain that its infantry counterpart was a 
standing force, so, surely also was the cavalry.
49
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The infantrymen selected were organised to fight in a
phalanx and "became the king's household guard. Theopompus
tells us (quoted nw42, above) that they were chosen on the
basis of their physique, from all the Macedonians. There is
no reason to doubt this evidence, there were obvious advantages
in having.tall strong men: but it might be expected that
Alexander also had in view the loyalty of the men, when making
his selection, and that the large majority came from the
heartland of the Apgead territory, in Lower Macedonia. The
same fragment indicates that it was a standing force, for
Theopompus uses the word e  » f o p o w  in describing their
function, and Photius records that they were of To
~ / / 52rutft* ippovpoc The size of the force cannot be known.
In 534 B.C. they numbered 12,000, but it is certain that 
their strength had been greatly increased by Philip: rather 
less than half of this number may be thought too many for the 
reign of Alexander II.
It is unlikely that the equipment of the phalangite of 
Alexander II was precisely the same as that of the. phalangite 
of Philip II, but there is no reason to think that it was 
fundamentally different. The armament of the Macedonian 
phalangite under Philip-II, as described by Polyaenus (4,2,10), 
was a sarissa, or long thrusting spear, a pelte. or small 
shield, a light helmet and greaves. ^  This equipment was 
more typical of peltasts than of heavy-armed hoplites, the 
force which usually was organised to form a p h a l a n x . T h e  
background of the development of this type of phalanx, which 
the Macedonians made peculiarly their own, calls for some
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discussion.
The Macedonian peoples were in large part similar to the
Thracians in life style and culture, and it is reasonable to
assume that their military traditions and style of fighting
also were similar. The Thracians were famous for their
courage and skill as light-armed infantry: Euripides (Rhesus
305) records that the Thracian infantry fell into three
divisions, peltasts, archers and javelin-men. The peltasts
were distinguished from the psiloi, that is the archers and
javelin-men, by having a little defensive armour, namely, a
small shield and a pointed cap. Also they were able to
operate independently, without the support of more heavily
armed troops. - There were basically two types of peltasts
among the Thracians, one which fought with a sarissa, a long
thrusting spear, and one which fought with akontia, or 
55javelins.
Despite the existence of the same sort of infantry
among the Macedonians, the Argead kings did not make effective
use of it because of the lack of organisation. All the
infantry fought in a mass, not differentiated according to
armament: swordsmen fought beside javelin-men, archers
56beside spearmen. Effective use of manpower resources was 
impossible under these conditions. There is no evidence of 
a good Macedonian infantry force until the middle of the 
fourth century B.C.: the kings did not exert sufficient 
control, nor was the kingdom sufficiently developed, to produce
I have argued, however, that Alexander II*s father,
one.
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Amyntas III, was able to consolidate his hold oyer the king­
dom and establish, at least in some areas, a more efficient 
system of administration. There is no evidence of any 
substantial improvement of the military forces under Amyntas» 
but it seems likely that he laid the basis for the advance 
under Alexander II. The materials, in the form of manpower 
and equipment, already existed in the kingdom, all that was 
required in order to produce a good infantry force was some 
organisation. The weapons and armament used in the phalanx
which Alexander II formed were already traditional for many
57of his subjects, to judge from Thracian parallels..
Alexander simply separated them,or some of them, from the 
other types of light infantry and organised them into a 
phalanx; formation. •
The form which the new unit took was, no doubt, greatly 
influenced by the connection between the Argead royal family 
and the great Athenian.commander, Iphicrates. Iphicrates, 
the adopted son of Amynta s, was  a great peltast tactician: 
Diodorus, in a confused passage (15,44,3), tells how 
Iphicrates changed his hoplites into peltasts. This is 
obviously wrong and Parke (pp.79ff.) and Anderson (pp.l29ff.) 
interpret it to mean that the peltasts were re-equipped with 
a smaller shield and a longer spear, to enable them to face 
the hoplite phalanx. Best (pp.l02ff.) has shown that there 
was, in fact, nothing revolutionary about Iphicrates* peltasts, 
or his use of them, and that the small shield and long spear 
had been the traditional equipment of one type of peltast.
There can be no doubt, however, that Iphicrates played an
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important part in demonstrating that peltasts were able to 
face the hoplite phalanx, and, in favourable conditions, 
defeat it. Parke has already noticed the similarity between 
Iphicrates* use of the peltasts, and the style of armament 
and fighting of the.Macedonian phalanx, and he suggested a 
possible connection between the two: there can be little doubt 
that Alexander II was inspired in part by Iphicrates* ideas.^ 
Alexander II, therefore, drawing upon the sarissa- 
bearing light infantrymen already existing in his kingdom, and 
inspired by contacts with Iphicrates, organised a small 
phalangite force. It was more lightly armed than the usual 
phalanx and required no great expenditure of resources. The 
increased prosperity of the Macedonian kingdom in the fourth 
century B.C. may well have inspired some of the lightly-armed 
infantrymen to equip themselves with a little more defensive 
armour, such as greaves and a helmet,^ which would have 
meant that little new equipment was necessary to implement 
the reform.
It is likely that the phalanx formed by Alexander II 
was based upon a file depth of ten men. This is indicated 
by Anaximenes* reference to the decas as a division of the 
infantry. Decas survives as the term for the section of the 
phalanx, even when the number of men in the section exceeded 
ten. Hence the section of sixteen men organised by Alexander 
at the end of his life was called a decas (Arr. 7,23,3; see 
also below Ch. V p. 1 7 8  ). Both Domaszewski and Hammond have 
been led to conclude that this indicates that the original 
file depth was ten men.^1 The lochos in the phalanx of
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Alexander seems to have been the largest division of the 
phalanx battalion, comparable to the ile of cavalry. Arrian 
mentions the lochagoi alongside the ilarchs as being called 
upon by name to do their best at the battles at Issus and at
Gaugamela (2,10,2.; 3,9,6).. Curtius tells us that the basic
division of the infantry was 500 strong during the first 
years of the Asian campaign,^2 so we may perhaps conclude that 
■under Alexander III the lochos was a division of about 500 
men. There is, however, no certainty that it had this 
strength from its first entry into the Macedonian system,
g *5for the size of a lochos varied greatly from army to army.  ^
Much is known about the divisions and organisation of the 
later Macedonian phalanx,, as it operated under Philip V and 
as described in the later writers on tactics, but it is clear 
that this cannot be confidently applied to the fourth century 
organisation. ^
It will be clear that I consider that the extent of the 
reform described by Anaximenes has often in the.past been 
exaggerated. The numbers involved in the hetairoi-cavalry 
and the pezetairoi infantry appear to have been quite small 
and, though the formation of the units marked an important 
advance in the military development, the mass of the 
Macedonian subjects was not affected. Many scholars have 
seen in Anaximenes* text evidence that the king, in struggling 
to assert his supremacy over-the local princes and leading 
nobles, made a bid to bring the commoners into his faction 
and thereby gain an important political ally.6  ^ It is 
misleading, I suggest, to see the creation of the pezetairoi
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in such a light. The political situation of Macedonia should 
not he compared with that of the Greek city states, for these 
pezetairoi were not ‘the hoplite class* conscious of their 
political rights and jealous of the nohles* powers; they 
were simply the military force of the king. They were, of 
course, important to the king’s position, as they formed a 
useful defence against rivals and added to the king’s prestige, 
hut ¿peculation upon the growth of the ’power of the people* 
should not he based upon this passage of Anaximenes.
The effects of the reform are not apparent in the events 
of the immediately succeeding years, though our sources are 
so poor that this is not necessarily significant. It is 
expensive to keep an army together and, as I have suggested, 
the permanent royal force was probably quite small in its 
initial stages: the hulk of the infantry still fought as 
light-armed skirmishers.^ Nevertheless Alexander had the 
confidence to invade Thessaly, had some success against 
Alexander of Pherae and garrisoned some cities of Thessaly 
(Diod. 15,61,4*5): though the garrisons were soon dislodged 
by the Thebans and Alexander assassinated in a court 
intrigue. ^  This tells us nothing about the armed forces, 
nor does the reign of Ptolemy the Alorite. He was mostly 
concerned with fighting rivals for'the Macedonian throne, and 
had to call in mercenaries to help him with this (Aeschin. 2,27f) 
but nothing is recorded of his own forces. If, as Aeschines 
tells us, he lost the support of a large part of the Macedonians, 
it is not surprising that he had to supplement his own forces 
by mercenaries.
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-When lie was removed "by an opposing faction and
Perdiccas III, brother of Alexander II, took over, the Argeadae
once more embarked on an ambitious foreign policy, Perdiccas
being on- active campaigning most of his reign. He made great
efforts to secure the north-west frontier, brought Lyncestis
under Argead control and conducted more than one campaign
68against the Illyrians (Polyaen. 4,10,1; Diod. 16,2).- He was
also active in Chalcidice^ and the coastal areas of his king-
dom, and established a garrison at Amphipolis, and probably
at other strategic points in his kingdom. Presumably the
hetairoi cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry formed the core
of his forces, but he must also on occasions have employed
other Macedonian troops, heavy cavalry and infantry, as well as
light-armed troops, and he certainly used mercenaries to
supplement his strength (Polyaen. 3,10,14; 4,10,2). In
Perdiccas* final campaign against the Illyrians Diodorus (16,
2,5) records that 4,000 men were killed, and implies that they
were all Macedonians, which indicates that a substantial force
of Argead subjects took part.
The military record of Perdiccas is quite impressive
and indicates that the forces were reasonably strong. The
regular campaigning will have accustomed the troops to
military service and trained them into a force to be respected.
Although details are lacking, it is clear that the Macedonians
were militarily strong enough to take an active part in the
71affairs of the Greek world. Nothing is’'heard of service by 
•Greeks living in Macedonia*, but they must have continued to 
give service, although the Argead kings were no longer so 
dependent upon them for phalangite troops.
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CHAPTER II
THE ARMY OP PHILIP II 
PART I Increase of Manpower
There is universal agreement that Philip was responsible 
for the form of the Macedonian army asd it is revealed by the 
Alexander historians in their accounts of the early years of 
the Persian expedition. There can be no doubt that this 
army was a much larger and more efficient force than the one 
Philip inherited from his brother Perdiccas, but details of 
Philip*s achievements do not survive and in any attempt to 
trace the development of the army during Philip*s reign, 
much must be conjectural.
Although the army of Perdiccas had been greatly shaken 
by their defeat at the hands of the Illyrians, the nucleus 
of the campaign force which the king had built up and kept 
together through his six years of rule must have remained.
On taking control of the situation, Philip rallied the troops 
and soon recommitted them to active campaigning. Diodorus 
describes Philip’s actions upon taking control, but it is 
most unlikely that the passage is reliable. I have already 
argued against Diodorus’ statement that Philip was responsible 
for the institution of the Macedonian phalanx, and, although 
it is undoubtedly accurate that he greatly expanded and 
improved the phalangite formation, it can hardly be that he 
achieved it in his first few months, as Diodorus states. 
Diodorus tells us little more than that Philip improved the 
army. Demosthenes, speaking in 341 B.C. (9,49), pays tribute
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to the efficiency of Philip*s army, the coordination of the 
hoplites, light-armed infantry, cavalry, archers and
pmercenaries, hut this again is far too general to he usable.
Evidence that the campaign forces of the Argead kingdom 
increased during Philip*s reign is straight-forward enough.
In 358 B.C., against the Illyrian Bardylis, Philip led 10,000 
infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 16,4,3). In 352 B.C., his 
army comprised 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry in the 
campaign against Onomarchus (Diod. 16,35,4). In 340 B.C. he 
had 30,000 troops at the siege of Perinthus (Diod. 16,74,5) 
and in 338 B.C., at Chaeronea, 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse 
fought on the Macedonian side (Diod. 16,85,5). In 334 B.C. 
Alexander led perhaps more than 40,000 troops against the 
Persians, while leaving 13,500 in Macedonia under Antipater 
(Diod. 17,17).^ These figures show a general trend towards 
larger armies in the field, and this is hardly surprising in 
view of the great expansion of territory and the widening 
interest of Philip. Prom the middle of the 350*s he probably 
had enough money to employ as many mercenaries as he wished 
and, as his strength grew, he was able to draw upon more allies 
and semi-independent tributaries for military support. In 
Alexander's expeditionary force to Asia, Thracians, Illyrians, 
Paeonians, Greeks and others contributed to the strength.^
This is a good indication of the diversity of troops called 
upon by Philip.
Although extensive use was made of non-Macedonians, the 
Macedonian content of these forces must have increased 
proportionately. An accurate measurement of this increase is
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not possible, but some discussion of the problem may be 
worthwhile. The Macedonian content of a campaign force is 
given only once: for the Asian expedition in 334 B.C. Diodorus 
(17,17,3f*) states that there were 12,000 infantry and 1,800 
cavalry. This is explicit enough, but Alexander did not take 
all his troops to Asia: 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry he 
left in Macedonia with Antipater (Diod. 17,17,5).^ These 
soldiers have been seen by scholars as approximately half the 
Macedonian levy,0 although Diodorus does not say that they 
were Macedonian: this would seem to be right. As important 
as the successful invasion of Asia, was the holding of Greece 
and Thrace and it seems a reasonable division of strength.
The force with Antipater was not a homeguard, as Griffith 
points out,^ and reservists were not included. It was a 
campaign force as was that of Alexander, prepared for an 
expedition to trouble spots in Thrace or Greece: its role is 
made clear from the uprisings in 331 B.C. in Thrace and Greece,
O
which threatened the security of Macedonia. Since it was not 
intended to be on continuous active service, it is not likely
Qthat allies and mercenaries were included.? The garrisons 
placed around Thrace and Greece, which undoubtedly were part 
mercenary,’1'0 are not included in Diodorus* total.
Despite the absence of some Macedonians on garrison duty 
and, therefore, not in Diodorus* total, the figures of 
Diodorus probably give some idea of the strength of the 
Macedonian levy in 334 B.C.: 24,000 infantry and 3,300 cavalry. 
A basis of comparison is the number of troops on the Illyrian 
campaign in 358 B.C. (Diod. 16,4,3): 10,000 foot and 600 horse.
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Although Diodorus does not say explicitly•that these troops
were exclusively Macedonian, scholars have assumed that they
were. This is probably right, for the Argeadae were in such
a feeble condition, that they would not have been able to
12draw upon significant numbers of allies or mercenaries. It 
is likely, therefore, that the force which Philip led against 
Bardylis was mostly, if not totally, Macedonian. It is also 
likely that the heavy infantry represented the full strength 
of the infantry combat-levy, for the Illyrian threat was 
urgent and Philip could have done nothing other than devote 
all his first-line infantry resources to this vital expedition. 
The cavalry cannot have represented the whole combat-levy, 
however, for there were certainly many more than 600 cavalry 
available to Philip: but there was little advantage in having 
a large force of cavalry in the broken hilly terrain of Upper 
Macedonia.
A comparison between the figure for the infantry 
available in 358 B.C. and that available in 334 B.C. can give 
us some indication of the enormous increase in effective 
military strength during the reign of Philip; Alexander could 
not have greatly increased the force in the short period 
between his accession and the start of the Asian campaign.
No such comparison between the number of cavalry available at 
the beginning and that available at the end of Philip's reign 
is possible, but it may be sound to assume that some 
substantial increase was achieved. It will be useful to look 
at those parts of Philip's policy and achievement that 
contributed to the build up of military resources.
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Direct expansion of the kingdom added manpower. Elimiotis,
Lyncestis, Pelagonia, Orestis, Tymphaea and Parauaea came
within Philip*s control. Although Elimiotis, Lyncestis,
Pelagonia and, perhaps, Orestis had supplied manpower before,
control of these areas had not been secure and the full
potential probably never realised before the reign of Philip.
In Lower Macedonia, Philip took direct control of Chalcidice,
Pydna, Amphipolis and many other areas on the coast and,
probably, inland, which could supply or support additional
13military manpower.
Apart from increasing manpower by conquest, Philip made 
much more efficient use of his manpower resources for military 
ends. Many of the men of Upper Macedonia and the northern and 
eastern border areas of Lower Macedonia had led a semi-nomadic 
existence, on the fringes of the mountain ranges. These could 
not be organised for useful military service until they were 
established in settled communities on the plains. Thucydides 
(2,100) pours scorn upon the infantry strength of Macedonia 
in the fifth century B.C., and in all but the coastal regions 
of Lower Macedonia the situation probably did not improve 
until the reign of Philip. By defining and strengthening the 
boundaries and bringing men down into settled communities on 
the plains, Philip made available a new source of good 
military manpower.^
In addition to the organisation of hill tribes and fringe 
communities, Philip reorganised the administration of the 
coastal areas of his kingdom in order to involve the Greeks 
of the kingdom in the military resources. Thucydides tells
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us -that Greeks contributed a few hoplites in the fifth 
century B.C., brigaded separately from the Macedonians. J 
The numbers of Greeks in the kingdom were much increased
1  f iduring the seventy years since the reign of Perdiccas, and 
some Greeks were probably contributing to the strength of the 
Argead army before the reign of Philip, but the control of 
the kingdom through most of the fourth century B.C. prior to 
Philip1s accession was too weak to allow an efficient levy 
of the Greek communities. With the upsurge of power and the 
inclusion of more Greek communities under Philip, more Greeks 
were available for levy, and Philip arranged the recruitment 
districts, as he arranged the other administrative districts, 
to involve the Greeks and Macedonians equally and without 
distinction. This is the obvious conclusion to be drawn from 
the known centres of the cavalry recruitment districts in the 
coastal regions. The Greek cities of Amphipolis and
17Apollonia were made centres of recruiting districts, which 
is strange if the Greeks were not included in the military 
census. In this way the Greeks were fully integrated into 
the military system, which would inevitably have resulted in 
an increased contribution from them. This was, undoubtedly, 
an important source of heavy infantry.
Another way in which Philip increased his manpower
resources was by land settlement. The transplantation of
population was accompanied by land settlement, making sections
of the population wealthier and, therefore, better able to give
18military service. Areas where the land was not supporting 
a full complement of military manpower were parcelled out;
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for instance, the area of Methone, which had been inhabited
by hostile Greeks who were no asset, was distributed to 
19Macedonians, whose wealth would make a contribution to the 
strength of the kingdom.
Momigliano pointed out that the cavalry force could not
be increased in the same way by grants of land to Macedonians
to bring them up into the cavalry census; for, he argued,
cavalry service was the distinction of a class rather than of
20a wealth group. This is a valid point, in that upper class
Macedonians would not have welcomed wholesale promotion of
lower class men into their ranks, though we should not
21completely rule out some promotion. Momigliano concludes
that Philip attracted large numbers of Greeks into the
22kingdom by grants of land, e.g. at Olynthus, and it was 
from these that the cavalry numbers were made up. This, 
however, does not seem to be a necessary conclusion: although 
some Greeks may have entered Macedonia to serve as cavalry, 
there was no shortage of Greeks already established there who 
might do so.
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PART II The Organisation of the Macedonian Troops
Almost nothing is known of the organisation before the 
very end of Philip’s reign, when, it can he assumed, it 
closely resembled that of the early years of Alexander’s 
campaign in Asia. It is, therefore, necessary to work back­
wards from the situation at the end of Philip’s reign in 
order to reconstruct the developments during his reign. In 
354 B.C., at the time of the crossing to Asia, the Macedonian 
army was divided into two parts, one part with Alexander, the 
other with Antipater in Macedonia: 24,000 heavy infantry 
divided equally, 3,300 cavalry divided in the ratio of 1,800 
to 1,500. To uncover details we must look more closely at 
the army which went with Alexander: nothing is known about 
Antipater’s force and the organisation of his force can only 
be reconstructed on the basis of Alexander’s force,
a) THE CAVALRY
The cavalry with Alexander was divided into eight
squadrons, one of which was frequently called the royal
squadron2  ^and was the king's personal mounted guard. Of the
other seven, two receive no description in our sources and
24the other five are named as follows: from Apollonia; the
AnthemouSian; the one called Leugaean; from Bottiaea; from 
Amphipolis. There can be no doubt that the names are 
derived from the areas from which the men were recruited, and 
it seems safe to assume that the other two had similar names:2  ^
it follows, as Curtius (5,2,6) indicates, that the cavalry 
was recruited and organised by district.25a It is generally 
held that the royal squadron was an exception to this rule
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and that it was recruited from the whole kingdom, with no 
regard for district divisions.2  ^ It is, however, equally 
possible that it was drawn from men who had a particularly 
close connection with the king: for instance, the men living 
around the traditional home of the Argeadae (Aegae), or from 
a particular tribal group; Strabo knows of a tribe of 
Argeadae (7 fr. 10).2^
The location of the districts, as far as we can trace it,
will help to reconstruct the organisation. Amphipolis, the
Greek city on the east bank of the Strymon, near the coast,
gave its name to one squadron. Anthemus, a city and district
of north-west Chalcidice, is, clearly, the origin of another.
The location of the other districts has been a matter, of
dispute. Many scholars have considered that the recruiting
district of Apollonia was in southern Chalcidice, named after
the city of Apollonia there,-which Philip destroyed in 348 B.C?^
There is, however, another city of Apollonia in the Argead
kingdom, south of Lake Bolbe, which is known to have been a
thriving city through the fourth and later centuries B.C., on
the main route east to Amphipolis and beyond. It is unlikely
that Philip would have perpetuated the name of a destroyed
city in a cavalry recruiting district, and there can be no
doubt that the centre of the recruiting district was, indeed,
29the city south of Lake Bolbe.
There is also disagreement about the location of the
district Bottiaea. Some scholars have thought that the
territory of the Bottiaeans in central Chalcidice was 
30referred to, but for Thucydides the area of Bottiaea is
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central Macedonia, the area from which the Bottiaeans were
31expelled by the Macedonians. It is known that the district
of central Macedonia retained its name, at least until the
32time of Philip V, whereas the territory of the Bottiaeans
in Chalcidice was scarcely ever called Bottiaea, hut more
usually Bottike: and neither of these names is applied to it
after the middle of the fourth century B.C., when Philip took 
* 2 ' 2
it over.  ^ The Bottiaea of the recruiting district can only
he the area in central Macedonia, the heartland of the Argead 
34-kingdom.
Another of the cavalry squadrons was described as 'the
one called leugaean', hut all attempts at locating its
recruiting area have failed. Beloch suggested that it may he
a mistake for Augaea (north of Sinthonia, in Chalcidice) or,
more likely, for Letaea, the district centred on Lete, near
the mouth of the Axios.^ Oberhummer suggested that the
36district was that of Aegae. Kahrstedt took a different
line, suggesting that 'leugaea* did not refer to a proper
37place name at all. 1 For him the form of the expression, 'the 
one called Leugaean*, suggests that 'Leugaean* is a nickname 
to describe an area; for example, 'woody*, 'watery', 'north*. 
This argument can carry no weight, however, because the 
infantry battalions from the areas of Elimeia and Tymphaea 
also are described as 'the battalion called Elimiot', and 
'the battalion called Tymphaean*. There seems to be no 
way of locating the 'Leugaeaji* recruiting district.
On the basis of what the ancient evidence does tell us, 
it is possible to suggest how Philip organised his Macedonian
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cavalry. It is established that the cavalry on the Asian
expedition was recruited and organised by district, with the
possible exception of the royal squadron. It is clear from
a glance at the districts known that this cavalry was not
drawn from the whole kingdom, for it is impossible that
Amphipolis, for instance, accounted for a seventh (or eighth)
part of the whole. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore,
that the cavalry left with Antipater, the other part of the
cavalry levy, came from those districts not drawn upon for the
Asian expedition. It also seems reasonable to suppose that
Antipater’s cavalry force was recruited and organised
similarly, being drawn from seven districts not represented
in Alexander’s force. Antipater would have had no equivalent
of the royal squadron. The royal squadron may be thought to
number 300, and to account for the discrepancy in numbers
39between the two parts of the Macedonian army. J This 
reconstruction seems most likely, and fits so well with the 
ancient evidence that it surely must be accepted. ' The cavalry 
of the Macedonians numbered 3,000 in 334 B.C., excluding the 
royal squadron, and was divided into 14 squadrons, each 
squadron being drawn from one recruiting district. It must, 
further be assumed that, with some possible exceptions 
mentioned below, the districts covered the whole of the 
kingdom.^0
It is not known how the cavalry was organised prior to 
the end of Philip’s reign, but it is clear that this arrange­
ment was mostly, if not entirely, the work of Philip. 
Amphipolis was not even a part of Macedonia before Philip’s
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reign; and Anthemus was not fully integrated, as is attested
"by Philip*s ceding it to the Chaloidians at the "beginning of
his reign.^ It is likely that Macedonians proper, as opposed
to native tribes and immigrant Greeks, contributed the bulk
of the cavalry strength prior to Philip’s reign. Therefore,
in order to integrate the new territory and manpower into a
unified military system a comprehensive reform of the
recruiting procedure was needed. Where Greek city states
had an established hold in the coastal regions, Philip
organised the system around them. The mass of Greeks,
undoubtedly, was clustered around the cities, and many
Macedonians and natives had become assimilated with the 
43Greeks:  ^it was, therefore, a logical development. Amphipolis, 
Apollonia and Anthemus were made centres of recruiting 
districts,.in which Greeks, Macedonians and natives were 
subject to the same system. In most parts of the kingdom, 
however, the Greek city state had not become established and 
the system was probably based on the traditional Macedonian 
tribal groups, in which prominent families were given 
responsibility for particular areas.^ There is some evidence 
that established administrative boundaries may have been left 
unchanged in some cases. In Upper Macedonia the areas of 
lyncestis, Orestis, Tymphaea and Elimiotis were retained for 
the infantry recruitment (see below), so it might reasonably 
be argued that they were for the Cavalry. However, even 
where an old name is used for a district, it does not 
necessarily follow that the boundaries were left unchanged.
In Upper Macedonia, where Argead control had only a short
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tradition and was, therefore, more dependent upon the 
established organisation of the former petty kingdom, Philip 
probably did not make many changes, but in lower Macedonia he 
may well have rearranged the boundaries quite freely. There­
fore, it cannot be assumed that the area of Bottiaea was the 
same as the Bottiaea which Thucydides mentioned, though some 
rough approximation must be expected.
It should be clear that there is little likelihood of
our successfully dividing the Argead kingdom into its
recruitment areas, and there is an added complication, in that
many tribal groups remained semi-autonomous, dwelling in
enclaves within the boundaries of the kingdom. The Bisaltians
and Crestonians are probably examples of such tribal groups,
45but doubtless many others existed but are never heard of: 
these did not become integrated into the military system. The 
Thracians east of the Strymon, except perhaps a few hellenised 
ones in the area of Amphipolis, also did not become fully 
integrated, although some of the tribes served in separate 
units.^
The date of the organisation of the military system must
remain equally uncertain. In general terms, however, it might
be expected that Philip would not have carried through the
reform until the boundaries and population of the kingdom had
reached some degree of stability. The boundaries were
probably not much changed after the early 540's, but
consolidation and movement of population no doubt continued
47for a few years. The date of 340 B.C. may be a reasonable 
conjecture for the approximate date of the reform which
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established the cavalry recruiting system substantially in 
the form we know from the Alexander historians.
It has been fashionable to believe that all the cavalry 
which went to Asia with Alexander came from the territory 
newly acquired by Philip:^"8 this has been encouraged by the 
belief that all the four identified squadrons came from this 
area. The fashion has led some scholars to the view that the 
cavalry with Alexander were distinguished in class, or 
relationship with the king, from those with Antipater. Berve 
believed that they were all ’new nobility’ who had been 
rewarded with land settlements by Philip and who, therefore, 
could be relied upon to support the Asian campaign. Momigliano 
believed that they were a class of men, mostly Greeks, who 
were enabled by land grants from Philip to serve on long and 
distant campaigns in their role as subjects of the Argead king. 
The men of ‘Old Macedonia’ had to stay in the kingdom, or not 
go far away, because they were needed for home defence. Hampl 
produced the most interesting theory:^ they were a totally 
new class of men within the Argead kingdom, who had bonded 
themselves to the king, as to a personal lord, by accepting 
land settlements from Philip in the newly won territory.
Only these had the obligation to serve the Argead king in 
foreign wars because he was king only within the boundaries 
of the kingdom, and the ordinary subjects, therefore, had no 
obligation to follow him outside of the frontiers of the 
kingdom.
Despite objections from Geyer and Zancan^8 and cautionary
51remarks from Griffith, these theories have continued to
43
exert much influence. They, in fact, all seem implausible,
for, as Griffith points out, it must he thought unlikely that
the old nobility ceased to serve their king in the traditional
way. Once it is accepted that two of the squadrons from
Apollonia and Bottiaea, certainly did not come from territory
newly won by Philip, and Anthemus can hardly be said to have
been newly won, in that it was Philip who ceded it at the
52beginning of his reign, there is nothing at all to be said 
in favour of thés theories. There is no reason to assume there 
was a class, distinction between the cavalry which went with 
Alexander and that which stayed with Antipater. If it is 
held that there was such a distinction, it has to be shown 
that there was some common distinguishing factor among the men 
of cavalry class of Amphipolis, Anthemus, Apollonia and 
Bottiaea, and some three or four other districts of the kingdom. 
This, I believe, is not possible.
There is no way of deciding which other districts 
contributed to Alexanders cavalry force; those who worked 
from the assumption that all the squadrons came from the ‘new 
territory* did not make any contribution to a solution to the 
problem. Beloch suggested that one or two squadrons may have 
been drawn from Upper Macedonia. ^  This he based on the 
presence of cavalry of Upper Macedonia on Alexander*s campaign 
against the Triballi in 335 B.C. (Arr. 1,2,5). It has often 
been assumed that this campaign was used by Alexander to train 
troops for the Asian campaign, and it might, indeed, give as 
good an indication as is available of the source of some of the 
unidentified cavalry, it is, however, far from certain that
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Alexander did use the Triballian campaign as a training 
exercise for his Asian troops. It seems best simply to admit 
that the criterion used hy Alexander in the selection of his 
cavalry force is unknown, and the squadrons cannot he 
identified beyond the four identifiable ones recorded in the 
sources.
Closely related to the question of which cavalry squadrons 
accompanied Alexander to Asia is the interpretation of the 
term >hetairoi‘. The whole body of Macedonian cavalry in 
Asia was called ‘the hetairoi cavalry of the king* by thei
ancient sources. Berve suggested that the cavalry left with
54-Antipater also were known by this name, ^ but there is no
evidence to support such a view. It is unlikely that the
term »hetairoi‘, which is often translated ‘Companions‘,
would have applied to cavalry left behind by the king, as they
could hardly be seen, in any meaningful way, as his companions:
they were not to see him for many years. If any honour was
attached to the title, as seems to be the case, the term must
55have been restricted to those cavalry serving with the king.
If, as I have argued, no particular class distinction 
marked out the cavalrymen who went to Asia from those who did 
not, the only qualification for the title thetairoi» was their 
accompaniment of the king. It should follow that the men lost 
their title when they stopped serving with their king on active 
campaign, and this does indeed seem to be the case. The status 
of an hetairos had a very different tradition in the Argead 
circles from that of cavalry service (see Ch.IIn.19a).
Perhaps we are now in a position to suggest a line of
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development for the term during the course of Philip’s reign.
The hetairoi cavalry at the beginning of his reign was a
household cavalry guard which was drawn from the nobility of
the Macedonians proper, mainly from the heartland of Lower 
56Macedonia. Little is heard of the unit, but it may have
been the 600 cavalry which went with him against Bardylis in 
57358 B.C. and, presumably, it accompanied the king on all his
campaigning. Theopompus tells us that it numbered 800 and the
members were incredibly wealthy by Greek standards. He was
referring to some unspecified time in Philip’s reign when
the body called the "hetairoi' was still something more
58exclusive than it was in 354 B.C.
A change in the nature of the hetairoi cavalry was a
necessary part of Philip’s plan to integrate the different
elements of the kingdom into a uniform military system, in
which the origins of the subjects made no difference to their
59military standing. J An elite cavalry unit of Macedonian 
nobility, in the main from heartland Macedonia, could not be 
allowed to survive. Therefore, Philip disbanded it and its 
members were put on an equal status with the other men of the 
cavalry class of the district in which they happened to be 
resident. This left the honoured title free for a more 
general application to cavalry serving with the king, which 
would override any divisive distinctions. Philip formed a 
small personal cavalry guard of about 300, which was the 
royal squadron,60 but with this exception, all the Macedonian 
cavalry which accompanied the king on campaign was of equal
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status, all drawn from the regular territorial levies. It 
was upon these cavalry squadrons, including the royal squadron, 
that Philip "bestowed the privilege of the title »hetairoi1 as 
a collective name for those on active campaign with the king.
In this way, membership of the hetairoi cavalry was made open 
to all of the cavalry class: it depended only upon their 
recruitment area being called upon to provide a squadron for 
a campaign with the king.
Accurate dating of the change is not possible, any more 
than the dating of the reform of the recruiting system. It 
must have occurred after the time to which Theopompus was 
referring, but since this time cannot be established (see 
Appendix I pp.33££) this is not of much help. It may be 
thought likely, however, that the change of meaning of the 
term »hetairoi1 was closely tied in with the reorganisation 
of the recruiting system; this I have tentatively dated to 
around 340 B.C. It might be that the reform of the hetairoi 
body was in large part inspired by the preparations for the 
Asian campaign. This great »crusade* presented a much 
greater challenge to Philip than any previous campaign, and 
particularly the strength of the Persian cavalry demanded a 
much greater effort in that arm. Prior to this campaign, 
Thessalians, allies and mercenaries could largely answer 
any cavalry requirement, and the likelihood is that Philip 
did not draw heavily upon Macedonian cavalry: only the elite 
hetairoi cavalry was regularly called upon for service. For 
the Asian expedition, however, Philip had to commit many more 
of his Macedonian cavalry and this may have moved him to make 
the change. It would obviously make for a much more loyal
47
and unified force if all the Macedonian cavalry levy was 
given the same status, and on a long campaign far from home, 
it was important to attach so vital a force as closely as 
possible to the royal person.62
"Whether this dating is accepted or not, there can he 
little doubt that in 334 B.C. the hetairoi cavalry was simply 
a part of the national levy of cavalry, that part which 
accompanied the king on the Asian expedition. The change in 
nature of the hetairoi must be seen in the context of Philip's 
other reforms, which were aimed at achieving integration 
and uniformity in the kingdom and the more efficient use of 
resources,
b) THE INFANTRY
Of the 12,000 heavy infantry which went to Asia, some
5 3were called 'hypaspists', others were called 'pezetairoi'.  ^
The relative strength of these parts is nowhere specifically 
stated, but scholars have reached some agreement that the 
ratio of pezetairoi to hypaspists was 9,000 to 3,000.
The Pezetairoi
Scholars are agreed that those called 'the pezetairoi' 
were the national levy of the Macedonian heavy infantry.6  ^
Details of these can be taken from Diodorus. In his 
description of Alexander's battle-line at Gaugamela,
Diodorus (17,57,2) records, that there were six battalions: 
this must represent the full strength on the Asian expedition; 
there were also six at the battle of the Granicus.66 Three 
of the battalions are named only after their commanders, but 
three have territorial descriptions: »the battalion called 
Elimiot»; »the battalion of the Orestians and Lyncestians»;
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• the 'battalion of those called Stymphaeans *. It is clear 
that, like the cavalry, they were organised and recruited 
territorially: one battalion from Elimeia, one from Orestis 
and Lyncestis combined, and one from Tymphaea. There is no 
difficulty about the identification of any of these places, 
all of which were in Upper Macedonia and were petty kingdoms 
before Philip*s reign.^
It seems reasonable to assume that the other three
battalions in Asia were also recruited and organised
territorially, as uniformity is to be expected. By the same
argument the Macedonian infantry left with Antipater, which
was the other part of the national levy, can also be assumed
to have been organised by territories. Berve (p.113)
suggested that Antipater was left with 3,000 hypaspists,
but this suggestion has generally not been favourably
received by scholars, who mostly see the 12,000 infantry
left with Antipater as being wholly a territorially recruited
levy.^ Berve*s views on the hypaspists have been shown to
be untenable and on this point also his view should be
rejected.^0 On the assumption, therefore, that Antipater*s
force was divided into eight territorially organised
battalions of 1,500 each, the whole heavy infantry levy of
the Argead kingdom was organised in fourteen territorial 
71battalions. It is known that at least one battalion was 
drawn from ihe two districts, i.e. from Orestis and lyncestis 
these were tribal non-urbanised districts and, therefore, 
probably relatively weak in heavy infantry.
Only three of these recruiting areas are known and, as
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it happens, all these are in Upper Macedonia. It must he
assumed, however, that the areas were not confined to one
part of the kingdom. Except for the three mentioned, evidence
is lacking, hut by drawing upon evidence on the cavalry, it
is possible to make some suggestions about Philip’s infantry
organisation. The 10,000 infantry which Philip led against
72Bardylis in 358 B.C. were probably almost all drawn from 
the heartland of Macedonia, for control of the rest of the 
kingdom was quite weak: there would have been little 
difficulty in raising such a number. It is probable that 
Philip initially made few demands upon the manpower of the 
new territories: there is evidence enough that allies and 
mercenaries bore much of the burden of military service.'^ 
Gradually, however, as the kingdom was stabilised and 
organised, a more comprehensive military levy was desirable, 
to involve the whole kingdom in military service.
The Upper Macedonian principalities taken into the 
kingdom retained their identities for the levying of soldiers, 
as is clear from the names of the battalions which went to 
Asia. Tribal groupings and loyalties had not been eroded by 
outside influences and it was natural simply to take over the 
established system of administration. This was done also in 
the more backward parts of Lower Macedonia, away from the 
coast and the trade routes. It is evident that Philip 
brought into closer control many areas and tribal groups, 
some of which, perhaps, became involved in the Macedonian 
military levy, while retaining their traditional regional 
or tribal identity.'^
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Elsewhere, however, particularly on the coast, many 
Greek communities had been taken in hy Philip and their 
infantry strength had to be integrated, no less than their 
cavalry strength. It is difficult to believe that Philip 
did not adopt the same methods of integration with the 
infantry as the cavalry, and it would be rather surprising 
if he did not use the same city centres for infantry 
recruitment districts; Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, to 
name only those known: ^  also there seems no reason why 
other cavalry recruiting areas, for instance Bottiaea, were 
not used for infantry recruiting. This does not necessarily 
mean that each recruiting area was assessed at 200-250 
cavalry and 1,500 infantrymen, though this may have been 
the case in some areas. Taking a hypothetical example,
Orestis may have been expected to contribute 200-250 cavalry, 
but to share with Lyncestis the contribution of 1,500 
infantry.
It is not possible to view the infantry reorganisation 
in isolation from the cavalry reforms, and there is no 
reason to think that they were not related actions: therefore, 
in dating the infantry reorganisation, the same considerations 
must be applied to arrive at a date of around 340 B.C. (see 
above p. ). Prior to this date, additional infantry, 
manpower in the newly controlled areas may have been 
utilised in a piecemeal fashion as it became available, but 
there can be little doubt that the form of the infantry force 
as known from the early years of the Asian campaign was the 
result of a comprehensive reform of recruitment and
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organisation carried through at one time, probably around 
540 B.C.76
The question of which districts contributed troops to 
the Asian expeditionary heavy infantry levy has not received 
much attention. Berve suggested that none were drawn from 
the new territory won by Philip, but three were from Upper 
Macedonia, as the ancient evidence attests, and the other 
three from ‘Old Macedonia1, or the heartland.77 This latter 
identification is sheer guesswork, inspired mainly by the 
mistaken belief that all the cavalry came from the new 
territory (see above, pp. 4 .2 * .  ). In fact, there seems no
way of determining the origins of the other three 
battalions.
The term ‘pezetairoi1 is used by Arrian to describe 
the Macedonian heavy infantry, and the hypaspists are 
explicitly not included.7® Prom his evidence, it can be 
concluded that the territorial heavy infantry levy which 
accompanied Alexander in Asia was called ‘pezetairoi1.
Berve thought that the name applied also to 9,000 of the
7Q12,000 infantry left with Antipater, J just as he thought 
that the term ‘hetairoi1 was applied to the cavalry left 
with Antipater. It is clear that the two terms are 
parallel and, as I have argued that the term ‘hetairoi* 
referred only to those with Alexander, so I suggest that 
the term »pezetairoi1 also was applied only to that part of 
the infantry levy on the Asian campaign.
This was not the original meaning of the term, which 
appears to have followed the same line of development as
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the term »hetairoi*. At the time of Alexander II it 
referred to the royal household footguard, and the reference 
of Demosthenes in 349 B.C. to the pezetairoi shows that they 
were still a special infantry force with a particularly close 
relationship with the king, and distinct from the ordinary
QAlevy. There is no further reference to the pezetairoi 
in the time of Philip, and when the word appears in the 
context of Alexander*s reign it has the much broader 
application explained above. It is clear that the purpose 
of the extension of this term was the same as the purpose of 
the extension of the term »hetairoi*, namely to give a much 
larger body of infantry a privileged name, in order to 
attach them all equally to the person of the king. The 
pezetairoi prior to this change were an elite drawn in the 
main probably from the Macedonians proper of heartland 
Macedonia. Such a body was not in line with the general 
policy of Philip. The pezetairoi guardsmen, therefore, were 
made equal with their fellows on the military census of 
their districts, losing their elite status which had, in 
part, been dependent upon their origins. The pezetairoi 
■unit was thus broken up and the name tpezetairoi1 was applied 
to the regular infantrymen recruited from the districts to 
accompany the king on campaign. In this way anyone, whatever 
his origin, had an equal opportunity of being honoured by 
being chosen to be a member of the pezetairoi units: the 
qualification was simply military service with the king.
As I have suggested in dealing with the cavalry, so I 
repeat in reference to the infantry; it seems quite likely
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that the extension of the name was precipitated by the 
preparation for the long and distant campaign against the 
Persians. A great strain would he put upon the Macedonian 
infantry force far from home for some years, on an arduous 
campaign. To foster loyalty the levy chosen for the 
campaign was to he honoured with the name ‘pezetairoi*, 
foot-companions of the king.
The Hypaspists
I turn finally to the term ‘hypaspists». There have 
been many theories put forward to explain the nature and 
origin of those called ‘hypaspists* hy our Alexander 
historians. Hans Droysen identified them with the royal
pi
pages, and Bauer thought that they were the porters of the 
Macedonian heavy infantry, who had been freed from their 
carrying function at the beginning of Philip*s reign, when
Op
the infantry were made to carry their own baggage.
These views have been decisively refuted by Berve and many 
others  ^and need not be seriously considered here. It can 
be assumed with some confidence that they were drawn ‘from 
the same social class and background as the phalangites1.®^ 
Their armour also has been a subject of discussion. Berve 
(I p.113) suggested that they were more lightly armed than 
the pezetairoi, and he has not been without supporters, but 
the recent consensus of opinion has inclined to the view 
that they had the same armour and weapons as the pezetairoi. 
In so far as the hypaspists fulfilled the same function as 
■pezetairoi it would seem to be right that they were armed in
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the same way.
If they were armed in the same way and came from the
same class as the phalangites, their distinction, as Tarn
observes (II p.140), must have lain in the method of their
recruitment. There is, in fact, no evidence upon the
methods of recruitment, but it is clear that they were an
elite royal force: part of the unit was the royal agema,
the personal bodyguard of the king, and the rest, as Tarn
86points out, was a royal footguard. The date at which the
hypaspists were instituted also is unknown. Bauer suggested 
the very beginning of Philip*s reign8  ^and Milns suggested
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a date in the late 350*s, but neither of these carries 
conviction. The word *hypaspist* does not occur at all in 
a Macedonian context until the accounts of the campaign of 
Alexander. This is perhaps odd, as Milns points out, if 
from early in Philip*s reign this body was as important as 
it was in the Asian campaign. However, although it can be 
assumed that they were Philip*s creation, there is no 
reason to suppose that he instituted the unit until near 
the end of his reign. This would explain the absence of 
reference to them in the Greek sources better than Milns* 
suggestion that the Greek authors were guilty of confusing 
the names »pezetairoi* and »hypaspist*
If the hypaspists were formed by Philip, as they surely 
must have been, their creation must be viewed in the context 
of the other military reforms of Philip. It seems likely 
that when Philip disbanded his footguard and changed the 
meaning of the term »pezetairoi*. he formed another elite
85
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infantry force to be his guard and to be a tactical shock 
unit; this force he called the ’hypaspists'. The value of 
having a small select force for making the first strike, and 
for special missions, is well demonstrated during the course 
of Alexanders campaigning in Asia.
It can be suggested, then, that Philip formed the
hypaspists shortly before the end of his reign. The old
footguard had been drawn from Macedonians proper, in the
main from heartland Macedonia, but the members of this unit
were put on an equal footing with the rest of the heavy
infantry levy, including immigrant Greeks and natives, and
a new footguard formed from the whole heavy infantry census.
The method of selection was probably the same as that
attested by Theopompus for the old pezetairoi, that is, on
the basis of physique-^ and we may add, loyalty. Many who
had been in.the old pezetairoi were no doubt selected for
the hypaspists, but the important difference was that the
hypaspist membership was open to the whole heavy infantry
census on merit. The royal agema was a distinct honoured
band within the hypaspists, the king’s personal bodyguard.
It may be that this also was chosen on merit from the whole
levy, but it is also possible, as with the royal squadron of
hetairoi, that they were all drawn from an area or tribe
with particularly close associations with the Argead royal 
91family.
Philip had inherited from his brother a small but well 
trained Macedonian force of cavalry and heavy infantry, which 
was a standing force attached to the king’s person. This
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royal guard, as it may "be described, consisted of the 
hetairoi cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry. Philip 
retained the organisation unchanged until about 540 B.C., 
when the recruiting districts were reveiwed and the 
populations of the new territories won by Philip were fully 
integrated. This greatly increased the military potential. 
Under the challenge of the Asian expedition, the size of the 
hetairoi cavalry was enormously increased in order that all 
the Macedonian cavalry needed for that campaign might be of 
equal status and be closely attached to the king*s person.
A corresponding reform of the pezetairoi infantry also was 
carried through, in order that the heavy infantry on the 
Asian campaign also might be closely attached to the king. 
Because it was useful to have a small elite shock force of 
infantry, in addition to the main mass of heavy•infantry, 
Philip created the hypasists, which became the royal guard.^
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CHAPTER III
THE COMPANION CAVALRY1 OF ALEXANDER 354-324 B.O.
PART I The Reform of 331 B.C.
I have already discussed the organisation and recruit­
ment of the Companion cavalry in the light of evidence drawn 
from the early years of the Asian campaign (Ch. II pp.36£ ).
At the battle of Gaugamela, and presumably throughout the 
campaign until this time, it was divided into eight squadrons, 
one of which was the royal squadron. Overall commander of
pthe force was Philotas, son of Parmenio. 
a) The Pate of the Reform
The first reform of the Companion cavalry attested in the 
sources occurred a short time after the battle of Gaugamela. 
According to Arrian it took place at Susa, but Curtius and 
Diodorus place it in Sittacene, an area west of Susa, on the 
route from Babylon. Diodorus is the most precise: at 17,65,1 
he says that after Alexander had left Babylon, there came to 
him reinforcements from Macedonia; on the sixth day after 
their arrival Alexander entered Sittacene and there stopped to 
rest his troops and reorganise the army. Curtius (5,2,1) also 
places the reform in Sittacene, but makes the reinforcements 
arrive at Babylon itself. Arrian (5,16,10) closely connects 
the reform with the arrival of the reinforcements from 
Macedonia, but places both at Susa.
It is clear that Diodorus and Curtius are drawing upon a
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common ultimate source, for, although Diodorus does not give 
the detail which Curtius does, his general comments are quite 
compatible with Curtius* detail and both place the reforms 
in Sittacene. That Curtius chose to connect the arrival of 
the reinforcements with the rest the soldiers had at Babylon 
is quite explicable. He had to reconcile the supposed 
debilitating corruption of the soldiery, which was the result 
of the extravagant living at Babylon as described by him, with 
the continued success of Alexander. The injection of 
uncorrupted reinforcements was an obvious way of doing this 
and therefore Curtius moved the arrival of the reinforcements 
to Balylon to enable him to juxtapose it beside his description 
of the corruption.
Basically two separate traditions emerge: Arrian 
represents one tradition, that the reinforcements arrived at 
Susa and led to the reforms there; the other Is.represented 
best by Diodorus, that the reinforcements arrived on the route 
from Babylon to Susa and on the sixth day after their arrival 
Alexander reached Sittacene, where the reforms took place.
In so far as the latter version is the more precise, it 
appears to be the more reliable. In addition, as Berve points 
out (I p.106 n.l), it is much more likely that a well known 
place be substituted for a less known than vice versa. Wirth 
has argued that it is not likely that in the depth of winter 
the army would stop en route for a rest. But Diodorus and 
Curtius state specifically that it was an unusually rich area 
particularly suitable for such a halt, and the weather in 
December is quite mild in that area.
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There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that Diodorus’
evidence should be accepted, and that the reform took place in
Sittacene. On this assumption we may attempt to date the
reform. The end of September or beginning of October is a
fixed point for the battle of Gaugamela.^ The most recent
discussion of the timing of Alexander’s movements is that of
Wirth, who suggests that Alexander may have taken a little
less than three weeks for the march to Babylon after the
5battle: this seems likely to be right. Alexander was quite 
keen to reach and occupy Babylon and such indication as there 
is suggests that he was moving at a steady pace: for Curtius 
(5,1,16) says that he reached Mennis from Arbela, a distance 
of just over 100 km., in over three days.^ The route all the 
way from G-augamela to Babylon is quite even with no serious 
obstacles, and we might, therefore, expect Alexander to cover 
the distance of approximately 460 km. at a daily average of 
about 25 km., i.e. 19 days. The army was rested in Babylon 
for 34 days (Curt. 5,1»39) and, therefore, Alexander set out 
from there about 53 days after the beginning of October. 
Arrian tells us that Alexander reached Susa in 20 days from 
Babylon (3,16,7)» a distance by direct route of over 450 km. 
Allowing for perhaps three or four days rest in Sittacene 
(Diod. 17,65,2; Curt. 5,2,2) we may estimate a daily rate of 
25-28. km., by no means excessive along the easy road from 
Babylon to Susa.^ Sittacene is the narrow fertile strip east
O
of the Tigris between the river and Susiana, under 250 km. 
from Babylon, and our calculations, therefore, lead us to 
date the reform about 65 days after the battle of Gaugamela,
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that is during the first week of December (331)*^
b) The Nature of the Reform
Diodorus gives no details, only a very general statement 
about the improvement of officer strength, the promotion of men 
on merit, the bettering of conditions of service, and a 
resulting increase in devotion and effectiveness (17 ,65,2ff.). 
Curtius has a fuller version: after a longer account of the 
changes in the infantry (see below, Ch.IV pp. 122f.), he 
writes of the cavalry (5,2,6): »For whereas before the 
cavalrymen were allocated each into his own tribe, separated 
from the men of the rest of the tribes, now the distinction 
by tribe was done away with and he assigned the men not 
necessarily to commanders of their own people but to those 
selected by himself.*^® On the face of it, this seems a very 
far reaching reform. The cavalry are given no qualifying 
description, so what Curtius is saying literally is that all 
the cavalry were put into units, not according to origin but 
according to whatever Alexander saw as convenient. However, 
it is clear that this cannot mean that the Macedonians, 
Thessalians, Greek allies, Thracians etc. were all mixed up 
into new tactical units. As the infantry reforms concerned 
only the Macedonians (see below, Ch.IY pp. 122f.), the 
cavalry reforms described here concerned only the Companion 
cavalry. It is known that these were organised by recruiting 
district up until the time of the battle of Gaugamela and the 
passage seems to mean that henceforth the Companion cavalry 
was no longer organised in territorial squadrons. As it reads 
in the text, this involved the redeployment of the men in the
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existing squadrons, and the reassigning of them to squadrons as 
Alexander saw fit. This seems a rather senseless reorganisation 
in that no advantages are immediately apparent: in fact, what 
Alexander would have "been doing was to break up squadrons of 
cavalry with at least four years of cooperative combat 
experience behind them.
In the other two accounts the reorganisation is closely
connected with the arrival of reinforcements, which Curtius
has displaced, and this naturally raises the question of
whether Curtius has misled his readers concerning the scope of
the reform, through detaching it from the arrival of the
reinforcements. If the text is made to apply only to the
reinforcements of Company cavalry, it means that the new
troopers were allocated to the squadrons where they were
needed, rather than strictly according to territorial
distinction. Such a procedure is quite understandable. All
the cavalry squadrons would not have suffered equally through
casualties, and the reinforcements would not have been drawn
12in the right numbers from the right district: it would,
therefore, have been impossible for Alexander to observe the 
territorial distinctions when integrating the reinforcements.
This is surely the meaning of Curtius* account. The 
number of reinforcements represents a substantial proportion of 
the whole Companion cavalry force, about a quarter, so in 
integrating them, Alexander went a long way towards destroying 
the territorial nature of the squadrons. We cannot know 
whether he still observed the territorial distinctions where
62
it was convenient, "but there would seem to he little advantage 
in doing so once the principle had been abandoned.
: Arrian gives more detail about the reform: ’Amyntas
arrived with reinforcements from Macedonia: of these
Alexander integrated the cavalry into the Companion cavalry,
and the infantry he added to the individual battalions,
allocating each man according to tribe. He also established
two lochoi in each ile, previously there had not been cavalry
lochoi, and appointed as lochagoi men chosen on merit from 
13the hetairoi.’  ^ By this evidence, the main feature was the
integration of reinforcements, which perhaps supports the
interpretation I have suggested of Curtius’ evidence. Tarn
(II p.160) thought that Arrian’s text meant that the cavalry
as well as the infantry were allocated ‘by tribe*. Though
this is a possible interpretation of the Greek, it is by no
means a necessary one and the evidence of Curtius that the
territorial distinctions were not observed makes such an
interpretation unlikely.^ Arrian is the only author to
mention the division of each ile of Companion cavalry into
two lochoi; and although these lochoi do not receive any
clear mention in the sources during the course of the
campaigning, there is no real reason to doubt that such a
15division was made. The reinforcements may have increased 
the size of the ilae to an extent that made it convenient to 
divide them into subsections (see below, p. 84- ): smaller 
tactical units would make for more flexibility and 
manoeuvrability. Arrian’s statement that the commanders of 
the lochoi were appointed on merit from the hetairoi could
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mean either that they were chosen from the ranks of the 
cavalry, or that they came from the hetairoi councillors.
There can he no doubt that the former alternative is right.
The post of lochagos was not exalted enough foracouncillor 
to hold, and it would he surprising to find the expression 
•chosen on merit* in connection with the appointment of a 
councillor to a post. There is, also, some indication in 
the texts of Diodorus and Curtius that men were promoted from 
the ranks on their past record. Diodorus (17,65,3) says that 
Alexander considered reports of good conduct in making the 
promotions, and Curtius (5,2,3) has some confused remarks 
about contests being held and the winners being appointed as 
chiliarchs. The chiliarchs were infantry officers, but it 
seems possible that Curtius has confused something he found 
in his source about the officers being chosen from the ranks 
on merit. If infantry positions were filled by open 
competition, though not, of course, in the form Curtius 
describes (see next chapter pp. 1 2 2 - f i ), it seems likely
that Alexander filled the new cavalry positions in the same 
way.
The royal squadron was probably, not affected by the 
change in recruiting policy. If it was already chosen from 
the whole cavalry levy irrespective of recruitment area (see 
above Ch.II p. 36) ,  no change was required to bring it into 
line with the new methods of ile division. It may, however, 
have been drawn from a special class of district, but even so, 
it seems unlikely that its tradition would have been tampered 
with: for such an elite band, special recruitment arrangements
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could easily have been made. ■ With regard to the division of 
the ilae into two lochoi, there seems no reason why the 
royal ile should not have been so divided.^ It was no doubt 
larger than the other ilae (see above Ch.II p.3*y), and, 
therefore, its size is no argument for its being treated 
differently, and there would have been considerable 
advantages in some degree of uniformity in the structure of 
the ilae of the Companion cavalry.
Arrian (3,18,5) records that early in 320 B.C. Alexander 
took with him on the assault of the Persian Gates, as well as 
some heavy and some light infantry, *the royal squadron of 
the Companion cavalry and, in addition to this, one tetrarchy 
of cavalry*. This is the only reference to a tetrarchy of 
cavalry in the Alexander historians, or indeed in any ancient 
author, and since it occurs immediately after the cavalry 
reform is described, we must consider whether this usage is 
connected with the reform, and whether Alexander formed 
tetrarchies of cavalry at this time.
The precise meaning of Arrian*s usage has been a matter 
of dispute. Plaumann suggests that a tetrarchy was a fourth
• .................  i _ 7part of the Companion cavalry, i.e. two ilae. Although he 
does not explain how he reached this conclusion, he is 
presumably drawing on the analogy of the Thessalian political 
unit (Pemosth. 9,26). Berve (I p.107 n.2) argues that in a 
military context a tetrarchy is a grouping of four units, not 
a fourth part, and that therefore four ilae is meant. He 
supports his view by citing the Suda*s definition of an 
infantry tetrarchy as four lochoi.
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Plaumann would seem to have the "better view. It is more 
likely that Alexander took only two ilae in addition to the 
royal ile on this particular expedition. Although no 
certainty is possible, the difficulty of the terrain made a
1 ftlarge force of cavalry of doubtful value: Ariobarzanes had
only 700 cavalry (Arr. 5,18,2); and the demands of,the other 
two missions, under Craterus and under Amyntas, Philotas and 
Coenus, must be taken into account. Arrian implies that 
Alexander took only a small strike force against Ariobarzanes, 
and the bulk of the army went by a different route. These 
considerations made it more likely that Alexander took three 
eighths of the Companion cavalry (about 860 men) than five 
eighths(about 1,400 men).
But on the essential point Plaumann and Berve are in 
agreement: a tetrarchy was a grouping together of standard 
tactical units to form a larger command. They both feel 
uneasy about the total absence of any other reference to such 
a grouping in Alexander*s army and, therefore, conclude that it 
was not a permanent arrangement but was formed only for the 
duration of a particular mission,. presumably with a tetrarch 
appointed to lead it. There seems to be no doubt that the 
term, as used by Arrian, refers to a grouping of ilae, but the 
view that it was an official term applied to a fixed number of 
ilae of Companion cavalry seems much less certain. It was, of 
course, frequently found convenient by Alexander to detach 
some part of the Companion cavalry to go on a special mission, 
and presumably the ilae involved were grouped together on
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occasion into larger units for tactical purposes. Plaumann 
and Berve suggest that the term »tetrarchy* was the term 
applicable to,two or four units grouped in this way: if it 
was used in this way, it is most odd that the term does not 
appear elsewhere.
However, Arrian states that the cavalry ilae of 
Companions were each divided into two lochoi (3,16,11) and it 
could he that Alexander, as well as dividing the ilae into 
two parts, also made provision for the grouping of ilae to 
form tetrarchies. It would have been quite compatible with 
his general aim of greater flexibility. Arrian implies that 
the ile remained the basic tactical unit and it would, 
therefore, have to be accepted that the tetrarchy was formed, 
as Plaumann and Berve suggested, only when tactical 
considerations required it. This is not necessarily an 
objection and would explain the failure of the sources to 
mention such a provision. On the other hand, it does not 
seem sound to postulate a totally unattested reform merely 
to justify the single use of a term by an author who is 
proven to be less than reliable in such matters.
It seems a sounder method of approach to explain 
Arrian*s use of the term by other means. In Taotica 10,1, 
Arrian defines a tetrarchy as four lochoi. This refers to 
infantry but, in the absence of any definition of a cavalry 
tetrarchy, it seems to be the best guide to Arrian*s use of 
the term. Since Arrian has stated at 3,16,11 that cavalry 
lochoi were introduced into Alexander*s army, is it not 
possible that Arrian is here substituting the term *tetrarchy*
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for two ilae, reasoning that four lochoi were equivalent to 
a tetrarchy, and thereby avoiding repetition of the word 
♦Lie *? That Arrian is capable of this does not seem at all 
unlikely; he frequently misuses such terms, see Appendix 
Ilia. It is certainly a difficulty that cavalry tetrarchies 
are totally "unknown outside this one reference, but this will 
always be a difficulty whatever the interpretation.
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PART II The Hipparchs and Hipparchies
a) The Appointment of Two Hipparchs
After the reform at the end of 331 B.C., there were
eight ilae (no longer organised strictly according to
recruitment area) and sixteen lochoi. All these were under
the command of Philotas. This organisation remained until
the death of Philotas in the autumn of 330 B.C. The passage
of Arrian describing the change at this time is explicit and
has never been questioned: at 3,27,4 he writes that «Alexander
appointed two hipparchs, Hephaestion, son of Amyntor, and
Cleitus, son of Dropides, and divided the body of the hetairoi
into two parts, because he did not want one man, not even
one of his friends, in command of so many cavalry, especially
as it was the best and most distinguished of all the cavalry*.
In place of Philotas, then, Alexander appointed two men. The
reason for the change given in Arrian may well come from
Ptolemy and there is no justification for doubting that this
19was the main motivating factor behind Alexander*s action: 
but he may also have wanted to make it easier to divide the 
Companions for greater flexibility. There is no other 
evidence upon the change. Tarn (II p.161) suggested that 
Cleitus remained leader of the royal ile and doubled up as 
hipparch, the royal ile forming one of the four ilae under 
him. This is possible, but there seems no reason to suppose 
that another man did not take over command of the royal lie. 
Alexander seems to have been wanting more officers in his 
army and this would certainly not have been achieved by
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keeping Cleitus in command of -the royal ile.
b) The Division into Hipparchies
(i) The Purpose
Although there are no specific references to any change 
in structure between 320 and 326 B.C., it is certain that 
prior to the battle of the Hydaspes the Companion cavalry 
was reorganised. At this battle the basic tactical unit was 
the hipparchy and the ile had become a subdivision of this 
basic unit. The dating and nature of this change have 
been the subjects of much discussion and a full treatment of 
the evidence is necessary. I discuss the term »hipparchy* 
elsewhere (Appendix Ilia) and it will be enough here to give 
the definition. The hipparchy was an independent tactical 
unit, the commander of'which was a top-ranking officer 
subordinate to nobody except Alexander or a strategic 
commander. Originally there had been only one independent 
tactical unit of Companions, under Philotas; from 330 B.C. 
there were two, and before 326 B.C. there were several more.
The purpose which would best be served by this rearrange­
ment is flexibility. The ilarchs were not top-ranking officers 
and were not suited for independent command: therefore, the 
ile, although it could be detached from the main body of 
Companion cavalry, had to be put directly under the command 
of the leader of the mission of which it was a part. It 
became clear to Alexander during the campaigning of 329 B.C. 
that frequent and substantial detachments of Companion 
cavalry were necessary to cope with the new style of warfare
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with which he was confronted. He could no longer expect 
set "battles in which the enemy would come against him in a 
united body: the opposition was dispersed and had to he 
chased. His army structure had, therefore, to he more 
flexible. . These considerations led to the permanent arrange­
ment of the crack cavalry force into several independent 
command units, well suited for easy detachment from the main 
body.
A brief analysis of the campaigning of the years 329-
327 B.C. will demonstrate the nature of the warfare and
Alexanders reaction to the changed circumstances. In 329
B.C. he sent a detachment against Spitamenes who was being
troublesome in Sogdiana. The detachment consisted of 800
mercenary cavalry, 1,500 mercenary infantry and 60 Companion
cavalry: the commanders were not top quality officers and
the mission ended in disaster, with the force being almost 
21annihilated. The reaction of Alexander was strong. It was
near the end of the campaigning season of 329 B.C., but when
he heard the news of it he took half the Companion cavalry,
the archers, the Agrianes and the fittest of the phalanx and
chased Spitamenes into the desert in an effort to avenge the
defeat. Craterus was left with the rest of the campaign
22force to advance to Zariaspa.
The whole campaign force reunited for the winter at 
Zariaspa in Bactria, but it was surrounded by hostile pockets 
of resistance. Sogdiana had not been subdued by Alexander^ 
thrusts into it and Bactria was unsettled. When a clear 
narrative resumes and the main campaigning season begins in
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the spring of 328 B.C., a change of strategy is immediately 
apparent. Alexander himself moved out of Bactria across the 
Oxus into Sogdiana: Arrian (4,15,7; 16,If.) says that he left 
Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager, all commanders 
of Macedonian pezetairoi units, to keep order in Bactria.
It is clear that Craterus also was left-in Bactria Because 
after a raid By Spitamenes on Zariaspa, it was Craterus with 
some cavalry who came to the rescue: Craterus and his troops 
did not rejoin the king until the following winter, at 
Uautaca (Arr. 4,17,1; 18,1$ Curt. 8,1,6). In Sogdiana,
Alexander himself advanced to Maracanda, not in one Body 
But in five divisions commanded By Hephaestion, Ptolemy, 
Perdiccas, Coenus and ArtaBazus, and himself (Arr. 4,16,2).
They reunited at Maracanda But he immediately divided the 
force again, this time into three parts, the commanders 
Being Hephaestion, Coenus and ArtaBazus, and himself.
Hephaestion went to consolidate Alexander*s hold on the
.conquered parts of Sogdiana, Coenus and ArtaBazus went towards j 
the Scythians, where Spitamenes was reported, and he himself j 
went off to the unconquered parts of Sogdiana. After each !;
division had completed its mission, they reassembled again 
at Maracanda (Arr. 4,16,3).
Alexander moved away from Maracanda towards the end of 
the campaigning season of 328 B.C., But left Coenus with the 
newly appointed satrap of Bactria, Amyntas, to winter in 
Sogdiana, with orders to maintain control and watch for 
Spitamenes. Under Coenus, in addition to the satrapal force 
of Bactrians and Sogdians under Amyntas, were left two
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■battalions of Macedonian pezetairoi infantry, Coenus* own 
and that of Meleager, all the mounted javelin-men and about 
4-00 Companion cavalry (Arr. 4,17,3). Alexander clearly 
intended to take no chances. Hephaestion, with a part of 
the army, was sent to Bactria to make preparations for 
supplies during the winter (Curt. 8,2,13), and Alexander made 
his way to Nautaca to spend the winter. The rest of the 
expeditionary force joined him at some stage during the 
winter apparently, hut the sources are obscure and contra­
dictory.2  ^ Campaigning seems to have gone on during the 
winter.2^ In the early months of 327 B.C. Craterus, who had 
rejoined the main force (Arr. 4,18,1), was sent against 
Catanes and Austanes, who were keeping up the resistance 
among the Pareitacenae. Craterus led his own infantry unit 
and those of Polyperchon, of Attalus and of Alcetas, and in 
addition 600 Companion cavalry. Alexander with the rest of 
the expeditionary force went into Bactria and was later joined 
there by Craterus, when preparations were made for the Indian 
campaign (Arr. 4,22,If.; Curt. 8,5,Iff.).
Flexibility and speed were the essential requirements 
for this type of warfare, and Alexander had learnt in 329 B.C. 
that a top quality commander and top quality troops must form 
the nucleus of any detachment. The typical detachment during 
328 B.C. consisted of a force of Companion cavalry, some 
light cavalry or infantry, or both, and a substantial force 
of good quality Macedonian pezetairoi infantry. Although the 
troops in many of the detachments are not detailed in the 
sources, there can be little doubt that some Companion
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cavalry were always included on missions away from the main 
"body.
The structure described by Arrian in 330 B.C. (3,27,10) 
clearly was not sufficiently flexible: with only two 
independent commands, Alexander, who clearly had to keep 
some Companion cavalry with himself, had only one regular 
independent command for detachment. In fact, after 329 B.C. 
Alexander found this organisation unworkable. The Companion 
cavalry, almost continuously through 328 B.C.,was divided 
into more than two divisions, and one of the hipparchs, 
namely Hephaestion, was almost continuously on independent 
missions on which much less than half of the Companion cavalry 
was present. In practice, therefore,his command of the 
Companion cavalry, if he still held it, can have been little 
more than a source of honour and prestige. The other 
hipparch, Cleitus, is not mentioned in the course of the 
campaigning of 329 and 328 B.C. and probably stayed with 
Alexander, in command of the Companion cavalry with the king, 
but on many occasions less than half the Companion cavalry 
was with the king and, therefore, the command structure of 
the body, if it persisted unchanged, was really an empty 
formality.
There can be little doubt that the changed strategy of 
the war encouraged Alexander to organise the Companion cavalry 
into a greater number of independent combat units, which 
could easily be detached for missions away from the main body. 
This is confirmed by our knowledge of the role of the
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hipparchies. Organisational command of four of the
hipparchies was given to those officers frequently sent on
separate missions: i.e. Hephaestion, Craterus, Coenus and
Perdiccas. When these men went on a mission away from the
main body, they usually took their own hipparchies as a
nucleus of the detachment: this was the purpose for which
25hipparchies had been formed.
(ii) The Date
This new arrangement was operative at the battle at 
the Hydaspes, but the precise dating of the reorganisation 
has been disputed.2  ^ The matter is complicated by Arrian*s 
inaccurate use of the term'hipparchy' in reference to the 
Companion cavalry. In fact, he uses it of any cavalry unit 
of substantial size and so, although ‘hipparchies of 
Companions* feature in Arrian prior to his narrative of the 
year 326 B.C., he may not be using the term accurately (see 
Appendix III pp. 3 SZ-f. ). Only two chapters after he 
describes the appointment of two hipparchs over the Companion 
cavalry (3,27,4), he writes of three hipparchies as being 
only a part of the Companion cavalry (3,29,7). It has been 
regarded by most scholars as impossible that each hipparch 
could have command of more than one hipparchy, and it has 
been held that Arrian is here inaccurate.2  ^ At Arrian 4,4,7 
three hipparchies are again only a part of the force. This 
refers to the summer/autumn of 329 B.C., less than a year 
after the appointment of the two hipparchs. Since it seems 
unlikely that the cavalry was reorganised again so quickly, 
this usage also probably is inaccurate.28
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The next usage of the expression ’hipparchies of
Companions* does not occur until Arrian 4,24,1 which refers
to the beginning of the Indian expedition in the late spring 
pq
o f 527 B.C. I have shown that by this time Alexander had 
adopted a new strategy which demanded more flexibility and 
made the organisation under two hipparchs unsuitable. This 
predisposes us to look more favourably upon the usage of 
Arrian here, but his inaccuracy is such that other evidence 
is needed.
As well as the reference to hipparchies, the passage 
also contains a reference to the agema of cavalry; this is 
the first mention of such a unit in Arrian*s narrative. From 
this time the agema of cavalry appears frequently in the role 
which had been played by the royal ile: the royal ile is 
mentioned for the last time at Arrian 3,18,5 and there can be 
no doubt that the agema replaced it. It seems most likely, 
as Brunt points out (p.29), that the appearance of the agema 
is connected with the change to hipparchies. When the 
hipparchies replaced the ilae as the basic tactical units, 
the royal ilet which previously had been under the command 
of one of the hipparchs of the Companions, was not included 
in any of the new hipparchies. It was Alexander’s horseguard 
and, as such, could perhaps be seen as Alexander’s hipparchy, 
though it is never called that. Anyway, ’ile* was no longer 
an appropriate name for it because it no longer formed part 
of a larger cavalry unit. Its name was changed, therefore, 
and it received the same title as the infantry guard.
There is corroboration that a reform had taken place
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■before the campaigning season of 327 B.C. At 4,27,5, in 
his description of an independent mission to Ora, Arrian 
refers to Demetrius the hipparch among its commanders, the 
others being Attalus and Alcetas. Demetrius is one of the 
men to whom a hipparchy is known to have been assigned when 
the Companion cavalry was reorganised, and he is called 
hipparch again by Arrian (6,8,2). This indicates that the 
structure in operation at the battle of the Hydaspes and 
later was already in existence in 327 B.C.
These passages together seem to be good enough 
indication that the reorganisation of the Companion cavalry 
had taken place before the start of the Indian campaign, in 
late spring 327 B.C. It remains to be decided how long 
before this time the change was made. I have already 
suggested that it is not likely that Alexander changed the 
command structure during the campaigning season of 329 B.C. 
because he had appointed the hipparchs only at the end of 
the campaigning season of 330 B.C. The change in strategy, 
however, is datable to early 328 B.C., which might suggest 
that it was at Zariaspa in the winter of 329/8 B.C., where 
the whole army assembled, that the reform took place.
However, there are some reasons to suppose that the winter 
of 328/7 B.C. was the date of the reform. Alexander could 
have kept the old structure through 328 B.C. in theory, while 
in practice adopting a more flexible approach in detaching 
parts of the Companion cavalry without regard to the 
hipparchs« official commands. This seems to be indicated 
from Arrian«s account of the campaigning through 328 B.C.,
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in which "there is no mention of hipparchies of Companions. 
Instead, we read of a detachment of 400 Companion cavalry 
with Coenus (Arr. 4,17,3) and a force of 600 Companion 
cavalry with Craterus (Arr. 4,22,1). If the Companion cavalry 
had already been organised into hipparchies, we would expect 
to find «the hipparchy of Coenus« and «the hipparchy of 
Craterus« or *his own hipparchy and that of Demetrius (or 
some other officer)«.
In addition to this, Alexander planned to remove Cleitus 
from the expeditionary force in the winter of 328/7 b .C.,51 
and this may be seen to be connected with a plan to change 
the structure of the Companion cavalry, for in the new-style 
body, Cleitus and Hephaestion were to lose their positions.
Dor some reason, Cleitus had never been used by Alexander to 
command an independent mission, unlike the other hipparch, 
Hephaestion, and it may be that Alexander did not think that 
there was a place for Cleitus in the new order.5  ^ He, there­
fore, planned to remove him from his post before, or at the 
same time as, carrying through the reform. This reform was 
intended to be part of the preparations for the Indian 
campaign, but Cleitus« death probably forced Alexander to 
carry it through earlier than he had expected.53 Alexander 
would not have wanted so prestigious a position to remain 
unfilled for many months and there was no reason why he 
should not bring forward the reorganisation to a time shortly 
after Cleitus« death. I would agree with Brunt*s dating 
(p.29), though not with his view that Cleitus« death was a 
major reason for the change.
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(iii) The Hummer of Hip-parohVfiW
Tarn (II p.164 ff.) was of the opinion that the reform 
produced five hipparchies, with the agema separate. This is 
the number of hipparchies named as participating in the 
battle of the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,11,3; 12,2; 16,3), where,
Tarn argues, Alexander must have fielded all his cavalry.
He was confirmed in his belief by Arrian*s reference in 324 
B.C. to the addition of a fifth hipparchy (7,6,3). Brunt 
(p.29ff.) points out, however, that Arrian«s evidence on 
the line-up at the Hydaspes may not be complete, and he 
believes that the appearance of the hipparchy of Cleitus 
immediately after the battle (Arr. 5,22,6) confirms this.
Tarn supposed that Cleitus had taken over Coenus« hipparchy 
when Coenus was left at the River Acesines (Arr. 5,21,1) but, 
as Brunt points out, this is most unlikely. Even if his 
hipparchy did not remain with him, and Brunt argues that it 
did, there is no reason to suppose that he would have been 
stripped of this most honorific command simply because he 
was temporarily absent from his men.
There is further indication that Arrian may not have 
given a comprehensive account of all the troops at the 
Hydaspes. Coenus« hipparchy is not mentioned in the narrative 
of the crossing of the river and suddenly appears from 
nowhere in the attack on the right (Arr. 5,16,3). Had it 
not been involved in this attack, we would be quite unaware 
of its existence. The likelihood that Arrian does not tell 
us the names of all the hipparchies of Companions at the 
battle seems high, and in view of the appearance of the
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hipparchy of Cleitus immediately after the battle, the 
indications are that there were at least six hipparchies of 
Companions in addition to the agema.
Brunt maintains that there were in fact seven (p. 29f.). 
The evidence he puts forward in support of this view is 
drawn from details from Arrian*s account;; of Alexander's 
approach to India. At 4,24,1, Arrian states that Alexander 
took 'almost four hipparchies of Companions', in addition to 
the agema, in an advance against the Aspasians.^ Since • 
Arrian has already stated that Alexander had sent out half 
the Companion cavalry with Perdiccas and Hephaestion towards 
the Indus (4,22,7) and had kept only half the Companions 
himself (4,25,1), Brunt concludes that »almost four 
hipparchies* and the agema accounted for half the Companion 
cavalry. He goes on to state that this shows that the whole 
Companion force comprised seven hipparchies and the agema.
As confirmation of this, he points to Arrian's account 
of the expedition against the Malli (526 BC.). At 6,5,5-7 
Arrian says that Alexander divided his expeditionary army 
into four parts, Craterus, Hephaestion, Ptolemy and himself, 
each leading a part. Alexander took half of the Companions 
(6,6,1), the rest of the Companions presumably being divided 
among the others. Arrian goes on to mention, in the course 
of the action against the Malli, the hipparchies of Perdiccas, 
Cleitus and Demetrius (6,6,4; 8,2). As Alexander must have 
had the agema, Brunt concludes that this confirms the 
equivalence of half the cavalry of Companions to three 
hipparchies and the agema. However, since he has argued
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above "that half the Companion cavalry was almost four 
hipparchies plus the agema, Brunt is clearly not on firm 
ground. What he seems to have proved from his use of this 
evidence is not that the Companion cavalry was divided into 
seven hipparchies and the agema. hut that Arrian is 
imprecise in his use of the term'half
Nothing precise, then, can he proved about the number 
hipparchies from these passages of Arrian and we are left 
with the names of six commanders of hipparchies which appear 
in his narrative, this is the only indication of the number 
of hipparchies. Although Arrian's record of the troops 
involved in the campaign is far from complete, there is 
nothing in any of our narratives which requires us to assume 
that there were more than six. It is, therefore, perhaps 
reasonable to accept that the names of all the commanders of 
the hipparchies are known from Arrian. In support of this, 
it should be noted that the commanders of the hipparchies 
were prominent officers and we might, therefore, justifiably 
expect their names, or the units under their command, to 
appear, however unsystematic Arrian's evidence might be.
(iv) Conclusion
The evidence indicates that in 327 B.C. Alexander 
established six hipparchies in addition to the agema. and 
the commanders were Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus, 
Cleitus and Demetrius. The first four of these were 
strategic commanders whose command over their hipparchies 
was organisational rather than tactical: they are never 
called 'hipparch' as Demetrius is (Arr. 4 27 5* 6 R p 'i
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These hipparchies normally formed part of their strategic
command when they were detached for an independent mission.
Under the Ptolemies the armed forces were organised into
strategic commands consisting of all types of troops, each
•*6strategic unit being capable of independent action. In 
327 B.C. this type of organisation was in its formative 
stages, and the division of the Companion cavalry into 
hipparchies was a part of the development.
The men after whom hipparchies are named, but who are 
never mentioned in command of independent missions, are 
Demetrius and Cleitus; we must, therefore, conclude that 
they were of lesser standing than the other four. These 
hipparchies were sent with whichever army commander needed 
them: for instance, when Perdiccas went on an independent 
mission along the Malli (Arr. 6,6,4), he took in addition to 
his own hipparchy that of Cleitus: also among the Malli, when 
Peithon led a separate mission, the hipparchy of Demetrius 
accompanied him (Arr. 6,8,2). There are obvious advantages, 
in terms of flexibility, in not having all the hipparchies 
attached to the top army commanders. Demetrius was the only 
commander of a hipparchy who had led an ile of Companion 
cavalry during the early years of the campaign (Arr. 3,11,8) 
and he was only a commander of cavalry and is not known in any 
other role: it is significant that he is the only one to 
whom a hipparchy was attached who is described as ‘hipparch* 
in the sources.
Cleitus also is not known to have led an independent 
mission but he seems to have been of higher rank than
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Demetrius. He appears as commander of an infantry "battalion 
at the beginning of the Indian expedition in 327 B.C. (Arr. 4, 
22,7), and again in this role at the Hydaspes (Arr. 5»12,2).
If it is accepted that the reorganisation of the Companion 
cavalry was carried out on the eve of the Indian expedition, 
it follows that Cleitus was also a commander of a hipparchy 
at the Hydaspes. If he did not hold the two commands 
together, we have to assume that between the reorganisation 
of 328/7 B.C. and early summer 326 B.C., when his name is 
attached to a hipparchy (Arr. 5,22,6), some unknown man held 
this command: this seems less likely. Although not a 
strategic commander, Cleitus was clearly an experienced 
officer and he may well have been given this dual command 
because Alexander was short of good officers whom he could 
trust.^
The effect of the reorganisation upon the royal ile 
has already been touched upon. From being a part of a larger 
command comprising several ilae, it became an independent 
command and its name was changed accordingly, to «agema*. 
There is no evidence that there was any other change. Its 
number probably remained at 300. The system of recruitment 
also, whatever it was, was probably unaffected (see above 
p. 3 6  )
The six hipparchies were divided into ilae. This is 
established by Arrian 6,21,3, which refers to Alexander as 
selecting one ile from each hipparchy. Tarn considered that 
the ilae were divided into hecatostyes. presenting a passage 
of Arrian in support of his view. The army sustained heavy
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losses of their.‘baggage animals during the march through 
the G-edrosian desert and in order to make good the losses
Alexander »distributed all the animals, .....  to the
commanders by individuals, to some of the men by ilae and
hecatostyes, to others by lochoi, ..... ». Tarn takes it
that the »hecatostyes» as well as the »ilae» refers to the 
Macedonian cavalry, contrasted with the »lochoi»of the 
infantry, and believes that there are two hecatostyes in 
each ile. ^  This view, however, is based upon his belief 
that Alexander had no Iranian cavalry on the march through 
Gedrosia, whereas it is certain that he had at least some 
(Arr. 6,22,1). It seems most likely that the »hecatostyes» 
refers to Iranian cavalry. It would appear, then, that the 
lochos continued to be the subdivision of the ile. ^  The 
number of ilae in each hipparchy is nowhere indicated, but 
since the Companion cavalry probably numbered less than 
2,500 at the time of its division into six hipparchies, it 
is likely that there were only t w o f o r  each ile is not 
likely to have numbered less than 150 men.
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PART III Reinforcements and Losses
At the time of the crossing to Asia in 334 B.C. the
Companion cavalry numbered 1,800 according to Diodorus 
4-217,17,4. A reinforcement arrived in the early spring of 
333 B.C., which numbered 300 (Arrian 1,29,4), and since 
losses up to this time can only have been light, this must
4^have brought the total to something over 2,000.  ^ During 
the years 333 to 331 B.C. there were no more reinforcements 
of Macedonian cavalry and wastage through sickness and enemy 
action must have reduced the total.^ At the battle of 
Gaugamela the force seems to have suffered quite badly, 
though no firm estimate of casualties is possible. It is 
perhaps reasonable to assume that not more than 3 0 0 were 
lost to active service during the years 334 to 331 B.C., and 
that when the 500 reinforcements arrived at the end of 331 
B.C.^ the total was brought to something in the region of 
2,300. If this is accepted, it follows that at the time of 
the reform of 331 B.C. each ile numbered about 280, with the 
lochoi at 140, with the royal ile standing at 300.^
Do Macedonian reinforcements are reported to have
48reached Alexander after the end of 331 B.C. losses between 
the years 331 and 327 B.C. may have run into the hundreds.
We hear of 60 Companion cavalry being killed on one mission, 
admittedly a particularly disastrous one, against Spitamenes 
(Arr. 4,3,7), and the determined resistance of the Eastern 
Iranians generally must have taken its toll. Apart from this, 
sickness, aggravated by the rigours of the climate and by 
fatigue, must have accounted for not a few. We hear of one
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group of Companion cavalry, not numbered, which was left 
in Zariaspa because they were sick (Arr." 4,16,6). Any number 
suggested for losses of Companion cavalry can only be very 
approximate, but perhaps the toll through the hard 
campaigning of 550, 529 and 528 B.C. may have been as high 
as 400. "Whatever the losses, the ilae were no doubt much 
weakened, though they could not have fallen much below the 
strength they had been at the beginning of the Asian 
campaign during this time.
It, in fact, seems unlikely that the Companion cavalry 
received any reinforcement during the campaigning in Eastern 
Iran. Berve believed that Iranians entered its ranks in 
substantial numbers from as early as 529 B.C.,^ but I have 
argued against this view in Appendix IYpgAOOf. He also 
suggested that the prodromoi entered the body of the 
Companions at the time they cease to be mentioned in the 
sources, i.e., 529 B.C., and Brunt has supported this 
suggestion, arguing that it is unlikely that such an important 
force would have been sent horned However, it must be 
remembered that the Iranians could, and did, provide Alexander 
with excellent light cavalry, (the Dahae mounted archers are 
the best known: Arrian 5,12,2 et. al.) The prodromoi may, 
indeed, have been sent home, as Tarn suggested (II p.164). 
There is, in any case, no reason to believe that they were 
included in the Companion cavalry, even if they did stay.
If they did lose their identity through being reorganised, 
it is more likely that they would have been made part of a 
light, rather than a heavy, cavalry body: it was in this
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style of fighting that their experience lay.51 They may
well, therefore, have formed part of the mounted javelin- 
52men, or of some unknown mercenary "body of light horse.
On the eve of the formation of the hipparchies the 
Companion cavalry probably numbered something under 2,000.
In the course of the reorganisation, however, some Iranians 
were brought into the ranks. The evidence for this is drawn 
from a retrospective reference in Arrian (7,6,5; 8,2). I 
discuss these passages at length in Appendix IV and I 
conclude that men of several tribes of the Eastern Iranian 
plateau, as well as some few Persians (the Evacae), entered 
the Companion cavalry during the winter of 328/7 B.C. Paced 
with the prospect of strong opposition from the fine cavalry 
of the Indian tribes, Alexander recruited substantial 
numbers of cavalry from Eastern Iranians. Most of these 
were organised tribally - we hear, for instance, of the 
Bactrian and the Sogdian cavalry (Arr. 5,12,2) - but some 
were armed with Macedonian equipment and introduced into 
the ranks of the Companions. We may assume that this 
reinforcement was closely connected with the reorganisation 
of the cavalry into hipparchies, but it may not have taken 
place at the same time: for, as I have suggested above, the 
death of Cleitus may have forced Alexander to reorganise 
the Companions earlier than he had planned.
The numbers involved were no doubt quite small; this is 
the natural interpretation of Arrian1s comment that they 
were outstanding specimens of their peoples (7,6,3). Any 
attempt to estimate numbers, however, is beset with insoluble
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difficulty. I have estimated that on the eve of the
reform of the Companion cavalry the strength of the force
may have numbered a little under 2,000. There are only two
indications of the size of the Companion cavalry during the
Indian campaign. Arrian (indica 19,2) records that on the
voyage down the Hydaspes in 326 B.C. Alexander took on to
the fleet all the hypaspists, all the archers, and of the
cavalry those called Companions: the total is- given at 
538,000.  ^ We may presume that the number came from Nearchus, 
and we have no reason to doubt it. I shall argue below 
(Ch.IV pp. tTO-f. ) that the hypaspists numbered 3,500 at 
this time but the archers present a much more difficult 
problem.
Berve (I p.133) argued that there were at least three 
chiliarchies of archers in 327 B.C. and presented Arrian 
4,24,10 in evidence. In an engagement with the Indians in 
that year Alexander divided the forces with him into three 
parts. One part he placed under the command of leonnatus, 
another part he led himself. The other part he entrusted to 
Ptolemy and it consisted of re im-atcr m<r-rZv r:wv
. ^  / /  \ \ f~L \  *  N
0  oitrC At Acu.v' To r p c - r o v  p e p o f  tent TyjV t\ t  rrnou
royal hypaspists the third part and the taxeis of Philip and 
Philotas and two chiliarchies of the archers and the 
Agrianes and half of the cavalry*. The genitive *of the 
archers* seems to be partitive and Berve appears to be right 
that this text implies that there were some archers in
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addition to the two chiliarchies under Ptolemy. Caution,
however, must be exercised in the interpretation of this
54.evidence, for this passage presents many difficulties ^ and
it seems likely that Ptolemy, plainly the source of the
passage, exaggerated his own importance in the engagement.^
In particular it must be doubted whether the part of the
army with Ptolemy was greater than that with leonnatus by
5 6as much as Ptolemy says it was. . If it is accepted that 
there were at least three chiliarchies of archers, the 
question must be raised of whether each chiliarchy numbered 
1,000 men.^ There seem to be too many unknowns for this 
passage to be used confidently to set the total strength of 
the archers, and we must be content with a less precise 
estimate.
In 354 B.C. Alexander had only a few hundred archers 
(Diod. 17,17,4, with my Appendix II), but he certainly did 
increase his strength in this arm: the Iranians were 
particularly strong in this arm. Curtius (6,4,2) states 
that Craterus was detached with his own and with Amyntas * 
troops, and with 600 additional cavalry and as many archers 
(cf. Arr. 3,23,2):^8 the date is 330 B.C. It is most 
unlikely that Alexander sent even the majority of his 
archers with Craterus (Arrian says *some of the archers*) 
and, perhaps, we are justified in assuming from this passage 
that the archers numbered at least 1,500. This was, however, 
five years before the voyage down the Hydaspes. We must 
conclude, I think, that we can only guess at the number of 
archers in Alexander*s army in 326 B.C., though some may
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have more confidence in the evidence of Arrian 4,24,10 
that there were at least three chiliarchies of them. I 
would suggest that it is unlikely that there were many less 
than two thousand in India with Alexander, in view of the 
strength of the Iranian archers and the overall size of the 
Indian campaign force. 7 On this view Arrian (Ind. 19,2) 
fixes a maximum for the Companion cavalry of about 2,500.
A passage used to fix the minimum size of the force is 
Arrian 6,14,4. After the campaign against the Malli, 
Alexander, on his way down the Hydraotes, 'put on the ships 
1,700 cavalry of the Companions, of the psiloi the same 
number he had had before,’ and about 10,000 pezoi‘. Tarn 
(II p.162) supposed that this was the full strength of the 
Companion cavalry, but it was not convenient for him that 
the body should have been so small as this at the time of 
the voyage down the river, and he, therefore, suggested that 
it was the strength of the body as it had stood at Bactra in 
spring 327 B.C. There is, however, no necessity to inter­
pret the passage to mean that 1 , 7 0 0  was the full total of the 
force; the genitive ‘of the Companions* could be partitive. 
This has been proposed by Brunt (p.38 n.34) and should be 
accepted because 1 , 7 0 0  certainly seems too small a number 
for the whole force, especially if it is accepted that 
Alexander dismissed 1,500 veteran Macedonian cavalry in 324 
B.C.^° If 1,700 is only part of the Companion cavalry, it 
seems likely that the full body numbered something over 
2,000. I would, therefore, propose 2,000 as a minimum
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for the whole Companion cavalry force.
The result of the discussion of numbers is rather 
inconclusive, hut it is at least clear that not many 
hundreds of Iranians were introduced to the Companion 
cavalry in 328/7 B.C. If my estimate of the strength of 
the body on the eve of the reorganisation is right, no more 
than about 500 Iranians were involved. There must, of 
course, have been losses during the fighting in India 
between 328 and 326 B.C., but Alexander probably made good 
the losses by promoting men from the units of Eastern 
Iranian cavalry serving in the army. If we assume, there­
fore, that the full strength of the force at the start of 
the Indian campaign was about 2,250 and that the agema con­
tinued to be 300 strong, we have a strength for each 
hipparchy of just under 330. The ilae in each hipparchy 
cannot have numbered more than two, about 165 each, with the 
lochoi being about 80. I do not make any claims concerning 
the accuracy of these estimates, but the figures may not be 
totally unhelpful.
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PART IV Changes During the Indian Campaign
At the "battle of the Hydaspes the commanders of the 
hipparchies were Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus, 
Demetrius and Cleitus (see above p. SO) , hut in the summer 
of 326 33.C. Coenus died (Arr. 6,2,1; Curt. 9,3,20). We 
hear of no replacement for Coenus and no new name appears 
as commander of a hipparchy, hut there is no reason to 
suppose that Coenus was not replaced, and in so far as 
Peithon seems to have taken over Coenus1 infantry battalion 
(Arr. 6,6,1; Berve II no.623; and see further, Ch.IY p.HZ ), 
we may he justified in suggesting that Peithon succeeded also 
to Coenus* hipparchy.
Before Alexanders return to Susa in 324 B.C. the 
number of hipparchies was reduced to four. This is made 
clear by Arrian's reference to the addition of a fifth 
hipparchy, which should be dated to 324 B.C. (Appendix 
IV pp.lf-174) . Berve (I p.lll) and Brunt (p.43) argue that the 
number of hipparchies was reduced to four after the march 
through Gedrosia, i.e., at the end of 325 B.C. This is
i
possible in that Alexander probably lost some Companion 
cavalry on that march,^ but I would offer an alternative 
dating. Arrian (6,17,5) records that in the summer of 325 B.C 
Alexander segregated those Macedonians whom he was intending 
to send home, and he sent them, with many other troops, 
under Craterus1 command through Arachosia and Drangiana to 
Carmania. J He himself led another part of the army by a 
more difficult route, and the parts were to meet again in 
Carmania. Among those designated for discharge were some
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Companion cavalry, and it seems reasonable to assume that 
this was the occasion of the reduction in the number of 
hipparchies from six to four. Alexander could have expected 
little resistance after this time and, therefore, had no 
cause to bring the force back up to strength.
The number of Companion cavalry sent with Craterus in 
325 B.C. cannot be known. The total of Macedonian cavalry 
discharged by Alexander in the years 325 and 324 B.C., which 
actually left for home from Opis in the summer of 324 B.C., 
was 1,500 men (see n.60). Many of these, however, will have 
remained with Alexander through Gedrosia, and some few 
others were probably drawn from garrisons which had been 
established in the centre of the Persian empire (Ch.V p 
It is difficult to believe that in 325 B.C. Alexander 
removed from the Companion cavalry the majority of the 
Macedonians, and since I have suggested that the Macedonian 
content was a little under 2,000 in 328 B.C., and we can 
confidently estimate that losses sustained down to mid 325 
B.C. amounted to at least 100 to 150, I would suggest that 
600 is the very maximum that was sent with Craterus in 325 
B.C. This would have reduced the Macedonian content of 
the body to around 1,200. It might be noted that the 
reduction in the number of hipparchies from six to four may 
indicate that one third of the force went with Craterus.
The places of these Macedonians were not filled and 
Alexander regrouped the body into only four hipparchies in 
addition to the agema. We may assume, perhaps, that Craterus 
and Cleitus were the commanders who lost their hipparchies,
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"because Craterus led those selected for discharge and 
Cleitus probably went with him.^ There was probably no 
further change in the organisation of the body, as Alexander 
made his way to Susa to celebrate the end of the Indian 
campaign, fresh cavalry reached him in Carmania, but they 
were not integrated into the campaign army, merely
accompanying it on its march through the centre of the
6 5Persian empire to Susa.
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CHAPTER IV
MACEDONIAN HEAVY INFANTRY 334-324 B.C.
I have already discussed the organisation of the heavy 
infantry as it stood at the end of the reign of Philip (Ch.II 
pp.4-7£ ), using for evidence the sources for Alexander«3 
campaign in Asia. I shall now look at the evidence con­
cerning Alexanders Macedonian heavy infantry in a little 
more detail and consider changes in organisation during the 
course of the campaign, to 324 B.C.
Diodorus, 17,17,5, tells us that 12,000 Macedonian 
infantry went with Alexander to Asia. These, together with
7,000 allies and 5,000 mercenaries, came under ParmenioS 
command.^ There seems to he no reason for doubting Diodorus' 
evidence, although Parmenio was clearly not in command of the 
whole infantry body in the same sense that Philotas commanded 
the Companion cavalry, for-the infantry was made up of many 
independent strategic units: e.g., allied infantry under 
Antigonus (Arr. 1,29,3), mercenary unit under Menander (Arr. 
3,6,8). Parmenio, however, as Alexanders second-in-command, 
can be expected to have held an unusual position, an overall 
command over several independent strategic units, which would 
have given him prestige and authority. There was also, 
perhaps, a good practical reason for such a position, for an 
overall commander could ensure understanding and cooperation 
among the diverse units which made up the phalanx.
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PART I The Pezetairoi
a) The Number and Commanders of Battalions 
(i) 554-551 B.O.
The pezetairoi were organised in independent strategic
2units, each under a taxiarch or strategos. Evidence on 
these battalions during the first four years of the campaign 
is relatively full: details of Alexander*s phalanx at all the 
three major battles fought during this period are recorded 
and there is substantial agreement among the sources.
Arrian alone has a full list of the battalions in the 
battle-line at the Granicus (I 14,2ff.): the hypaspists were 
on the right flank and beside them from right to left were 
the phalanxes of Perdiccas, son of Orontes (Berve II no.627); 
of Coenus, son of Polemocrates (Berve II no.459)5 of Craterus, 
son of Alexander (Berve II no.446); of Amyntas, son of 
Andromenes (Berve II nos.57 and 64);^ of Philip, son of 
Amyntas (Berve II no.775). Arrian then describes the line 
from left to right, up to the centre: the phalanx of Craterus 
on the left flank, then that of Meleager (Berve II no.494), 
and that of Philip. There is some confusion clearly in that 
the battalions of Craterus and Philip are mentioned twice. 
Craterus» battalion invariably held the opposite flank to the 
hypaspists so it seems likely that it did so here, the 
battalion of Philip held the middle of the line.^ There is 
little doubt that at the battle of the Granicus there were 
six battalions under the following commanders: in order 
of position in the line from left to right, Craterus,
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Meleager, Philip, Amyntas, Coenus, Perdiccas.
In the tattle-line at Issus Arrian (2,8,3f.) gives a 
list of the battalions which differs from the line-up at the 
tattle of the G-ranicus only in that Coenus is on the outside 
of Perdiccas, and in place of Philip, son of Amyntas, is 
Ptolemy, son of Seleucus (Berve II no.670). Curtius (3,9,7) 
agrees with Arrian except for minor differences of order; 
Arrian*s version should te preferred. In the tattle-line at 
Gaugamela, Arrian (3,11,9) records that there were the 
following battalions: those of Coenus, of Perdiccas, of 
Meleager, of Polyperchon, son of Simmias, of Amyntas (Amyntas 
was away and his battalion was commanded by Simmias) and of
Craterus. Diodorus (17,57,2) has much the same detail as 
Arrian, even to the order of the line, except that the 
battalion of Amyntas is not mentioned at all and in its place 
is the battalion of Philip, son of Balacrus. Curtius (4,13,
27) has a very confused account, though there is some agree- 
ment with the other versions. His account can be ignored^ 
except for the remark that Amyntas was away (which agrees 
with Arrian*s detail) and Philip, son of Balacrus, was 
commanding his battalion in his absence (which agrees with 
Diodorus* version).
The usual interpretation of all this evidence is that 
there were six battalions of pezetairoi from 334 to 331 B.C., 
as set out by Berve (I p.114) and Tarn (II p.142). Philip, 
son of Amyntas, lost his command between the battles of the 
Granicus and Issus, for some unknown reason,6 and was 
replaced by Ptolemy, son of Seleucus. Ptolemy was killed at
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Issus (Arr. 2,10,7) and Polyperchon succeeded him. As for 
the disagreement over Amyntas‘ deputy at Gaugamela, Arrian’s 
version that Simmias stepped in is generally preferred. The 
only part of this interpretation which seems at all doubtful 
is whether Simmias really did command the "battalion of 
Amyntas at the battle of Gaugamela. Philip, son of Balacrus j 
(Berve II no.778), is otherwise unknown while Simmias, j
Amyntas* brother (Berve II no.704), is well attested, and, J1
i
o f course, being brother to Amyntas, may be expected to have j: j
deputised for him. On the other hand, it is very difficult j
to explain how Philip should have slipped into the tradition,^ :j 
whereas there are two reasons why Simmias should have
■1:intruded. The name Simmias appears just a few words before, ji 
as father of Polyperchon, and since Simmias would naturally 1
be connected with Amyntas, it would not be difficult to account ;
j
for the mistake. I do not think the evidence allows a . j;
decision to be made on this point. j;
(ii) 551-324 B.C.
The number of battalions of pezetairoi in the years 
following the battle of Gaugamela is not so clear. Hans 
Droysen considered that the number of battalions increased, 
but he did not suggest by how many, or when.8 Beloch thought 
that the number rose to at least ten, one under Philotas and 
another under Gorgias being added when reinforcements arrived 
at the end of 331 B.C. and another, under Cleitus, arriving 
with reinforcements in 329/8 B.C.: Peithon may have led yet 
another battalion, or he may have taken over that of Coenus 
in 326 B.C.9 Berve thought that a battalion under Philotas
{
l i ;
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(II no.803) was added when reinforcements arrived at the end 
of 331 B.C., and another three or four before 326 B.C, 
proposed additional commanders being Gorgias, Philip, Cleitus 
and Balacrus. Tarn would allow for the addition of only- 
one battalion, that of Cleitus at Bactra in 3 2 7 B.C . 1 1 Mins 
accepted that there were no more than seven battalions in 
India, and. argued this number was reached by the addition of 
the battalion of Philotas, which was formed in 331 B.C., to 
the six recorded at the battle of Gaugamela. 1 2
We must look at the evidence used in support of these 
theories. The fullest case in favour of an increase to ten 
or more battalions is presented by Berve, who considered that 
those men who have their names attached to taxeis by Arrian, 
with the single exception of Antigenes (II no.83), were 
pezetairoi battalion leaders. According to Berve, Philotas, 
Philip, Balacrus, Gorgias and Cleitus all commanded 
battalions because they are said by Arrian to command taxeis, 
and all these battalions were additional to the six which 
fought at the battle of Gaugamela. Only two of the six at 
Gaugamela changed their commanders, that of Psrdiccns went 
to Alcetas (II no.45); and that of Amyntas to Attalus (II 
no.181). Berve considered that on the Indian campaign eleven 
battalions in all were in existence. In India in 326 B.C. 
Coenus died and Peithon (II no.623) took over his battalion. 
Tarn has argued the fullest case in favour of the number 
seven (II pp.l42ff.), taking as the basis of^his theory the 
evidence of Arrian, which indicates that at the battle of 
the Hydaspes there were seven battalions. In order to
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account for the other men who, Arrian said, had commanded 
taxeis, Tarn argued that some of the taxeis were not 
pezetairoi hattalions at all, and that some of the battalion 
commanders had succeeded to the hattalions of others. He 
dismissed Philip and Balacrus, as commanders of light—armed 
troops, and argued that Philotas succeeded to Perdiccas* 
battalion after the battle of G-augamela and that he in turn 
was succeeded by Alcetas in 327 B.C. Craterus was succeeded 
by Gorgias in 328 B.C. and Coenus was succeeded by his son 
Antigenes in 327 B.C. Only the battalion of Cleitus was a 
new one, he concludes, added in 327 B.C.: Peithon succeeded 
to Cleitus* battalion in 326 B.C.
There are difficulties in both these views. If it is 
accepted with Berve that there were in fact eleven battalions 
of pezetairoi in India, it is very odd that only seven can 
be detected in the battle accounts: though our sources are 
far from complete, the omission of four battalions would be 
very surprising. On the other hand, Tarn*s complex succession 
of commands passing rapidly from one man to another is also 
unsatisfactory. In addition he has to force the evidence 
to suit his theory: because he believes that Philotas was 
succeeded by Alcetas, he has to dismiss as inaccurate Arrian*s 
reference to the taxis of Alcetas at 4,22,1, stating that it 
is a mistake for Meleager; and because he believes Gorgias 
succeeded Craterus in 328 B.C. and Antigenes succeeded Coenus 
in 327 B.C., Tarn has to produce the theory that the 
pezetairoi battalions in some cases, though not in others, 
retained the names of their former commanders. It is clear
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that Tarn has quite arbitrarily selected those parts of 
the evidence which suit his case and rejected those parts 
that do not.
One of the keys to the problem of the number of 
pezetairoi battalions is Arrian«s use of the term «taxis«.
It is the term regularly used by him of the pezetairoi 
battalions and probably was the official term: but as well 
as having this technical meaning, it is also applied by Arrian 
to any body of troops. This has been at the root of the 
confusion concerning the number of pezetairoi battalions: the 
crucial factor in establishing the number is deciding which 
usages in Arrian refer to pezetairoi battalions and which to 
other troops. Berve acknowledges that «taxis« does not always 
mean a battalion of pezetairoi and argues that one instance, 
at 6,17,3, refers to a unit of hypaspists.14 Yet elsewhere 
he is content to accept that taxis does mean a pezetairoi 
battalion without even discussing the possibility that it may 
refer to some other unit. Tarn rightly criticises him for 
this, but even he follows no consistent criterion in deciding 
where Arrian is using <taxis« of a pezetairoi battalion and 
where not.
It is clearly sound to begin from the secure evidence 
of the pezetairoi battalion commanders at the battle of 
Gaugamela. Where the name of one of these men is attached 
to a taxis it is safe to assume that it is a pezetairoi 
battalion to which reference is being made. There are, 
however, many instances of a taxis attached to the names of 
other men, and in such cases consideration should be given
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to the nature of the pezetairoi battalion command. The
pezetairoi battalions contained the mass of the Macedonians
in the army, and the spirit and morale of the men in these
battalions was undoubtedly an important factor in that of
the whole army. Also, in purely tactical importance, they
ranked beside the Companion cavalry. It is not surprising,
therefore, that command of one of these battalions was one
of the highest-ranking posts in the army, carrying with it
great influence, and held by men of great distinction. All
those who held these posts down to the battle of Gaugamela
were very prominent in the army, and it may be assumed that
Alexander was careful to choose men of strong leadership
qualities, who had the loyalty and confidence of the men.
Following the battle of Gaugamela there is no noticeable
change in the nature of the battalions15 and it seems safe to
assume that the nature of the commands also remained
unchanged. It follows that only prominent men are likely to
have held command of the battalions, and that it is likely
that Alexander avoided, as far as possible, the risk of
undermining morale and efficiency by frequent changes of
commander.. There was very little change in commanders during
16the first four years; and, in particular, the fact that
Amyntas retained his command despite his absence for
17eighteen.months, 1 underlines the importance of the relation­
ship between the battalion and its commander.
Keeping in mind the nature of the pezetairoi battalion 
command, we may now consider those taxeis in Arrian which 
appear for the first time after the battle of Gaugamela, and
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which, have "been thought to he pezetairoi battalions. They 
are the taxeis of Aloetas, Attalus, Gorgias, Cleitus, Peithon, 
Balacrus, Philip, Philotas and Antigenes.
Alcetas*  taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,1; 4,27,1} 5,11,3. 
Both the commander and the unit play a sufficiently prominent 
role to support the view that this was a pezetairoi battalion. 
Alcetas was of high birth, being the brother of Perdiccas, 
and is among those Alexander entrusts with command of 
independent missions (Arr. 4,27,1} 1,27,5): he had a position 
as prominent as that of Amyntas, Meleager and Polyperchon.^8
Attalus* taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,1; 24,1} 24,10; 6,
17,3, and in this case, also, both the commander and the unit
figure sufficiently prominently to indicate that it was a
pezetairoi battalion. Attalus was the son of Andromenes and
brother of Amyntas, and is mentioned along with Polypercfmn,
Gorgias and Meleager on an independent mission in Bactria in
328 B.G. (Arr. 4,16,1), and with Gorgias and Meleager when
these are left on an island in the Hydaspes before the battle
(Arr. 5,12,1). Further, he was in joint command of an
■independent mission against Ora in 327 B.O. (Arr. 4,27,5).
It may confidently be accepted that the taxis of Attalus
• 19was one of pezetairoi.
Gorgias1 taxis appears only once, at Arr. 4,22,7, where 
it is mentioned as part of the advance expedition sent to 
bridge the Indus: the taxeis of Cleitus and Meleager appear 
alongside it. Although his taxis is mentioned only here, 
Gorgias, presumably with his taxis, figures on two other 
occasions in the company of pezetairoi battalion commanders:
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at Arr. 4,16*1» tie is mentioned in joint command with
Polyperchon, Attalus and Meleager in Bactria in 328 B.C.,
and, at Arr. 5,12,1, he is left with Meleager and Attalus on
an island in the middle of the Hydaspes. Finally, he is
mentioned Toy Justin as one of the prominent Macedonians who
accompanied Craterus and the veterans discharged from Opis in
324 B.C. (12,12,8). These indications of Gorgia3* prominence
seem sufficient to support the view that the taxi3 of Gorgia3
20was one of pezetatroi.
Cleitus* taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,7 and 5,12,2: on one
occasion with the taxeis of Gorgias and Meleager on the
expedition to Bridge the Indus, and on the other occasion in
the preliminaries to the battle of the Hydaspes, with the
hypaspists and the taxis of Coenus. The contexts of these
two usages imply strongly that Gleitus was in command of a
pezetairoi battalion, and he is otherwise a very prominent
man, being mentioned in command of a hipparchy at Arr. 5,22,6
and 6,6,4. Finally, he appears in Justin*s list of the
prominent Macedonians discharged from Opis (12,12,8). There
seems good reason to think that Cleitus’ taxis was one of 
21pezetairoi.
Peithon's taxis is stated explicitly to have been one
of pezetairoi (Arr. 6,6,1) and so there need be no discussion
of this one. Although this unit is not specified elsewhere,
Peithon figures as commander of an independent mission both
at Arr. 6,7,2 and 6,17,4, presumably having his taxis with
22him both times.
The taxeis of Balacrus, Philip, Philotas and Antigene3
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come under suspicion "because of the lack of prominence of 
the units and their commanders. The other pezetairoi 
commanders make their mark in the sources and.clearly played 
a significant role in the campaigning over several years, hut 
these men have no stature hy comparison. I consider each man’s 
career individually.
Balacrus’ taxis appears at Arr. 4,24,10, where it is in
company with Attalus’ taxis under the command of Leonnatus
23during one of Alexander’s engagements with the Indians. ^
This taxis does not appear elsewhere. The only two men of 
any prominence hearing the name Balacrus, who appear in the 
sources, are the son of Nicanor (Berve II no.200) and the
commander of the javelin-men (Berve II no.202). The former
24was left in Cilicia as satrap after the battle of Issus  ^and
did not rejoin the main army. The commander of the javelin-
men, however, was a prominent officer with the main army,
being mentioned at Gaugamela (Arr. 3,12,3), and in the raid
against the Scythians (Arr. 4,4,6), and, probably, in a
reconnaissance mission in India (Curt. 8,11,22). If it is
not this Balacrus whose taxis is mentioned here, then another
prominent officer of this name, unknown outside this passage,
must be postulated. In fact there can be little doubt that
it is the unit of javelin-men to which Arrian refers here as 
25a taxis.
In the same passage (Arr. 4,24,10), the taxis of Philip 
appears in the company of the hypaspists and the taxi3 of 
Philotas under the command of Ptolemy in the same engagement 
with Indians. There was, of course, a Philip, son of Amyntao,
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who commanded a pezetairoi taxis at the battle of the 
Granicus, hut he lost his command to Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, 
before the battle of Issus and that battalion was now under 
Polyperchon, son of Simmias (see above pp .% f.) , According 
to Curtius (4,13,27), a Philip, son of Balacrus, had 
deputised for Amyntas at the battle of Gaugamela, but Amyntas 
had resumed his command after his return from Macedonia and, 
as I shall argue below, this battalion was under Attalus in 
327 B.C. There is no case for identifying this Philip with 
either of these former pezetairoi commanders; it was a 
common name in Macedonia and Greece, and there is no 
commander of prominence with whom this Philip could be 
identified. Berve accepted that' this taxis was another 
pezetairoi battalion, but Tarn argued that it was probabljr 
a light-armed unit, which balanced the javelin-men of 
Balacrus under Leonnatus. Whether Tarn is right about its 
being a light-armed troop or not (it may just as easily have 
consisted of mercenary hoplites), it seem3 hardly possible 
that it was a pezetairoi unit, for neither the unit nor the 
commander is known elsewhere.
In the same passage again another taxis appears, that 
of Philotas (Arr. 4,24,10). This unit was with the taxis 
of Philip and the hypaspists, all under Ptolemy. There has 
been substantial agreement that this taxis was one of 
pezetairoi, ^  and this view finds support in the appearance 
of this taxis also at 3,29,7, where it is part of the force 
which Ptolemy led in pursuit of Bessu3 in 329 B.C. The 
version, however, which Ptolemy gives of his part in the
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capture of the rival king has been called into question "by 
Welles, who argues convincingly that the less dramatic
noaccount of Aristohulus is to he preferred: in his account,
Bessus was surrendered hy the followers of Spitamenes and 
Dataphernes■(Arr. 4,30,5). If Aristohulus does have the 
more accurate version, no force was sent out after Bessus and 
the taxis of Philotas did not take part. Welles suggests 
that Ptolemy may have drawn details from some later mission 
he led, perhaps this one, or some minor engagement not worthy 
of being reported. In any case, the important point for U3 
is that if the taxis of Philotas did not play a prominent 
role in the pursuit of Bessus, the only action it performed 
which was thought worthy of mention hy the ancient sources is 
in this minor engagement with some Indians. Not only does 
the unit not appear elsewhere hut neither does Philotas himself. 
Berve (II no.803) sees a reference to this Philotas in Arr. 
5,18,6:2  ^at the assault on the Persian Gates early in 330 B.C., 
Alexander sent Amyntas, Philotas and Coenus with the larger 
part of the army towards the River Araxes, while he led the 
assault force against the stronghold of the Gates. Berve 
argues that this Philotas commanded a pezetairoi battalion, 
pointing out that he is listed between two pezetairoi 
commanders. However, hy far the most likely man of this name 
to hold a command in the company of Amyntas, son of Andromenes, 
and Coenus, son of Polemocrates, is Philotas, son of Parmenio. 
Tarn says that Philotas, son of Parmenio, could not have been 
casually mentioned between two 'phalanx leaders', as if of 
equal rank, hut Tarn, I believe, greatly underestimates the
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importance of Amyntas and Coenus. It must also be noticed
that Alexander took less than half the Companion cavalry on 
30the assault, and it therefore seems likely that the 
commander of the Companion cavalry went with the larger part 
of his cavalry. Someone must have been in command of the 
large part of the cavalry not with Alexander. If some concern 
is felt about the order in which the names are listed in
Arrian, it should be noted that in Curtius* account of the 
episode (5 ,4 ,2 0 .3 0 ), Philotas is explicitly made the most 
distinguished officer in command. It seems wrong to suppose 
that this prominent officer at the Persian Gates was any 
other than Philotas, son of Parmenio.
I would conclude, therefore, that the taxis of Philotas 
has no more claim to being accepted as pezetairoi than the 
taxeis of Balacrus and Philip, which also make their sole 
appearance in this passage. That three instances of the use 
of *taxis1 in reference to troops other than pezetairoi 
should occur in one passage is remarkable. It is also remark­
able that a minor engagement should be covered in such detail, 
and this fact accounts for the specific mention of less 
important units which would not normally figure at all. The 
reason for the detail is doubtless that Ptolemy, as a leading 
actor, made the most of the episode, even to the extent of 
saying that the opponents were much the most warlike of those 
in the area.(Arr. 4,25,3). It may be, even, that Ptolemy 
made a deliberate attempt to mislead his readers into thinking
..........................  31that they were pezetairoi battalions.
The taxis of Antigenes appears at Arrian 6,17,3, as one
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of the units sent with Craterus through Arachosia and
Drangiana in 325 B.C. (on the date see above Ch.III n.63)*
It appears beside the taxeis of Attalus and Meleager and at
32first sight may seem to consist of pezetairoi. It does not,
however, appear at any other place, and there are no
indications elsewhere that Antigenes held a rank equal to
that of the commanders of pezetairoi battalions: he is never
mentioned in command, or joint command, of an independent
mission. At the battle of the Hydaspes he does appear
between Seleucus and Tauron  ^as joint commander of the
infantry phalanx (Arr. 5,16,3), but the accounts of the
battle are so confused that the significance of this evidence
is not clear. According to Arrian 5,13,4, the only infantry
which crossed the river with Alexander was the hypaspists,
the archers, the Agrianes and the javelin-men: and he states
that Seleucus had command of the »royal hypaspists» (13,4) and
Tauron of the archers (14,1). If this evidence is taken with
that of 5,16,3, it follows that Antigenes is left with
command of the Agrianes and javelin-men, as the »royal
hypaspists* are simply the hypaspists (see below p .
However, it is clear that the details of the commanders of
the phalanx at 5,16,3 come from a different source from those
about Seleucus» command of the hypaspists and Tauron's command
34of the archers at 5,13,4 and 14,1. We are, therefore, not 
justified in using the passages closely together, and even if 
we do use them in this way, nothing about Antigenes» 
permanent command emerges, for if he did lead the Agrianes and 
javelin-men, it was- only for the duration of the battle: for
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the Agrianes and javelin-men did not form a permanent unit.
Tarn uses the evidence' of Arrian*s account of the "battle
to show that Antigenes did command a pezetairoi battalion,
but his case-is based upon a wrong interpretation. He assumes
that the phalanx under Seleucus, Antigenes and Tauron at
Arrian 5,16,3 actually contained five battalions of pezetairoi,
35and that it was these that Antigenes commanded.  ^ But there
is no evidence that there were any pezetairoi in this phalanx,
and it is fantastic that an otherwise insignificant officer
should have had so high a command. Tarn feels obliged to
apologise for this view, and suggests that Antigenes was the 
36son of Coenus^ and that Alexander, seeing the father*s 
qualities in the son, not only made him commander of his 
father*s battalion but also, for the purpose of the battle, 
made him commander of all the pezetairoi in the line. His 
case is made even more outrageous by his having to assume that 
although Antigenes had taken over Coenus* battalion, it 
actually had retained Coenus* name.
There is, in fact, nothing to connect Antigenes with the 
pezetairoi. and the lack of prominence of the man and his 
unit1 make it most unlikely that he commanded a battalion of 
pezetairoi. It does seem likely, however, that Antigenes 
commanded Macedonians: this is indicated by the context of 
Arrian 6,17,3» All the troops which Arrian lists, with the 
exception of the archers, who were Iranian, were Macedonian^ 
and the unit of Antigenes was one of the Macedonian units 
which Alexander wished to spare the march through the desert
38of Gedrosia.
n o
If Antigenes* taxis did consist of Macedonians, it must
have "been hypaspist, and since the hypaspists were organised
39into chiliarchies at this stage, we must assume that the 
taxis of Antigenes mentioned at Arr. 6,17,3 was a chiliarchy 
of h y p a s p i s t s T h a t  Arrian should use »taxis1 where he 
might more accurately have used »chiliarchy» is no surprise^ 
and I find no difficulty in accepting that Alexander detached 
a part of the hypaspists to go with Craterus. I shall argue 
"below that the command structure of the hypaspists was 
flexible enough at this time to allow for easy detachment of 
a part of the hypaspists, and Alexander no doubt judged that 
Craterus needed a force of hypaspists to make his force 
properly balanced (see also Appendix V p. 4 . 2 $ ) . The tactical 
importance of the role of the hypaspists in conjunction with 
archers, which also formed a part of Craterus* force, needs 
no emphasising (Arr. 5,23,7; 6,21,3 et passim.).
I suggest, therefore, that the taxeis of Balacrus, Philip, 
Philotas and Antigenes were not pezetairoi units and I now 
leave them out of account. The men who commanded pezetairoi 
units in the years following the battle of Gaugamela are as 
follows: Amyntas, Perdiccas, Coenus, Polyperchon, Meleager, 
Craterus, Alcetas, Attalus, Gorgias, Cleitus and Peithon. In 
order to understand the way in which the pezetairoi units 
developed it is necessary to look more closely at the careers 
of these men in order, if possible, to fix the dates between 
which they held their commands. This will enable us to decide 
which battalions were new and which simply changed their 
commander. I begin with the commanders at the battle of
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G-augamela.
Polyperchon retained M s  command of M s  pezetairoi 
"battalion until he was dismissed with Craterus and the 
veterans from Opis in 324 B.C. (Arr. 7,12,4; Just. 12,12,8). 
His taxis appears frequently in the sources (Arr. 4,22,1;
Curt. 8,5,2; Arr. 4,25,6; 6,5,5) and his name, without his 
unit, appears at Curt. 5,4,20; Arr. 4,16,1; 5,11,3. There 
can be no doubt that he retained his command throughout the 
years 351 to 324 B.C... Meleager also retained his command 
through these years, and is still a prominent Macedonian 
infantry commander with the expeditionary force after 
Alexanders death (Curt. 10,6,20ff.). His taxis appears at 
Arr. 3,18,4; 4,17,5; 6,17,3, and his name without his unit at 
Curt. 7,6,19; Arr. 4,16,1; 5,12,1).
Polyperchon and Meleager certainly retained their 
commands throughout, two others, Amyntas and Coenus, certainly 
gave up their commands for they died during the course of the 
campaign. Amyntas resumed his command on his return from 
Macedonia (Arr. 3,23,2; 3,24,1; 3,25,6), but he died in the 
winter of 350/29 B.C. (Arr. 3,27,5). Coenus continued in his 
command up until his death in summer 326 B.C. (Arr. 6,2,1) 
and his taxis is very prominent throughout this period (Arr. 
3,24,1; 3,25,6; 4,24,1; 4,25,6; 4,28,8; 5,12,2; 5,21,1).
It can hardly be coincidental that Attalus, the younger 
brother of Amyntas, appears as a battalion commander after 
Amyntas* death. The ties between battalion and commander were 
very strong among the pezetairoi and it was no doubt good for 
morale if the brother of the former commander took over the
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post. It has, therefore, been generally assumed that
42Attalus succeeded to Amyntas* command, for although his 
taxis is not mentioned until Arr. 4,22,1 (327 B.C.), he 
appears with other pezetairoi battalion commanders at 4,16,1 
(328 B.C.), and there can be no doubt that he took over his 
brother1s battalion on Amyntas* death in the winter of 330/
29 B.C.
The other command which certainly fell vacant was that of
Coenus. It is clearly preferable to assume that he was
succeeded by one of those known to have commanded a pezetairoi
battalion. Of these, only Peithon could have succeeded him
because all the others are known to have held their posts
before Coenus* death in the summer of 326 B.G., whereas
Peithon appears in this role only at Arr. 6,6,1, shortly after 
43Coenus* death.. The identity of this Peithon is not settled. 
Berve gave him a separate entry (II no.623) from the ‘body­
guard*, son of Crateuas (no.621), allowing for the possibility 
of identity, but pointing out that Arrian should have made the 
identification clear if they had been the same man. Tarn (II 
p.147), however, asserts quite definitely that they are the 
same man and, although Peithon is quite a common name, I think 
it likely that it was the son of Crateuas that took over 
Coenus* battalion. It seems unnecessary to assume that there 
were two prominent officers of this name in the campaign force 
in the last three years of Alexander*s life.
Perdiccas and Craterus remained prominent throughout the 
campaigning, but their taxeis disappear from the sources during 
the later years of the Asian expedition. Perdiccas* taxis
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is not mentioned again after Arr. 3,18,5 (early 330 B.C.) 
and Craterus* taxis, prominent down to 327 B.C. (Arr. 3,18,4; 
3,23,2; 4,22,1), does not appear after early spring of that 
year. Scholars have found it impossible to believe that 
Perdiccas* battalion, if it continued under this name, could 
have escaped mention through the remaining seven years of the 
campaign. As Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, appears as 
a Pezetairoi battalion commander after 327 B.C. (Arr. 4,22,1), 
there has been general agreement among scholars that Perdiccas 
gave up his command to his brother. This is surely right, 
but the precise date at which Alcetas took over cannot be 
fixed definitely, except within the limits of 330 and 327 B.C. 
Berve (II nos.627 and 45) suggested that Alcetas may have 
taken over when Perdiccas was promoted to the post of ’body­
guard* in 330 B.C. However, even if Perdiccas was given this 
honour in 3 3 0 B.C.,^ and there is no good evidence that he 
held this post until the end of 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,21,4), he
may well have continued to hold his command of the pezetairoi 
45battalion. It seems not unlikely, in fact, that the change 
was part of the reorganisation which took place after the 
death of Cleitus in the autumn of 328 B.C.^
The other commander at the battle of Gaugamela was 
Craterus. He certainly retained his command until 327 B.C.: 
the last mention of his taxis is at Arr. 4,22,1. Berve (II 
no.446) believed that there was evidence that Craterus 
continued to hold this post: at 4,23,5 Arrian records that 
Alexander left Craterus on a separate mission Tots *AX Off 
¿ ¡ y e / i o n  -rZv, ...... This cannot, however, be used
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with any confidence to support the view that Craterus con­
tinued to he a pezetairoi battalion commander. The word etWo?
47here may simply mean «also*: ' or Arrian may he using the word 
merely to differentiate between those infantry units Alexander 
was taking with him against the Aspasians - that is, the 
hypaspists, the archers, the Agrianes and the taxeis of Coenus 
and Attalus (4,24,1) - and those he was leaving behind with 
Craterus. Berve is not certain whether he retained his 
battalion command after this time (early summer 327 B.C.) or 
not, but Schachermeyr asserts that Craterus did retain his 
infantry command until 324 B.C. (Al, d.Gr ♦ He explains
that the taxis of Craterus does not appear in Arrian after 
early 327 B.C. because Arrian knew he was in command of a 
hipparchy and could not accept that the same commander could 
also hold an infantry command. This argument depends upon 
crediting Arrian with much greater sensitivity than he
Aftactually possessed. There is, in fact, no indication that 
Craterus was a pezetairoi commander after early 327 B.C.
While the fact that his taxis is not mentioned is not 
conclusive proof that he lost his command (Gorgias* taxis 
appears only once (Arr. 4,22,7) ), one would expect Craterus« 
battalion to be more prominent than Gorgias* because Craterus 
was a much more important officer. The omission of any 
mention of the battalion is particularly striking in two 
passages of Arrian (5,11,3 and 6,17,3), where other taxeis 
put under Craterus* command are specified, but there is no 
reference to his own. It would certainly be expected that in 
these contexts it would have received mention if it had
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existed. It is also worth, noting that if Perdiccas gave up 
his command (and there is general agreement on this), there 
is some reason to suppose that Craterus, who held a similar 
rank in the army and the Macedonian aristocracy, also gave up 
his, and at about the same time. The indications are that 
Craterus gave up his infantry command sometime after the 
compaign he led in the early months of 327 B.C., hut before the 
summer of the following year, when the absence of his 
battalion from accounts of the battle on the Hydaspes is 
significant.
Tarn (II p.145) believed that Gorgias succeeded to
Craterus1 command, but there are insuperable obstacles to>
this belief. G-orgias appears in the role of pezetairoi 
commander in 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,16,1) while Craterus* taxis is 
mentioned by Arrian in early 321 B.C. (4,22,1).^ Tarn 
explained that the taxis continued to be known by the name of 
Craterus »for a time*, even after he had ceased to be its 
commander. Obviously this explanation is not satisfactory, 
and if we do accept, as seems most reasonable, that one of the 
battalion commanders known to us succeeded to Craterus» 
position, it follows that the only possible successor is 
Cleitus. His taxis appears for the first time at Arr. 4,22,7, 
at the very start of the Indian campaign, in the early summer 
of 327 B.C.: thus the change would have been made on the eve 
of the Indian campaign after Craterus had returned from the 
campaign against Austanes and Catanes (Arr. 4,22,1), in the 
spring of 327 B.C. Nothing is known of Cleitus* background
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or qualifications, "but from this time he appears frequently 
and prominently both during and after Alexander*s lifetime 
(Berve II no.428 and see above, Ch.III pp. Sl-f. ).
It thus appears likely that all the new commanders 
except Gorgias succeeded to the commands of battalions 
already in existence at the battle of Gaugamela. Alcetas 
succeeded to the command of his brother Perdiccas, probably 
in the winter of 328/7 B.C., and Attalus to the command of his 
brother Amyntas in the winter of 350/29 B.C. Cleitus 
succeeded to the battalion of Craterus in the spring of 327 
B.C. and, finally, Peithon took over from Coenus on the 
latter*s death in summer 326 B.C. Of the other battalions at 
the battle of Gaugamela, both remained under their commanders, 
Polyperchon and Meleager.
Only one battalion was added by Alexander, therefore, 
during the course of the campaigning, namely that of Gorgias. 
He appears in his role as pezetairoi commander in 328 B.C., 
when he is left in Bactria with other pezetairoi commanders 
to keep order (Arr. 4,16,1). However, because he does not 
appear until 328 B.C., it does not necessarily follow that 
the battalion was not added until this time. Our sources for 
the years 351 to 328 B.C. give a far from full coverage and 
it would not be at all surprising if this battalion was with 
the main army during all or part of this time and by some 
chance escaped notice.
Despite Berve*s argument (see below) that new battalions 
were formed by taking parts of existing battalions and 
joining them to mercenary and Iranian troops, I believe that
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it is most probable that the new battalion was recruited on
the same basis as the others had been, i.e. that it was drawn
50from a recruiting district of Macedonia. I shall argue this 
point more fully below p.//7, but, anticipating the conclusion, 
I would suggest that there is a strong probability that the 
new battalion was created when the only Macedonian reinforce­
ments attested after the battle of Gaugamela arrived, that is,
51at the end of 331 B.C. There is perhaps some support for
this view in Curtius. Immediately after the death of Philotas
in autumn 330 B.C. Amyntas is brought before the army to
answer charges against him: in his defence, Amyntas claims
that he has been undeservedly maligned by Olympias, because
he took some of her favourites during his recruiting mission
of 332/1 B.C. He points to men serving Alexander well thanks
to his efforts, Gorgias, Hecataeus and Gorgatas (7,1,33).
Beloch (p.329) sees this Gorgias as the uezetairoi commander
and cites Curtius1 passage as evidence that Gorgias and his
battalion arrived in 331 B.C. with the reinforcements that
came with Amyntas. Berve (II nos.233 and 234) argued that
this identification is not acceptable because Gorgias, the
battalion commander, was a mature man, while Curtius implies
that the Gorgias in his passage is a young shirker. Berve*s
52argument, however, is not conclusive. Curtius would not 
have hesitated to use the name of any prominent person among 
the reinforcements of 331 B.C. in order to build up Amyntas* 
argument. I believe that some credence should be given to 
Beloch's identification.
Bor Tarn (II p.144) there was conclusive proof that no
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new "battalions were added when the reinforcements arrived 
in 331 B.C. This proof lay in Arrian's failure to mention 
it at 3,16,10, which records only that Alexander integrated 
the cavalry reinforcements into the Companions and added the 
infantry t u I* vi^orc -ruts ~ \ \ n s , arranging them
according to tribes (for the full text, see above Ch.III n.13) 
Tarn interpreted this to mean that Alexander distributed all 
the infantry reinforcements among 'the existing battalions', 
and that Arrian's wording rules out the possibility that any 
new battalion was formed. Milns, however, has the opposite 
opinion (GRBS 7 p.160). He points out that Arrian says 
nothing of the 'existing battalions' and translates 'he added 
the infantry to the other battalions, each man according to 
nationality'. He concludes that 'the emphatic position of the 
words y u f  strongly implies that there was a battalion
or battalions, over and above the ones to which additions 
were made*. Milns is certainly right that Arrian's text 
contains no implicit or explicit reference to existing 
battalions only being involved in the reinforcement. He 
himself, however, reads far too much into the text in seeing 
a strong implication that a new battalion, or battalions, was 
added. The word order is hardly enough to support the inter­
pretation of Arrian's text to the effect that some of the 
reinforcements formed a new battalion, or battalions, and the 
rest were distributed among the other battalions. The words 
Tttir oiW euf surely do no more than look forward to the next 
phrase concerning the system of distribution: it has the 
meaning of 'individual' (see above, Ch.III n.13).
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There is nothing in the text to indicate that new 
battalions were added, but this has no more significance than 
that Arrian did not record that the number of battalions was 
increased. It is quite wrong to do as Tarn did and count 
the omission in Arrian as proof that no additional battalion 
was formed at the end of 531 B.C. Arrian*s failure to mention 
such an addition carries no weight in the face of the very- 
strong probability that the seventh battalion was added when 
reinforcements from Macedonia arrived. The only Macedonian 
reinforcement which is recorded in the sources is that of 
December 351 B.C. Many scholars have admitted that the 
seventh battalion could have been added only when fresh 
Macedonian troops arrived, but they have preferred to assume 
that reinforcements arrived at a later time and have escaped 
mention in the sources. This procedure is not sound, as I 
shall try to show below (pp. Ì3Ì-P. ). I would conclude, 
therefore, that among the reinforcements which Amyntas brought 
out from Macedonia at the end of 331 B.C. was a newly formed 
territorial battalion of pezetairoi, ^  of which the commander 
was Gorgias. The background of Gorgias and the recruiting 
district of the battalion are unknown.
There is no indication that the size and number of the 
pezetairoi battalions changed before the return from India, 
but it may be that when Alexander selected Macedonians whom 
he considered past service and sent them with Craterus through 
Arachosia and Drangiana in 325 B.C. (Arr. 6,17,3), some 
reduction took place. I have suggested above (Ch.III p 
that the number of hipparchies of Companion cavalry may have
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"been reduced from six to four at this time. Although Arrian
does not specify that Macedonian infantry as ■well as cavalry
past service were selected, it seems reasonable to assume that
there were infantry among 'the other Macedonians* whom
54Alexander designated for discharge. There is, however, no 
indication of the number of pezetairoi battalions in the last 
years of Alexander*s reign and it is impossible to know 
whether the number was reduced at this time. Perhaps Alexander 
did not interfere with the traditional territorial divisions 
and left the number at seven. It is certain, at least, that 
the battalions of Meleager and Attalus continued (Arr. 6,17,5)* 
In the early summer of 530 B.C. Alexander left Parmenio 
in the centre of the Persian Empire while he continued east­
wards (Arr. 3,19,7). Parmenio had held overall command of the
heavy infantry and his removal from the main army meant
55increased responsibility for the battalion commanders. The 
nature of the warfare in the years following Gaugamela made 
it essential that the pezetairoi battalion commanders should 
take on more responsibility. Apart from the 6,000 detached 
to guard the treasury in 350 B.C., who were -under Parmenio*s 
command (Arr. 5,19,7), Craterus and Amyntas were detached to 
guard Parthiene (Curt. 6,4,2; Arr. 3,25,2), and Craterus again, 
to reduce a pocket of resistance among the Arii (Curt. 6,6,25) 
and later to take Cyropolis (Arr. 4,2,1; Curt. 7,6,17). 
perdiccas and Meleager went against the Memaceni (Curt. 7,6,19) 
and Craterus was left with most of the phalanx while Alexander 
pursued Spitamenes (Arr. 4,6; 55 Curt. 7,9,20). In 328 B.C. 
Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager were left in Bactria
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to keep order (Arr. 4,16,1) and Coenus was sent off towards 
the Scythians (Arr. 4,16,3). Then Craterus went on a 
separate mission against the Massagetae (Arr. 4,17,1) and 
Coenus and Meleager were left in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,17,3). 
Although it is not always specified that these commanders 
took their taxeis with them, there seems no doubt that they 
did. It is clear that in the years following 331 33.C. the 
pezetairoi battalions were truly independent strategic units 
and there was no place for an overall commander.
Schachermeyr expressed the opinion that there was a far
reaching reform in early 327 B.C. in which Alexander
reorganised the army into small task forces comprised of a
hipparchy of Companion cavalry and a pezetairoi battalion or
hypaspist unit and containing the different types of troop
56necessary for totally independent action. There is, however, 
no evidence to support this view and although in practice the 
same units tended to join together for independent missions,
I doubt whether it was a formal arrangement. In any case, 
there is no marked difference in the operations before and 
after spring of 327 B.C. which could suggest a far reaching 
reform such as Schachermeyr proposed. The fact that Coenus 
and Cleitus commanded both hipparchies of Companion cavalry 
and battalions of pezetairoi infantry does not seem to support 
Schachermeyr*s case: ' neither Coenus nor Cleitus are 
particularly prominent as leaders of independent missions.
The double offices of these two men may indicate no more than 
that Alexander was short of good officers whom he could trust 
(see also Ch.III p.Si ).
122
(Id) Internal Organisation
At the same time as the reinforcements were integrated 
and the seventh battalion added, there was a general 
reorganisation of the army. The reform of the Companion 
cavalry has already been dealt with (Ch.III pp .¿O -R ), but
the infantry also was reformed in a parallel reorganisation. 
Diodorus (17,65,2f.) makes a general statement about the 
commanders of the army being strengthened in number and 
quality, but makes no specific statement about the infantry 
units (Ch.III p. 6 0  ).
Curtius (5,2,3ff.) has a more detailed description of a 
specific reform of the infantry. He records that while 
resting the army in Sittacene, to prevent the soldiers from 
becoming slack because of the leisure, Alexander appointed 
judges and put up prizes for those competing in a contest of 
military valour: 'those who should have been judged the 
bravest were each to command a body of 1,000 men - they called 
them chiliarchies - this being the first time that the forces 
were divided into that number; for previously there had been 
lochoi consisting of 500 men, and the prizes of command had 
not gone to bravery. A great throng of soldiers had assembled 
to take part in this illustrious contest, both to act as 
witnesses of the deeds of each entrant, and to give their 
opinion as to the judges; for they could not fail to know 
whether honour was paid to each man justly or falsely. Hirst 
of all the prize for valour was awarded to old Atarrhias, who 
before Halicarnassus, when the battle was abandoned by the 
younger, men, had been chiefly instrumental in arousing them
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to action, Antigenes was judged to be next to him, Philotas I
of Augaea gained third place, the fourth was assigned to 
Amyntas, and after these came Antigonus and next lyncestes 
Amyntas, Theodotus gained seventh place, and Hellanicus the 
last.*98
Diodorus * evidence on its own tells us very little. It jl 
is clear that Alexander increased the number of officers in . 1'i !
the army and appointed more high-ranking commanders: also, j
i
some emphasis was placed upon promotion on merit. But ij'Ij!
specific details are lacking. Curtius» evidence can perhaps ¿i
i I
tell us more, but there are difficulties in his account. It j
is an odd procedure for Alexander to have held a competition 'I
in military valour in order to keep the soldiers on their i
mettle and to have awarded as prizes chiliarchies, which were 1; 
high-ranking officer positions. Both Berve and Milns have Jj
been unable to accept that this is what Alexander actually did?9 
He would surely have wanted personal control over the promotion | 
of officers and would not have handed the task over to a board j
of judges, under the supervision of the common soldiers. |;1:1:
Berve thinks that Curtius really means pentacosiarchies, not j!
!i
chiliarchies, and accepts that Alexander appointed penta- j;
cosiarchs in this way, but, as Milns points out, there is no 
justification for this interpretation.60
It seems so out of character for Alexander to have 
allowed others to appoint his officers, that I cannot accept 
Curtius» evidence as it stands. Diodorus* evidence, for what 
it is worth, indicates that Alexander made his own study of i 
the records, and there is an added difficulty. The number of
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victors rewarded with the office of chiliarch is given at 
eight. X shall argue below that the whole Macedonian heavy 
infantry was involved in the reform, not just the hypaspists, 
as Berve and Milns believe,61 and there were many more than 
eight chiliarchies of these, if it is accepted that only the 
hypaspists were involved the number is too great.
Milns seems to have the correct explanation of the 
difficulty of Curtius* passage. He suggests that Curtius, or 
his source, has conflated two separate incidents which 
occurred in Sittacene, and that the awarding of prizes to men 
of outstanding service should be seen as being quite distinct 
from the reorganisation of the infantry. There is no reason 
to reject that a competition was held, in which brave conduct 
was measured by a board of judges under the eye of the men: 
as Milns points out, it would have been good for morale. The 
competition was not, of course, an open one, but seems to have 
been restricted to officers below the top rank. The winner 
Atarrhias (Berve II no.178) seems to have been an officer of 
the hypaspists: in the following year (330 B.C.) he led 300 
armed men, certainly hypaspists, to make the arrest of 
Philotas (Curt. 6,8,19.22). The runner up, Antigenes, may 
also have been an hypaspist officer, if he is to be identified 
with the officer of that name discussed above (pp./07£ ). 
Berve, however, suggests that the Antigenes of this passage 
is of lower rank, but he presents no compelling reason for 
this.62 Philotas Augaeus (who came third) and Hellanicus 
(eighth) have been plausibly identified by Berve (II nos.807; 
298) with the officers who led the defence of some siege
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machinery at Halicarnassus (Arr. 1,21,5). It should he 
noted in this connection that Atarrhias received his prize 
for bravery at the siege of Halicarnassus. Theodotus 
(Berve no.361) and Antigonus (the latter cannot he the 
»One eyed» (Berve II no.87) ) do not appear elsewhere in 
the sources, and the two men hearing the name of Amyntas 
cannot certainly he identified with any of the others of that 
name, all of whom seem too high ranking in the Macedonian 
aristocracy.
Although all the winners cannot he certainly identified, 
it seems likely that this contest was held among the lower 
ranking officers of the infantry, with rewards for those 
judged to have given proof of outstanding bravery during the 
early years of the campaigning. The prize-giving may he 
compared with part of the celebrations held by Alexander at 
the end of the Indian campaign, when prizes were given to more 
prominent officers for outstanding conduct (Arr. 7,5,4).
Just as there is every likelihood that there was a 
prize-giving in Sittacene, more or less of the character 
described by Curtius, so there is every probability that there 
was an infantry reorganisation along the lines described. 
Diodorus states that Alexander appointed more high ranking 
officers, which is also the implication of Curtius1 evidence, 
and it is known that chiliarchies became a division of at 
least the hypaspists.
• Berve, and he is followed by Milns, was of the opinion
that the reorganisation described by Curtius affected only
63the hypaspists. ' Berve gave no arguments in favour of this 
view but was, no doubt, led to this belief by the appearance
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of chiliarchies of hypaspists in the later years of the 
campaign (Arr. 3,29,7; 4,30,5; 5,23,7). Milns argues that it 
cannot refer to the pezetairoi hecause no change in the size 
of the pezetairoi battalions is attested.^ The hypaspists, 
however, formed only a small part of the whole Macedonian 
infantry body and the natural interpretation of Curtius» 
evidence is that all the infantry was involved. In addition, 
the evidence of Diodorus indicates that some quite far reaching 
reorganisation of the command system was carried through, not 
that only a small part of the infantry was reorganised. I can 
see no reason to modify the meaning of Curtius* passage in the 
way Berve and Milns suggest. The fact that there were 
chiliarchies of hypaspists is no indication that there were 
not also chiliarchies of pezetairoi.^  An argument from 
silence can carry no weight as we know hardly anything of the 
size and subdivisions of the pezetairoi battalions. Curtius 
does not say that the chiliarchies replaced the territorial 
battalions as the basic strategic unit.
I would, therefore, interpret Curtius1 evidence to mean 
that the reorganisation involved the pezetairoi battalions, 
as well as the hypaspists (on the hypaspists, see below 
pp. ). Until this time (late 331 B.C.) each battalion
(1,500 strong, see Ch.II p.^ff) had consisted of divisions 
of 500 men, as Curtius states (see also above, p./22), but 
after this time it contained two chiliarchies, each 
chiliarchy being divided into two subdivisions (see further 
below pf>.t30£). The effect of this change would have been 
to make the battalions more flexible and the officer strength
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"better. It would also have made the battalions more 
flexible, allowing for the easier subdivision of them. The 
new positions of chiliarch were probably filled by Alexander 
in the way indicated by Diodorus, on the basis of the past 
record of the men (see also on the cavalry reform, Ch.III
We must here notice Milns* ‘tentative* reconstruction 
of the divisions of the pezetairoi battalions. Basing his 
ideas upon what is known of the organisation of the phalanx 
of Philip V, Milns suggests that in 331 B.C. the taxis. which, 
he believes, had a paper strength of 1,500, was divided into 
three pentacosiarchies of 500: each pentacosiarchy was 
divided into two lochoi of 250 men; each lochos contained two 
tetrarchies of 125 men; each tetrarchy consisted of eight
gg
decades of 16 men. There is, however, little supporting 
evidence for this reconstruction. Curtius* evidence, as I 
have argued, may be taken as indicating that the taxis was 
divided into chiliarchies and each of these was divided into 
two sections of about 500. There is, however, nothing to 
indicate that these sections were called ‘pentacosiarchies*:^  
Curtius says nothing about such a term being introduced, and 
I would think it unlikely that Alexander had pentacosiarchies 
from the beginning of the Asian campaign. Terms drawn from 
numerical strength were not usual for the larger infantry 
divisions among the Greeks. ‘Lochos‘ was the usual word for
go
the largest subdivision of a battalion, and since it is 
established that there were lochoi of infantry in Alexander*s 
army, it seems likely that these divisions of 500 were, in
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fact, called 'lochoi'.^  Rolfe assumes this in his trans­
lation given above (p. 1 2 2 ) . »Lochos»' continued to be a term 
applied to a subdivision of infantry at least until the 
reforms of 324 B.C», when the terms 'pentacosiarchy* and 
'hecatostys' were introduced.70
-A-S for the smaller sections, it is not sound to work from 
parallels from the army of Philip V. His phalanx was 
certainly based upon a file depth of sixteen men, each file
- ............ •71being called a 'lochos *. It is by no means certain that 
Alexander's phalanx was similarly structured. It is agreed 
that the original Macedonian file depth was ten,72 but 
Domaszewski suggested that in.Alexander the Great's time it 
was sixteen men.,-/ He argued this on the basis of Arrian's 
description, of the decas of four Macedonian heavy infantry 
and twelve Persian archers and javelin-men, formed by Alexander 
at the end of his life. However, the mixed decas of 
Macedonian heavy infantry and Iranian light infantry can ' 
hardly be seen as a typical phalangite file, and there can be 
no certainty that a file depth of sixteen men was basic for 
the regular phalanx. Callisthenes (Polyb. 12,19,6) says that 
Alexander marched to Issus in a column with files eight men 
deep, and Arrian (1,6,1), in describing a formation which 
Alexander adopted in the Danube campaign, says that the depth 
was one hundred and twenty men. It could be, therefore, that 
the sections were based on the number eight. It does not, 
however, seem safe to make any confident judgment: it may be 
that the phalanx under Alexander the Great was not so rigid 
as it later became.1^
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If the file depth under Alexander the Great was not 
sixteen (certainly it was not called a »lochos»)t then it is 
not justifiable to use the structure of the phalanx under 
Philip V to help reconstruct the groupings of files. Under 
Philip V eight decades formed a tetrarchy, but there is only 
one very doubtful piece of evidence that tetrarchies existed 
in the Macedonian army of the fourth century B.G. A monument 
found at Thermopylae bears the inscription ‘the work of the 
tetrarchy of Philip*: it has been dated to the middle of the 
fourth century B.C.^ As Dittberner points out, Philip II 
was active in this area at this time, and this tetrarchy could 
have consisted of Macedonians. On the other hand, there is 
nothing to connect the inscription with the Macedonians 
and it cannot be used to prove that ‘tetrarchy* was a term in 
use in the Macedonian army of Philip II.^ The question of the 
existence of infantry tetrarchies under Alexander the Great 
must be left open.
Pinaily, the term ‘speira* under Philip V referred to a 
company of 256 men, that is sixteen files. It is generally 
agreed that the word was not in use under Alexander the Great, 
but Milns suggests that it took over the meaning of ‘lochos‘ 
after Alexander*s death, when ‘lochos‘ came to be referred to 
the single file of the phalanx. There is, however, no 
evidence that what was a »speira* under Philip Y was a »lochos* 
trader Alexander the Great, and it seems best simply to admit 
that we do not know the organisation and terminology of the 
smaller divisions of the phalanx.
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(c) Reinforcements and Losses
The strength of the pezetairoi at the time of the 
crossing to Asia in 334- B.C. was 9,000 (see Ch.II p . ^ 7  ).
A reinforcement of 3,000 Macedonian infantry reached Alexander 
in the following year at Gordium (Arr. 1,29,4), the majority 
of which must have gone into the pezetairoi. ^  Losses through 
garrisoning and casualties must he taken into account hut 
these were prohahly not very high. Milns has reckoned that 
losses down to the battle of Gaugamela may have reduced the 
main force hy 3,000,  ^hut this figure seems disproportionately 
high. Tarn and Marsden are inclined to think that losses were 
not great, and Marsden points out that Alexander seems to have
OA
regrouped his garrison troops for the battle of Gaugamela.
On the whole, I think it ■unlikely that many more than 1,500 
Macedonian heavy infantry were lost to Alexander in the four
Q-|
years to the battle of Gaugamela, so perhaps about 10,500 
heavy infantry of the pezetairoi lined up at Gaugamela.
In the battle the pezetairoi do not seem to have 
suffered greatly although a gap was opened in the line (Arr. 
3*14,4): perhaps something under 200 would be a reasonable 
estimate of losses. A garrison of 700 Macedonians was left 
in the citadel at Babylon (Curt. 5,1,43): although 2,000 
other forces were also left there, it is unlikely that they 
were Macedonian. Therefore, not more than about 1,000 
pezetairoi were lost between the battle of Gaugamela and the 
arrival of the reinforcements in December 331 B.C., so when 
the 6,000 reinforcements arrived (Diod. 17,65,1; Arr. 3,16,10; 
Curt. 5,1,40; see above pp.H7-f.), even allowing for substantial
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reinforcement of the hypaspists (see “below pp.l50f.), rather 
more than 14,000 pezetairoi were with the main army. Each
......... Opbattalion would, therefore, have numbered over 2,000. This 
increase in size from about 1,500 to 2,000 would seem to 
support my view that the battalions were reorganised into 
chiliarchies.
Milns argued that the paper strength of the battalions 
remained at 1,500 and that all the battalions were over-
O/
strength in anticipation of losses to garrison duty. *
Alexander did leave a strong garrison of Macedonians in Susa to 
guard the treasure, 1,000 men (Curt. 5,2,17), but this would 
not have reduced the size of the seven battalions by more than 
150 apiece. He points also to the garrison of 3,000 left at 
Persepolis (Curt. 5,6,11), but in this Milns is mistaken. As 
Alexander had left Persepolis in ruins he would hardly have 
spared 3,000 crack troops on these: these 3,000 men were only 
a temporary garrison, until the treasure could be moved to 
Susa.8  ^ There is no evidence that Alexander left large 
garrisons of Macedonians anywhere except in Babylon and Susa. 
The 6,000 left at Ecbatana (Arr. 3,19,7) later rejoined 
Alexander (Curt. 7,3,4).
Ho Macedonian heavy infantry reinforcements are recorded 
in the years following 331 B.C. until the return from India. 
Even if the heavy infantry had a light combat role in these 
years, losses through age and sickness over seven years of 
continuous campaigning in rough country must have been heavy: 
the few details which we have indicate this. Alexander sent 
home Macedonian veterans (Arr. 3,29,5; Curt. 7,5,27), or 
put them into settlements (Arr. 4,4,1; 4,22,5;
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Curt. 7,3»23). It is impossible to estimate accurately 
the numbers lost, but any proportion under one quarter of the 
total may be too low. The pezetairoi must, therefore, have 
been reinforced during this time.®^ Berve (I p.118) 
suggested that the pezetairoi battalions were reinforced from 
Greek mercenaries and conquered subjects of the Persian 
Empire, these reinforcements being brigaded with the lochoi 
o£ pezetairoi, though not actually taken into those lochoi.
Tarn suggested that Macedonian reinforcements reached 
Alexander in Bactra in 327 B.C. and he has been followed by
QO
Brunt. Schachermeyr argues for a view that Greek 
mercenaries were the source of reinforcement for the 
pezetairoi.^
Tarn*s case has been attacked by Milns,"^ who has shown 
that it rests on no sound base. The relevant evidence is 
contained in Arrian (4»18,3), where it is stated that 
Alexander' sent Sopolis, Epocillus and Mftenidas * to Macedonia* 
to bring to him the forces *from Macedonia*. Tarn argues 
that they actually met the army *at no great distance* from 
Alexander*s camp and that the reinforcements reached Alexander 
in the spring of 327 B.C. Tarn explains that the reference 
to the three leaders going *to Macedonia* is due to an error 
caused by the appearance of *from Macedonia* a few words later. 
His case is plainly unsatisfactory and we may conclude that 
there is no evidence that any Macedonian reinforcements 
arrived with Alexander until after Alexander*s return from 
India.
It appears unlikely, however, that natives of the
86
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Persian Empire were drafted into the pezetairoi. I argue 
elsewhere (Appendix IY pp..£00£ ) against Berve*s view that 
the hipparchies of Companion cavalry were units containing 
diverse types of cavalry and the same arguments apply in the 
case of the pezetairoi battalions. There is no hint in the 
sources that these units were not homogeneous and there are 
sufficient indications that they consisted entirely of 
pezetairoi (Arr. 4 , 2 3 , 1 ;  5,25,6; 6,6,1; 6,21,3). The Iranians 
were accepted into the Companion cavalry from 328/7 B.C.
(Ch.III p . 8 6  and Appendix IY pp , / f -0 3 'F . ), hut the pezetairoi 
were a much more conservative body than the cavalry and seem 
to have led the complaints at the inclusion of the Iranians in 
the cavalry (Arr. 7,8,2) (Appendix IV pp.377-f. ). (The 
pezetairoi kept their territorial distinctions and their local 
nationalism,-^ while the Companion cavalry lost both of these.) 
This apart, and perhaps more important for Alexander, the 
heavy infantry of the Persian Empire was generally of poor
Q pquality:^ none is known to have served under Alexander until 
the very end of the reign (Ch.V pp , 1 8 8 - f . ). It is, therefore, 
most unlikely that any were made part of the pezetairoi 
battalions.
The only source of reinforcement remaining is that of 
the Greek mercenaries. Tarn argued that no Greek mercenaries 
can have served within the pezetairoi battalions because 
Alexander had used so many for garrisons and settlements, and
Q'Xthe few left to him served separately in India. J This line 
of argument, however, can hardly present any obstacle to the 
belief that some Greek mercenaries were brought into the
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pezetairoi battalions. Only a few, hardly more than 3,000
to 4,000, need have been involved, and the fact that some
mercenaries served outside the pezetairoi battalions is no
indication that some were not taken for service within the
battalions. Tarn uses the same argument to prove that
Orientals did not serve within the Companion cavalry.
Certainly Tarn underestimates the numbers of G-reek mercenaries
available to the master of the Mediterranean world, and there
is some evidence that Alexander drew heavily on mercenaries
both for service with the satraps (for instance, Curt. 5,1,43,
Diod. 17,106,3) and with the main campaign force. Mercenary
forces are known to have joined the campaign army regularly:
in 331 B.C. (Arr. 3,16,10; Diod. 17,65,1; Ourt. 5,1,40), in
330 B.C. (Curt. 5,7,12) and again (Arr. 3,23,8f.; Diod. 17,76,
2; Curt. 6,5,10) and in Areia (Curt. 6,6,35). In 329/8 B.C.
a large reinforcement came to Bactria (Curt. 7,10,Ilf.) and
in 326 B.C. more arrived (Curt. 9,3,21; Diod. 17,95,4).
Although many of these, doubtless, did not serve with the
main force, it is difficult to believe that Alexander did not
94keep with him a substantial force of Greek mercenaries.
Milns would reject the view that Greek mercenaries were 
added to the pezetairoi because ’The phalanx retained its 
purely national character till the end of Alexanders reign1.^ 
It is certainly true that the battalions of the pezetairoi 
retained their national character in that they opposed any 
coalition with the people they had conquered and were hostile 
to Alexander’s medising. There is no evidence, however, that 
they felt similar hostility to the Greek mercenaries: for
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Greek mercenaries had served alongside Macedonians for a 
quarter of a century, ever since Philip had "begun to make 
extensive use of them. Griffith has pointed out that the 
Macedonians and the Greek mercenaries were usually on good
qgterms during the campaign of Alexander.
It is also important to note that the distinctions 
"between Macedonians and Greeks was "being "broken down "by the 
policy of the Argead kings. The conscious hellenising and 
encouragement of G-reek immigration was taken a step further 
"by Philip when he reorganised the kingdom to effect the full 
integration of the resident Greeks (Ch.II pp. 4 -0  £  ). if
Alexander did recruit pezetairoi from the G-reek mercenaries, 
he merely continued the policy of his father, who "brought 
many Greeks into the service of his army when he established 
the new recruiting areas. Any argument "based upon the national 
character of the Macedonians can carry little weight, for the 
character of the pezetairoi was already a mixed one, of Greeks 
and Macedonians.
There seems to be good reason for thinking, therefore, 
that it was from the mercenary Greeks that Alexander drew 
reinforcements for the pezetairoi. This was in line with 
the established policy of the Argead kings and the absence 
of any reference to reinforcements of Macedonians seems to 
make it certain that the pezetairoi battalions were kept up 
to strength in this way. The procedure involved in the 
change of status of the mercenary cannot be known, but it was 
regarded as an upgrading of status. He may have been given a 
grant of land or simply of money, and the conditions of
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service in terms of monetary reward and retirement benefit 
were, no doubt, better for the pezetairoi than for the 
mercenaries.
The date at which Alexander began to draw reinforcements
for the pezetairoi from Greek mercenaries cannot be fixed, but
he may have decided upon this policy as early as 330 B.C.
Schachermeyr suggests that Alexander may have been following
a deliberate policy of building up an »Imperial Army* of
97Macedonians and Greeks, but perhaps it is enough to explain
Alexander*s decision by reference to the practical convenience.
It is possible, as Berve suggested, that he was hoping to
weaken opposition to his policies by not increasing the number
of Macedonians from home.^ The mercenaries would feel fewer
ties with home and would be more amenable to Alexander*s will
than those fresh from Macedonia. At the same time, it was
clearly important for Alexander not to destroy the Macedonian
nature of the expedition and of his kingship.
There is no evidence concerning the strength of the
pezetairoi in the years following 331 B.C. I have suggested
that at the time of the reinforcement in December 331 B.C.
the total was rather more than 14,000. A garrison of 1,000
was left at Susa (Curt. 5,2,17) and losses of 3,000 to 4,000
must be allowed for through the years of campaigning on the
Iranian plateau and in India. The numbers were, however,
*
probably made up from the Greek mercenaries. In mid 325 B.C. 
Alexander selected some as veterans for discharge, and sent 
them with Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana (Arr. 6,17, 
3). I have suggested above (p.^2) that the places of the
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cavalry veterans whom Alexander selected at this time were 
not filled, and it is probable that the same is true of the 
infantry.
The number of pezetairoi who were designated for dis­
charge at this time cannot be known. Arrian does not even 
specify that any pezetairoi infantry were marked out, he 
refers only to Companion cavalry *and those of the other 
Macedonians whom he had already decided to send to Macedonia 
as being past service*. There can, however, be little doubt 
that pezetairoi infantry formed the majority of these »other 
Macedonians*. 10,000 Macedonian infantry were discharged 
from Opis in 324 B.C. (Diod. 18,16,4) but some of these will 
have been taken from the hypaspists, others from garrisons 
left in the centre of the empire, and many will have stayed 
with Alexander during the march through Gedrosia. Any 
estimate of the number designated for discharge and sent with 
Craterus in 325 B.C. can only be conjectural, but surely the 
large majority of the pezetairoi remained with Alexander at 
this time and I think it unlikely that more than 2,000, in 
addition to the battalions of Attalus and Meleager, went with 
Craterus (see also Appendix V p.*Zfc). This would have 
reduced the size of the battalions with Alexander to a little 
over 1,500 apiece.^
In Carmania at the end of 325 B.C. infantry reinforce­
ments of Macedonians reached him, brought by the generals 
from Media (Arr. 6,27,6 and see below Ch.V pp J W f . ) , As with 
the cavalry reinforcements which came to him at this time, 
these troops were not integrated with the Indian campaign
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army, "because much of this army was soon to he demobilised 
(see Ch.Ill n.65).
(d) Conclusion
The character and organisation of the pezetairoi 
remained remarkably unchanged during the whole of the Asian 
expedition to 324 B.C. The battalions were increased in 
size in 331 B.C. and a battalion added to the existing six, 
but the territorial divisions continued to be fundamental.
In the years following 330 B.C. they were reinforced by men 
selected from the Greek mercenary bodies, but these were 
absorbed by the Macedonians and there is no noticeable change 
in attitudes among the body of the pezetairoi. The conserv­
ative nature of the pezetairoi can also be seen in the 
length of time the commanders of the battalions held their 
posts.
5 There was a general trend towards the lessening in 
importance of their position in the army from 330 B.C. During 
the first four years of the campaigning, when Alexander was 
faced by strong forces of Greek mercenary heavy infantry 
and the general pattern of fighting called for a major con­
tribution from the Macedonian phalangite forces, the 
pezetairoi played a most important role: the highest post in 
the army was the command of the phalangite troops, held by 
Alexander*s second-in-command, Parmenio. During the fighting 
in Iran and India, however, the nature of the fighting changed: 
the enemy was more elusive and there was less scope for close 
order fighting. The pezetairoi were used more for policing 
and never lined up together for a major battle. Even at the
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Hydaspes the battalions were dispersed (despite Tarn’s dis­
belief of the sources, II pp.l90f.), and did not play their 
traditional role. Light infantry and cavalry were the more 
important arms, for they were more mobile and, therefore, 
more suited to the new style of warfare.
One of the results of this was a decline in status for 
the -pezetairoi commanders, to the advantage of the commanders 
of the Companion cavalry. The top officers in the early years 
of the expedition had been the infantry commanders and these 
positions had been held by the leading nobles in the army; 
e.g., Craterus, Perdiccas, Coenus, Amyntas, Polyperchon. In 
328/7 B.C., on the eve of the Indian campaign, Craterus, 
Perdiccas and Coenus were made commanders of hipparchies of 
Companion cavalry, and along with Hephaestion, also a 
commander of a hipparchy of Companions, they became the chief 
strategic commanders of the army, the chief officers of 
Alexander (Ch.III pp. 80-F. ). There was also a political
aspect to this development. The pezetairoi retained their 
narrowly Macedonian attitudes and were less sympathetic to 
Alexander’s favouring of Iranians than the Companion cavalry, 
who had shown themselves willing to receive Iranians into 
their ranks. Apart from this, cavalry officers formed the 
leading group of officers and administrators in the system of 
the Achaemenid empire, which Alexander was in part adopting 
(see Ch.V pp. IWB'P. ).
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PART II The Hypaspists
a) To the Reform of 331 B.C.
There is as great a controversy over the organisation 
of the hypaspists as over that of the pezetairoi. The three 
main theories which need attention are those of Berve, Tarn 
and Milns.
Berve»s theory proposes that the hypaspists consisted 
of two distinguishable parts, the »royal hypaspists» or »life­
guard*, and the hypaspist combat force, within which was an 
elite, the agema the’ strength of the »royal hypaspists* 
is unknown, but the hypaspist combat-force numbered 3,000 
plus 500 in the agema. Tarn asserted that there was only one 
body of hypaspists, 3,000 strong, of which 1,000 were the 
agema: there were no hypaspist lifeguards. Milns, most
recently, has suggested that the hypaspists consisted of
3,000 hypaspists only, as Tarn, but that only 500 of these
. .. ' 102 were m  the agema.
Berve based his case for the existence of a »royal
hypaspist lifeguard* upon a few references in Arrian to the
royal hypaspists as opposed to the more frequently occurring
hypaspists. Tarn, however, has shown conclusively that the
’royal hypaspists* are identical with the hypaspists. It was
the agema which acted as Alexander’s bodyguard and any theory
which makes out of the royal hypaspists a special corps of
bodyguards, distinct from the agema. does not take enough
account of the imprecise terminology of the Alexander
103historians, Arrian included.  ^ The only passage which can 
be taken to indicate that there were distinct bodies of
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hypaspists is in Arrian's description of the battle-line at the
Hydaspes (5,13,4); rwv Sf ir^wTouf to u $ or r tti(T7Vf
N a  \ s  “7 c -» x/i ?  f  C  -  c/ > v
T o o ?  ffo ttri K i K o v r  f  u>v jy ^ c T o  z t - h ¿=JTfr«r^f T*jf iirirui-fwi
/  ^  '  ; /  V / »  \ /  7  ^  /  \
TOOTOt4» 'To e{-^rJf~fe£ T° p  alert. Aifcov • rouTWV' Tour
?/v. c / c ‘  ^ e « s  ? *- * f  t a
t iA A O o f viTeivm *r'ru*j v*f *4c.OlcrToiS eti -rjyeftWt-oii ev T f  Terre f^^peiiVov.
Here three distinct bodies of troops appear, 'the royal 
hypaspists*, the agema and 'the other hypaspists*. Tarn 
explained that what has happened is that the taxeis of the 
pezetairoi have dropped out and the hypaspists have slipped in 
to make up for them.'1'0^ But Tarn's reconstruction of the 
battle, which is quite unconvincing, is dependent upon this 
interpretation and there seems to be no good reason for 
supposing that this is what has happened (see also ;.p. 1 0 * 7 ).
In view of the fact that in Arrian's description of the battle­
line at the G-ranicus the taxeis of Philip and of Craterus 
appear twice (Arr. 1,14,2, see pp. ^5" ), there is really
no difficulty in accepting that Arrian has here simply put 
the hypaspists in twice. It is certain that this single 
mention is not enough to support the existence of the 'royal 
hypaspist lifeguard*, when it can be shown that all the other 
examples of 'royal hypaspists' are alternatives to the simple 
'hypaspists'.
Leaving aside Berve's 'royal hypaspist lifeguard», we 
may now turn to the organisation of the hypaspists at the 
time of the crossing to Asia, in 334 B.C. There is no direct 
evidence upon the size of the body, but there has been a 
measure of agreement among scholars that it numbered 3,000.
This is based upon the evidence of Arrian's description of
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the battle-line at Issus (2,8,3f.). On the right wing 
against the mountains was drawn up the agema and the 
hypaspists, then came the battalions of Coenus and Perdiccas, 
up to the centre of the heavy infantry. On the left wing 
were the battalions of Amyntas, Ptolemy, Meleager and Craterus. 
It has been assumed by scholars that the line of the heavy 
infantry was balanced, that there were equal numbers on 
either side of the centre point, described by Arrian. It 
follows from this that the hypaspists and two battalions of 
pezetairoi were equal to four battalions of pezetairoi, in 
other words that the hypaspists were numerically equal to 
two battalions. Since it is known that there were six 
battalions and that these together with the hypaspists
numbered 12,000 at the time of the crossing to Asia (Piod.
10517,17,4), the hypaspists must have been 3,000 strong.
Berve was of the opinion that the agema did not form a part 
of the 3,000 but was additional to this number (I p.1 2 7 ). 
However, if the evidence of Arrian’s description of the line­
up at Issus is taken as an indication, it must be accepted 
that the agema and the other hypaspists numbered only 3,000, 
for Arrian states specifically that it was the agema and the 
hypaspists that were in the battle-line together.
The only other evidence we have upon the organisation of 
the hypaspists body is in the passage of Curtius already 
discussed (above pp. IZT.-F. ) in reference to the pezetairoi
(5,2,3). Curtius states that prior to 331 B.C. the Macedonian 
infantry was organised in units of 500 only, but that in the 
reform of that year Alexander introduced chiliarchies.
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J. Cr. Droysen, Berve and Milns take this to he adequate
support for the view that the hypaspists were organised in
units of 500 down to 331 B.C.106 I have already argued for
this interpretation in reference to the pezetairoi and there
seems no reason for doubting that the passage can also he
applied to the hypaspists. Tarn assumed that the chiliarchy
structure, which certainly existed in the period after 331
107B.C., also existed prior to this date, 1 hut the evidence of 
Curtius contradicts this view. The only evidence that there 
were chiliarchies of hypaspists in the first four years of 
the campaign comes from Arrian 1,22,7* Arrian records that 
Adaeus the chiliarch died at the siege of Halicarnassus and 
although Milns has recently argued that fAdaeus was not a 
hypaspist officer at all, the likelihood is that he did
]QO .....command hypaspists in this action. The role of the taxeis
under Adaeus and Timander (1,22,4) is characteristic of the 
hypaspists; they often were used in conjunction with light­
armed troops for a rapid attack.10  ^ Also, Arrian uses * taxis1 
of units of hypaspists elsewhere, e.g., the hypaspists troops 
under Ptolemy son of Philip at the battle of the G-ranicus 
(Arr. 1,14,6; Berve II no.671). There is, therefore, no
difficulty in accepting that he refers ’taxis* to hypaspists 
110here. The context strongly indicates that these troops 
were Macedonian and it seems most probable that they were 
hypaspist. Although most scholars have accepted that Adaeus 
did command hypaspists at Halicarnassus, only Tarn believed 
that he was a chiliarch of hypaspists. J. G-. Droysen 
believed that Arrian was using the term anachronistically
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and Berve followed him.'*"^’ There seems no difficulty in 
accepting that Arrian was using the term anachronistically, 
as it is not uncharacteristic of him to do this (see Appendix 
Ilia), and in the face of Curtius* explicit evidence, Arrian's 
solitary usage cannot stand.
The size of the agema is nowhere given. Tarn, following 
his belief'that the hypaspists were in units of 1,000, 
suggests that the agema also was 1,000. Berve and Milns, 
following their belief that the hypaspist units were 500 
strong, suggest that the agema was 500. Ho certainty can be 
reached concerning the strength of the agema, but there is, 
perhaps, some indication that Berve and Milns are most likely 
to be right. If the major divisions of the hypaspist force 
were units of 500 men in the early years of the campaign, 
clearly there was some advantage in having the agema the same 
size because it always operated in close cooperation with 
other units of the hypaspists. It could be argued that it 
consisted of two units of 500 men, but this seems less likely. 
In 329 B.C. in the assault on the rock Aornos, Arrian records 
that Alexander ledadetachment of somatophylakes and 
hypaspists to the number of 7 0 0 (4,30,3): these somatophylakes 
were the agema of the hypaspists (Appendix Ilia). If the 
agema numbered 1,000 men, it would surely be expected that 
these 700, chosen for a particularly hazardous venture with 
the king, would have been wholly somatophylakes. or agema. 
rather than partly hypaspists. The conclusion which, I 
would suggest, is indicated by' this evidence is that the agema 
numbered only 500 in 329 B.C. It is most improbable that
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the agema was reduced in number between 334 B.C. and 329 
B.C. (I shall argue below that the overall size of the 
hypaspist body was increased), and I therefore incline to 
the view that the agema numbered 500 men in 334 B.C. and, 
indeed, throughout the campaign in Asia.
There is little evidence about the officers of the
hypaspists. Commander of the whole force was Nicanor, the
second son of Parmenio.  ^ Of the commanders under him, we
may know the names of three. At Halicarnassus, it is
generally held, the taxeis of Adaeus and Timander consisted
of hypaspists, and it seems likely that these men commanded
two of the units of 500 men.^^ At Tyre, when Alexander and
the hypaspists were assaulting the wall, Admetus, whom
Diodorus calls ‘one of the commanders* (17,45,6), was killed
in the first assault along with twenty of the hypaspists
(Arr. 2,24,4). It would appear from this that Admetus also
115was an officer of the hypaspists at the siege of Tyre.
Berve suggested that Hephaestion commanded the 'royal 
hypaspist lifeguard* at the battle of Gaugamela, and although 
'royal hypaspists' as a separate body did not exist, we 
should look at his evidence:Diodorus 17,61,4 records 
that some prominent officers were wounded in the battle, 
among them Hephaestion, tujv <r«*>^ oi-ro •ckvji/
..... Welles cannot decide what somatophylakes are
referred to, pointing out that Nicanor, not Hephaestion, was 
commander of the hypaspists, and doubting that the Greek can 
mean 'fighting first among the 'bodyguards* ' in the sense 
of 'the small group of bodyguards proper*.11^ Certainly 
'somatophylakes' cannot here refer to the hypaspists, because
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Nicanor is commander of them and Hephaestion could hardly 
he under Nicanor. It is not so certain that Hephaestion is 
not yet a »bodyguard proper*, for he could hold both this post 
and a command of the Companion cavalry (contra Welles), but 
it seems likely that Hephaestion did not hold this post until
1 1 Q
rather later, when he achieved more prominence. Nothing 
is known of Hephaestion*s role in the early years, but he is 
likely to have gone into battle by Alexander*s side, that is 
on horseback, and there is nothing to connect Hephaestion 
with any infantry guards. He was not, however, commander of 
the ile Basilike, for Cleitus was its leader. The phrase 
is clearly a problem, but Diodorus* terminology is sometimes 
quite imprecise and the term »somatophylax* in particular is 
frequently used incorrectly. 13 It is quite possible that 
all that should be understood from Diodorus* evidence is 
that Hephaestion was prominent among the circle of friends 
fighting around Alexander (cf.Curt. 4,16,32; Arr. 3,15»2).
b) From the Reform of 331 B.C, to 324 B.C.
At the time when the reinforcements were integrated in 
early December 331 B.C. the internal structure of the 
hypaspists was reformed. I have already presented the 
evidence and arguments concerning this reorganisation above, 
in my discussion of the pezetairoi, and the case does not 
need to be presented again here. Alexander wanted to increase 
the number of high ranking officers and, therefore, he 
introduced into the hypaspists, as well as the pezetairoi. 
the new divisions of chiliarchies, where previously there 
had been only divisions of 500. The existence of chiliarchies
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of hypaspists in the years following 331 B.C. is well
attested (Arr. 4,24,10» 4,30,6; 5,23,7), and reference is
120made to chiliarchs of hypaspists at Arrian 4,30,5* As
with the pezetairoi, it seems probable that the sections of
500 continued to exist, as subdivisions of the chiliarchies,
for this would give added flexibility. By this reorganisation,
additional high ranking officers were introduced to the
hypaspist body, making it easier to detach independent
commands of hypaspists for missions away from the main body.
This was in line with the general needs of Alexander, faced
121with the more scattered enemy of the Iranian plateau.
The number of chiliarchies and the size of the hypaspist
body after 331 B.C. has been a matter of dispute among
scholars. J. G. Droysen thought that there were at least
122four chiliarchies, the agema being one of them. Berve
believed that the hypaspist force had been increased by 1,000 
when the reinforcements arrived at the end of 331 B.C., and 
that in all there were four chiliarchies and an agema of 500, 
making a total of 4,500.12  ^ Tarn, of course, believed that 
there was no change, and that the hypaspists remained at 
3,000.12 '^ Most recently, Milns has suggested that the 
hypaspists remained at 3,000, organised in three 
c h i l i a r c h i e s H e  does not discuss the position of the 
agema, but the implication would seem to be that the agema 
remained at 5 0 0 and formed one half of one chiliarchy.
Despite the frequent appearance in our sources of the 
hypaspists, details of organisation are quite elusive. The 
major piece of evidence used to fix the number of chiliarchies
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is contained in Arrian 4,30>6: Alexander sent on a mission
J. G. Droysen concludes that four chiliarchies are referred
as a chiliarch of the hypaspists means that Nearchus led his 
own chiliarchy on the mission, even though Arrian does not 
specifically mention it. This would mean that four 
chiliarchies are detailed here, that of Nearchus, which 
stayed under his command, and that of Antiochus and two other 
chiliarchies attached to Antiochus. Tarn, however, disagrees, 
pointing out that Arrian does not say that Nearchus had his
own chiliarchy under his command, and concludes that 
Nearchus* chiliarchy was one of those under Antiochus1 
command: therefore only three chiliarchies are mentioned
more than two chiliarchies of hypaspists in addition to 
Antiochus1 own, hut that Arrian is here guilty of had writing, 
in saying ‘two others1 where he should more correctly have 
said ‘the two others*. There seems to he little douht that 
Tarn is right, that the passage cannot he used to prove that 
there were more than three chiliarchies of hypaspists. Arrian 
specifies only three, and no reliance can he placed upon the 
precise implications of Arrian’s language.
The passage cannot, however, he used to show that there
to h e r e H e  considers that the description of Nearchus
i
here.^^ He explains that the implication of the Greek 
$vo T dC r*j «¿AX**- is perhaps that there were in all
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were not more than three chiliarchies of hypaspists. In 
fact, it seems likely from this evidence that the agema was 
additional to the three chiliarchies mentioned here. For the 
expedition led hy Antiochus and Nearchus was not an important 
one, hardly the sort for which Alexander would have detached 
his personal guard, especially as Arrian implies that 
Alexander continued on his way (4,30,7)« Tarn argues that 
there were only three chiliarchies of hypaspists, on the 
strength of Arrian 4,24,10, where it is recorded that 
Alexander gave to Ptolemy ’the third part’ of the hypaspists. 
Tarn concludes that this must mean one chiliarchy out of 
three and that the hypaspists numbered three chiliarchies in 
all. This is not, however, a reliable argument, for 
Alexander clearly divided the troops into whatever numbers 
he thought fit: at 4,30,3 Arrian records that he detached 
7 0 0 hypaspists, but nobody would argue from this that the 
hypaspists were organised in units of 7 0 0 .
This passage of Arrian (4,30,6), then, seems to indicate 
that there were at least three chiliarchies of hypaspists 
and the agema, and in so far as there is no evidence to show 
that there were any more than this, we should perhaps 
conclude that this was the full strength. Three chiliarchies 
of hypaspists are detailed again by Arrian, when Ptolemy 
leads them, in company with the archers and Agrianes, at the 
siege of an Indian township (5,23,7)« On this occasion 
Alexander himself led the siege engines against the walls, and 
he must have kept his agema with himself for this. This 
passage seems, therefore, to confirm the indications drawn 
from the earlier one (4,30,6).
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The total numerical strength of the hypaspists was
thought "by Tarn and Milns to have remained at 3,000 and not
IPSto have "been increased by the reinforcement of 331 B.C.
Berve, however, thought that there were 4,500 in the 
hypaspists after 331 B.C. Berve reached his decision on the 
strength of his "belief that there were four chiliarchies in 
addition to an agema, which he considered remained at 500. 
Tarn’s arguments are based upon the belief that there were 
three chiliarchies including the agema. Milns, however, 
presents two further arguments in favour of the figure 
remaining at 3,000.1'51 He points to the size of the 
hypaspist body of Eumenes in 318 B.C., which according to 
Diodorus 19,28,1, was not more than 3,000. Milns argues 
that since Eumenes was consciously imitating Alexander, this 
proves that the hypaspists numbered 3,000 throughout 
Alexander’s lifetime. This argument is hardly conclusive, 
nor is his argument from Arrian,- 3,16,10, which he interprets 
to imply strongly that no reinforcements went into the 
hypaspist body because Arrian says that the reinforcements 
were distributed by tribe: for the text see Ch.IIL n.13.
Since hypaspists were not arranged by tribe, Milns argues, 
it follows that no reinforcements went to the hypaspist body. 
Arrian can, however, be over and over again convicted of 
imprecise and incomplete coverage of detail, and the omission 
of details of additions to the hypaspist body when a general 
infantry reinforcement was taking place would rate as one 
of Arrian’s more forgivable inaccuracies. In any case, it is 
obvious that the hypaspists must have been reinforced
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somehow to compensate for the losses they sustained. It may 
he that losses were made up from the ranks of the pezetairoi 
rather than from new recruits from Macedonia, in which case 
the reinforcements would not have gone into the hypaspists. 
Therefore, even if it is accepted that Arrian is accurate on 
this point and the reinforcements were all distributed by 
tribe, i.e. among the pezetairoi, it is still possible that 
the hypaspist body was increased.
It is clear that nothing in Arrian’s text can be used 
to indicate that the hypaspist force was not increased, and 
If the pezetairoi were increased in number, there is perhaps 
some reason for also thinking that the hypaspists were. I 
have argued from Arrian 4,30,6 that there were three 
chiliarchies in addition to the agema in 327 B.C. This 
prima facie would indicate that the hypaspists numbered
3.000 in addition to the agema. Droysen, reasonably enough, 
has warned against accepting that there were necessarily
1.000 men in a chiliarchy,  ^ but in the case of the royal 
elite guard it is perhaps likely that the units would have 
been kept up to strength. The agema, I have argued (p.14-4- )» 
numbered 500 men prior to the reform of 331 B.C. In fixing 
this number I used evidence drawn from the year 329 B.C., 
and it therefore follows that the agema numbered 500 men also 
after the reform. It might be thought that if chiliarchies 
were introduced in 331 B.C., the agema also would have been 
increased to 1,000 men. However, this is not a necessary 
conclusion: the agema was the king’s personal guard and it 
therefore did not have to be of exactly the same organisation 
as the rest of the hypaspists.133 It seems quite likely that
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a greater conservatism was observed in dealing with this 
unit than with the rest of the units of the hypaspists.
I conclude that after 331 B.C. the hypaspist force 
numbered 3,500, including the royal agema of 500 men. This 
means that the number of the hypaspist body was increased by 
500 men from its pre-331 B.C. strength of 3,000; and the 
obvious time for such an increase is December 331 B.C. when 
the Macedonian reinforcements arrived and the general 
reorganisation took place.
The reform of the hypaspist body in 331 B.C. did not 
formally affect Nicanor*s position as commander of the whole 
force, except that he had more officers below him. In the 
early summer of 330 B.C. Parmenio was removed from the main 
army (Arr. 3,19,7) and the post he had held as overall 
commander of the heavy infantry was disestablished. As a 
result Nicanor was no longer responsible to any higher 
authority, except, of course, Alexander himself. Nicanor 
continued to hold his post until his death in Hyrcania in the
late summer of 330 B.C. Most scholars agree that following 
Nicanor‘s death a successor to the command of the hypaspists
1  'T .Awas appointed, J but Schachermeyr has suggested that the 
hypaspists were broken up into separate chiliarchies with the 
agema also separate, with no overall commander
No hypaspist officer is mentioned after Nicanor!s death 
•until 327 B.C., when Jhitiochus and Nearchus are said to be 
chiliarchs of the hypaspists (Arr. 4,30,5). Arrian*s text 
makes it unlikely that either of these men held the post 
which had been Nicanor*s: Arrian makes no distinction between
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the two, they were simply chiliarchs of hypaspists. It is 
odd, however, if there was an overall commander, that he did 
not lead the hypaspists on this occasion 'because it appears 
likely that all except the agema were involved. This passage, 
therefore, tends to support Schachermeyr*s view that there 
was no successor to Nicanor.
At the battle of the Hydaspes Arrian refers to ‘the 
royal hypaspists which Seleucus led1 (5,13>4; cf. 5,16,3): 
royal hypaspists are simply the hypaspists (see above p . Ify-O).  
There is no reason to doubt that Seleucus led the hypaspists 
in this battle, and Tarn and Milns have taken the evidence 
as clear indication that by 326 B.C. Seleucus had taken over 
command of the whole hypaspist t r o o p . T h i s  is not a 
necessary conclusion. The hypaspists had, of course, to 
have an overall commander at the battle, but this does not mean 
that Seleucus held the post of permanent commander of all 
the hypaspists. There is nothing except this passage to 
connect Seleucus with the hypaspists. Berve saw Seleucus as 
commander of the royal hypaspist lifeguard, succeeding 
Hephaestion in this position, and he suggested that 
Neoptolemus succeeded Nicanor.^^ This rests upon the 
reference of Plutarch, Eumenes 1,13> which gives Neoptolemus 
the title archihypaspistes. This would seem to miean that 
Neoptolemus was overall commander of the hypaspists at the 
time of Alexander's death (see Ch.V pf * l 7 S £ ) , but in view of 
the far reaching reforms towards the end of Alexander's life, 
it is scarcely good evidence that he held the post from 
350 B.C. or, indeed, at any time before 324 B.C.^®
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There is no indication that there was a successor to 
Nicanor, and the fact that there was no commander of the 
hypaspists to lead them on their mission against the 
Assacenians seems to indicate that there was no permanent 
commander. There can he no doubt that the rank of chiliarchy 
of the hypaspists was quite a distinguished one: it is 
difficult to believe that Nearchus (Berve II no.544), for 
instance, was given the post of a mere subordinate officer, 
one of four under the commander of the hypaspists. 
Schachermeyrfs view should, therefore, be preferred: i.e., 
that there was no overall commander, but each commander of a 
chiliarch and the commander of the agema were top-ranking 
officers on a par with the commanders of the pezetairoi 
taxeis.
The names of three chiliarchs of hypaspists are known. 
Antiochus (Berve II no.90) and Nearchus are stated explicitly 
by Arrian to have been chiliarchs of the hypaspists (Arr. 4, 
30,6) in 327 B.G. In 325 B.C., as I have already argued 
(pp. IO*f ), Antigenes was also probably a chiliarch of the 
hypaspists. v It is not possible to know whether Seleucus 
held a hypaspist command, a chiliarchy or command of the 
agema: perhaps his connection with the hypaspists at the 
Hydaspes does indicate that he did hold such a command.
The dates at which these men took up and laid down their 
commands cannot be fixed with any certainty. Nothing is 
known of Antiochus who is mentioned only on this occasion. 
Nearchus joined the expeditionary force at Zariaspa in the 
winter of 329/8 B.C. (Arr. 4,7,2) and he could have become 
a chiliarch any time between then and the summer of 327 B.C.
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He must Have given up his command at the latest when he was 
appointed admiral in autumn 326 B.C. (Arr. 6,2,3). Antigenes 
was an experienced officer and had, perhaps, been with the 
army from the very beginning, but the date at which he became 
a chiliarch cannot be known. He was certainly chiliarch by 
the summer of 325 (Arr. 6,17,5)« Seleucus, if he did hold a 
permanent-hypaspist command, also presents an insoluble 
problem because the reference to him at the battle at the 
Hydaspes is the first mention he receives from the Alexander 
historians. He is not mentioned again until the weddings at 
Susa, when he figures most prominently among the hetairoi: 
his career under Alexander is totally unknown apart from this.
I have argued that the battalions of the pezetairoi did 
not receive reinforcement from the subjects of the Persian 
Empire, but it may be thought more likely that the hypaspists, 
who were closer to the king, did receive into their ranks 
some Iranians. Berve (I p.128) argued that their numbers 
must have been kept up in this way: certainly Iranian guards 
were present at Alexander's court from as early as 350 B.C., 
when, it is attested, Alexander introduced Persian court 
ceremony and appointed the most distinguished Iranians, among 
them the brother of Darius, Oxyathres, as doryphoroi (Diod. 17, 
77,4). There are, however, no indications that any Iranians 
actually entered the hypaspists, and even at the end of 
Alexander's life it would appear that the 'Persian' guards 
were separate from the 'Macedonian*. This is shown by, for 
instance, the description of the chariot made t?o transport 
Alexander's body, which appears in Diodorus 18,27: the
Macedonian guards were depicted separately from the Persian 
(Ch.V pp./73£).
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Yet no Macedonian reinforcements reached Alexander after 
531 B.C. and, therefore, no fresh recruits from Macedonia 
could have entered the hypaspists to make up for losses.
There are two sources from which the reinforcements could have 
been drawn: from the ranks of the pezetairoi t or from the 
Greek mercenary units. Although there is no evidence, it is 
perhaps more likely that promotion to hypaspist rank was 
held out as a reward to deserving pezetairoi9 rather than 
that mercenaries could enter straight into the hypaspists 
without first serving in the pezetairoi.
This completes my discussion of the hypaspists prior to 
the reform of 324 B.C. I have suggested that this Body 
consisted of 3,000 men at the time of the crossing to Asia, 
this number Being inclusive of the a gema of 500 and ' ■
five other units of 500. In 331 B.C. the size of the whole 
body was increased hy 5 0 0 and chiliarchies were introduced 
as the main tactical subdivision, their number being three, 
and the agema being in addition to the three chiliarchies.
This number remained constant from 331 to 324 B.C., the 
strength being kept up from the ranks of the pezetairoi.
Until the time of his death in 330 B.C. Uicanor was overall 
commander of the hypaspists, including the agema. but no 
successor was appointed and each chiliarchy and the agema 
became an independent strategic unit parallel to the taxeis 
of the pezetairoi.
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CHAPTER Y 
THE ARMY 524/5 B.C.
PART I The Discharge and Reinforcement of Troops
The Indian' campaign officially ended at Susa in the
spring of 324 B.C.^ and Alexander set about establishing the
form of the army. The ancient evidence is rather confused
on the order of events during the last year of Alexanders
life, and it is not possible to fix precisely the time at
pwhich Alexander instituted the various reforms. It is, 
however, clear that the main framework of the military 
organisation was established at Susa in the spring to early 
summer of 324 B.C. At that time the cavalry reinforcement
was carried through, the Companion cavalry given its form,
■ • ■ 3and the Iranians introduced into the cavalry agema;^  and at 
Susa the Epigoni arrived and were drilled in their phalangite 
formations.^ Therefore, even though the Macedonian veterans 
did not leave the main body until Opis was reached in the 
late summer of 324 B.C., there seems to be little doubt that 
the manor reorganisation': had taken place some months before, 
at Susa.
Already in mid 325 B.C. Alexander had selected some 
Macedonians who were not ‘fully fit’ and put them under the 
command of Craterus whom he was sending through Arachosia and 
Drangiana to Carmania (Arr. 6,17,3; see above, Ch.III Vfi-Wf-; 
Ch.IY p#>./36£and Appendix V p.426 for a discussion of numbers). 
Alexander clearly intended to send them home, and many more 
were designated for discharge at Susa. The total number of 
Macedonians who set out under Craterus» leadership from Opis
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for Macedonia in the late summer of 324 B.C. was 11,500 (Arr.
7,12,1; Diod. 17,109,1» Justin 12,12,7). The precise number
is taken from the number of veterans under Craterus in 322 B.C.
(Diod. 18,16,4), which is given as 6,000 who had crossed to
Asia with Alexander, 4,000 who had joined en route, and 1,500
cavalry. Also with Craterus were 1,000 Persian bowmen and
slingers, but on these, see below, p./££ . The infantry is
said specifically to have been veterans of Alexanders
campaign and it is, therefore, most probable that these were
the men sent from Opis. It is reasonable to assume that the
6cavalry also were, although Diodorus does not say so. It 
is difficult to believe that Alexander would have sent any 
cavalry but veteran Macedonian with Craterus, for while he 
might want bowmen and slingers in Macedonia to replace 
mercenary forces, he would hardly want Iranian cavalry 
there. This passage in Diodorus is in any case the best 
indication we have of the number of Macedonians discharged 
by Alexander in 324 B.C.
Some of these, as Beloch pointed out (p.346-7), were 
taken from garrison duty and not from the combat army, and 
he cites those left to garrison Babylon and Susa (Curt. 5, 
1,43; 2,16) as an example of such troops. There must have 
been others, and some cavalry as well as infantry may have
O
been involved. Some of the Iranians and other troops which 
had fought in the Indian campaign probably were also sent 
home, the Bactrians, Arachosians and others, and mercenaries, 
but there is no firm evidence. At least some were retained, 
however, for Hystaspes, the Bactrian, and Itanes, the
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Sogdian, entered the cavalry agema: other Iranians were no !
douht also kept for service.  ^ Alexander had also ordered a ; 
general demobilisation of mercenary armies in the pay of 
the satraps and generals he had left behind to keep order 
when he was in India (Diod. 17,106,3» and see below p./63)« 
Beloch makes some attempt to calculate what proportion of . ;
the army returning from India was discharged, but no reliance 
can be placed on his figures.1® • No more can be said with any i \
confidence except that large numbers of troops must have i
been demobilised upon Alexanders return, not only from the ; 
Indian campaign force, but also from the troops which he had 
left behind or which had been recruited in his absence. [
3
The sources do not give details of troops joining fj
1Alexander on his return from India, though many certainly 1
did come to him. In Carmania the commanders who had been I
left with Parmenio in Media arrived with the troops under ;
them, and Stasanor, satrap of the Areians, the satrap of
the Zarangians, and the son of the satrap of the Parthyaeans
and Hyrcanians came to him, presumably also bringing troops
from their satrapies.11 There can be little doubt that
other reinforcements from other places also arrived: many
troops from the Median and Persian tribes would be expected
to have been called upon, once Alexander was back from the
Indian campaign. At Susa 30,000 Iranian youths, trained in
Macedonian infantry tactics, arrived from many different 
12regions, and a general cavalry reinforcement, which I have 
argued took place at Susa, certainly included substantial 
numbers of Iranians (see Appendix IV for discussion
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of evidence, namely Arr. 7,6,3-5). In 323 B.C. 20,000 
Persians, who were, at least partially, light-armed bowmen 
and javelin-men, came to Alexander, and especial mention is 
made of Cossaean and Tapurian troops (Arr. 7,23,1)* At the 
same time, at Babylon, Philoxenus arrived from Caria with a 
force and Menander from Lydia with another force: mention is 
also made of Menidas arriving with cavalry, but it is not 
clear whether these were new troops or simply old ones 
returning (Arr. 7,23,1: see below p./7/ ).
It is odd that no Macedonian reinforcements are
detailed. Berve, Tarn, Schachermeyr and others have
accepted this omission as an indication that no troops
13reached Alexander from Macedonia before his death. This 
is impossible to believe. I have argued that it is 
conceivable that Alexander did not receive Macedonian 
reinforcements after he left Western Iran in 330 B.C. (Ch. Ill 
pp , > IV pp./3/"£ ), "but I am unable to accept that none
arrived in 324-3 B.C. Alexander had sent off Menidas, 
Epocillus and Sopilis in 328 B.C. for the very purpose of 
recruiting reinforcements from Macedonia.^ The latter two 
are not heard of again, but Menidas is with the main army in 
command of cavalry in 323 B.C. This cavalry force, mentioned 
by Arrian (7,23,1), can hardly be these reinforcements - it 
could not have taken 5 years to bring them - they must have 
been waiting for Alexander on his return from India. Perhaps 
they arrived with the generals from Media in 324 B.C., with 
whom they had been awaiting Alexander’s return.^ Some 
Macedonians were undoubtedly included in the general cavalry 
reinforcement at Susa (Arr. 7,6,3-5; and see Appendix IV
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pp , / h l ‘2-f. ). In general terms this is all that can he said.
There undoubtedly were substantial reinforcements of
Macedonians, Iranians and others, which more than made up
for those discharged, but our sources tell us little about 
15athem.
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PART II Troops for Service In the Satrapies
During the course of his campaigning Alexander had 
appointed satraps, strategoi and garrison commanders to 
administer and control the conquered territory. The details 
have been fully discussed by Berve (I pp.253-83) and need 
no elaboration here, but some notice must be given to the 
recruitment and deployment of troops through the empire. 
Originally the Achaemenid system seems to have been based on 
the concept of the satraps having full powers in their 
districts, just as the king did in the empire, but owing 
allegiance to the king and being responsible to him. It 
became necessary for the Achaemenids to detach command of 
large forces from the post of satrap in order to keep them 
from breaking away from the central administration; the 
empire was divided into seven military toparchies, as the 
Greeks called theiji, probably by Darius I, and commanders 
directly responsible to the king were installed in these, 
with a substantial military following of royal troops. In 
addition to these there were royal garrisons on the main 
routes and at strategic points, also directly responsible to 
the King.16
Alexanders system seems to have been based upon the 
same principles. The empire continued to be organised on the 
satrapal basis, with the satrap having responsibility for 
defending and policing his area. For this the satrap raised 
mainly locally recruited forces, supplemented by mercenaries, 
and the King did not have direct command over these troops.1  ^
But Alexander did have royal troops in garrisons in important
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cities and at strategic points, e.g. at Babylon, Susa,
“1 QMemphis. In addition, over areas in which Iranians were
appointed as satraps, Alexander stationed Macedonian
strategoi, or episkopoi, who commanded royal troops posted
in the area as a security measure: e.g. in Babylonia in
331 B.C. Apollodorus was appointed strategos over the troops
19left in that satrapy; Mazaeus, the Iranian, was satrap.
Alexander, therefore, had to provide troops for service 
in garrisons and in the detachments stationed around the 
empire, as well as reinforcing the main army. For many of 
those he had left on such duties on his way through the
Persian empire to India had been veterans and will have been
o nready for discharge in 324 B.C. Also, he had ordered many
mercenaries to be put out of service on his return from
India.^ In the fifth century B.C., the Achaemenids had in
large part used subject peoples - Iranians, Carians, and
other peoples of Asia Minor - who were attracted into the
22service by grants of land or other rewards of service.
In the garrison at Elephantine in the fifth century B.C., 
there were Persians, Medes, Chorasmians, Carians and many 
other subject peoples, as well as Greek mercenaries: the 
officers were for the most part Persian and Median.  ^ In the 
fourth century B.C., the Achaemenids had inclined more to 
the use of mercenary troops in the garrisons and detachments; 
but there is some evidence that towards the end of his life 
Alexander hoped to use more subjects, in preference to 
mercenaries.  ^ It is, therefore, likely that in 324 B.C. 
many Iranian troops and troops from other subject peoples,
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were, recruited for service in garrisons and detachments 
posted around the empire.
The sources give us few details of such troops. By-
chance, we are told that 1,000 Persian archers and slingers
were sent with Craterus and the veterans discharged from
Opis and they may have been intended for service in
Macedonia.2  ^ We may assume that many thousands of other
subjects were recruited for similar service; missile-throwers
and other light infantry, and also cavalry, were doubtless
recruited and sent for service in various parts of the
empire. The Epigoni also may in part have been intended for
service in garrisons and detachments in the satrapies: they
27would have been suitable replacements for mercenaries. ‘ In 
the absence of evidence, however, this can only be speculative.
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PART III The Main Army
As well as sending forces for service in various parts 
of the empire, Alexander also kept a large army together 
tinder his direct command. Although the Indian campaign was 
finished, he undertook a campaign against the Cossaeans late 
in 324 B.C. and planned to start a major expedition against
no
the Arabians in 323 B.C. Evidence concerning much of the 
army under Alexander during the last year of his life is 
poor, hut it is possible to reconstruct the form of the 
central core.
a) The Companion Cavalry
The organisation of the Companion cavalry is better
known than that of any other body, mainly because of the 
evidence of Arrian (7,6,3-5). This passage is treated at 
length in Appendix IV, and here I am concerned only with the 
information it gives about the form of the Companion cavalry 
in 324 B.C. One part of this passage refers to a reform 
which took place at Susa in 324 B.C. The massive 
demobilisation of Macedonians and Iranians no doubt greatly 
reduced the size of the Companion cavalry, J and Macedonian 
and Iranian reinforcements were drawn upon in a general 
reinforcement of the whole cavalry force, and the Companion 
cavalry built up in strength. We are given no information 
about the numbers of Iranians involved, nor precisely which 
tribes were represented. Only a handful of Iranians entered 
the agema, but this is no indication that a similarly small 
number entered the rest of the force. The entry of the
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Iranians into the agema was clearly considered the last
straw, and may well indicate rather that quite substantial
numbers joined the ranks of the ordinary Companions. Those
who entered the agema were homotimoi or other nobles of the
30highest rank at the court, and their names are recorded
for us: Kophen, son of Artabazus, Hydarnes and Artiboles,
sons of Mazaeus, Sisines and Phradasmenes, sons of
Phrataphernes. All these were of Persian descent, in the
31strict sense of the word. Of the other four who were so
honoured, the race of Aigobares and Mithrobaeus is unknown,
32Itanes was a Sogdian and Hystaspes a Bactrian. The
origins of these men may indicate that those who entered the
other ranks of the Companion cavalry came mainly from the
Persians, no doubt also from the Medes, but that a few also
came from Eastern Iranian peoples.
Those Iranians who entered the ranks of the Companion
cavalry during the Indian campaign were equipped like the
Macedonians (see Appendix IV pp. 4 - 1 9 * . ). The only direct
evidence upon the arms of the Iranians in the Companion
cavalry is in Arrian 7,6,5 and it is ambiguous. Arrian
states that ‘they* exchanged their javelins for thrusting
spears, but it is not clear whether »they* refers to those
who entered the agema or to all the Iranians in the
Companion cavalry. It is generally assumed that only these
in the agema are referred to, but this is not a necessary
interpretation and I suggest that Alexander did not introduce
34cavalry units with mixed arms.
The whole force was organised into five hipparchies
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plus the agema. This is stated plainly by Arrian and there
is no reason to reject his evidence. Brunt considered that
.......... 3 5the fifth hipparchy was the agema, but this view is not
tenable (see Appendix IV p. 4-13). Tarn, who believed that
the cavalry had been organised into five hipparchies in 526
B.C., suggested that in 524 B.C. the Macedonian content of
the hipparchies was drawn together to form one chiliarchy of
56Companions, 1,000 being all that was left. This chiliarchy 
he argued was put under the command of Hephaestion.
Tarn based his case upon the passage of Arrian (7,14,10), 
which states that Alexander appointed nobody as chiliarch of 
the Companion cavalry to replace Hephaestion, but the 
chiliarchy retained Hephaestion's name and carried as its 
standard an image of Hephaestion. Tarn believed that 
Hephaestion was appointed to the position of hazarapati. and 
that this meant that he must have commanded a body of 1,000 . 
horse and that this body was a chiliarchy. I shall discuss 
Hephaestion's position at the time of his death more fully 
below (pp./^Sf-A ), but for the moment it is sufficient to 
say that Hephaestion's position was not a straight copy of
..........................  38the Achaemenid office of hazarapati. Hephaestion's title 
of 'chiliarch1, although it was the Greek equivalent of the 
Persian word 'hazarapati', is not sufficient evidence for 
the view that a chiliarchy of Companion cavalry numbering
1,000 was under Hephaestion's command.Diodorus says that 
the unit which Hephaestion commanded was 'the most 
distinguished hipparchy' of Companion cavalry (18,3,4), thus 
corroborating the evidence of Arrian 7,6,4. There is no
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other indication that there was a chiliarchy of Companion 
cavalry in Alexander's army, and there is strong evidence 
to show that Alexander retained the term 'hipparchy1 for his 
basic cavalry -unit. Under the Ptolemies 'hipparchy* 
continued as the term for the basic cavalry unit, which is 
highly significant, and no chiliarchies of cavalry are 
attested in the 'Successor* armies.^ There can be little 
doubt that the title given in Arrian should not be preferred 
to the firm indications that the -unit which Hephaestion 
commanded was a hipparchy. It is easy to explain how Arrian 
was misled into thinking that Hephaestion*s unit was actually 
a chiliarchy. For Arrian, naturally, a chiliarch was a 
commander of 1,000 men and a chiliarchy was a technical 
military term for the unit he commanded. He, therefore, 
wrote 'chiliarchy' for the more correct 'hipparchy', perhaps 
to show off his knowledge of military terminology: compare, 
for instance, his usage of 'tetrarchy' at 3,18,5 (see above, 
Ch.Ill pp. ).
Tarn also believed that the Companion cavalry was sub­
divided into sections of 100 and supported this view with 
a reference in Arrian (7,24,4) to Alexander distributing 
sacrificial victims and wine to the army by lochoi and 
h e c a t o s t y e s He compares this with Arrian 6,27,6, where 
Alexander is said to have distributed baggage animals to 
some by ilae and hecatostyes, to others by lochoi (see Ch.III 
pp . S 2 f ) , and concludes that the hecatostys had become the 
standard subdivision of cavalry. However, the cavalry could 
be covered under «lochoi», as a lochos was a subdivision of 
an ile> and the evidence is not strong enough to indicate
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that the ile did not remain the basic subdivision of cavalry.
In the Ptolemaic army 'ile1 was the term for the subdivisions
of cavalry, and I suggest that in the army of Alexander also 
42this was so.
Evidence on the commanders of the Companion cavalry can 
be drawn from Diodorus 18,3,4. Diodorus states that after 
Alexander's death Seleucus succeeded to the command of the 
hipparchy of the Companion cavalry which was the most 
distinguished. He explains that Hephaestion had been the first 
to hold this position and after him Perdiccas had taken it.
This evidence is confirmed by Plutarch (Eum. 1,3),^ who says 
that Eumenes succeeded to Perdiccas' command of a hipparchy 
when Perdiccas was moved to the command of Hephaestion's 
hipparchy on the latter's death. The natural interpretation of 
this evidence is that Hephaestion was appointed commander of 
the most distinguished hipparchy of the Companion cavalry 
when that unit was formed at Susa in 324 B.C., and Perdiccas 
was put in charge of another of the five hipparchies. When 
Hephaestion died later the same year, Perdiccas succeeded to 
his post and Eumenes was appointed to the post left vacant by 
Perdiccas.
The matter is complicated, however, by Arrian's evidence 
(7,14,10), which states that Alexander did not appoint anyone 
to replace Hephaestion as chiliarch of the Companion cavalry, 
but the unit continued to bear Hephaestion*s name. There is 
no doubt that the chiliarchy referred to by Arrian is the 
hipparchy referred to by Diodorus and Plutarch. The sources 
are, therefore, at variance.
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Tarn accepts Arrian*s evidence, and argues that 
Seleucus was the first man to hold command of the military
4-4-unit after Hephaestion, and that was after Alexander*s death.
He does, however, allow that Perdiccas may have succeeded to 
the * vizier dom* d_e facto, without the military command.
Tarn*s case is poor; it is clear that the evidence of 
Diodorus and Plutarch indicates that Perdiccas succeeded to 
the military command, and in so far as the *vizierdom* carried 
no formal duties (see below) it is unlikely that Perdiccas 
would have been appointed to the office de_ facto.
Brunt offers the solution that Perdiccas succeeded to 
Hephaestion*s command of cavalry d_e faoto^  and this seems to 
be the likely answer. Command of this most distinguished 
hipparchy was linked with the position Hephaestion had held as 
Alexander’s second-in-command (see below ppA93-f.)i to give 
Perdiccas the command which had been Hephaestion*s would have-, 
been to mark him out as second-in-command, as taking over 
Hephaestion*3 role in all its aspects. This Alexander did 
not wish to do. However, the unit of the Companion cavalry 
needed a commander and, therefore, Perdiccas was given this 
command de_ facto. But it was made clear that Perdiccas was 
not in fact succeeding to the office of chiliarchy which 
Hephaestion had held, by the unit’s bearing the image of 
Hephaestion as its standard, proclaiming the continued 
connection with its dead leader.^
There seems to be little doubt that Perdiccas did take 
command of the most distinguished hipparchy on Hephaestion’s 
death, and Plutarch (Eum. 1,2) says that when Perdiccas moved 
into Hephaestion’s post, Eumenes took over Perdiccas*
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hipparchy. We have, then, the names of two men who held 
commands of hipparchies simultaneously. The leaders of the 
cavalry faction after Alexander's death are given in Arrian 
(Diad. 2): Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, and after these 
lysimachus, Peithon, Seleucus and Eumenes. Three of these, 
apart from Perdiccas and Eumenes, may have been in command 
of hipparchies of Companion cavalry at Alexander's deathf^ 
but the evidence is not good enough for us to be sure.
There is no firm evidence concerning the strength of the 
Companion cavalry. Perhaps the hipparchies remained at
.... 4.8around 350-400 men strong and the agema at about 300. The 
total would thus have been about 2,000. But no certainty can 
be achieved.
There is no evidence concerning other cavalry units in 
Alexander's army in 324/3 B.C. Menidas arrived with cavalry 
under bis command by 323 B.C., in time for the Arabian 
expedition, but nothing more is known of them (see above, pj¿0). 
The general.reinforcement of 324 B.C. presumably involved many 
Iranian cavalry, both missile-bearers and lancers, and the 
troops which arrived from Caria and Lydia (Arr. 7,23,1) 
presumably contained some cavalry. But there is little to be 
gained from pursuing a discussion of these troops when 
nothing is known about them.
b) The Infantry
During the discussion of the infantry I shall frequently 
refer to the description of the Persian court of Alexander 
which is preserved in Aelian (V.H. 9,3), Athenaeus (12,539e) 
and Polyaenus (4,3,24). Polyaenus has the fullest version.^
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He says that among the Macedonians and Greeks Alexander kept 
a modest court, "but among the "barbarians he had a very 
elaborate one. He describes the royal pavilion with 100 
couches and 50 gold pillars, draped with gorgeous materials, 
and then details the troops and attendants gathered around 
Alexander. Hirst came 500 Persian melophoroi standing inside 
the tent dressed in purple and quince yellow. After the 
melophoroi came an equal number of archers, distinguished 
from them in colour: for some wore flame-red, some blue and 
some scarlet (Aelian and Athenaeus say that there were 1,000 
of these). In front of these stood 500 Macedonian argyraspids 
of outstandingly tall stature. In the middle of the pavilion 
stood a‘ gold throne on which Alexander sat conducting the 
proceedings, and the bodyguards stood around on all sides of 
the king as he gave judgment. In a circle around the tent the 
agema of elephants was arrayed and 1,000 Macedonians dressed 
in Macedonian uniform. Next to these were 500 Susian 
»purple-bearers* and then in a circle 10,000 Persians, the 
tallest and most handsome of all the Persians, decked out in 
full Persian dress, all carrying short swords (akinakes).
Polyaenus states that this was the style of Alexander*s 
court among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians, but this 
is impossible. Por Alexander could not have had 10,000 
Persian, or even Iranian, guards, and a unit of elephants at 
any time before his return from India, and therefore 
Polyaenus is wrong in stating that Alexander held such a 
court among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians (see 
Appendix VI p.^?6)* However, there is good reason to think
173
that the description is a fairly accurate description of 
Alexander's Persian court, as it was instituted in 324-3 B.C. 
Jacohy suggested, and scholars generally have agreed, that the 
passage is derived ultimately from Chares.50 Chares was usher 
at the Persian court of Alexander and may, therefore, he 
thought reliable on such matters. A certain amount of 
exaggeration may have been introduced, and some details 
changed during the transmission (see, for instance, Appendix 
concerning the argyraspids), but in general the 
description is quite credible. The colour and splendour of 
the Persian court is well established and the details fit 
well with what is known of the traditions of the Achaemenid 
institution: for instance, the coloured apparel of the 
melophoroi and the archers, and the grant of purple from the 
king are well attested.^ With the reliability of the 
passage established (I hope) we may move on to consider the 
individual units of infantry.
(i) The Hypaspists
The discharge of Macedonian veterans in 324 B.C. will
52have reduced the number of hypaspists, and after the 
demobilisation, Diodorus states, Alexander appointed 1,000 
Persians ‘to the hypaspists around the court* (17,110,1).
Justin clearly refers to the same action when he says that 
Alexander * chose 1,000 of these young Persians for the body 
of the guard (satellitum)* (12,12,4). These passages seem to 
imply that Alexander actually introduced Persians into the 
body of the hypaspists and Berve accepted this interpretation.55^
He pointed to Arrian's reference to Alexander's ‘mixing in
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with the taxeis of Macedonians Persian melophoroi» (7,29,4).
The Persian guards referred to by Diodorus and Justin were 
the melophoroi, for they must be identified with those 
described as guarding Alexander in the passage of Polyaenus 
quoted above. But there is no compelling evidence to 
indicate that any Persians actually became hypaspists in the 
strict sense of the word in the Macedonian context. For 
Diodorus* use of the term *hypaspist* could very well carry 
the general meaning of ‘bodyguard*, and too much significance 
should not be read into Diodorus* implication that the 
Macedonians were replaced by Persians. ^ That Alexander used 
Persians in his army in 324 B.C. is certain, but it does not 
follow that the place of each Macedonian discharged was filled 
by a Persian. If this is what Diodorus meant then he is surely 
wrong and has been misled by the juxtaposition of the 
discharge of veterans and the introduction of Persians.
However, it seems more likely that Diodorus did not think 
deeply about the meaning of the words, rather he was merely 
following a conventional formula to describe the act of 
reinforcements. It might be thought that Arrian*s reference 
to the intermixture of Persian melophoroi into the taxeis 
certainly indicates that the melophoroi actually became 
members of the hypaspist body, but Arrian's terminology is 
vague and it could equally well mean that units of melophoroi
were introduced alongside Macedonian units and not actually 
55into them.
In fact, it seems most unlikely that any Persians 
actually entered the hypaspist body in Alexander's lifetime.
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The evidence of Polyaenus quoted above shows that the Persians
assigned to guard duty at the court kept their Persian
identity and their Persian equipment. The hypaspists were
56not simply guards at the court^ hut a most important combat 
unit, and it seems unlikely that Alexander would have 
disturbed the effectiveness of the body by making it a mixed 
force containing Macedonians in Macedonian equipment and 
Persians in Persian equipment. 1 Under the Successors the 
hypaspists continued to be used in the role they had played 
under Alexander and particular stress was placed upon the 
Macedonian origins of the hypaspists. Both these consider­
ations support my view that no Persian melophoroi entered the 
hypaspists.
I would suggest that the hypaspist body was reinforced 
only by Macedonians and that it kept its traditional character. 
The divisions of the body were probably also unchanged. In 
India they were arranged in chiliarchies (Ch.IV pp.l46f.), and 
this remained the standard infantry division under the 
Successors.^ Polyaenus* evidence shows that the chiliarchies 
continued to be subdivided into units of 500, for this was the 
number of hypaspists in attendance upon Alexander at the 
court. The strength of the body had been around 5,000 
(excluding the agema of 500) in India and there is no reason 
to think that that number changed:if this is right, then the 
number of chiliarchies will have remained at three.
In India there was no overall commander of the hypaspists, 
each chiliarchy being an independent command (Ch.IV pp.l52f.). 
However, Plutarch (Eum. 1,3) refers to Ueoptolemus as 
archihypaspistes. which should mean ’commander
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6 0of the hypaspists*. It may well he that in the more 
settled conditions of 324 B.C. Neoptolemus was appointed to 
the position which Nicanor had held, but which had not been 
filled during the campaigning in Eastern Iran and India 
because of the necessity for maximum flexibility. There were 
no doubt advantages in having the hypaspists drawn together 
under one commander: it would establish a unity among the 
royal guard and thereby esprit de corps.
I have not discussed the infantry agema in the context of 
the rest of the hypaspists because it was probably kept 
separate.^ In India it had naturally been separate from the 
chiliarchies of hypaspists and, although there is no direct 
evidence, it seems most likely that it remained separate. The 
cavalry agema was separate from the hipparchies of Companion 
cavalry and the infantry agema was a parallel unit, and, 
therefore, probably not under Neoptolemus1 command. Arrian 
(7,29,4) states that Alexander mixed some pre-eminent Persians 
(homotimoi) into the agemata. We are given details of nine 
men who entered the cavalry agema (Arr. 7,6,4.5, see above 
p./66 ) and Arrian*s use of the plural (« .yypetrt ) should 
mean that Iranians of similarly high rank were introduced into 
the infantry agema. However, it is strange that none are 
named and this passage of Arrian is not good evidence, because 
he is not following a source but making his own general 
summary (see above n.55). If no Iranians entered the 
hypaspists, it seems probable that none entered the infantry 
agema. We should, therefore, explain Arrian*s plural as 
rhetorical. We may assume that prominent Persians entered 
the melophoroi. as was traditional, and that the Macedonian
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guard units remained separate.
{;;\Th.e Pezetairoi
The seven battalions of pezetairoi which fought in 
India lost a great many men in the demobilisation which 
followed that campaign. The majority of the Macedonians sent 
home undoubtedly came from these battalions. This led Beloch, 
Berve and Schachermeyr to conclude that very few Macedonians
62remained in the regular heavy infantry forces after 324 B.C., 
but I have already argued that Macedonian reinforcements 
certainly arrived and we may assume that these were 
phalangites. Even if the reinforcements were not equal to 
the number of men discharged, Antipater was soon to arrive 
with a new force of Macedonians (Arr. 7,12,4).
Schachermeyr argued that Persians were integrated into 
the Macedonian heavy infantry battalions and pointed to the 
passage of Arrian 7,29,4, which refers to Alexander mixing
- .................. ............... 63melophoroi into the taxeis of the Macedonians.  ^ I have 
already suggested that that-passage refers to the use of 
Persian guards alongside Macedonian guards at the court 
(above pp.J73-£). The melophoroi in Achaemenid times consisted 
of 1,000 nobles selected from the Persians to be royal 
g u a r d s a s  such they would hardly fit into the phalanx.
Their name obviously implies that they kept their Persian 
equipment, which also seems to rule out any such integration. 
It might finally be noted that Arrian is quite erratic in his 
use of »taxis» and, while it often means ; battalions of 
the pezetairoi, often it means »unit* in the general sense 
(see Appendix Ilia). Arrian*s passage cannot, then, be used
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to support Schachermeyr's case.
But Diodorus and Justin refer to the introduction of
Persians into the army after the discharge of the Macedonian
veterans at Opis. Diodorus (17,110,1) says that Alexander
introduced Persians to the number of those discharged, while
Justin (12,12,4), seemingly drawing upon the same source,
states that Alexander mixed in with his army Persians armed as
Macedonians, that is the Epigoni, see below p A s  I
have already suggested above p./73, although the natural
interpretation of Diodorus* evidence would be that the place
of each Macedonian discharged was taken by a Persian, this is
not acceptable. Justin's version need mean no more than that
units of the Epigoni were introduced beside the Macedonian
65units, and this is how Berve interpreted the evidence.  ^ It 
would not have made sense, from the viewpoint of military 
efficiency, to mix Persians into the Macedonian battalions,
for it could have done nothing but arouse ill feeling in the
, . 66 phalanx.
Berve (I pp.l21f.) argued that the pezetairoi ceased to 
exist, at least by the time the mixed force of Macedonian 
phalangites and the Persian bowmen and javelin-men was formed 
at Babylon (Arr. 7,23,3.4). He means by this that the 
Macedonian phalanx was disestablished. Arrian says that 
Alexander formed sections containing four Macedonian heavy 
phalangite infantry men and twelve Persian light-armed 
infantry men. (These sections never went into action, and 
many scholars have been doubtful of their practical value, ^  
but Arrian's evidence is confirmed by Diodorus (17,110,2)
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and we have no reason to doubt that Alexander did form such 
sections. Alexander regularly used light-armed troops in 
conjunction with heavy-armed and he probably wanted to 
experiment with the new formations during the Arabian 
expedition, but it is impossible to believe that Alexander 
used all the Macedonian heavy infantry in the experiment. 
Arrian*s evidence certainly implies that some Macedonian heavy 
infantry were withdrawn from the traditional phalanx, but not 
that the Macedonian phalanx ceased to exist altogether.
Berve argued further that the role of the pezetairoi was
68completely taken over by the Epigoni at this time.
Schachermeyr seems to agree.^ jn support of this view Berve 
points to the name which Alexander gave to these Iranians, 
i.e. ‘the Successors*. But it may well be that he coined the 
term for the very purpose of demonstrating to the Macedonians 
that they were not indispensable, and that they must not be 
arrogant and insubordinate (for this idea, see Arr. 7*29,4). 
Berve also cites Arrian 7,11,5, which states that after the 
mutiny at Opis Alexander formed Persian pezetairoi to replace 
the Macedonians. But it is generally accepted that none of
70these Persian replacement forces was of permanent standing.' 
There are no sure indications that Alexander intended to 
replace the Macedonian pezetairoi with Epigoni, and, as I have 
argued (p,/60), it is most likely that Alexander had a large 
force of Macedonian phalangites in his army at the time of 
his death. It is possible that Alexander had a long-term 
plan to relieve the Macedonian infantry of much of the burden 
of service in Asia, but it is certain that little progress
180
towards such a goal had teen made "by the time of his death.
I would conclude that Alexander did not run down the 
Macedonian pezetairoi force, nor did he introduce Persians 
into it. The question of the organisation of the force 
cannot he satisfactorily treated because of lack of evidence. 
Some of the phalangites were put into the mixed sections dis­
cussed above, at least for the duration of the Arabian 
expedition. The majority, however, remained in pezetairoi 
formations of traditional type, but it seems unlikely that 
Alexander retained the old territorial divisions. There were 
obvious advantages, both administrative and political, in 
destroying the territorial distinctions. Por the distinctions 
would have been a restriction upon freedom in the recruiting 
and promotion of men, and they would have helped maintain the 
local allegiance of the men and the power of the nobles. It 
seems likely, therefore, that in the course of the massive 
reinforcement and reorganisation Alexander removed the 
traditional territorial divisions and adopted a more flexible 
principle of dividing the men into tactical groupings. I 
have already argued in Ch.IT pp. /2.2.f? that the battalions 
were subdivided into chiliarchies and I would suggest that 
these became the basis of the new organisation. In the 
Ptolemaic army, groupings of chiliarchies were probably called 
»hegemoniae» ; these were under the command of strategoi: the
............... 71term «taxis» was not in official use. There is no evidence 
that Alexander used the term «hegemoniae». but there is some 
indication that groups of pezetairoi chiliarchies were under 
the command of a strategos: the strategoi were admitted to 
court when Alexander was dying, while the chiliarchs and
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pentacosiarchs had to remain outside (Arr. 7,25,6).
It might seem likely that of the old commanders of the
taxeis who remained, each took command of a strategic
division. Certainly Meleager continued to he a prominent
infantry leader after Alexander*s death: and there is no
doubt that Alcetas and Attalus remained with the army, and
their background indicates that they also will have been
72prominent infantry leaders.‘ We cannot know how many
.... 7*strategoi of pezetairoi there were.-'
It is also unknown how many chiliarchies were grouped
under a strategost perhaps no more than two; but it is clear
that the chiliarchy was divided into two pentacosiarchies.
Prior to 524 B.Co the chiliarchy contained two lochoi. which
had a paper strength of 500 (see above Ch.IY pp./27-f), but
the term pentacosiarchy was introduced in 324 B.C.
Pentacosiarchs appear in Arrain 7,25,6, alongside chiliarchs,
as subordinate officers after the strategoi. It should be
74noted that the term was also used in the Ptolemaic army.
The pentacosiarchy itself may have been subdivided into
sections of 100. In the Ptolemaic army the hecatontarchy
75was a basic subsection of the pentacosiarchy and there is 
perhaps an indication in Arrian 7,24,4, that the pentacosiarchy 
of Alexander was similarly divided. Por there it is recorded 
that Alexander distributed sacrificial victims and wine by 
lochoi and hecatostyes: I have already argued that the *lochoi* 
refers to the cavalry, we might therefore conclude that the 
»hecatostyes* refers to the infantry.^6 Some doubt must be 
cast upon this interpretation because the term might refer to
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t h e Iranians, who were certainly divided into units of 100.
It is, however, more likely that Alexander is being described 
in this passage fulfilling his role as king of the Macedonians, 
in preparation for the Arabian expedition. The variation 
between the term which appears in Arrian and that of the 
Ptolemaic army does not seem particularly significant.
The question of the survival of the term »pezetairoif 
should perhaps be raised. Berve (I p.121), in the belief that 
the Macedonian phalanx was disestablished, naturally concluded 
that the term died out (see above p J 7 8  ). The term 
originally was applied to a small royal guard, but Philip, in 
his preparations for the Persian campaign, extended the term 
to embrace all the heavy phalangite Macedonians who served 
in the royal army, with the exception of the hypaspists 
(Ch.II pp. 57-£ ). The other terms, *hetairoi* and 
«hypaspist*, survive and so it seems likely that the term 
»pezetairoi* also survived the reforms. The army was given 
its form at Susa in the late spring to early summer of 524 
B.C., and I would suppose that no major reorganisation took 
place after this time (see above p J S 7 ) ,  it is, therefore, 
significant that during the course of the mutiny at Opis 
some months after this Alexander formed, or threatened to 
form, a new body of »pezetairoi1 out of Persians (Arr. 7,11,
3). This indicates that a body of Macedonian pezetairoi was 
in existence at the time of the mutiny. Whether all the 
ordinary Macedonian phalangite soldiers in the service of 
Alexander were called *pezetairoi* is more doubtful. Those 
in service in garrisons, and perhaps those introduced into 
the new-style sections alongside the Persian light
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infantry, were not part of the traditional Macedonian 
phalanx and therefore probably did not bear this name.
The total strength of the pezetairoi at the death of 
Alexander cannot be calculated with any accuracy: there is 
simply no information. Brunt points out that Perdiccas had 
available to him a considerable force of Macedonian infantry 
after Alexander’s death^ and it is difficult to believe that 
Alexander had not prepared a good force of Macedonian 
phalangites before mounting the Arabian expedition. I would 
suggest that the hypaspists and pezetairoi together could not 
have numbered less than 7,000 - 8,000 on the eve of the 
Arabian expedition.
Before leaving our discussion of the pezetairoi some 
reference must be made to the 1,000 Macedonians in Macedonian 
uniform at the court of Alexander mentioned among the other 
forces in attendance (see Polyaenus’ passage). One might 
naturally suppose that they were hypaspists, additional to 
the 5 0 0 within the pavilion of the king, but if this were so 
one would expect them to be called hypaspists, or at least 
argyraspids (see Appendix VI). If they were not hypaspists 
they must surely have been pezetairoi, for no other category 
of Macedonian infantry is ever mentioned, and ’Macedonian 
uniform* would naturally be interpreted to refer to the 
Macedonian phalangite armour and weapons in this context.
The full splendour and variety of the infantry seems to have 
been on display, and the absence of pezetairoi would be 
surprising. I would suggest, therefore, that chiliarchies 
of nezetairoi attended upon the king’s court, the duty being
rotated.
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(iii) The Melophoroi
Herodotus, in his description of the marching order of
the army of Xerxes which invaded Greece, says that the 1,000
Persian infantry which followed directly behind the king were
distinguished by means of their spears, which were decorated
by the shape of an apple being worked on the butt (7,41,2).
Heracleides of Cumae tells us that the melophoroi were 1,000
Persians selected for their high rank from the ranks of the
Immortals. They had golden apples on the butts of their
spears and held a court in-the royal complex, through which
7ftthe king would walk in order to go out of the palace.
There can be no/doubt that Alexander continued to maintain 
this unit in the Achaemenid tradition: the evidence of 
Polyaenus quoted above makes this certain, as does the 
passage of Arrian 7,29,4. It is also certain, as I have 
indicated above (p./7£), that these melophoroi are referred 
to by Diodorus (17,110,1) and Justin (12,12,4); they are 
the Persians who joined the »guards around the court».
Berve suggested that Alexander reduced the number of 
melophoroi to 500, on the strength of the evidence of the 
description of Polyaenus, but this is most unlikely in view 
of the traditional strength of the body and the agreement in 
Diodorus and Justin that the Persian royal guards numbered 
1,000.^ As the royal guards probably kept a continuous 
watch at the court, some must have been off duty when others 
were on, and I do not think it is necessary to see the 
evidence of Polyaenus as contradicting that of Diodorus and 
Justin. I conclude, therefore, that Alexander organised a 
body of high ranking Persian nobles to the number of 1,000
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to form a royal guard and thereby keep up the tradition of 
the Persian court. Their commander was presumably a Persian 
of very high rank, and it would seem likely that they were 
divided into sub-units of 5 0 0 .
There is no mention of the troops called the »Immortals* 
in our sources for the last year of Alexander*s life and yet 
the melophoroi, Heracleides tells us, were a part of the
O Q
10,000 Immortals in the Achaemenid days. They had been 
drawn from Persians, Medes and other Iranian peoples, and 
from Elamites, and had gained their name from being always 
maintained at the strength of 10,000. 8 1 They were stationed 
at the centre of the Persian Empire, but in times of emergency 
they were sometimes sent on a special mission and when the 
king went on campaign in person they accompanied him as an
opelite combat force of heavy infantry. Originally they were
all spearmen it seems, or at least this was their
83characteristic weapon.  ^ The force seems to have survived to 
the day of Darius III, despite the fact that the Persian 
infantry in general were greatly overshadowed by the Greek
a  a
phalangites. ^
That Alexander continued this force is unlikely. If it 
had been continued we would almost certainly have heard of it 
because it had made such an impression upon the Greeks. The 
Persian heavy infantry had been proven badly inferior to the 
Greek, and particularly the Macedonian, counterpart, and 
Alexander would hardly want as many as 10,000 inferior troops 
in the army. There was some point in continuing the tradition 
of the Achaemenid court with 1,000 melophoroi. their absence
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from -the Persian court would have made an impression upon the 
Iranians and subject peoples. But the Immortals were too 
numerous to keep for the sake of form and not so important. 
Their name, in the Greek language, is not likely to have 
appealed to Alexander either, and I suspect he would have 
received some satisfaction from demonstrating that the 
•Immortals* were, in fact, quite mortal.
(iv) The Royal Archers
At the court of the Achaemenids, as well as the brightly 
coloured melophoroi, archers were in attendance, as the 
evidence of the reliefs and tiles shows. The description 
in Polyaenus shows that Alexander also continued this part of 
the spectacle, for archers are placed with the melophoroi 
within the royal pavilion. The number is given as equal to 
the number of melophoroi in Polyaenus, that is 500, but in 
the versions of Aelian and Athenaeus they are said to number
1,000. There is no way of proving which is right, but ve>
86should perhaps accept the majority view. Even if Polyaenus
is accepted and only 500 were at the court, we would have to
suppose that the force numbered 1 ,0 0 0 , as was traditional
among the Persians, and that 500 were off duty, as were 500
melophoroi. The bow was an honoured weapon among the Persian
nobility and the Persian archers were highly effective and
famed soldiersj there is, therefore, nothing surprising in
87their being present at the royal court. I would suggest
that they were Iranian, and perhaps Elamite, nobility
honoured with a place at court and privileged to wear bright
88colours by the king. "Whether this was the full force of
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royal archers or only part cannot he known in the absence 
of evidence. The Iranians were very skilled archers and 
could make an important contribution to the fighting strength 
of the army, but there is no reason to suppose that more than
1 , 0 0 0  high-ranking men were honoured by being called to serve 
in the royal guard. There can be no doubt that the commander 
of the royal archers was a Persian of high rank.
(v) 10.000 Persians Armed with Short Swords
In Polyaenus» description of the court scene, there 
appear outside of the royal pavilion, and beyond the 
elephants, 10,000 Persians in Persian equipment, armed with 
the characteristic Iranian short sword (akinakes). Polyaenus 
is the only one to mention that they were armed with the 
Iranian short sword, but we have no reason to doubt him on 
this point. He is also the only one to say that these 
Persians were »the most handsome and tallest»: if reliable, 
this might mean that they were an elite force of some kind, 
but the reference to their good looks and stature may be 
simply, aimed at heightening the effect of the passage, without 
any particular significance. 3 The akinakes seems to have 
been regularly carried by Iranians at court, to judge from 
the reliefs at Persepolis,and it may be that these 10,000 
were in ceremonial dress, rather than in their fighting 
e q u i p m e n t . I f  this is so, it is impossible to know what 
sort of troops they were. They may have been light infantry, 
the Iranian and Elamite peoples were strong in this depart­
ment: ^ 2 but they may have been cavalrymen, without their
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horses, in the dress conventional for nobles at court.
Hot enough is known of the circumstances of this court
described by Polyaenus, and although it is likely that they
were a military force, details of their organisation cannot
be discussed for lack of evidence. The 500 Susians, to whom
Alexander had granted the privilege of wearing the purple,
and who stood next to the 10,000, are clearly not a military
force. Polyaenus is the only author to describe them as
Susians, and if he is right, we should perhaps conclude that
this court was held in Susiana, for there can be no other
reason for the Susians in particular being in attendance at 
93court.
(vi) The Epigoni
These were 30,000 Iranians whom, Arrian tells us, the 
satraps from the newly founded cities and the rest of the 
conquered territory brought to Alexander at Susa in 324 B.C.^ 
The clear implication of this evidence is that they were 
drawn mainly from the Iranians whom Alexander had brought 
into his new settlements:^ these naturally will have been 
more readily available for training. But others were selected 
from the rest of the population of the Iranian plateau, if 
Arrian’s evidence can be trusted. The reference to »the 
satraps from the newly founded cities’ is clearly inaccurate 
for the governors of these settlements were not satraps,
Arrian is using the term as if it were a synonym for »archon* ? 6 
The order for their training had been given in 328/7 B.C., 
before the start of the Indian expedition. ^  Tarn was of 
the opinion that these young Iranians were mere boys when
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they arrived at Susa, and dismissed them as of no significance, 
(II p.169). Yet he can hardly he right, since they had been 
under training for four years.
I have already argued against the interpretation of the 
ancient evidence to mean that the Epigoni were put into the
qo
same units as Macedonian heavy infantry. I have also tried 
to refute the arguments used by Berve to show that they 
replaced the Macedonian phalanx. I interpret the evidence to 
mean that the Epigoni were organised into separate units 
alongside the Macedonians. Details of their organisation are 
not recorded, but they must have been arranged in formations 
similar to the Macedonian phalangite force, as is implied by 
Diodorus* reference to their being formed into an antitagma 
to counterbalance the Macedonian tagma, because the 
Macedonians were becoming insubordinate.^ And in so far as 
they were recruited and trained in various centres in the 
eastern empire, it is perhaps likely that they were organised 
according to district.
Thirty thousand Iranian heavy-armed infantry is a very 
large number and it seems doubtful whether Alexander would 
have wanted so many on the Arabian expedition. Some, no doubt, 
were intended for this expedition, but many may have been 
sent for service in garrisons or in detachments of royal 
troops around the empire (see also above p.1 6 4 - ).
(vii) Other Troops
In 323 B.C., presumably in preparation for the Arabian 
expedition, Peucestas, satrap of Persis, arrived with 20,000 
men, at least some being archers and javelin-men. 1 0 0 Many of
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the archers and javelin-men were attached to Macedonian heavy
infantry in the new-style mixed sections, as described by
1 01Arrian (7,23,5.4) and Diodorus (17,110,2), but surely 
not all were so attached. But the organisation of those not 
in the mixed sections cannot be known, nor can that of the 
Cossaeans and Tapurians who also arrived with Peucestas (Arr. 
7,23,5). The Cossaeans and Tapurians also were probably light­
armed infantry, for they were mountain-peoples.
We can do no more than simply record the arrival of 
troops from Caria under Philoxenus and from Lydia under 
Menander (Arr. 7,23,1; see above, p , ! 6 0 ) m These were, 
presumably, satrapal levies called for the Arabian expedition, 
just like the troops from Persia. There was a tradition of
heavy infantry in these places, not unlike the Greek hoplite
102tradition. The cavalry under the command of Menidas, 
which arrived at the same time as the troops from Caria and 
Lydia, may have been a force of mercenaries, but I suggest 
this only because of Menidas* background as a commander of 
mercenary cavalry and because Arrian fails to give an 
indication of their nationality (7,23,1).^^ There were 
almost certainly other mercenary units with the army at 
Alexander*s death. In the disturbance following that death, 
Philip Arrhidaeus sent on a deputation representing the 
infantry faction Pasas the Thessalian (Berve II no.608),
Amissus the Megalopolitan (Berve II no.53), and Perilaus,
Berve suggests that Pasas was an officer of Greek mercenaries, 
and I would suppose that Amissus held a similar position. 
Perilaus (Berve II no.630) was perhaps a Macedonian, for" his
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nationality is not given, but we cannot know what troops he 
commanded.
c) The Size of the Main Army
The only relevant figures contained in the ancient
sources are those in Curtius 10,2,8, where it is recorded that
before the discharge of the veterans from Opis, Alexander
ordered 1 3 , 0 0 0  infantry and 2 , 0 0 0 cavalry to be retained in
Asia; »thinking that Asia could be held in check with a small
force, because he had placed garrisons in many places and had
recently founded towns and filled them with settlers who
would be anxious to keep their property1. Beloch and Berve
considered that these figures referred to the number of
European veterans of the Indian campaign whom Alexander did 
105not discharge.  ^ Brunt, however, rightly points out that 
the number is far too low to cover Greeks, Balkan troops and
-] A C
Macedonians. He suggests that the numbers refer to the 
reinforcements called for by Alexander during the year 324- 
3 B.C. But Curtius says nothing about Alexander calling for 
reinforcements, and it seems unlikely that Curtius could have 
come across a record of the number of troops which Alexander 
summoned from Macedonia in the last year of his life. It 
seems most likely, however, that the numbers do refer to 
Macedonians; it was the Macedonian veterans who were to be 
discharged. If it is accepted, as I have argued above p J 6 0 ,  
that considerable Macedonian reinforcements had already 
reached Alexander before the Macedonian veterans were 
discharged, there is no difficulty in taking the words of 
Curtius to mean what they say; i.e. that Alexander kept
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1 3 , 0 0 0  infantry and 2 , 0 0 0 cavalry and sent the rest of the
Macedonians home. Ho importance need he attached to Curtius*
107explanation of the reasoning behind Alexanders action. ‘
But even if Curtius* evidence is accepted, and Alexander 
did have 13,000 Macedonian infantry and 2,000 Macedonian 
cavalry with him in summer 324 B.C. (after the veterans had 
been discharged), we have no clear indication of the overall 
size of the army. It seems likely enough that Alexanders 
army was in excess of 50,000 on the eve of the Arabian
T 0 ftexpedition, but it is impossible to know the actual strength.
193
PAST IV The Position of Hephaestion in 324 B.C.
I have already discussed Hephaestion’s command of ’the 
most distinguished hipparchy» of Companion cavalry (p p/674),
"but he is said also to have held the chiliarchy. In Photius’ 
epitome of Arrian Diadochi 3, it is stated that in the 
settlement at Babylon, after Alexander’s death, it was agreed 
that Perdiccas hold the chiliarchy which had been held by 
Hephaestion, and in a note Photius explains t o  be.
¿Trc-r^orry f u p r r Z r y r Diodorus explains that
‘the position and rank: of chiliarch had first been brought 
to fame and honour by the Persian kings, and afterwards under
Alexander it gained great power and glory..... * (18,48,5),10^
This explanation is made in the context of Antipater’s 
appointment of his son Cassander as chiliarch to Polyperchon, 
who was ’the guardian of the kings and supreme commander*, to 
be ’second in authority*.
The Achaemenid Kings had had an officer called
hazarapati: originally this post was closely linked with
command of the royal guard, the melophoroi; these numbered
1 , 0 0 0  (see above, p. ) and it was this command which gave
the officer his name, <commander of 1,000*. (The Greeks
called him chiliarch). But the office was much more than
simply a command of 1 ,0 0 0, it carried great prestige and
brought a rank second only to the King. 1 1 1  Under Darius III
the hazarapati was Habarzanes, whom Arrian calls chiliarch on 
112two occasions, but by this time the office was linked with 
a command of 1 , 0 0 0  elite cavalry, not the melophoroi.11^
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The office which Hephaestion held under Alexander clearly- 
continued the Achaemenid tradition: he commanded an elite body 
of cavalry and was an officer of great importance. But the 
precise nature of Hephaestion*s position needs a fuller 
discussion.
It has Been widely held that the post at it existed 
under the Achaemenids gave its holder overall responsibility 
for the armed forces, and therefore for the whole administration 
of the empire: he was »prime minister* or »grand vizier».^^
The case for this interpretation of the office has been 
stated most fully by Junge.'*"'^  Many scholars have drawn the 
conclusion that the office under Alexander was of a similar 
nature and brought Hephaestion general power over the armed 
forces and the administration of the whole empire. They have 
been confirmed in this belief by the description of the office 
(when taken by Perdiccas) as etrir-^otr^j Tyr rupirjerjr
The evidence upon which this view of Hephaestion*s 
position is based, is not sound. Despite the elaborate 
arguments of Junge in defining the powers of the Achaemenid 
hazarapati, he has no firm evidence to support him. Recently 
Frye has warned against using post-Achaemenid conditions as 
evidence for the Achaemenid chiliarchy, and seems to come out 
against the existence of any formal prime minister. He 
tentatively offers the description of the official as a 
•representative or assistant of the king when the latter was 
indisposed, or unable to carry out his functions». It seems 
clear that far less is known about the nature of the office 
under the Achaemenids than about its nature under Alexander, 
and that Achaemenid parallels cannot be used in a discussion
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of Hephaestion’s position.
The other evidence, drawn from Photius* epitome of
Arrian (Diad. 3), is no more reliable, as has been
117demonstrated by Schachermeyr. After taking the chiliarchy 
Perdiccas took, or claimed, the powers of firrrjpowj Ytjr 
f$»t*rc\et*s > this included command of the royal 
army and overall control of the empire. But, as Schachermeyr 
has argued, this was not by virtue of his office of chiliarch. 
The king was weak, there was a power vacuum; Perdiccas took
advantage of his prestige to seize control and he should not
H Rbe seen as fulfilling his role as chiliarch. That his 
position was not based on the office of chiliarch is shown, 
as Schachermeyr notes, by the appointment of Seleucus as 
commander of the most distinguished hipparchy of Companion 
cavalry. Under Alexander this command had been closely 
linked with the office of chiliarch, and it was not within 
the power of the chiliarch to appoint anyone to this command 
in the army. We may conclude that the description of the 
chiliarchy in Photius * epitome reflects the reality of 
Perdiccas* position, not the theory behind the post of 
chiliarch.
By his appointment Seleucus took the most distinguished 
command in the army and became pre-eminent among the 
officers: J in effect he became Perdiccas* second-in-command, 
though this should not be seen as bringing any formal duties. 
It was this position as second-in-command to the commander 
of the royal army, which Diodorus describes as the chiliarchy 
in the years following Alexander*s death. Hence Cassander 
is chiliarch, second-in-command to Polyperchon in 319 B.C . , 1 2 0
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a position.very different from that of Hephaestion, who had 
been chiliarch to the King.
In summary then, the evidence from the period following 
Alexander's death is not applicable to Hephaestion's position 
and in discussing the chiliarchy under Alexander attention 
must be confined to the last year of Alexanders reign.
Schachermeyr argues convincingly that, in fact, the chiliarchy
121carried no formal defined duties. Alexander was a strong 
self-ruler and would not have handed over to any subordinate 
the responsibility for any aspect of imperial administration, 
certainly not command of the army. Furthermore, the tradition 
of the Macedonian kingship was one of a strong direct rule 
by a patriarchal king, without any bureaucratic system of 
ministers with defined areas of responsibility. The kings 
naturally had to have agents to whom they could entrust 
specific tasks, but these agents had defined powers and duties 
only as long as it took them to carry out their allotted task. 
Every delegation of authority was an ad hoc arrangement. The 
Macedonian kingdom was run by the Argead king and the 
hetairoi councillors, who were advisers to the king and upon 
whom he could draw for agents when necessary. It is most 
likely that this tradition continued among Alexander's close 
associates in the administration of the Persian empire.
Alexander, however, had to have a man of outstanding 
prestige, someone recognised as Alexander's right-hand man, 
who could take the king's place when necessary and whom men 
would respect and obey. The existence of such a man was both 
natural and necessary. In the early years of the campaigning
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Parmenio had fulfilled this role and, although the
relationship between him and Alexander was of a very different
character from that between Hephaestion and Alexander, their
places in the army and at court are comparable. Parmenio
had been the natural representative of the king; for instance,
when Alexander took a detachment of troops around the coast
of Asia Minor, Parmenio led the larger part of the army to
Sardis (Arr. 1,24,3)» Similarly, when Alexander decided to
go from Susa to Opis by ship, he put Hephaestion in command
of the army to lead them by road to Opis (Arr. 7>7,1).
Parmenio had held the prestigious command of all the heavy
infantry, a post which supported his position and authority
123as the king’s stand-in.  ^ Hephaestion held the most 
prestigious command of the elite of the Companion cavalry 
(Diod. 18,3,4).
Por the Macedonians Hephaestion’s position was clear 
and needed no further bolstering, but Hephaestion had to have 
authority with the Persians, as well as with the Macedonians, 
if he was to be able to be Alexander’s stand-in. The Persians 
were very conscious óf status and protocol and could not be 
expected to share the unsophisticated attitudes of the 
Macedonians to rank and authority. Alexander, therefore, 
sought to build up Hephaestion’s status among the Persians.
He married him to a daughter of Parius, the sister of his own 
wife, at the marriage ceremonies at Susa (Arr. 7 ,4 ,4 ) and no 
doubt sought in other ways to give Hephaestion a royal image 
But he also made use of the traditional office of the 
hazarapati, the holder of which was looked upon as the king’s
122
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agent par excellence. This "brought no formal powers or
duties to Hephaestion, merely prestige among the Persians.
He remained one of the pool of inner circle hetairoi upon
which Alexander could draw for advice and help. He was not
overall commander of the armed forces, nor did he have any
permanently delegated authority over the administration of
the empire. He held no formal powers outside his command of
125the most distinguished hipparchy of Companion cavalry.
The other officers of the army similarly will have had 
no formal political duties, hut will have been members of 
the council of the king*s advisers. There was of course 
some informal differentiation in rank, determined by the 
prestige attached to the office and person of the members: 
Hephaestion and his office stood out at the top. The 
prestige attached to the commands of the other hipparchies 
and the infantry commands cannot be known in detail, but it 
may be supposed that the cavalry commands were in general
1 pcmore prestigious than the infantry commands, and that 
perhaps the commander of the hypaspists stood superior to 
the other infantry commanders.
124-
Conclusion
In the last year of his life Alexander sought to win
the acceptance of his position as their King from the
127Persians and Medes. 1 He also hoped to establish a spirit 
of cooperation between the Macedonian nobles and the Persian 
and Median nobility. To further these ends he introduced 
substantial numbers of cavalry of these peoples into the
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hipparchies of Companion cavalry, alongside the Macedonians, 
and continued the Achaemenid units of the melophoroi and 
royal archers, giving them a privileged position at court 
alongside the Macedonian hypaspists. He did not, however, 
set up any mixed units of Macedonian and Iranian infantry, 
except for the experimental sections of phalangites and 
light infantry. Such units would not have "been militarily 
effective, for in general the Iranian heavy infantry were 
inferior in quality, and the Macedonian infantry had shown 
themselves hostile to cooperation with the Iranians. Also, 
it was less important for Alexander to achieve harmony 
between the infantry classes than between the cavalry classes, 
upon whom he was dependent for administrators of his empire.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MACEDONIAN ARMY M E  POLITICS
To conclude this study, it is appropriate to discuss 
the political role of the Macedonians with Alexander. There 
has been a tendency to see the heavy infantry as a 
politically and nationally conscious body with defined rights 
and a defined role in its relationships with the king. But 
a study of the ancient evidence reveals a high degree of 
flexibility in the attitudes of Alexander and the men towards 
each other, which would scarcely be possible in a rigidly 
defined political system. I wish to argue in this chapter 
that no theory, nor anything which can properly be termed 
ideological, influenced the relationship between the king 
and his men: it was essentially a simple relationship 
governed solely by the personalities involved in, and the 
circumstances surrounding, any particular issue.
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PART I The Theory of the Macedonian State
So much has been written upon this subject that any full 
survey of the literature is not practicable. The many 
arguments and interpretations of the evidence revolve around 
the fundamental work of i1. Granier, hie makedonische 
Heeresversammlung. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht, 
and, although the evidence used by scholars varies, most 
follow his conclusions concerning the Macedonian assembly 
quite closely.^" Granier*s case in the briefest terms is this. 
The Macedonian kingship developed from the patriarchal style 
kingship, known from Homer and parallel to the old Germanic 
heroic kingship. In these systems the king was chosen by the 
warriors to be their leader, but they were in a sense his 
equals and he lived among them as one of them, «primus inter 
pares *. When the state became more defined, a formal 
assembly of the men-in-arms existed beside the king, holding 
sovereign power. Then, as the people settled down and became 
more scattered, the assembly lost its powers and the nobility 
around the king usurped their position, in practice but not 
in theory. In the 4th century B.C., however, with the rise 
in importance of a regular force of Macedonian infantry, the 
■assembly of the men-in-arms revived and the kings, in 
particular Philip II, fostered its political role as a 
counterbalance against the nobility; and it became an 
important support of the monarchy. The exercise of its 
sovereign power is seen in many events of the 4th century
B.C., in the designation of the king or regent and in acting 
as jury in cases involving Macedonians on charges of high
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treason. In practice, Granier explained the men-in-arms 
did not exercise a free choice in designating the king because 
the right of primogeniture dominated: and their powers had 
little effect because in large part the king did not allow 
them to exercise them or ignored their decisions. But 
nevertheless, he argues, the king and his subjects were 
conscious of their constitutional status and this influenced 
their relationships.
Granier*s case has been found acceptable by most 
scholars, and though many of his arguments have been shown 
to be unsound, other arguments have been supplied in support 
of his conclusion. A different intepretation has been 
presented by P. de Francisci, Arcana Imperii, vol.II, pp.345- 
4-35. In a study of the institutions of power in the ancient 
world he allocates a hundred pages to a study of the 
Macedonian kingship. He finds little trouble in dismissing 
Granier»s arguments in support of the constitutional rights 
of the assembly of the men-in-arms, explaining the activities 
of the assembly as the result of an act of will on the part 
of the king rather than the exercise of their constitutionally 
defined sovereign power. It was at the king*s bidding that 
the men met at the accession and acclaimed their king. There 
was no question of their choosing their king and the 
acclamation was a mere survival of the decision taken by the 
original followers to give their allegiance to the king. The 
custom that the subjects meet for certain judicial decisions 
was established by the kings themselves and was not, therefore, 
a constitutional right of the subjects. The kingship was,
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in short, a personal one, and the state was founded upon 
the recognition by the king's followers of his innate 
superiority. The followers, in theory, had no rights except 
that of the refusal to follow the king, and once they had 
accepted the king they had no rights of limiting his power.
In summary, the arguments concern the theory of the 
Macedonian state. Is the kingship an organ of the state 
with its powers dependent upon and restricted hy the men-in- 
arms? Or does the kingship exist in the king quite 
independently of his subjects, unaffected by any decision of 
the men-in-arms and quite unlimited? Aymard, in two articles 
'published in 1950, settles the question of the nature of
pthe kingship in favour of Granier. He argues that Granger's 
case is supported by the freedom in the relations between the 
king and his subjects, which is apparent, particularly, in 
two passages from the ancient sources.
His first text comes from a speech Arrian puts into the 
mouth of Callisthenes on the occasion of the attempted 
institution of the custom of 'proskynesis'. In arguing 
against the custom, Callisthenes makes a comparison between 
the Macedonian and Persian kingships, alluding to Alexander's 
descent from Heracles and Aeacus and.stating that the 
Argeadae o t s i  p U  Ic
ctf>Xovr** SteTeXetro/v (4,11,6). This indicates, Aymard states, 
the existence of a defined and respected political nomos 
which was not dependent on the king and which limited his 
actions. This means that, contrary to de Francisci's belief, 
the kingship was not a personal one, but was an organ of the
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state as is indicated by the title used by the king fi* trt\ eu r  
M **i*S *v ~ *v , and by the presence of ‘the Macedonians*
beside the king in treaties of the 3rd century B.C.^
With the nomos established, Aymard finds evidence of the 
assembly of the men-in-arms within this nomos. Polybius 
(5,27,5-7) describes how Philip Y wanted to dispose of the 
commander of the peltasts, Leontius, and after sending the 
troops under his command far away to Triphylia, arrested him. 
Leontius* troops hearing of his arrest, sent a deputation to 
the king calling on him not to take any further action against 
him and not to bring him to trial in their absence, saying 
that if he did, they would consider they were held in low 
esteem and despised by him. Polybius makes the comment that 
the Macedonians had always enjoyed this kind of freedom of 
speech (isegoria) in their relations with their kings. 
Although Philip was annoyed and put Leontius to death without 
delay, the members of the deputation seem not to have been 
punished-for insolence or mutiny, and it is clear that they 
were confident that they were within their rights to let the 
king know what they felt and ask to be consulted on the fate 
of their leader. Aymard argues that Polybius* note about 
isegoria supports the view that they were acting according 
to an established tradition of behaviour, which both the 
king and the men-in-arms recognised. He finds corroboration 
of this interpretation in a passage of Curtius. In his 
treatment of the trials which Alexander conducted before the 
Macedonian men-in-arms in 330 B.C.j Curtius remarked de 
cauitalibus rebus vestuffco Macedonum modo inquirebat exeroitus 
_in -pace erat vulgi — . et nihil notestas regum valebat.
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nisi prius valuisset auctoritas (6,8,25).^ Aymard concedes 
that this evidence on its own could carry no weight, "because 
Curtius is notoriously unreliable in such matters. However, 
when taken with the text of Polybius, he considers that it 
shows that it was part of the Macedonian tradition that they 
had this right.
Aymard continues that, once this is accepted, there can 
be little doubt that the political tradition also laid down 
the competence of the men-in-arms in the designation of their 
king. Por, as he rightly points out, this right is much 
more basic than the judicial rights, and must have existed 
if the judicial rights did.
In explanation of the insignificant influence which the 
men-in-arms in general had upon the conduct of affairs, even 
though they had these important rights, Aymard states that 
the assembly consciously refrained from using its powers:
»Elle demeura un organe constitutionnel infiniment 
discret en general, et si docile à 1*impulsion du souverain 
que celui-ci put 1»utiliser à son profit sans risque de la 
voir entreprendre contre son autorité ou contre sa politique. 
Peut-être n*est-il pas excessif de voir dans cette discretion, 
à peu près sans exemple ailleurs, un paradoxe; elle constitue, 
en tout cas, l»une des plus puissantes originalités de la 
Macedoine antique.»
These, in essence, are the three central discussions of 
the theory of the Macedonian state and I shall look briefly 
at each in turn. Granier*s case is dependent upon his 
theory of the origin of the Macedonian kingship and upon his
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interpretation of certain events of fourth, century Macedonian 
history, how, as Aymard points out, nothing can he known of 
the origin of the kingship;^ any theory about it could be 
constructed only from the known workings of the kingship.
This argument, therefore, is worthless. As for Granier‘s 
arguments from certain historical events, Aymard concedes that 
nothing can be shown from these either, because the examples 
of the exercise of political power by the people need not be 
the result of the working of the constitution but may in each 
instance be explained simply as the result of the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, he Franciscos case suffers from the 
same weakness as Grander's, in that it is dependent upon a 
theory concerning the origins of the kingship which is 
unsubstantiated. Nor is his idea of the theory behind the 
state borne out by what is known of the practice. If there 
was a defined constitution, under which the subjects 
recognised the absoluteness of the monarch and their total 
dependence upon him, it is difficult to see how it became 
customary for the Argead kings to consult them on judicial 
matters. Such a custom surely has no place in a 
constitutionally absolute monarchy.
Aymard*s case is built upon the text drawn from the 
speech of Callisthenes, as it appears in Arrian (4,6,11).
For Aymard this text proves that there was a political nomos 
among the Macedonians, which laid down a certain code covering 
the king’s actions in particular situations. But the text is 
far from good evidence. It is drawn from a speech composed 
centuries aiter the event and there is no good reason to think 
that it is an accurate reflection of anything said at the time.
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The comparison "between the Persian ‘tyranny* and the Greek
•rule of law*, or nomos, was commonplace, and just the sort
of detail which might be worked into a speech in this context,
whether it formed part of the actual speech delivered at the
time or not. And even if it is accepted that Callisthenes
did actually use the words attributed to him by Arrian, he may
not have been referring to a defined set of constitutional
laws protecting the subjects from arbitrary decisions of the
king. ‘Nemos’ came to have the quite vague meaning of 'the
7characteristic of a free society*, and it need have no more 
significance than this here. There is no doubt that the 
Macedonians looked upon themselves as free men and expected to 
be treated as such, but this does not mean that their freedom 
was safeguarded by specific statutes or recognised 
constitutional rights.
Once this basic text of Aymard is taken away, his other 
evidence, drawn from Polybius and Curtius, carries little 
weight. The text of Polybius (5,27,5-7) refers only to the 
freedom of speech enjoyed by the Macedonians in their relation-
g
ships with their king. There is no reference to any specific 
right, and the only significance the passage has is that, when 
the Macedonians felt strongly enough about something, they 
told the king what they thought. Aymard‘s argument that 
Polybius took for granted the right of the people to 
participate in trials, and, therefore, emphasised Macedonian 
freedom of speech, is not convincing. If a specific right 
justified the peltasts* deputation to the king, then the
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comment about their freedom of speech is out of place: they 
were merely acting in accordance with the constitutional 
safeguards. Surely more significant for any discussion of 
the theory of state is Philip*s reaction to the peltasts* 
message, and the fate of Leontius. The obvious conclusion to 
be drawn from the incident is that Leontius had no right of 
trial, and it seems perverse to try to use the evidence to 
prove that he did.
If Polybius* evidence does not support Aymard’s case, 
then Curtius* comment about the army*s, or people*s, tradition­
al role in capital cases (6,8,25) stands alone. Aymard admits 
that Curtius* evidence on its own is not good enough to support 
his argument, but we should look at the passage of Curtius 
more closely. Curtius says that it was a vetustus modus that 
the army take a leading part in the trials or, if it was peace­
time, the vulgus took the role. The mention of the vulgus 
in itself immediately raises doubts about the reliability of 
the passage. Pew scholars can accept the existence of any 
representative assembly of Macedonians outside of the army,^ 
and it would appear that Curtius, or his source, was trying to 
reconstruct constitutional procedure on the basis of a few 
examples of the army acting as jury. If there was no 
representative assembly in peacetime, then this particular 
detail has been invented. If this was invented, then perhaps 
the vetustus modus concerning the army*s part also has been 
invented. It is not difficult to see how someone interested 
in barbarian institutions would be tempted to generalise 
about the army's role in the light of the succession of trials
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said to have "been held before the Macedonian troops in 330 
and 327 B.C.10
But, to leave this difficulty aside, Aymard*s inter­
pretation presupposes a degree of precision in the use of 
terminology which is highly improbable for Curtius. homos, 
in its narrow constitutional sense, as Aymard uses it, has 
the meaning ‘that which is recognised and acknowledged as the 
valid norm within a given milieu1 Th-e word presupposes 
that the institution or procedure has been agreed upon 
formally by the parties concerned. There can be no certainty 
that this is.what Curtius meant here. It seems quite likely 
that all he means is that it was customary for the king to 
summon the army to take part in such trials: or, following 
the lines of de Francisci*s argument, the army*s participation 
was an act of will on the part of the kingj it was a custom 
he was free to follow or not, as he wished. That Curtius was 
not sensitive enough to distinguish between the narrow 
meaning of nomos and the vaguer meanings of words for 
tradition or custom can easily be demonstrated. Just three 
chapters after his reference to the vetustus modus of the 
army, Curtius (6,11,20) attributes to the Macedonians a lex 
providing for the execution of all relatives of those found 
guilty of plotting to kill the king. This Curtius repeats 
in connection with the »Pages* Conspiracy*, calling it a mos 
on this occasion (8,6,28), but he makes Alexander say in a 
speech that he had long ago abandoned the usage. Curtius here 
reveals a total disregard of the subtleties of the words 
referring to constitutional practice. Bex is perhaps an
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acceptable Latin equivalent of nomos in its narrow 
constitutional meaning, in that it implies that the parties 
concerned have agreed to its provisions. But mos clearly 
falls short of this meaning, though there is some implication 
of general acceptance of its recommendations. But if it was 
a lex or a mos, Alexander should not have been able to 
arbitrarily discontinue it. If he was able to do so, then it 
was not a lex or a mos, but simply a general practice 
followed by the Argead kings, established by an act of will on 
the part of the king. It is generally agreed that Alexander 
was not bound by any lex or mos to execute the relatives of 
convicted traitors,12 and if Curtius1 evidence has any 
validity at all, it can mean only that the Argead kings had 
been in the habit of following such a course of action. But 
the major point to be noted is that Curtius is quite 
unreliable in his use of terminology.
To return to*our text about the army*s role, Curtius 
uses the vague term vetustus modus in referring to the 
practice of the army*s participation. It may be thought, 
though we have only this instance and one other poorly 
attested one,  ^to indicate that the Argead kings were in the 
habit of using the army as jury. But it is surely unsound to 
use the passage of Curtius, as Aymard does, to indicate that 
a political nomos existed among the Macedonians, of which 
the right of the army to participate in trials was an 
important part. Aymard is thus left with no supporting texts 
able to carry the weight of his argument.
Neither attempt to reconstruct a political nomos for the
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Argead kingdom is successful. Both the theories seem 
artificial; the arguments revolve around intangible concepts 
and improvable hypotheses which bear little relationship to 
the practice as revealed in the ancient sources. Granier 
asks us to accept that in theory the people had defined rights, 
but in practice they played no effective role. Be Francisci 
states that the king in theory had unrestricted power over 
his subjects, but in practice chose to allow them some power. 
The difficulties inherent in Aymard*s case are best summed up 
by Aymard himself. In conclusion of a long argument to prove 
the existence and powers of the assembly, he suggests that 
the assembly*s discretion in not using the powers it possessed 
is perhaps not parallelled elsewhere and is a paradox: *l*une 
des plus puissantes originalités de la Macedoine antique*.^
It is indeed exceptional that a people who were conscious of 
their powers and rights should consciously deny themselves 
these rights, even when the king went completely against 
their wishes and against the whole spirit of the constitution. 
It is one solution to say that the Macedonians were an 
exceptional people in this respect, but another explanation 
of their ‘discretion* may be thought more likely; namely that 
the people were not conscious that they had powers defined by 
constitutional statutes.•
I would suggest, in view of these difficulties, that 
modern scholars have attempted to force the practice of 
Macedonian politics to fit preconceived theories which are 
out of place in the context of the unsophisticated Macedonian 
state. Aristotle, in classifying monarchies (Pol 3,9,1285) 
recognised that many monarchies could be described neither as
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absolute nor as constitutional. At one end of the scale he 
placed the Spartan monarchy as a constitutional monarchy in 
which the king’s power is limited, and. at the other end of 
the scale came the absolute monarchies. Between these 
extremes, he says, lie most monarchies. Later (Pol. 5,9»
1315a,18-55) he specifies that the reason for the long 
survival of the Spartan and Molossian monarchies is that they 
are limited and their subjects share power. He does not 
mention the Argead kingship, although it was long lasting 
and although he was very familiar with it. This might be 
thought to imply that the Argead king’s power was not limited 
in any defined way, as the Spartan and Molossian king’s power 
was limited, and the subjects did not share power. For if it 
had presented an example of the constitutional monarchy 
Aristotle was discussing, it would surely have appeared.
Aristotle, then, seems to support the view that the 
Macedonian kingship lay between the two extremes, not absolute 
but not limited by any defined constitution. Aristotle’s 
testimony (albeit negative), together with the difficulties 
involved in any classification of the monarchy as absolute or 
constitutionally limited, points strongly to the conclusion 
that there was no constitution which specified that the king 
was absolute and none which limited his power. All was 
determined by circumstances:- e.g. by the personality of the 
king, the atmosphere of the times, the mood of the people.
Some kings would be better able to ride roughshod over the 
wishes of the nobles and people than others, and the relations 
of a particular king with his subjects would change from year 
to year. The conduct of affairs was governed by no particular
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expectation on the part of the people.
If we look at the background of the Macedonian state,
it becomes even less likely that any constitutional theory
existed. In general in the ancient world, political practice
led only slowly to the formulation of a political theory. It
seems impossible that there had been sufficient practice
involving the Macedonian men-in-arms by the time of Alexander's
15death to lead to the formulation of any theory. It is 
widely accepted that no political consciousness and no active 
involvement in politics developed among the common people of 
Greece until after some of them began to serve regularly as 
heavy infantry. The Macedonian commoners made no substantial 
contribution to the armed forces until near the end of Philip's
1 g
reign. Prior to this date any active participation in
political decisions by Macedonian commoners is out of the
question, for even if they had political opinions they had no
17means of expressing them.
Granier offers three pieces of evidence relating to 
the period prior to the end of Philip's reign to indicate that 
the men-in-arms did actively participate in politics, and I 
shall consider these here. The chronographer Porphyry records 
that Amyntas III was expelled by the Macedonians (PHG III, 
p.691). Granier interprets this to mean that the men-in-arms 
were the agents of the expulsion and that this is the first 
example of their exercising of their right to choose their 
king. This is quite unconvincing. A chronographer would not 
be careful about his terminology and his expression 'expelled 
by the Macedonians' may be nothing more than a transition
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clause marking -the end of one reign. In any case,‘Macedonians *
is a vague term which, we would naturally assume referred to
18some combination of nobles.
The next example is drawn from Justin and concerns the 
accession of Philip II. Justin (7,5,9) records that Philip, 
after being guardian of Amyntas, son of Perdiccas HI, for a 
long time compulsus a populo regnum suscepit. Here, says 
Granier (pp.26-27), the men-in-arms are again exercising their 
king-making rights. But this interpretation reads too much 
into evidence which is patently unreliable. The idea of a 
man like Philip being ‘forced by the people1 to take the 
throne is not acceptable. As guardian to his young nephew 
he was in an ideal position to take over the throne, just as 
Archelaus and Argaeus had done when they had been guardians.  ^
Politics were traditionally the concern of factions of nobles 
and the kings were made or broken through alliances among 
the factions. Justin‘s text is not enough upon which to build 
a theory that the Macedonian people, or men-in-arms, suddenly 
decided to take matters into their own hands. Diodorus
(16,3,3) records that Philip won over r* but
this has no significance: the phrase is a mere t-ott©*- 
In any case,Philip naturally tried to win over every element 
in the kingdom.
The other passage proposed by Granier (pp.27-28) as 
indicating the king-making rights of the Macedonian men-in- 
arms is Diodorus 16,3,5. Here, Diodorus describes how the 
pretender Argaeus appealed to ‘those in Aegae to welcome his 
return and become the founders of his kingship*. He argues
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that this indicates that the inhabitants of Aegae had 
originally had especial importance in designating the king 
and that if Argaeus had obtained their support he would have 
received some sort of constitutional backing for his position. 
This is ridiculous. As home of the Argead kings, Aegae was 
of course a prestigious town, but hardly had a Constitutional* 
importance. Hammond has argued, plausibly, that Aegae was 
near Yergina, which would mean that it was the closest 
place of any size to Argaeus* landing place at Methone.
There are, then, no examples of any participation by 
commoners in politics, and I would suggest that there was no 
chance of any because the commoners never met regularly in 
any significant numbers and were not involved in the king*s 
affairs until the very end of Philip*s reign. There is, 
therefore, no likelihood of any political theory being 
formulated before the end of Alexander<s life. Practice 
leads only very slowly to a theory being worked out and a 
period of twenty years is not enough for such a development. 
Granier (pp.l8f.) suggested that the theory was lying dormant 
in the men*s consciousness, to be awakened at the touch of 
the phalanx, but such an idea is fantastic.
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PART II The Men-in-Arms and Politics In Alexanders Reign
I have argued against the existence of any theoretical
basis for the practice of politics in the Macedonian state
and have suggested that the Macedonian commoners played no
active political role prior to the reign of Alexander. The
belief that there was a theory of state, and that the
Macedonian commoner was conscious of it and of his rights
within it, has greatly influenced the interpretation of some
scholars of events during Alexander*s campaign in Asia. It
is misleading to consider the relationship between Alexander
and his men as one between a king and politically conscious
subjects, with each partjr governed in its attitudes to the
other by preconceptions and traditions developed and defined
21into codes of behaviour. This view has led to the belief
that during the campaigning the men-in-arms developed a
community of attitudes among themselves and came to represent
the »nation of the Macedonians1, consciously seeking to
exert influence upon state policy both through constitutional
and unconstitutional methods, as democratic ideas began to
22stir in their minds. The background of the men involved 
makes such a blossoming of political sophistication unlikely, 
as I have already argued, and I wish to discuss the incidents 
cited to show the men*s consciousness of their political 
power and their progress towards active political involvement, 
and to suggest sounder interpretations and a more reasonable 
approach to the question. We may begin with the evidence 
upon Alexanders succession.
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Pausanias chose to kill Philip on an occasion when very 
large numbers of people were present at Aegae, gathered from 
all over Macedonia and the Greek world to celebrate a festival 
and the marriage of his daughter. It was an exhibition for 
the Greek world of Philip's greatness and, no doubt, many of 
the Macedonian infantry were present. Justin opens book 11 
by describing the feelings of Philip's army at his death.
As there were a number of different nationalities, so there were 
different reactions, hope of freedom, rejoicing at the break 
from campaigning and fear of attack from neighbours. Into 
this situation came Alexander who spoke to them, taking away 
their worries and encouraging them. He gave them promises and 
they looked forward to better things to come. To the 
Macedonians he gave immunity of all things except military 
service and won everyone's goodwill: corpus hominis, non 
virtutem regis mutasse se dicerent. Then Alexander saw to 
the death of the guilty (i.e., the accomplices in Philip's 
assassination) at the funeral pyre of his father, put down 
the rebellions of peoples and dealt with several plots against 
himself.
Diodorus' testimony is shorter and less specific. At 
17,2,1-2, clearly drawing upon the same tradition as Justin, 
he says that Alexander succeeded Philip, punished his father's 
assassins and held his father's funeral. Though he was not 
universally popular he established his authority, winning over 
the Macedonians with 'tactful statements', declaring that 
the king was changed in name only. He then addressed the 
embassies and kept drilling the soldiers. Diodorus then
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moves on to internal opposition (Attalus) and the rebellion 
in Greece.
The Pseudo-Callisthenes version of the accession (1,26) 
gives one important additional detail, that it was Antipater 
who presented Alexander to the troops and commended him to 
them. Though the version is confused and cannot he used 
indiscriminately for historical reconstruction, this 
particular detail seems likely to he right. There can he 
little douht that the factions of Antipater and Olympias were 
either behind the assassination or moved quickly to take
O-Kadvantage of it and set Alexander on the throne.
Granier (pp.29f.) used this evidence in support of his 
view that the Macedonian men-in-arms were conscious of their 
right to designate the king, and suggested that Alexander was 
presented to them because this is what the law required, and 
what the men expected. But this is by no means a necessary 
interpretation, nor, as I have argued, is it a likely one. 
There is no reason to doubt that Alexander did come before 
the assembled troops and did seek to win their allegiance, 
but this was dictated by plain common sense not by any 
constitutional theory. The troops were there and if Alexander 
did not win their allegiance someone else might have done so. 
It would have been lunacy for Alexander to have ignored them.
Not only is there no indication that the army*s involve­
ment was the result of constitutional requirements, but there 
is not even a hint that the army looked for any part in 
settling the crisis caused by Philip*s death. It played a 
totally passive role, expressing no opinion but accepting
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what was placed before it: the troops allowed themselves to 
he carried along with the current. Because their role was so 
passive it is not possible to determine their attitudes with 
any assurance and the details which appear in Justin*s
2  Aaccount cannot be trusted. ^ However, the broad outline of 
events as given in the ancient evidence may be accurate, and 
from this it is possible to obtain some idea of how the men 
felt.
Philip had, in large part, been responsible for the
formation of the army of the Macedonians. He had greatly
improved the circumstances of a large number of his subjects
and, in particular, he had been generous to those who served 
25in the army. The value of the support of the troops for 
his faction was appreciated by him and he worked to attach 
the men to himself. His record of military success ensured 
that he made much progress to this end. At the time of his 
death the troops were undoubtedly attached to their king, who 
had done so much for them and who could be expected to bring 
even greater benefits in the future. Those troops at Aegae 
at the time of his death would have felt their fortunes 
particularly closely linked with their king. They no doubt felt 
dismay at the passing of Philip and greatconcern for their 
own future. These feelings were personal ones, not linked 
with any ambition for the people of Macedonia or any approval 
of Philip*s state policies, and they are quite enough to 
explain the course of events as set out in the ancient 
evidence. There is no indication that any more sophisticated 
thinking played a part in the approval of the succession of
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Alexander. Alexander and the supporting factions did every­
thing to try to reassure the troops that nothing had changed: 
Antipater, the trusted general of Philip, was Alexander*s 
chief supporter;2  ^the similarity between Alexander and his 
father is emphasised; in particular the generosity of Philip 
was continued through Alexander*s announcement of freedom 
from taxation for the troops. Political consciousness seems 
far removed from their thinking: in a situation in which 
their very livelihoods were affected they show no awareness 
of their power and no interest in interfering in the course 
of events for their own benefit.
Granier (p.41) uses another episode connected with 
Philip's death to support his belief that the Macedonian 
men-in-arms did have a defined role in the conduct of state 
affairs. This concerns the death of the assassin Pausanias. 
The fate of Pausanias is the subject of varying reports. 
Diodorus has the clearest account of his death (16,94,4-): he 
fled towards his horse, pursued by the bodyguard, and would 
have got away had he not caught his foot in a vine; he fell 
and Perdiccas and others caught him and killed him with 
javelins. Justin (9,7,10) indicates that a horse was ready 
for his escape but he did not get away and he was later hung 
on a cross. 1 Diodorus is contradicted by the Oxyrhynchus 
Papyrus 1798, which, as restored by Wilcken, reads(sc//?A^v^of,) 
...Jjrrpos T ot* M£****$otft tfy. «vro<
It is this text which Granier accepts as the accurate account 
of what happened, using it to support his submission that it 
was laid down in Macedonian law that the army be the judges
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in cases involving Macedonians on charges of high treason. 
Against this there are two objections. Firstly, it does not 
seem sound to accept so lacunose a text in contradiction of 
other sources, and there is absolutely no evidence that 
[rrpo$ should be supplied. Even if the text is
accepted, however, there can be no question of a trial with 
the Macedonians as judges. Pausanias had assassinated a 
popular king in the public eye at a great festival, his fate 
could not be in question. The strength of feeling among the 
crowd would have been such as to make anything like a trial 
impossible. If there is some truth in the text, Alexander 
may well have found it to be in his interest to allow the 
crowd to vent its feelings against the assassin, but there
Q Qis no indication of any trial. And there is no evidence 
that others implicated in the assassination received any 
trial (Justin 11,2; Mod. 17,2,1): they are simply said to 
have been killed at the funeral of Philip by Alexander. But 
the ancient accounts are clearly not reliable and it is not 
sound to use the details in them in any argument about 
procedures followed in cases of the assassination of the 
king. Granier*s argument can thus be set aside, being 
without any reliable evidence to support it, and we may move 
on to the years of the Asian campaign.
Alexander took with him 12,000 Macedonian heavy infantry. 
These men became intimately involved in the affairs of the 
king and the king was heavily dependent upon their continued 
support for himself and his policies. In such a situation 
it might be expected perhaps that the troops would develop a 
greater political consciousness and seek to influence the
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policy of the state, "but this does not seem to have been 
the result. The experience of the Macedonian commoner in 
political affairs was practically non-existent and even the 
direct involvement in the affairs of state could not com­
pensate for this lack of experience. Granier (pp.31-2) draws 
upon a piece of evidence relating to the year 331 B.C. to 
prove that both Alexander and the men were in fact conscious 
of the right of the men-in-arms to designate the king. Again 
his case must be noticed. Plutarch (Alex. 34) records that 
after the victory at Gaugamela Alexander was proclaimed ‘King 
of Asia*:
This, Granier argues, can only refer to an official designation 
by the men-in-arms, by which Alexander was made ‘King of 
Asia*. He supports this by reference to an inscription 
(Blinkenberg 32 XXXVIII 104) in which Alexander is said to 
have become ‘lord of Asia* after the battle.^0 As Alexander 
had been using the title since the battle of Issus (Arr. 2,14, 
9) this could only have the significance, Granier suggests, 
of an official designation by the assembly, giving constitut­
ional backing to his use of the title.
While it seems reasonable to assume that Plutarch means 
that Alexander was acclaimed ‘King of Asia* by the troops after 
the battle at Gaugamela, there is no reason to believe that it 
was anything other than an outburst of enthusiasm (an 
organised one!) with no constitutional significance. Nor is 
the passage of Arrian reliable. It is part of a letter 
supposed to have been written by Alexander, in which Alexander
29
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provocatively calls upon Darius to call him »King of Asia*.
There is no reason to think that the latter is genuine, or 
31contemporary, and certainly the passage cannot he used to 
show that Alexander regularly used the title of himself. The 
other text quoted hy Granier does not support his case, merely 
reflecting the reality that Alexander was lord of Asia. It 
cannot he shown that Alexander could not officially use the 
title »King of Asia* until it had been bestowed upon him hy 
the troops. As conqueror of Darius he naturally took on 
Darius* titles, claiming sovereignty over those who had 
formerly been Darius* subjects. This cannot, therefore, be 
seen as indicating either that Alexander could not properly 
take on the title of »King of Asia* without the title being 
officially bestowed by the men-in-arms, or that the men-in-arms 
were becoming conscious that they were the men who made kings.
The most famous instance of the interference of the 
Macedonian men-in-arms in politics is at the trial of 
Philotas, Alexander of Lyncestis and Amyntas and his brothers. 
The evidence does not need setting out in detail as the
32events are well known and the details reasonably clear.
Philotas did not take seriously an urgent request of an 
interview with Alexander by two young Macedonians who 
subsequently revealed to Alexander that they wanted to report 
an attempt on his life by Dimnus. Suspicion was roused 
against Philotas because he had prevented the interview and 
Alexander got a case together against Philotas, implicating 
him in the plot. Firstly, Alexander brought the case before 
some of the hetairoi councillors and then before the general
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assembly of the army. Curtius (6,8,23) says 6,000 troops 
turned up. Alexander made his case against Philotas and 
Philotas defended himself, hut not successfully, and he was 
killed hy the troops. After Philotas and his associates had 
"been slain, one of Alexanders agents had Alexander of 
lyncestis brought before the troops. He was given a chance 
to defend himself but was also killed. Then Alexander 
brought Amyntas and his brothers, close associates of Philotas, 
before the army but they were not killed but freed from guilt.
Granier (pp.42ff.) argues that these men were brought 
before the army in accordance with the Macedonian law laying 
down a procedure for the trials of Macedonians on charges 
of high treason. I have already argued that there need have 
been no such law and, indeed, only on one other occasion (in 
327 B.C.) is there any indication of such a procedure in the
rZrZ
ancient sources. ? There are many other examples of 
Macedonians being killed by the king without any consultation 
with the men-in-arms, and without the king being thought the 
worse of. For instance, Menander, a prominent Macedonian 
(Berve II no.502), was executed for refusing to command a 
garrison (Plut. Alex. 57). Other reasons can be found to 
explain Alexander*s decision to involve the men-in-arms.
It is generally accepted now that Philotas was innocent 
of any plot or act which could be seen as treason. Alexander 
wanted him removed, however, probably because they wa$'■- the 
leading member of a noble faction which opposed the continued 
eastward progress of the campaign.^ How Alexander, if he 
ever wanted to, no doubt could inconspicuously remove less
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prominent members of the expeditionary force, but the removal 
of Philotas, the son of Parmenio, commander of the Companion 
cavalry, who had the support of leading nobles of Upper 
Macedonia,^ was more difficult. Parmenio was an old and 
eminent general, a veteran of Philip's campaigns, who had held 
command over many of the Macedonians in the army before 
Alexander had come to power.  ^ And he had held the post of 
commander of the heavy infantry in the Asian campaign, until 
he had been left behind in Media earlier the same year. 
Parmenio's prestige was certainly high. Alexander knew that 
he could not remove Philotas without also removing Parmenio, 
and this he could not hope to achieve without arousing 
considerable disapproval. Alexander was influenced to take 
the case before the troops because the life of a popular man 
was involved then, not because the men-in-arms expected to be 
involved in trials of this nature.
In other circumstances the disapproval of the men may not 
have mattered. Philip Y, for instance, did not care about the 
disapproval of the peltasts when he killed‘Leontius (Pol.5,27, 
5-7). But Alexander's men were in a most favourable position 
for expressing their disapproval. Alexander knew that he 
could not rely on them to docilely accept such offensive 
behaviour as the removal of Philotas and Parmenio, and for 
this reason called the men together, in order to involve them 
in the offence and thereby to some extent escape the 
disapproval.
For these reasons, therefore, Alexander brought the 
Macedonian men-in-arms together. Philotas was the main
226
threat in Alexander's eyes and his removal was the most 
dangerous in that it involved the removal of Parmenio. It 
is clear that Alexander had no real case against him and made 
Philotas* fate a personal issue, in which the men-in-arms had 
to choose between the accused and their king: their decision, 
if such it can he called, was in fact little more than the 
submission to Alexander's will. The removal of Alexander of 
lyncestis was much less dangerous, he had been under arrest 
for five years.^ It may be, as Hamilton suggests,'58 that 
Alexander saw his namesake as a potential rival to the throne, 
but the men-in-arms did not see him as such. Their feelings 
for their king were roused, the lyncestian's death could have 
meant little to them, they merely did what they thought the 
king expected of them. Amyntas and his brothers, however, 
came into a different category. Amyntas, a member of a 
leading family of Tymphaea, had been a most prominent!.infantry 
commander from the beginning of the campaign. ^  The 
association of his family with Philotas was no doubt 
’disturbing■to Alexander, but there is no evidence that the 
king tried to implicate them in any plot to assassinate him. 
Perhaps Alexander pressed the case against them less 
vigorously, he may have been aiming only to discourage 
opposition among the nobles by demonstrating his support 
amongst the troops and his willingness to use this support in 
factional fighting against even prominent infantry officers.
In any event,Amyntas and his brothers were allowed to 
maintain their positions.
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The attitudes of the men.-in-arms in these trials were 
evidently formed solely on the "basis of the immediate circum­
stances, that is the personalities involved. In over five 
years of campaigning Alexander had led them to wealth and 
glory "beyond their expectations, his prestige had perhaps 
reached its highest point. His deeds had eclipsed those of 
his father and in any trial of strength between Parmenio, who 
represented the old order, and himself, the majority of the 
men were naturally drawn to his own faction. The men would 
perhaps have been more reluctant to condemn the more popular 
Amyntas and his brothers, but if Alexander had pressed the 
case to involve them in the assassination attempt, we have no 
reason to suppose that they would not have sent them to the 
same fate as Philotas. In any case, there is no sign of the 
troops being conscious of the political power inherent in 
their involvement in the trials, no urge to take an active 
role: they were totally dependent upon the will of the most 
dominant personality, the will of Alexander.
Granier (p.46f.) also uses, the evidence on the trial 
of the *royal pages* as further evidence of the right of the 
men-in-arms to act as jury in trials involving Macedonians on 
capital charges.^ Hermolaus led some of the royal pages in 
a plot to assassinate the king, the plot was uncovered and 
according to some versions^ Alexander brought them before the 
army, where, amid threats to their lives, they confessed and 
were stoned to death by the troops, or by the ‘royal pages1. ^  
Callisthenes, whom Alexander implicated in the plot, was not 
allowed to appear before the assembly, but was merely imprisoned
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or hanged.  ^ The evidence which states that Alexander brought 
the royal pages before the assembly of the men-in-arms is 
suspect: Ptolemy and Aristobvlus.:; do not seem to mention it, and 
Arrian implies that his source is not good (4,14,2). We must, 
therefore, be cautious in using the details contained in the 
sources, and Granier is far too confident in his assertion 
that the pages were tried before the army.^
However, some notice must be taken of a comment put into 
Alexander^ mouth by Curtius (8,8,19), that Callisthenes was 
not brought before the assembly because, as an Olynthian, he 
did not have the same right as a Macedonian. This could be 
taken to imply that the Macedonians did have a right to be 
brought before the assembly, but few would place much reliance 
upon this clause.  ^ I have already touched upon Curtius* 
inaccuracy in dealing with such matters, and it seems most 
unlikely that Alexander said any such thing. It is not clear 
why an Olynthian should not have been considered to be 
Macedonian; he was the subject of the Argead king, no less 
than the citizen of any other Greek place taken over by Philip 
and incorporated into the kingdom, e.g. Amphipolis. Certainly 
we need to assume no such constitutional rights to explain why 
Callisthenes did not appear before the assembly while the 
royal pages did (if they did). The Macedonian troops are 
hardly likely to have been much concerned about the fate of 
Callisthenes, Alexander need expect no disapproval from them 
if he simply removed him. The pages, however, were a different 
matter. They were of the most.prominent families of the 
Macedonian nobility and support for them may have been 
considerable. Alexander may well have felt that he could
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not simply execute them without the men's asking questions 
and disapproving of his action. The easiest way to avoid 
such disapproval was to involve the men in the execution..
The episode of the trial of the pages, therefore, cannot he 
used in any discussion of the rights of the men-in-arms.
The details are poorly attested, and even if the pages were 
tried before the assembled troops, this does not prove that 
there was a constitutional statute laying down the right of 
Macedonians to be so tried.
We may now move on to consider the mutinies of the 
Macedonians at the Hyphasis and at Opis.^ These are the 
only occasions during Alexanders lifetime when the 
Macedonian men-in-arms can clearly be seen asserting their 
collective will on their own initiative. There has been 
some discussion among scholars concerning the precise nature 
of the gatherings at which the troops made their feelings 
known. For Granier it was unthinkable that the soldiers 
could have had the constitutional right to disobey orders, and 
he therefore suggested that the gatherings were not formal 
»assemblies of the men-in-arms» but spontaneous informal 
g a t h e r i n g s M o s t  recently, Schachermeyr has suggested that 
the gathering at the Hyphasis was not a formal meeting but the 
one at Opis was.^® Such discussions are meaningless and 
reveal the weakness of any attempt to impose a definite form 
upon Macedonian political practice. The men made no distinction 
between their relationship to Alexander as subject to king
and their relationship to him as soldier to general, they were 
aware of no distinction between formal and informal meetings.
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As G-ranier saw, it is, of course, out of the question to 
reconstruct a Macedonian constitution which laid down the 
right of the men-in-arms to refuse to continue a campaign.^
But recently Schachermeyr has used the mutinies as evidence 
that the Macedonian commoners in the army were becoming a 
united and politically conscious body, ready to consult their
own interests before those of the nobles and to act to inter-
50fere in state policies. In the mutiny at the Hyphasis he 
sees the stirrings of democracy, and he suggests that the 
actions of the men at Opis show that they were nationally 
conscious, representing the nation of the Macedonians, and in 
that role rejecting Alexanders policy of fusion with the 
Iranians. We must consider this interpretation of the 
mutinies.
At the Hyphasis in 326 B.C. the Macedonian troops refused 
to continue the march eastwards and, despite Alexander's 
efforts to persuade them to continue, the invasion had to be 
abandoned. There is, of course, no doubt that the men showed 
a united front and that they spontaneously opposed Alexanders 
wishes: they successfully influenced the king's policy in their 
own interest. But it does not follow from this that they 
were politically motivated, that they were even aware of the 
implications of their refusal to go on; all they felt was that 
they wanted to escape the discomforts and uncertainty from 
which they were suffering. I have argued consistently that 
the Macedonians had no awareness of political issues, but were 
influenced only by personalities and immediate circumstances. 
There is no reason to suppose that the mutiny at the Hyphasis
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involved any factors more complicated than these. It was a 
simple mutiny brought about by the extreme demands made upon 
them by Alexander, as he led them endlessly further into the 
unknown, away from their homeland. It is possible that by 
this stage their bond with Alexander was weakening, and 
Alexander no longer could command the respect and affection 
he had previously inspired in the men. His spell was 
insufficient to give the soldiers the strength to endure the 
toils and fatigue of campaigning in the difficult conditions 
of India. It seems unnecessary, and misleading, to see in 
this response to deep-rooted instincts the stirrings of 
democracy. The men were not seeking a role in the decision­
making procedures of the Macedonian state, they merely did not 
want to suffer what they were suffering in India. We might 
note, finally, that Alexander did not abandon the invasion of 
India because he recognised the right of the men-in-arms to 
interfere in state'policy, but merely because he could not go 
on without the troops. It was sheer practical necessity.
At Opis in 324 BCL Alexander discharged veterans of the 
Indian campaign and at this the Macedonian men-in-arms 
spontaneously mutinied, refusing to follow Alexander any more 
unless he led them home. Again the Macedonians showed their 
independence, their unanimity, their ability to combine to 
act in their own interests. But it does not follow that we 
should see in the mutiny a growing awareness of their political 
power on the part of the men, and a consciousness of their 
position as representatives of the Macedonian nation.
Certainly we should not see them consciously following a 
nationalist policy, in opposition to Alexander's policy of
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fusion with the Iranians. It seems much more likely that the
action of the Macedonians was again a simple mutiny with no
political considerations involved. The men had lost their
•relationship with their king, there was no longer any contact
between them. Alexander had begun to favour the Iranians, to
bring them into an equal position beside the Macedonians. The
Macedonians felt excluded and bewildered. It was the
estrangement between themselves and Alexander that impelled
them to mutiny, not a rational disapproval of his policies.
The discharge of veterans in itself was not a reason for their
mutiny, it was merely the occasion upon which they mutinied:
they had been close to mutiny when Alexander had offered to
clear their debts, which proves that they were not acting
52rationally at this time. They resented Alexander's 
favouring of Iranians, but to see in this resentment a policy 
of nationalism, and the growth of a popular pressure group in 
opposition to Alexanders policies is surely wrong. The 
mutiny was inspired by a simple breakdown in the relationship 
between Alexander and his men. We may explain this breakdown 
in terms of certain actions of Alexander and certain attitudes 
held by the Macedonian commoners, but it is misleading to 
foist our reasoning upon the Macedonian commoners, and from 
this invent a political motivation for their action. The men 
who mutinied at Opis did not reason, and did not know what 
motivated them, they were confused and distressed that they 
had lost their relationship with Alexander.
We must look finally at the part played by the men-in-arms 
in the upheaval which followed Alexander*s death, for evidence
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on this is often used to show that the Macedonian soldiers 
with Alexander in Asia were politically conscious.  ^ The 
majority of prominent officers who had served under Alexander 
supported the suggestion of Perdiccas that a decision upon 
the succession should "be postponed until Alexander*s child 
by Roxane was horn. But Meleager, with the hacking of the 
mass of the infantry, pressed the claim of Alexanders half- 
brother, Philip Arrhidaeus. A compromise was reached and 
details settled before a gathering of the Macedonian troops. 
Philip Arrhidaeus was to be king, and, if a son was produced 
by Roxane, he should share the kingship. Other arrangements 
were agreed before the troops, to provide for the command of 
the army and the administration of the empire, but these were 
in large part overridden when Perdiccas took over the direction 
of affairs.
Granier (pp.58ff.) sees this as another proof that it 
was recognised among the Macedonian people that the army had 
the right to choose and designate the king. Schachermeyr sees 
the role of the troops in the settlement at Babylon as marking 
a most important stage in the political development of the
54-men-in-arms. During the course of the campaigning the men
gradually became more conscious of their own political 
interests and power to implement these interests, as is shown 
by the mutinies in India and at Opis. But, Schachermeyr 
continues, at Babylon came the culmination of this development, 
when the proper function of the assembly of the men-in-arms 
was realised, as the men achieved full consciousness of their 
position and powers as the royal army of the Macedonians.
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They saw themselves as representing the national interest of 
the Macedonians, in opposition to the ideas of fusion with the 
Iranians advocated by Alexander. For, in supporting the 
claims of Philip Arrhidaeus, Schachermeyr argues, they were 
rejecting the broad imperialist policies of cooperation with 
the Iranians and supporting a return to the more narrowly 
nationalistic aims, which they identified with Alexander's 
father, Philip. As important, for Schachermeyr, as the 
troops' consciousness of their own role is the recognition by 
the nobles of the troops* right to participate in the choice 
and designation of the king. The result was a true concensus 
of the Macedonians achieved through the constitutional process 
of a formal assembly.
There is no doubt that the army played an active role in 
the struggle for power, supporting Meleager's proposal that 
Philip Arrhidaeus be king. There is also no doubt that the 
nobles took notice of the opinions of the troops and modified 
their plans accordingly. But there is no support in the 
ancient sources for the view that the roles taken by the 
men-in-arms and the nobles were laid down by political 
tradition. The support of the army was of course most 
important: anyone bidding for power was obliged to seek the 
favour of the army, for this was the only basis of power for 
the officers at Babylon. But the practical necessity is quite 
sufficient to explain the attitude of the nobility and the 
participation of the troops.
A passage of Curtius, part of a speech by Perdiccas 
before the army, should perhaps be noticed, as it may be
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thought to support the view that the right of the troops to 
designate the king was recognised. Perdiccas says that it 
lies in the power of the army to name its head (capite opus 
est; hoc nominare in vestra potestate est (10,6,8) ). But 
this need not refer to any constitutional right, hut only to 
the practical reality of the situation: in these circumstances 
the army did have the power to make, or break, anyone bidding 
for the kingship. Curtius need mean no more than this. But 
even if he did have some notion of an established political 
tradition in his mind, I have already shown, I hope, that 
Curtius1 grasp of constitutional theory and practice was very 
loose, and his evidence on such matters should not be relied 
upon.
Schachermeyr*s view that the Macedonian heavy infantry 
had developed a spirit of independence and become a 
politically conscious force with its own opinions needs some 
discussion. I have already suggested that opposition to 
Alexander at the Hyphasis and at Opis should not be seen as 
a political initiative taken by men conscious of their ability 
to influence state policies. The dispute over the succession 
was a more clearly political issue and the participation of 
the heavy infantry was decisive, but Schachermeyr surely 
exaggerates the degree of their political awareness and their 
consciousness of any political power to influence decisions 
of state. I have tried to show that they had no consciousness 
of any political tradition and that they had no expectation 
of, or interest in, participation in policy making. When 
asked for support they would give it in accordance with their
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feelings towards the personalities involved. At the accession 
of Alexander in 536 B.C., for instance, they supported 
Alexander and to that extent made a political decision, hut 
it hardly follows from this that the troops involved were 
politically conscious! And the situation at Babylon in 525 B.C. 
scarcely seems different, the troops were asked for their 
support and they gave it in accordance with their feelings.
At Babylon unanimity was not achieved among the officers, 
Meleager sought the support of the troops for his faction, in 
opposition to Perdiccas at the head of other factions. The 
troops were thus presented with a choice, but it does not 
follow from this that they were more politically conscious in 
525 B.C. than they had been in 5 5 6 B.C. They played an active 
role in so far as they chose whomto support, but they showed 
no initiative towards involvement in the political decision.
Bor is it necessary to explain their bias towards 
Meleager's faction in terms of a greater awareness of political 
and national issues. I have suggested that in 536 B.C., at 
the accession of Alexander, the men's mood was influenced by 
their affection for Philip and their expectation that 
Alexander would follow along the path marked out by his father, 
which promised to bring them a prosperous livelihood. Such 
simple attitudes can scarcely be called political at all. In 
525 B.C. their mood was influenced by no more sophisticated 
considerations. They had been led by Alexander through a 
decade of hard fighting, only to be asked at the end to share 
the fruits of victory with the conquered, and to be asked also 
to share their king with them. They had become alienated
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from Alexander, therefore, in the last years of his reign.
The proposal presented to them hy Perdiccas was that the 
decision concerning the succession he postponed until 
Alexander’s child hy Roxane was horn in several months* time. 
The alternative suggested hy Meleager was that the adult son 
of Philip, half-hrother of Alexander, he made king immediately. 
Schachermeyr reasons that the men decided between the two 
proposals on the basis of their awareness of the national 
interest, hut their response was surely not so intellectual.
The child of Alexander was not yet horn, it might he female.
It would certainly he semi-Iranian. This was hardly likely 
to appeal to the troops, in view of their feelings on this 
subject. On the other side, the nearest male relative of 
Alexander was available, the son of Philip who had done so 
much for the Macedonians. The troops reacted as they did 
because of their experience, hut their response was 
instinctive, not reasoned as Schachermeyr argues. They did 
not support Meleager’s proposal because they considered that 
Alexander’s policy of fusion with the Iranians was against 
the national interest, or even against their own interest; 
in supporting Philip Arrhidaeus they were not supporting a 
return to a more narrowly nationalistic policy. Their 
decision was made on the basis of simple considerations of 
the personalities involved: Philip Arrhidaeus was more 
acceptable, hut they were not conscious of any reasons for 
their choice.
This concludes my survey of the relations between 
Alexander and the Macedonian heavy infantry. I have tried
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to show that these relations were unaffected hy any conscious­
ness, on either side, of any constitutional theory, nor hy 
anything except immediate circumstances and the feelings of 
the men. The intimate involvement of the men in affairs of 
state and the king*s dependence upon the support of the troops 
during the Asian campaign made it necessary for those in power 
to take some account of the mood and opinion of the troops, 
hut the troops shcwWno sign of any political consciousness and 
no progress towards active participation in the formation of 
state policy.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I
THE MACEDONIAN ARMY UNTIL THE ACCESSION OE PHILIP II
(100,5). Gomme (II p.248) suggests that these ’allies 'may 
n o f he the peoples (lyncestians, Elimiots and others)
(sc. the people of Lower Macedonia under Perdiccas’
that they were already ’subject’ to Perdiccas and 
suggests that the ’allies’ were independent people to 
the north. But his suggestion is not convincing. There 
were, of course, Paeonian tribes to the north which may 
have had alliances with Perdiccas, but there is no 
evidence. (See I.L. Merker, ’The Ancient Kingdom of 
Paeonia*, Balkan Studies 6 (1965) pp.35-54, for a general 
discussion of these peoples.) The natural interpretation 
of Thucydides* reference at 100,5, however, surely is 
that the men of Upper Macedonia are the ones summoned.
They are called ’allies* at 99,2 (as G-omme himself notes) 
and are explicitly distinguished from the subjects of 
Perdiccas in lower Macedonia, ’having their own kings’. 
Eurther, «these Macedonians* (100,1) which were 
threatened by the Thracians, and are the subject of the 
narrative of ch.100, would seem to be only the 
Macedonians of lower Macedonia, cf. G-omme loc.cit. The 
«Upper Macedonians’ are, therefore, not included among
kingship) Kot\ (99,2). Gomme points out
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the Macedonians who face the Thracians. If they were 
not there, then surely »the allies* summoned by Perdiccas 
were the subject allies of Upper Macedonia, for if he 
called for any support it would surely be from them.
2) Torone, lecythus, Scione, and Mende are known to have 
been in Brasidas» hands (Thuc. 4, HOff.; 121).
3) For Greek cities in Macedonia, see now, Hammond 
Macedonia pp.123-191.
4) The Chalcidians generally were weak in hoplites. See, 
for instance, Best ,^ >.20.
5) Hermes 81 pp.88ff. Kahrstedt assumes that all the
3,000 hoplites were made up from Greeks living in 
Macedonia (p.96), but this is not what Thucydides says.
6) cf. Gomme III p.613.
7) Epirus (Oxford, 1967) pp.422,439.
8) Maked. b.z. Phil, p.88; cf. Best p.142.
9 ) KeU  rleW ei %l£KO<rp t jv e  T*  T*  k>k T*. t o v  TTo\e^fOU
a r r r o if  Kea o u \ o i f  -rr j t i W y  it * pei<rK(-vYj K ^ e itrcro v t ........
For the formula elsewhere, cf. 1,80,3» 6,41,3.
10) cf. Kahrstedt p.104; Griffith G&R 12 p.128.
11) Pydna was besieged in 411 B.C., and, when reduced, moved 
inland (Diod. 13,49,1).
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12) When ambassadors came to Sparta from Acanthus and 
Apollonia to complain of the ambitions of Olynthus in 
583 B.C., according to Xenophon*s account (Hell. 5,2, 
12ff.), they warned the Spartans that the Olynthians had 
undertaken to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas, 
and had even occupied Pella. They continued that 
Amyntas was withdrawing from his cities and had been 
just about driven out of the whole of Macedonia. Caution 
must be exercised in using such evidence, but the 
implications are that Amyntas was in some way in possession 
of these cities which Olynthus was setting out to free,
and that in so far as he could withdraw from the cities 
he would seem to have had troops in occupation: further, 
it seems that withdrawal from the cities meant that he 
lost control of the country. We cannot know the content 
or strength of these garrisons, but it seems likely that 
they were in the main mercenary.
13) Geyer Maked. b.z. Phil, p.79, argues that Xenophon 
deliberately understated the contribution of Amyntas to 
the victory over the Olynthians, because he did not want 
to give the impression that a semi-barbarian king could 
inflict a defeat upon Greeks. In view of the established 
weakness of the Macedonian troops, however, it hardly 
seems necessary to convict Xenophon of such bias in his 
reporting.
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14) Kahrstedt pp.96ff.; Griffith G&R 12 p.128. It led to
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the growth of urban centres.
15) Maked. B.Z. Phil, p.101. The argument runs as follows. 
Amyntas• son-in-law is called Ptolemy, the Alorite, by 
Diodorus (15,71,1), presumably to distinguish him from 
other men of the same name. Ptolemy must have been a 
high-ranking Macedonian noble and high-ranking nobles 
were not city dwellers; Ptolemy, therefore, was not a 
citizen of the city of Alorus. It follows that he must 
have had landholdings in an area which was named after 
and administered from the city of Alorus. cf. Pantauchus, 
the son of Nicolaus (Berve II no.604). There is no 
reason to suppose that this is the only instance of such 
an arrangement; in the time of Alexander III the practice 
seems to have been widespread throughout Lower Macedonia, 
cf. Mieza, Verria, etc. in the trierarch list Arr.~Ind.
18,5f» We may assume that Amyntas put royal agents into 
these cities, and perhaps a small garrison.
16) Aeschin. 2,27.
17) The succession was usually a time of turmoil: from the 
time of Alexander I to that of Alexander II it had 
always been accompanied by violence.
18) The text is that of Jacoby, EG-rH II A no.72 P.4 (pp.116-7).
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tr e '^ / r o i t p o f  A ^ o i r ^ f  ^cXtn-/rtKo?r. ?ftv « .^ tft€ -\ sy s
ot ^cXtiririifwv Tre-jn f - ^ \ o(^££Jo\j X^/iuv ^ y < r iv  ei*~et~rae
V v ^ r  r „ < ^ /}>» c xrow#- /^v" e v O o jo 'r e l 'T o v Z  i-rrrreu ^ i\ y  iro v fp tirv f t r ^ o y y
\ r\ \ / \ \ V_ \TTy^ o«rTjU’o jje v tre j ~ ro v r be rrAet&~rt>u<» K on  r o u r  tr e f 0 *** 
e t *  X o j f o u s '  K e ti S e K c e S o e ?  K *et r ^ r  e c \\«*v t i ^ c i 'r  
ir^Xwv' T r& ^ e -TW t^ ovS  i*>y/o^4eicrevJ  o r r u J  5 i  b cC lT e ^ ^ t
r y i  f i e t c r i \ t n y j r  e r e i ip 'e e c  -rrp o & v ffo -r-^ T o e  
Slot-re X« o-t v ovrfy.
Momigliano (p.8) suggests that #o*t r o u * r r e ^ o u r  
*pi*- ~rou? Se TrXetcr To u $"
should he omitted because it is tautologous: the infantry- 
can he none other hut the commoners and he concludes 
that the words are a gloss. However, this does not seem 
sound. Anaximenes is interested in showing that both 
cavalry and infantry were involved in the organisation, 
and some explicit reference to the infantry is required. 
Geyer suggests that Keci'  is explicative and this is
right (Maked, b.z. Phil, p.88).
19) 1376-8.
19a) The hetairoi proper were men called into a specially
close personal relationship with the Argead king. Many 
were influential nobles in dependent parts of the kingdom, 
whom the king wished to hind to himself for political 
reasons, others were rather personal friends of the king. 
The relationship does not appear to have carried any 
formal duties, hut those hetairoi at court generally
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shared in the king’s-life, eating, drinking and hunting 
with him, and often were called into council "by the king 
for discussions of state policy. They also formed a pool 
upon which the king would draw for officers and agents 
to carry out particular assignments. Some methodiin$e<&ci o'f 
distinguishing between these hetairoi and ther cavalry 
force called4hetairoj/, and I have adopted the terms 
«hetairoi councillors« and «hetairoi cavalry* in order to 
avoid confusion. Literature on the »hetairoi councillors* 
is extensive. See, for example, Plaumann 1374ff. s.v. 
rrwyot ; Berve I pp.30ff.; Carrata Thornes; Eranke 
review of Carrata Thornes) Gnomon 30 (1958) pp.206-210.
20) Maked. b.z. Phil, p.88.
21) I pp.104,115.
22) pp.8ff.
23) RE 19 (1938) 1413 s♦v . pezetairoi.
24) II PP*137, 140f.
25) p.104.
26) G&R 12 p.128.
27) Jacoby FGrH II c p.105.
28) ibid. p.107.
?q) Liddell and Scott Lexicon s.v. Sophocles Lexicon
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says that this meaning is a Hebraism.
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30) Prof. Keaney, who is working on the manuscripts of
Harpocration, reported to me that there was no reason to 
doubt the text.
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31)
32)
33)
34)
35)
3 6 )
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
The translation is that of Sherman, Diodorus Siculus 
voi. VIl(Loeb edition, 1952) p.241.
Pi. S£h. 223b. Arist. EJff. 1098b, 28.
of. esp. Momigliano pp,13f.
I p.104.
1376-8.
II p.137; cf. Momigliano p.8.
I p.104.
FGrH lib 115 E.224.
Xen. Hell. 5,2,40.
Philip had under his sovereignty, in addition to Elimeia, 
Lower Macedonia, Orestis, Lyncestis and other territory 
of Upper Macedonia.
Demosth. 01. II, 16f. to?c $ e r-^r ^cXo-ryet**- ■>r-jx
s  y ^ f \ C \ « \ -
T O U Y ujv  ov f*  € Y'e-O’T l  - ------ -- o c  O uV T T o W o t f y n K e S o v
kcXiirrrsAtf f/i rot»r«»iv ¿v re r a-Me ^ ~ a sir1 ov
7 \
tL iro
7/wf outre
V mj
 ^% - / t / ' / l> 9
(TTwi1 • o< if Ì'y IT^< tfl/TOV ovT’f y
i r e ì e r e s i o 01 S o f x ^  / r^ V  £ V o u tr c v  «£*- « « r J  /Q-
VOt
Oi / f ¿.r <=A t' 6 * ^ « ^
s07-y '  \ ~ »'«V T>c 7-»u0 Tro\t^fOu/ .—  o ’f/ » \ .f<r< o  \ *M r  (
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42) FGrH Ills 115 f.348: Q co iro p y ro c a r x  ¿ k
_ M C S > J  \ <? S \ >Tw  w r/ofK fflovw »/ trZrc \t-KTo{ o i <r7o (  «qrr t ^ t i ^ o T o f r o i
* * r / f  o w  T o v  ^ o icrtA i« ^  f# « « i\ o i;v ro  7 r ^ / 7 y ^ o < .
His words are echoed hy Photius and the Etymologicum 
Magnum; of. Jacoby lie p.107.
43) I cannot accept that Theopompus was really referring to 
the hypaspists and made a mistake when he used the term 
»pezetairoi* in this fragment. This is the argument 
presented by Milns Historia 16 p.511.
44) RE 19 (1 9 3 8 ) 1413.
45) It is generally assumed that the text of Anaximenes does 
refer to the beginnings of the phalanx system, e.g.
Berve I p.113; Kahrstedt p.104; Griffith G&R 12 p.128.
46) Arr. 4,2,1; 7,23,3.
47) See the description in Xenophon (Cyrop. 2,3»22) and the 
discussion of Anderson p.100. The names of other 
divisions are known from later times, e.g. the reign of 
Philip V (E.W. Walbank, Philip V (Cambridge, 1940) pp.293f. 
and from the writers on Tactics (e.g. Arrian Tactica), but 
there can be no certainty that the phalanx of the 
Macedonians always was so organised. See also below,
Ch.IV pp. /Z7P .
48) See above p. /3 . Plaumann 1378 uses this passage.
4 9 ) pCPhS 4 p.7.
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50) Parke pp.69; lOlff.
51) Jacoby EG-rH lib 115, E.224: for a discussion of dating 
and content, Appendix I. Between the time of Alexander II 
and 540 B.C. the extent of the kingdom had been doubled. 
The personal army of Jason of Pherae numbered 500 cavalry 
and 1,500 infantry (cf. Parke pp.69,101ff.).
52) See above, n.42.
53) Por a discussion of the armour, see Griffith PCPhS 4 
pp.3ff.
54) The lack of a breastplate and the smaller shield in 
particular distinguished them from the hoplite. See the 
discussion of Griffith (loc.cit.).
55) Por a discussion of the Thracian peltast, see Best pp.3-11 
and plates on p.46.
56) Cf. Kahrstedt p.104.
57) That is the sarissa and the pelte.
58) Aeschin. 2,27.
59) Parke actually believed that Philip II was responsible 
for the Macedonian phalanx and suggested that Philip may 
have been influenced by Iphicrates* use of the peltast 
(pp.155-6). Cf. Anderson pp.l29ff. The connection 
between Alexander and Iphicrates is even more likely.
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60) The appearance of more defensive armour is noticeable 
among the Thracians during the fifth century B.C., when 
increased contact with the Greeks brought more trade and 
prosperity (Best pp.l3f.). The same development may have 
taken place in the Argead kingdom during the first half 
of the fourth century B.C.
61) The section of sixteen men was not a true phalangite file, 
in that twelve of the men were archers and javelin-men.
It is nevertheless significant that the file was called a 
decas. Cf. Domaszewski p.26; N. Hammond Studies in Greek 
History (Oxford, 1973) p.548.
62) 5,2,3. See below, Ch.IV pp./22/:
63) Xenophon (An. 3,4,21) gives a lochos as 100 men. In the 
Spartan army it was part of a mora, but its size was not 
consistent (Xen. Hell. 2,4,31). Cf. RE 13 (19,26) 933f.
64) Cf. E.W. Walbank Philip V (Cambridge, 1940) pp.293ff. 
and Arrian Tactica. By the time of Philip V the lochos 
was the basic phalangite file, and comprised 16 men. All 
the divisions were thus in multiples of 16, at least in 
theory. It would seem.that many changes had taken place 
in the organisation and terminology since the middle of 
the fourth century B.C. (see further, Ch.IV pp./2”7-/; ).
65) Eor instance, Momigliano p.9; Geyer Maked. b.z. Phil.
pp.88f.
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66) If Alexander II separated some ‘peltasts* from the mass 
of infantry to form a phalangite force, he may also have 
separated other units, for instance, archers and javelin- 
men. There is, however, no evidence of any such units in 
the sources until the campaign of Alexander III in Asia, 
when archers appear (Arr. 1,6,6 et passim). It should
he noted that Philip and Alexander III made use of 
Cretan mercenary archers (Berve I pp.l49f.).
67) Justin 7,5; Diod. 15,71,1. Geyer Maked. b.z. Phil. 
pp.l27ff•
68) On all this, see Geyer op.cit. pp.l35ff.
69) Polyaen. 4,10,2.
70) Philip withdrew this garrison at the beginning of his
reign. RE 1 (1894) 1951 s.v. Amphipolis. Cf. Demosth. 23, 
116
71) Philip could raise 10,000 infantry in 358 B.C. and he 
could by then have had little time to build up the 
military resources he had inherited (Diod. 16,4,3).
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260
NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
THE ARMY OF PHILIP II
1) 16,5.
2) Other references to the quality of Philip’s army appear 
in Erontinus 4,2,4., Polyaenus 4,2,10.
3) See Brunt pp.27ff. and Appendix II pp.357J£.
4) Diod. 17,17,3ff.
5) It has Been generally assumed that all the figures for 
Macedonians refer to heavy-armed troops, infantry and 
cavalry. This is almost certainly accurate. Only 
hetairoi type heavy-armed cavalry are known and 'pezoi* 
usually refers to heavy-armed infantry. However, it must 
he remembered that there were a few hundred light-armed 
Macedonians in Alexander’s infantry force and, presumably, 
there were also a few in Antipater’s, but it seems likely 
that these were not included in the totals given by 
Diodorus. See further discussion Appendix II pp. 35-fff.
6) Eor instance, Beloch p.326; Berve I pp.105 and 113.
7) G&R 12 p.132.
8) Diod. 17,63,1. Antipater collected together an army of
40,000 for this expedition and, although many of these 
were Greeks (allies and perhaps some mercenaries), it is
difficult to believe that less than a third of them were 
Macedonian.
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9) The Macedonian treasury was very low (Arr. 7,9,6) in 
334 B.C., and mercenaries would not have been employed 
unless really needed.
10) Although this is not explicitly stated anywhere, it was 
a general policy to use mercenaries for garrison duty. 
The force with Corragus (Aeschin. 3,165), though in part 
Macedonian no doubt, was surely made up in large part 
from mercenaries.
11) It is not clear whether Griffith considers that all the 
Macedonians in garrisons were included in Diodorus' 
total or not; perhaps the implication is that if the 
mercenaries of the garrisons were not included, neither 
were the Macedonians (G&R 12 p.129)* If the Macedonians 
are not included, perhaps the total for 334 B.C. can be 
brought up a little closer to that for 323 B.C., which 
Griffith is at pains to do (p.131).
12) Griffith G&R 12 p.129. Momigliano p.10.
13) On the manpower resources of Macedonia, see now Hammond
■ ■ -
Macedonia pp,15ff.
14) Philip's reputation as a founder of settlements was well 
established in the ancient world. Most often quoted is
the reference put into Alexander's mouth by Arrian (7,9,2), | 
that Philip found most of the Macedonians nomadic and I
poor and brought them down from the mountains on to the i
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plains and made them live in cities. Whatever the
authenticity of this speech in Arrian (see Wttst Historia
2 pp.177-188), there is plenty of evidence that Philip
cdid found many settlements. See A. Keramopoullos, <*u 
W o \ e t f "  -ro v  < f> ,\ flfTTOO f S '
Classical Studies presented to E. Capps (Princeton, 1936) 
pp.191-203. H. Dell, »The Western Frontier of the 
Macedonian Monarchy» Ancient Macedonia pp.115-126. For 
Philip’s settlements in Thrace, see Diod. 16,71,2.
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15) 4,124,1.
16) On Greek immigration see most recently C. Edson »Early 
Macedonia* pp.38ff.
17) See "below. Scylax 66 knows Apollonia to he a Greek city.
18) Griffith PCPhS 4 p.9, suggests that Philip’s soldiers 
provided their own armour and this is prohahle: but even 
if Philip did help them with their armour, an increase 
in wealth meant an increase in their ability to serve in 
the army.
19) Diod. 16,34,5. On the territory of Olynthus, see 
Demosth. 19,194.
20) Momigliano p.16.
21) Grants of land to prominent Macedonians are well attested, 
but there is nothing to show that these grants raised a 
man from 'infantry class' to 'cavalry class' and, indeed,
263
there is nothing to show that the aim of the grants of 
land was to increase the cavalry potential. It is Just 
possible that some of the cadet families of the Old 
Macedonian nobility, which Griffith plausibly suggests 
benefitted from the grants more than any other class 
(G&R 12 p.135), had fallen into such poverty that they 
could not afford to equip themselves as cavalry, but this 
seems unlikely. As Tarn says, II p.155, those who 
benefitted from the grants may well have held land in 
other parts of Macedonia already. It remains true, 
however, that an increase in their wealth would have made 
them better able to serve their king, even on a long 
campaign (so Griffith).
22) He actually suggests (p.14) that the comparison of
Theopompus (Jacoby EGrH 115 E.225b) between the land of 
the 800 hetairoi and the land of 10,000 rich Greeks 
referred to the distribution of the land of Olynthus to 
hetairoi, quoting the size of the citizen body (10,000 
(Demosth. 19,266) ), to support him. This is evidently 
wrong. Theopompus is using 10,000 in the most general 
sense of *a very large number* and was not thinking of 
any specific body of Greeks. In any case it is impossible 
that all 800 hetairoi had the land of the Olynthians 
(Appendix I p.338)«
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23) Arr. 1,18,3; et passim.
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24) Arr. 1,12,7; 2,9,3; In general, see Berve I p.105.
25) See, for example, Berve loo.cit.
25a) See Ch.III pp.^öf.
26) See Berve loc.cit.
t . . . .
27) On the tribe of the Argeadae, see now Hammond Macedonia 
pp.431ff*
28) Eor instance, Berve loc.cit.; Momigliano p.ll; Tarn p.1 5 4 .
29) So Geyer, in a review of Hampl, Ph¥ 5 (1936) pp.118-123, 
esp. p.l21j and P. Zancan, Il monarcato ellenistico nei 
suoi elementi federativi (Padua, 1934) p.138.
3 0 ) See n.28.
3 1 ) 2.99.3. See also Hammond Macedonia pp.l50ff.
32) Polybius 5.97.4.
33) RE 3 (1897) 795.
3 4 ) So Geyer and Zancan, see n.29»
35) Beloch p.326.
3 6 ) RE 2 (1 8 9 6 ) 2299.
3 7 ) P.107.
3 8 ) Diod. 17,57,2. And see below, Ch.IV pp.
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39) Cf. for instance, Berve I p.105; Momigliano p.ll. Tarn's 
assertion (II p.155) that an equal force of cavalry was 
not left with Antipater has not Been accepted "by recent 
scholars: cf. Griffith G&R 12 p.129.
40) The 3,300 cavalry would seem to represent the full first- 
line strength of the Argead kingdom.
41) See RE 1 (1894) 1951: Edson, 'Strepsa', CPh 50 (1955) 
pp.l69ff* esp. p.172.
42) See above, pp.4£
43) On this process, see, in general, Kahrstedt's article.
44) In Bottiaea, for instance, although many urban settlements 
had developed (see Hammond Macedonia pp.l50ff.), they were 
not used as military recruitment areas because the old 
divisions had not been eclipsed by them.
45) Edson, 'Early Macedonia* (p.28 n.61) makes the point that 
the Bisaltians are not recorded as serving the Argeadae 
in war.
4 6 ) See Berve I pp.l34ff.
4 7 ) On Philip's expansion in general, see Geyer RE (1928) 
6 9 8-7 6 8 , Makedonia, esp. 717-732. Eor movement of 
population in the 340*s B.C., see J.R. Ellis, 'Population- 
Transplants by Philip II*, Makedonika 9 , pp.9-17.
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48) Berve I p.105; Momigliano p.ll; Tarn II p.154.
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4 9 ) pp.6 6ff.
5 0 ) see n.29.
51) G&R 12 p.135.
52) Zancan (cited n.29) p.138, thought that it had been a 
Macedonian city from its foundation, but it seems unlikely 
that Amyntas II would have ceded it to Hippias (Herod.5,94) 
and Philip II to the Chalcidians (Demosth. 6,20) if this 
had been so.
5 3 ) p.3 2 6 .
5 4 ) I p.104.
55) Momigliano (pp.7ff.) stated that all the cavalry class 
were called »hetairoi«, but there is no evidence that the 
word ever carried this meaning. Hampl*s view that the 
term referred to the personal followers of the Argead 
king (see above and n.49) cannot be defended. See, for 
instance, Geyer's review PhW 5 pp.118-123; and my 
discussion of Anaximenes* fragment, Ch.I pp. /6 /\
5 6 ) Although immigrant Greeks were brought into the ranks of 
the hetairoi cavalry, it certainly remained, essentially, 
an elite of Macedonian nobility.
5 7 ) Diod. 16,4,3.
58) EGrH 115 E.225b. The phrase «at that time« (see Appendix 
I Pp-332(1 seems to imply that he was referring to a
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II
■time "before some change took place.
59) Predricksmeyer («Ancestral Rites of Alexander the Great*, 
CPh 61 (1966) pp.179-82 esp. p.181 n.15) suggests that 
Philip and Alexander tried to break down the religious 
barriers between Macedonian, Greek and native within the 
kingdom. The same may well be true of military divisions.
60) See above p.39
61) I shall argue below that there were no Macedonian cavalry 
but the hetairoi with Alexander on the Asian campaign 
(Appendix II pp.365i£).
62) I suggested in my discussion of Anaximenes* fragment 
(PGrH 72 P.4) that Aneximenes* explanation of why
Alexander applied the term »hetairoi* to the cavalry did 
not carry conviction in view of the nature of the body; 
for it is not necessary to seek a personal bodyguard*s 
loyalty with a name: they would be loyal in any case.
His comment fits much better the situation of 554 B.C., 
a situation with which Anaximenes was much better 
acquainted, and which could have led him into confusion. 
It can perhaps be used to support my view here.
65) Por instance, Arrian 1,8,5; 2,27,1; 2,25,2; 4,25,1.
64) See, for instance, Beloch, p.530. Por a full discussion, 
see Ch.IY pp . /£/ £
65) Por instance, Berve I p.115; Tarn II p.1 4 1 .
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66) Arr. 1,14,2. Beloch believed that there were seven 
battalions at Gaugamela (p.528), but he was misled by- 
confusion in the sources (see Ch.IV pp. *75" ff. for my 
discussion of the passage of Arrian).
67) See, for instance, Hammond Macedonia pp,102ff.
68) Cf. Berve I pp.H5f.
69) See, for instance, Beloch pp.526ff.
70) Tarn II pp.142,148. Milns Historia 20 pp.l87ff.j 
below, Ch.IV p f>. I^ O f.
71) Tarn II p.142, assumes that Antipater was left with six 
battalions only, which would mean that some of the 
battalions of the infantry levy numbered 1,500, others 
2,000. Unless there is specific evidence to the contrary, 
it is sound to assume a uniformity in the organisation.
72) Diod. 16,4,3.
75) Parke pp.l55ff. Momigliano p.15 n.l calculated that the 
Macedonian infantry on the campaign against Onomarchus in 
552 B.C. numbered 14,000. Even if his method of arriving 
at this number is sound, and this is doubtful, it 
cannot be shown that all these were Macedonians (See Diod. 
16,35,4: to arrive at his figure Momigliano subtracts 
the number of Thessalian infantry in the field in the 
previous year (6,000, Diod. 16,50,4) from the total 
Diodorus gives for 352 B.C., 20,000).
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74) Some tribal groups remained aloof, see n.45 above.
75) See above, pp. * 6  -f.
76) Kahrstedt p.104, suggests that Philip’s achievement lay- 
in the uniform organisation and arming of the infantry, 
which before had been very ragged and uneven. It seems 
likely that he has exaggerated the poor condition of the 
infantry prior to Philip’s reform, and that the heartland 
of Macedonia did produce some good infantry, but he 
probably accurately describes the situation in the more 
remote parts of the kingdom.
77) I p.115.
78) 1,28,5; 2 ,2 5 ,2 ; 4,25,1; 5,22,6; 6,6,1; 6,21,5; 7,2,1.
See further, my discussion of the term ’phalanx*
Appendix III p.375i(?
79) I 115* He thought that Antipater had 5,000 hypaspists, 
corresponding to Alexander’s. Tarn agreed that all the 
infantry levy was called ’pezetairoi’ (II, 140).
80) Pemosth. 01. 2,17. Despite Milns' arguments, Historia 
16 p.5H, there seems no doubt that Demosthenes used the 
term «pezetairoi« of an elite guard and that the 
scholiast was right. See discussion above, Ch.I n.45.
81) p.12.
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82) p.452.
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83) Berve I p.123; Milns Historia 16 p.512; Tarn II p.148.
84) Milns Historia 16 p.511.
85) Tarn II p.153; Griffith PCPhS 4 pp.3f. Milns Historia 
16 p.510. They fought at the major Battles within the 
phalanx (Arr. 2,8,3> 3»11,9).
86) Berve's case to show that there were two distinct Bodies 
of hypaspists, the agema Being part of the ordinary 
hypaspists, a separate Body from the t?oyal hypaspists', 
is untenable, as Tarn has shown (II p.149).
87) p.432. Bauer's case is Based on the view that they were 
converted porters.
88) Milns Historia 16 p.511.
89) See also my discussion, Ch.I pp.
90) EGrH 115 E.348. See above, Ch.I n.42.
91) See above, pp. 3 6  £
9 2 ) I have not touched upon tactical developments during 
Philip's reign, though some are attributed to him (e.g. 
Arrian Tactica 16,6).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
THE COMPANION CAVALRY OF ALEXANDER
1) The term is in wide use to refer to the hetairoi 
cavalry of Alexander the Great and I have therefore 
adopted it in my discussions here.
2) Diod. 17,17,4. Berve II no.802.
3) Historia 20 p.620.
4) See most recently, Hamilton, Comm, p.81 on the date of 
the battle.
5) (Historia 20 pp.620f. Beloch p.518 also reached this 
conclusion though by different means. Badian, *Agis III* 
Hermes 95 (1967) pp.170-192, esp. p.185 n.J suggested 
that Alexander reached Babylon in about a fortnight, but 
he has informed me that he has revised his estimate and 
would agree with Wirth.
6) See Badian, Hermes 95 p.185. The site of Mennis was near 
modern Kirkuk. The whole question of marching rates is
a difficult one. It might be expected that there was a 
comfortable day’s march to which the army in favourable 
circumstances would conform. R. Milns, «Alexander«s 
Pursuit of Darius through Iran«, Historia 15 (1966), 
p.256, calculated that Cyrus« army averaged 18 km. per 
day when moving at full speed over 700 km. (Xen. Anab. 
1,4,19 - 1,8,1). More recently, C. Neumann, *A Note on 
Alexander’s Marching Rates« Historia'20 (1971), pp.196-8
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suggests that a normal day's march may have been in the 
region of 19-24 km. Conditions along the roads of the 
plain of Mesopotamia could hardly have been better for 
marching, providing the weather was favourable. See Iraq 
and the Persian Gulf, Naval Intelligence Division (1944), 
esp. pp.91ff. with figure 24 for a description of the 
route south from Gaugamela.
7) Wirth Historia 20 p.620 thought that Alexander would have 
had to dash ahead of the main army in order to reach Susa 
in 20 days, but I disagree with his estimate of the speed 
of Alexander's army on this route.
8) The district of Sittacene is named after the city of 
Sittace, it seems, but its location is the subject of 
disagreement among the ancient authors. Stephen of 
Byzantium placed it on the Tigris, Xenophon (Anab. 2,4,13) 
put it 15 stades west of the Tigris. The weight of 
opinion, however, makes the city lie to the east of that 
river. Ptolemy (6,1,6) says the city is two degrees 
longitude east of the river, close to Susiana: Strabo 
(11,13,6; 15,3,12) and Pliny (n.h. 6,1,14) also indicate 
that Sittacene lay to the east of the river. Diodorus' 
evidence is too confused to be usable (17,110,4). See 
Welles* discussion, Diod. Sic, pp.442-3. It would appear 
that it was a narrow fertile strip bordered by the river 
in the west and by Susiana in the east, and on the
direct route from Babylon to Susa. Por further
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discussion see RE 3 A, 1 (1927) 399f.
9) Diodorus (17,65,2) says that Alexander rested in Sittacene 
hecause he was anxious to rest the army after the fatigue 
of long marches, but I do not think this is good evidence 
for supposing that Alexander marched from Babylon to 
Sittacene in forced marches. He may have been using a 
standard formula to explain why Alexander rested his 
troops. Weissbach, RE 5 A,1 (1927) 400, interprets 
Diodorus* evidence (17,65,1) as meaning that Alexander 
entered Sittacene on the sixth day after leaving Babylon. 
However, Diodorus states only that it was after 
Alexander had left Babylon and was on the road that the 
reinforcements met him and that it was on the sixth day 
after the arrival of the reinforcements that Alexander 
entered Sittacene. Diodorus gives no indication how long 
Alexander had been on the road when the reinforcements 
arrived. Alexander could only have reached the Tigris 
from Babylon in five days if he had headed north-east 
to ford the river, instead of going on the direct route 
to Susa.
10) Nam cum ante equites in suam quisque gentem 
discriberentur seorsus a ceteris, exempto nationum 
discrimine, praefectis non utique suarum gentium, sed 
delectis attribuit.
11) Curtius actually refers to the cavalry being divided
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according to gens prior to the reform, and the distinction 
of natio being removed by the reform. But there can be 
no doubt that he is actually referring to the recruitment 
districts. See above, Ch.II pp. 36 £
12) Cf. Berve I p.106. It is possible that in 331 B.C.
recruits for the Asian force were drawn from districts 
which had not been drawn on in 354 B.C.
is disputed. It could mean »the other battalions*, but 
since none have been mentioned previously it is more
(see Ch.IV pp.//7f; ). Robson in his translation of this 
passage (Arrian, Loeb edition, 1949) I p.277 offers the 
translation »various*, but perhaps »individual* gets the 
sense better.
14) Cf. Berve I p.106.
The translation of Trfir
likely that the words Z W ul s look forward
to the phrase which follows
NOTES TO CHAPTER III
15) Although the interpretation is disputed, I shall argue
"below (pp. ) that the lochoi of Arrian 7,24,5, are
Macedonian cavalry sections.
16) Cf. Berve I p.106 n.4.
17) 1379.
18) Eor a description of the campaign, with particular 
reference to the terrain, see A. Stein, Old Routes of 
Western Iran (London, 1940) pp.18-27.
19) Accepted without question, "by, for instance, Brunt, p.51.
20) Arr. 5,11,3; 12,2; 16,5. Eor a date of April/May 526 B.C. 
for the "battle, see Beloch, p.520.
21) Arr. 4,3,7; 5T,2ff.; Curt. 7,7,30ff. Cf. Tarn I p.68f.
22) Arr. 4,6,5ff.; Curt. 7,7,30ff.
25) The sources seem to imply that Hephaestion wintered in
Bactria (Curt. 8,2,15), Coenus in Sogdiana (separate from 
Alexander, Arr. 4,17,3), Craterus somewhere in Bactria 
(Arr. 4,18,1) and Alexander at Nautaca in Sogdiana (Arr. 
4,18,1). Cf. Tarn I p.72 n.l.
24) Coenus was active in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,17,4), Alexander
made raids against strongpoints in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,18,4) 
and in the territory of the Pareitacenae (Arr. 4,21,1).
Cf. Tarn, I p.72 n.4.
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25) Berve (I p.108), Tarn (II p.164-5) and Griffith (JHS 85 
pp.68-74) argue that Alexander introduced hipparchiea as 
a means of using Iranian horse in conjunction with the 
Companion cavalry. I deal with this point in Appendix IVpp, 
¿¿.OOfl, hut I hope I have shown that there was adequate
reason for a reorganisation in the very nature of the 
warfare. Brunt (pp.50-52) suggested that the reason for 
the reorganisation was Alexander's distrust of his 
officers. But Alexander surely trusted Hephaestion and 
could have made him commander of the Companions. The 
organisational necessity was the paramount consideration.
26) Berve (I p.108) suggested a date of 529 B.C., hut hi3
arguments were decisively refuted hy Tarn (II p.165 n.4). 
Tarn (II pp.l65ff.) put the date of the reorganisation 
at mid-526 B.C., hut for reasons which have been shown 
to he inadequate hy Brunt (p.29). Griffith (JHS 85 
pp.68f.) argues for a date of 529 B.C. on the basis of the 
belief that Arrian did not confuse the meanings of the 
words *ile' and ‘hipparchy*. This belief, I have tried to 
demonstrate, is untenable (Appendix III pp.383-P. ).
Brunt (pp.28-50) argues for a date of 528 B.C.
27) For instance, Tarn (II p.156 n.4) and Brunt (p.29).
Contra Griffith (JHS 85 pp.70-1): Cf. Appendix III pp.385^
28) See n.27.
29) Eor the date of the start of the Indian campaign,
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Cf. Arr. 4,22,3.
50) Tarn. (II p.165 n.3) argues that Demetrius is mistakenly 
called hipparch "by Arrian here, and that he was in fact 
an ilarch. He asserts that Demetrius was an ilarch at 
the battle of Gaugamela in the autumn of 331 B.C. and 
invites us to believe that he was still ilarch in 327 B.C. 
despite the fact that he admits that he wa3 hipparch one 
year later in 326 B.C.
31) Curt. 8,1,19. I see no reason to doubt Curtius* 
testimony on this point. Contra E.I. McQueen, ‘Quintus 
Curtius Rufus» in Latin Biography (ed. Dorey, London 1967) 
pp.17-43 esp. p.29.
32) In any case, the satrapy of Bactria was vital to the 
security of the empire and Alexander must have a reliable 
man in the post (Badian, G&R vol.12 p.177). It was also 
a good opportunity to remove from his presence one of
the ‘old guard* Macedonians (cf. Parmenio*s post in Media).
33) Curt. 8,5,4; Arr. 4,22,3* On the date of Cleitus* death, 
see Hamilton, Comm, p.139*
5 4 ) Arrian*s expression ‘almost four hipparchies* ~rZ>/
f i t W t u w  fTfltijPw v f i  ~T€ < T (Toepe(f ¡ 4 o t \ t a " r * .  U i r o ^ i o t l '  ^
is odd. Tarn (II p.164 n.l) criticised Berve (I p.108 
n.5) for his translation ‘nicht ganz vier Hipparchien*, 
suggesting that it was ‘a clumsy phrase which might 
suggest that the agema was not included in the four
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squadrons* (Tarn believed that Arrian used »hipparchy* 
for *ile* here). I presume the translation Tarn would 
offer is »about four hipparchies*, but I do not under­
stand his reasoning. Arrian is explicit that the a^ema 
was not included in the four hipparchies and potXt.cr'ru 
is, therefore, quite redundant on Tarn’s interpretation. 
I would tentatively accept Berve’s interpretation and 
assume that Craterus was left with just a part of a 
hipparchy (Alexander had detached as few as sixty men 
once, Arr. 4,3»7)> and this would have left Alexander 
with rather less than four hipparchies. It is, never­
theless, an odd expression for Arrian to have used, and 
the difficulty cannot be regarded as settled.
35) J.G-. Droysen thought the passage meant that there were 
eight hipparchies, but presented no further arguments 
in support of the view (Alex, p.339). Griffith (JHS 83 
p.73) also believes that there were eight hipparchies, 
but see below, Appendix IV p p.401 &
3 6 ) On the organisation of the Ptolemaic army in general, 
see lesquier. Schachermeyr (A1.d.Gr. pp.358f.) believed 
that the hipparchy comprised light horse and mercenary 
horse as well as Companion cavalry. When needed, he 
suggested, a force of infantry combined with a hipparchy 
could be formed which would be a totally independent 
army equipped in every arm. There is, however, no 
evidence that Alexander did include different types of
NOTES TO CHAPTER I I I
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cavalry in the hipparchies and no evidence that he yet 
thought in terms of making permanent arrangements for 
small independent armies. Of the strategic commanders, 
only Coenus, it appears, held a command of a hipparchy 
and an infantry force (see further, Ch.IY pp. /2/£ ). 
Tarn represents the opposite view to Schachermeyr»s: 
he does not allow for strategic commanders holding more 
than one military post (II pp.l42f.), and he has been 
followed by Brunt (p.30 n.12). The evidence clearly 
points to the fact that men did hold more than one post 
at one time, and even Tarn admits that Hephaestion and 
Perdiccas were somatophylakes at the same time a3 they 
commanded hipparchies,
57) Berve I p.109; II no.328. It is perhaps surprising that 
Cleitus held command of two units of such important 
troops, But we do not know enough about Cleitus» back­
ground and his position on the staff of Alexander to be 
confident enough to doubt the evidence of Arrian.
38) 6,27,6; iruvrot (& c*Z ixo% 6yite) ~—
-rots fte* i cpc r *¿cv j  roTs Se K*xrtJiXotr
\ < / , \ \V e  k *cc * k c c t  o  t r r o u e ,  T o < f  d f K«r*< AoYouJ^......
39) Griffith has supported Tarn»s view (JHS 83» p.73 n.16)
40) In the Ptolemaic army the lochos continued to be the
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subdivision of the ile (Lesquier, p.gi).
41) For a discussion of the strength of the Companion cavalry- 
after the reorganisation into hipparchies, see "below.
Brunt (p.29) also suggests that there were two ilae in 
each hipparchy.
42) Eor a discussion of this passage, see Appendix II pp.35'8-f.
43) The most recent full treatment of Macedonian cavalry 
reinforcements is that of Brunt pp.36-9* But hi-3 
calculations are wrong, "because he misinterprets the 
evidence of Polyhius 12,19,2 (from Callisthenes).
Polybius records that 800 cavalry reinforcements reached 
Alexander "before he reached Cilicia, and Brunt added 
these to the 300 recorded, "by Arrian, to produce a total 
of 1,100 Macedonian cavalry reinforcements. However, 
Polybius does not say that these 800 were Macedonian, and 
further it seems most likely that the 800 of Polybius 
includes the 300 of Arrian. It also seems likely that 
the total given by Polybius includes 200 Thessalians and 
150 Eleans who, Arrian says (loc.cit.). arrived with the 
300 Macedonians. The discrepancy of 150 men may be 
accounted for by assuming that Arrian1s account is 
incomplete, or by supposing that Polybius* total includes 
the neogamoi who were returning to the main army after 
spending the winter with their wives (Arr. 1,29,4):
cf. Walbank Commentary II pp.371f. Walbahk considers 
the latter explanation unlikely, but the evidence of
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Polybius is not very reliable and it must be remembered 
that be was trying to emphasise the size of Alexanders 
army as reported by Callisthenes (see further, Appendix 
II p/p.34ff£). We are, in any case, clearly not justified 
in supposing that more than 500 Macedonian cavalry 
reinforcements arrived, and Arrian’s evidence is to be 
followed.
4 4 ) Marsden (pp.6 8ff.) estimates that the strength of the 
Companions at Gaugamela was 2,071, but the figure seems 
too high and such precision is not justified. He makes 
his calculation on the basis of the descriptions of the 
wedge-formation in which the Macedonian cavalry fought, 
as contained in Asclepiodotus (Tact. 7,9) and Arrian 
(Tact. 16,6). It is, however, in general not sound to 
apply the descriptions of drill formations on the parade 
ground to the battle formations of Alexander the Great. 
Cf., for instance, Hammond’s review of Marsden JUS 86
(1 9 6 6 ) pp.2 5 2f.
45) Cf., for instance, Tarn II p.160.
46) Arr. 5,16,10; Diod. 17,65,1; Curt. 5,40,1. See my 
discussion above pp. 5*7■£
4 7 ) On the strength of the royal lie, see Ch.II vp , 3 Y .
48) Brunt has no evidence for a reinforcement of 500 in 
528/7 B.C. (p.57). See also Ch.IV pp. /31-f.
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49) I p.lll.
50) Berve I p.108; Brunt p.28. Berve thought that the
prodromol were Macedonian, and this no doubt influenced 
his view. I would maintain, with Tarn (II p.164), that 
they were Thracian (see further, Appendix II pp.365'-f. ).
51) Schachermeyr (cited n.38) believed that light horse 
served within the hipparchies, but there is no evidence 
to support this view.
52) It is generally assumed that the body of mounted javelin- 
men, which is mentioned first in 330 B.C. (Arr. 3,24,1), 
was wholly Iranian (as Brunt p.28), but no evidence 
supports this view.
53) Professor J. Hamilton drew my attention to this passage, 
as having some possible relevance to a discussion of the 
strength of the Companion cavalry.
5 4 ) These difficulties particularly concern the many taxeis 
which are mentioned here and nowhere else (see Ch.IV 
pp. /0 £f. ).
5 5 ) See in particular the aristeia of Ptolemy described 
earlier in the chapter ( sec. 3ff.) Cf. Errington
pp.233-42 on the bias of Ptolemy’s reporting; and Welles 
Misc. Aless. pp.lOlff.
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5 6 ) leonnatus is said to have had only the taxeis of Attalus 
and Balaerus (Arr. 4,24,10).
28J
57) As Droysen (Hermes 12 p.248) pointed out, there can he 
no certainty that a chiliarchy always had 1,000 men.
Cf. the decas of 16 men formed hy Alexander in 323 B.C. 
(Arr. 7,23,3.4).
5 8 ) Berve I p . 1 3 3  seems to read 1500 (MD) for the manuscript 
tradition of 600 (DC), hut offers no explanation of this 
reading. For the manuscript tradition, see Hedicke's 
Teuhner edition of Curtius (editio major, Leipzig, 1927).
59) Arrian (Ind. 19,5) gives a total of 120,000 at the time 
Alexander was setting off down river to the sea. This, 
undoubtedly, included many Indians, not properly a part 
of the expeditionary army (see Appendix V p.4-23), hut 
even if the army was only half this size, it was still a 
very large force. .
60) Diod. 18,16,4. We have no reason to douht the evidence 
(cf. Brunt p.38 and Ch.V pp.l^^-fi ).
61) There is no positive evidence on this, hut I can see no 
reason why Alexander should not have wanted to keep his 
best cavalry force up to strength. Once the principle 
of Iranian cavalry serving within the Companion cavalry 
was established, there was no cause to let the number of 
Companion cavalry fall while the army was involved in 
heavy fighting in India.
62) Losses sustained hy Alexander's army in the Gedrosian 
desert were probably lighter than many scholars have
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believed (see further, Appendix V pp. 4JL I+ . ).
63) Alexander had sent Craterus and his force away before he 
arrived at Pattala in July of 325 B.C.: for the date of 
Alexanders arrival at Pattala, see Strabo 15,1,17, with 
Hamilton*s discussion Comm. pp.l81f. Tarn (I p.104 and 
map) shows that Craterus went through the Mullah pass, 
which means that he left Alexander about 250 km. up river 
from Pattala. We may conclude, therefore, that he left 
sometime in June 325 B.C.
64) Cleitus was one of the commanders sent home in 324 B.C. 
according to Justin (12,12,8).
65) Iranian satraps and the generals from Media came to 
Alexander in Carmania at the end of 325 B.C., and they 
almost certainly brought troops to him (Arr. 6,27,3). But 
faced with the prospect of demobilisation after the 
Indian campaign in just a few months time, Alexander 
could not have considered reorganising his army to 
include them. See my discussion in Ch.V p./5"7and 
Appendix I? p. 4/6.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
THE HEAVY INFANTRY OF ALEXANDER
1 ) For a full discussion of this passage and of Parmenio’s 
position, see Appendix II, esp. pp. 36/-p.
2) Their official rank was that of »strategos1, cf. Berve I
p.2 0 2 .
5) For the identification of Berve II nos. 57 and 64, cf. 
Badian TAPhA 91 p.334.
4 ) Arr.. 2,8,4; 3,11,10. Craterus had overall tactical 
command of the left wing of the infantry phalanx at the 
Battles of Issus and Gaugamela. He probably held the 
same position at the Granicus and this dual position 
held by Craterus, i.e., the command of his battalion and 
the command of the left wing of the phalanx, may have 
misled Arrian into mentioning a battalion under Craterus 
twice. The battalion of Philip held the middle of the 
line and it seems likely that it appears twice because of 
the order in which Arrian describes the line: he first 
presents the line from right to left, up to the centre, 
and then from left to right, up to the centre; in each 
case the centre battalion is included.
5 ) Only Domaszewski (pp.43ff») has used Curtius* evidence, 
and the results are not satisfactory (see below, n.7 ).
6 ) Beloch (pp.326ff.) suggests that Philip did not in fact 
lose his battalion command but retained it until at
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least 327 B.C., when he appears again at Arr. 4,24,10; 
Ptolemy*s battalion arrived with the reinforcements 
(Arr. 1,29,4). However, there is no assurance that it 
is the same Philip at Arr. 4,24,10, and he has to assume 
that Philip*s battalion was absent from the battle of 
Issus and that both Arrian and Biodorus omitted a 
battalion (different ones) in their accounts of the 
battle of Gaugamela. In addition, his interpretation of 
the confused account of Curtius is not satisfactory.
7 ) Domaszewski (pp.43If.)» following the interpretation of
E. von Roeder (unpublished Heidelberg dissertation, 1920), 
thought that each taxis was made up of two chiliarchies 
of different arms and that each chiliarchy had its own 
commander. Eor this reason he suggested, there is 
frequently confusion over which commander should lend his 
name to the taxis. So Simmias was commander of one 
chiliarchy, Philip of the other. This view is not 
acceptable as it raises far more problems than it solves.
8 ) pp.l2ff.
9 ) pp.J27ff.
1 0 ) I pp.ll5f.; II nos. 784; 2 0 1 ; 203; 428.
1 1 ) II pp.l42ff.
1 2 ) GRBS 7, pp.159-166. He accepts Tarn»s conclusions about 
the number and identity of the battalions at the battle
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of the Hydaspes.
13) See also Appendix Ilia.
14) II no.83.
15) Even Berve (I pp.H 8f.) agrees on this.
16) Only Philip, the son of Amyntas (Berve II no.775), seems 
to have been removed from his post. Ptolemy, the son of 
Seleucus (II no.670), was killed at Issus.
17) Por Amyntas» absence, see Diod. 17,49,1; Curt. 7>1>38.
Cf. Berve II no.57 and 64 (see n.5 above).
18) In general, see Berve II no.45; Tarn II p.144.
19) Cf. Berve II no.181; Tarn II p.142.
20) Cf. Berve II no.233; Tarn II p.145.
21) Cf. Berve II no.428; Tarn II p.147.
22) Cf. Berve II no.623; Tarn II p.147« On the identity of
this Peithon, see below p. i l 2.
23) I have already discussed this difficult passage in 
connection with the Companion cavalry (Ch.III pp. 8 7 -fi ) 
and see further below, pp . / 0 7
24) Arr. 2,12,2.
25) Tarn II p.144 already reached this conclusion.
26) See Berve*s listing under this name (II nos.774-789).
27) Cf. Berve II no.803; Tarn II p.144; Milns GRBS 7 p.160.
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28) Miso. Aless. pp.lOlff.
29) Followed "by Tarn II p.144; Milns ORBS 7 p.160.
3 0 ) For a discussion of the number of cavalry involved, see 
above, Ch.III ■£>fx&4—£-
31) For a discussion of the bias of Ptolemy and its influence 
upon Arrian, see Welles, Miso. Aless. pp.lOlff.;
Errington pp.233ff.
32) As Tarn (II p.146) thought.
33) Berve II nos.700; 741.
3 4 ) Cf. Arr. 5,14,3; 14,4.- Arrian clearly found several 
conflicting accounts of the battle and pieced them 
together as best he could. The result is far from 
satisfactory.
35) II pp.190-198. Tarn*s reconstruction of the battle is 
dependent upon the view that where Arrian refers to 
hypaspists (5,13,4), he really means pezetairoi. The 
interpretation is not acceptable (see pp. ¡ ¿ .O f . ). 
Contrast Beloch pp.341ff.
3 6 ) Tarn*s arguments appear at II pp.313f. His case is 
based upon Justin 13,4,14: Susiana gens Coeno, Phrygia 
major Antigo.no. Philippi filio, adsignatur. The text 
cannot be accepted as it stands, as Tarn shows, but his 
emendation is far from certain; he reads: Susa (or
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Susiana) Antigeni Coeni (sc_. filio), Phrygia maior 
Antigono Philippi filio. This is quite arbitrary and 
cannot he used to support Tarn*s case. All the 
probabilities point to Antigenes being a mature man: he 
was among those selected for discharge as veterans and' 
was duly sent home in 324 B.C. (Arr. 6,17,3» Justin 12, 
12,8). later he commanded a body of veterans, i.e., the 
argyraspids (see below, Appendix VI). If Antigenes were 
the son of Coenus, he could not have been so old.
37) See also my discussion, Appendix V p . 4 - 2 8 ,
38) . The majority of the Macedonians were, by the time they
returned from India, veterans of almost ten years of 
campaigning. Alexander sent some complete units with 
Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana (avoiding the 
Gedrosian desert), and also in addition selected the 
weakest men from the other Macedonian units.
39) See my discussion below, pp./£-£-£
40) Beloch (pp.329f.) and Berve II no.83 also think that 
Antigenes commanded a unit of hypaspists, but rather 
because of his supposed association with the argyraspids 
(see below, Appendix VI pp. 4 . 3 4 - f-).
41) See Appendix Ilia.
42) Cf. Berve I p.116; Tarn II p.142.
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43) Cf. Berve II no.623; Beloch p.329.
44) This rests on the very doubtful evidence of Curtius 6 , 
8,17, where Perdiccas and Leonnatus are described as 
armigeri.
45) That a bodyguard could temporarily hold another post is 
also established (Berve II nos.357; 627): Cf. Milns 
GRBS 7 p.160 n.10.
46) See Ch.III pp. 7 & '€ .
47) Cf. Liddell and Scott, Lexicon, s.v. u \ \ o f II, 8.
48) It did not stop him in the cases of Coenus and Cleitus 
(5,12,2; 5,16,35 5,22,6).
49) For Domaszewski (p.31), this indicates that the names 
are interchangeable in the description of the taxis and 
shows that the taxis was divided into two chiliarchies, 
but see n . 7  above.
50) . Cf. Tarn II p.143 n.l; Milns GRBS 7, p.161.
51) Arr. 3,16,10; Curt. 5,1,40; Diod. 17,65,1. See my 
discussion above, Ch.III pp.5TfTh.is is argued fully and 
convincingly by Milns, GRBS 7, pp.l60ff.
52) He cannot show that Hecataeus and Gorgatas were young 
(II nos.293,232).
5 3 ) This was seen most clearly by Milns (GRBS 7, pp.l60ff.),
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"but lie thought that its commander was Philotas. j
5 4 ) See n.38 above. 1
5 5 ) Cf. Schachermeyr A1.d.Gr. p.358 and see my discussion 
Ch.III pp. 69^.
5 6 ) A1. d. G-r. p.358. See also Ch.III n.36.
57) He thought that Craterus also commanded both a taxis and 
a hipparchy, but I have argued above that Craterus gave 
up command of his taxis in 327 B.C.
5 8 ) • The translation is that of J.C. Rolfe, Quintus Curtius
(Loeb, 1946) pp.343f. I quote the Latin for the first 
part down to »... had not gone to bravery».
iudioes dedit praemiaque proposuit de yirtute militari j
certantibus nova; qui fortissimi iudicati essent singulis 
militum milibus praefuturi erant —  chiliarohas vocabant —  
tunc primum in hunc numerum copiis distributis; namque 
antea quingenariae cohortes fuerant nec fortitudini 
praemia cesserant.
Eor a discussion of the translation of »cohortes» as 
»lochoi», see below.
59) Berve I p.127; Milns Historia .20 pp.l90ff.
60) It is really no more likely that Alexander would have 
appointed pentacosiarchs in this way than chiliarchs.
61) Cited n.5 9 .
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62) II nos.83 and 84. Berve identifies this with Antigenes 
of Pellene (II no.84), who lost an eye at Perinthus and 
was disgraced over the fraud of which he was found guilty 
at Opis (Plut. Alex. 70,4). The reason Berve cannot 
identify this Antigenes with the man who is a commander 
at the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,16,1), whose unit is mentioned
at Arrian 6,17,3, and who later commanded the 
argyraspids (see Below, Appendix YI pp. is that
he considers that this man is a common soldier, whereas 
the other Antigenes (II no.83) is clearly an officer of 
quite high rank. However, it is unlikely that the 
Antigenes who came second in this contest was a common 
soldier and there seems to he no particular reason for 
thinking he could not he identical with no.8 3 . I can, in 
fact, find no obstacle to accepting that Berve II nos.
8 3 and 84 are identical.
63) Berve I p.127; Milns Historia 20 pp.l90ff.
64) It is hardly significant that there is no evidence that 
the size of the pezetairoi battalions changed, when we 
are never told what the size was. Por a discussion of 
the subdivisions, see below.
6 5) Besquier, pp.93-4, remarks that the chiliarchy was the 
sub-unit of the taxis until the reform of 324 B.C. 
Domaszewski, pp.3 0ff., was of the opinion that the taxeis 
were divided into two chiliarchies from the start of the 
Asian campaign, but see above, n.7.
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6 6) Historia 20 pp,193ff. Eor the details of the army of 
Philip V, cf. E.W. Walbank, Philip V (Cambridge, 1940) 
pp.293f..
67) Eerve I p.127 and Milns Historia 20 p.193 assume without 
argument that the subdivision of the chiliarchy was the 
pentacosiarchy.
6 8) E.g. at Sparta, Xen. Hell. 2,4,31. Cf. the discussion, 
RE 13 (1926), 933-5 s.v. lochagos.
69) Arr. 3,16,10. See also above, Ch.I pp.25”f.
70) Arr. 7,24,4; 25,6. See further, Ch.V pp./#/•£
71) Cf. F.W. Walbank, Philip V pp.293f.
72) Cf. Domaszewski p.26; Hammond, Studies in Greek History. 
p.548; see further Ch.I pp.ZS'-p .
73) P.2 6 .
74) Arr. 7,23,3.4. See further Ch.V p. 1 7 $ .
75) See the cautionary remarks of Hammond in his review of
\
Marsden, JHS 8 6 (196 6) pp.252f.; and Pritchett pp.l38f.
\
7 6 ) IG IX 1, 316.
77) The inscription might just as well be the work of 
Thessalians for instance. Dittberner suggests that
the tetrarchy was a cavalry section, on the strength of
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Arrian 3,18,5, "but see my discussion of this usage
Ch.III pp.64f. Everything points to the tetrarchy
being an infantry section, Asclep. Tact. 3,4; Suda 
✓s. v • T-er-pot^ycvL
78) Polybius records (from Callisthenes) that 5,000 infantry 
reinforcements arrived between the crossing to Asia in 
334 B.C. and the battle of Issus (12,19,2), but he does 
not.specify their nationality. We may, however, assume 
that 3,000 of them were these Macedonians, we have no 
details of the other 2,000. Beloch (p.330) suggested 
that 300 of the 3,000 reinforcements of Macedonians were 
hypaspists, but our source material is not precise 
enough to justify any discussion of such small numbers.
79) GRBS 7 pp.l62f.
80) Marsden pp.27f.; Tarn II pp.l82f.
81) Any precise figure can only be conjectural.
82) Cf. Domaszewski (p.2 9), but for different reasons.
8 3 ) I do not maintain that the chiliarchies of the pezetairoi 
must have been exactly 1 , 0 0 0  strong, but an increase in 
size of the battalions would have encouraged such a 
reorganisation.
84) GRBS 7, pp.l62ff.
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85) On the movement of the treasure, see now E. Borza, »Eire 
Erom Heaven. Alexander at Persepolis* OEh 67 (1972) pp. 
255-45, esp. pp.259f.
8 6) Cf. Berve I pp.291-8.
87) Milns ORBS 7 p.161, would seem to allow for no 
reinforcement of the pezetairoi after 551 B.C.
8 8 ) Tarn II p.147; Brunt p.39. Belooh pp.556f. assumes 
Macedonian reinforcements came in 529/8.
89) A1.d.Gr. pp.558f.
90) ORBS 7, pp.l60f.
91) Cf. Berve I pp.H 8f.; Schachermeyr A1.d.Gr. p.558.
92) Cf. Tarn II p.145*
9 5 ) loc.cit.
9 4 ) Cf. Parke pp.192-8; Griffith Mercenaries pp.17-27.
95) GRBS 7 p.161.
96) Mercenaries p.26.
97) A1.d.Gr. p.558.
9 8 ) I p.117.
99) This calculation is /based on the assumption that the 
battalions of Attalus and Meleager remained at full
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strength, i.e. 2,000 each. Of The other five battalions, 
which stayed with Alexander, would have amounted to
1 0 , 0 0 0  at full strength, but if about 2 , 0 0 0 of the 
weaker members were taken out, this left Alexander.with 
about 8 ,0 0 0 .
1 0 0 ) I pp,1 2 2ff.
101) II pp.l4 8ff.
102) Historia 20 pp.l90ff.
105) See further, Appendix III pp. 37/*£
104) II pp.l91ff.
105) Cf. for instance Beloch p.530.
106) J.G. Droysen, Hermes 12 p.248; Berve I p.127; Milns
Historia 20 p.195* Berve and Milns assume that these 
units of 5 0 0 men were called »pentacosiarchies*, but I 
have argued above that they are more likely to have been 
called ‘lochoi* (pp. 1 2 7-f. ).
107) II p.150.
108) Historia 20, pp,189f.
109) e.g. at the battle of the Hvdaspes, Arr. 5,15,4; 14,1.
110) See Appendix III pp. 3 7 8 .
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112) Of. Tarn II p.138.
113) Eiod. 17,17,4; Berve II no.554.
114) Berve II nos.22;746. Milns Historla 20 p.191 denied 
that these were hypaspist units, hut see my discussion 
above, p. /*3.
115) Gf. Berve II no.24.
116) Berve II no.357» On *the royal hypaspists1 as a simple 
alternative name for the hypaspists, see above, pp ./lf-O f.
1 1 7 ) Diod.Sic. pp.294f.
118) There is no evidence that he held this post until 326 
B.C. (Arr. 6,28,4).
119) See Appendix III pp.jy/'fc
120) I have not referred to the evidence of Arr. 3,29,7,where
chiliarchies of hypaspists also appear, because of the 
suspect nature of this passage (see Welles, Misc. Aless. 
pp.lOlff. and my discussion Ch.III j<p. ).
121) Milns Historia 20 p.193 thinks that the reform would not 
have increased *fire-power and mobility* because the 
tactical unit was now double its former size. However, 
he admits that the small divisions of 5 0 0 continued to 
exist,' and the addition of three high-ranking officers 
surely would have made for more flexibility.
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122) Hermes 12, p.248.
1 2 5 ) I p.1 2 7 ; Domaszewski (p.5 7 ) also thought that there were 
four chiliarchies hy 529 B.C.
124) II p.150.
125) Historia 20, pp.l90f.
126) Hermes 12, p.248.
127) II p.150; he is followed by Milns Historia 20 p.191.
128) Tarn II pp.l48f. Milns, Historia 20 p.192. On the 
reinforcement of 531 B.C. see Arr. 5,16,10; Curt. 5,1,40, 
and my discussion above pp. ‘y’ J 'f .
129) I P-127•
1 5 0 ) I have already argued against this interpretation 
above, pp. ¡4 -7  -F.
151) G-RBS 7 pp.l59ff.
152) Hermes 12 p.248.
155) Berve I p.127 and Milns Historia 12 p.193 agree that the 
strength of the agema was not changed from 5 0 0 men by 
the reform of 531 B.C„
154) Cf. Berve I p.127-8; Tarn II p.153.
135) Al.d.Gr. p.558.
156) Tarn II p.153; Milns, Historia 20, p.1 9 0 .
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137) II no.548.
1 3 8 ) Neoptolemus* only appearance during the whole of the 
Asian campaign is at the storming of Gaza, where Arrian 
refers to him as ‘one of the hetairoi‘ (2 ,2 7 ,6).
139) Arr. 6,17,3* On this Antigenes, see n.62 above.
140) If it was standard practice for one of the hypaspist 
officers to take full command of the hypaspists when 
they were combined, as when Antiochus took command (Arr. 
4»30,6 ), Seleucus may have been chiliarch or commander 
of the agema.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
THE ARMY 324-3 B.C.
1) Arr. 7,5. Beloch, p.321, calculates that Alexander 
arrived at Susa in March 324 B.C. This cannot he far 
wrong.
2) The most outstanding confusion is over the timing of the 
mutiny, with Arrian placing it firmly at Opis (7,8,1) 
and the other sources, with the exception of Justin, who 
places it at Babylon (12,10,7; 11,1), placing it at Susa 
apparently (Diod. 17,109,1; Curt. 10,2,12; Plut. Alex. 
71,2). The military reforms connected with the mutiny 
in the sources cannot, therefore, he precisely dated, 
even though for the hroad outline of the order of events 
Arrian*s evidence is clearly the most reliable (see, for 
instance, Badian, JHS 85 p.160).
3) See discussion in Ch.III pp. and Appendix IY
PP.4-/2 "f-
4) Arr. 7,6,1; Diod. 17,108,1; Plut. Alex. 71,1 (See 
below pp JS S 'F . ).
5) Eor a date later than June, cf. Beloch p.321.
6) Cf. Brunt p.38.
7) Philip had employed Cretan archers and these also served 
under Alexander, see Berve I p.149.
8 ) Alexander would naturally have left as garrison troops
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the less fit soldiers: 1,000 are specifically stated "by 
Ourtius (5,2,16) to "be old, and we may assume that others, 
though perhaps only a few, were left in Media on garrison 
duty in 330 B.C., for Media was an important centre for 
Alexander (Arr. 3,19,7» 26,3).
<¥) Tarn (II pp.166-7) asserts that all had left before
Alexander entered the Gedrosian desert, but on this he 
must be wrong. Alexander would not have discharged many 
Iranians before the Indian campaign was officially ended, 
Of the mercenaries, many had been left behind en route 
in settlements and as guards, see, for instance, Arr. 
4,5,2; 4,16,4; 5,8,3; Curt. 7,10,10. And see, in general, 
Griffith, Mercenaries pp.22ff.
10) Beloch, p.345ff. His figures are based on no sound 
evidence and need no detailed refutation; see further, the 
discussion in Appendix V p.
11) Arr. 6,27,5* See discussion in Ch.III rp*73. 
and Appendix IY pp. 4 - 1 7  -F-
12) Arr. 7,6,1; Diod. 17,108,If.; Plut. Alex. 71»1.
13) Berve I pp.l83ff*> Tarn II pp.l67ff.; Schachermeyr 
Al.d.Gr. pp.488ff. Contra Brunt pp.36-9*
Arr. 4,18,3* Berve II nos.508, 301, 7 3 6 . See also 
discussion above, Ch.TIV pp- /3/ •£
14 )
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15) Arr. 6,27,3. Media was a military headquarters. Berve 
does assume that the cavalry under Menidas was the 
reinforcement called for in 328 B.C. (II no.508)
15a) Brunt (p.38) suggests that the figures of Curtius (10,2,
8) of 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry refer to the 
number of Macedonian reinforcements called upon hy 
Alexander in 324/3 B.C. This is not, however, the 
natural interpretation of the evidence and Brunt*s case 
is not acceptable (see below, pp.f?/-£ ).
16) On the organisation of the Achaemenid empire, see,
particularly, Xenophon Cyrop. Book 8. Eor modern works,
......... / ......... ....................
see P. Junge Klio 34 pp.1-55; P. Ehtecham L*Iran sous
les Achemenides; Dandamayev pp.15-58. There is little
evidence after Xenophon*s time, but we may perhaps
assume that the principles of the organisation remained
the same. Cf. Berve I pp.274f.
17) The satrapal force of Amyntas, made satrap of Bactria in 
328/7 B.C., consisted of Bactrians and Sogdians, and 
these seem to have been directly under his command (Arr. 
4,22,3; Berve II no.60), Berve (I p.276) shows that 
there can be no doubt that the Macedonian satraps at 
least, had full responsibility for military matters 
within their satrapies. The Iranian satraps also must 
have had powers to levy troops and maintain a satrapal 
force, even though the king kept royal troops in their
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satrapies (see "below). This was a traditional role of the 
satraps and in seeking continuity in the administration 
of the empire, Alexander is not likely to have made such 
a radical change as to prevent the satraps such as 
Mazaeus in Babylonia (Berve II no.484) and Atropates in 
Media (Berve II no.180) from raising their forces.
(Cf. the discussion of 0. leuze, Die Satrapieneinteilung 
in Syrien und im Zweistromlande von 320-320 (Halle, 1933) 
pp.274-302). The existence of mercenaries in the 
satrapal forces is shown by Alexanders order to the 
satraps on his return from India to disband the 
mercenary armies they had raised (Diod. 17,106,3).
18) Curt. 5,1,43; Diod. 17,64,5; Curt. 5,2,16; Arr. 3,5,1.
19) Arr. 3,16,4. Berve II no.101; no.484. In general on 
these troops, see Berve I pp.276ff.
20) Cf., for instance, Curt. 5,1,43; 2,16.
21) Diod. 17,106,3.
22) The warrior class of the Iranians would naturally expect 
such service (Yasna 32,1; 33,4). On grants of land in 
return for military service, cf. Xen. Cyrop. 8,4,28; 
8 , 6 ,10 .
23) For these details cf. E.G-. Kraeling The Brooklyn Museum 
Aramaic Papyri pp.32ff.
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24) Eor the decline in the importance of the Iranian warrior
class in the fourth century B.C., see, ibr instance,
✓Ehtecham pp.62ff.
25) This is indicated by the order to the satraps and
strategoi to disband their mercenary armies (Diod. 17,106,3) 
Also, by ordering the return of exiles to the Greek cities, 
Alexander reduced the number of men available for recruit­
ment as mercenaries (Diod. loc.cit.). This is not to say 
that Alexander wanted no mercenaries in his service; there 
seem to have been mercenary troops in Babylon after his 
death (see below p. 1 9 0 ).
26) Diod. 18,16,4. It seems more likely that they were 
intended to serve in Macedonia, rather than that they 
were simply sent as an escort force. Alexander had relied 
upon Cretan mercenary archers earlier in his reign
(cf. Berve I pp.l49f.).
27) It is difficult to believe that Alexander would have 
wanted 30,000 such phalangites in the main army; see 
further, below, p. i d r.
28) Arr. 7,15,1; 19,6.
29) If 1,500 Companion cavalry were dismissed in 324 B.C., 
then, as Brunt points out (p.38), very few of the 
survivors of the Indian campaign could have remained, no 
more than a few hundred I would think. However, the 
number lost in the Gedroaian desert may have been
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exaggerated by Brunt (see Appendix V).
50) Arr. 7,29,4-. In the Achaemenid empire, the homotimoi 
were a special group called to court into the service 
of the king: it was clearly an outstanding honour (Xen. 
Cyrop. 2,1,9; 7,5,85).
51) Berve Nos.459, 759, 154, 709, 812. The term »Persia*.’» 
is often used loosely also, in the meaning ‘Iranian* 
or simply ‘Easterner*.
52) Berve II nos.32, 526, 392, 763 (see also Appendix IV 
P.*/7 )• Itanes was honoured in this way Because he 
was the Brother of Alexander’s wife Roxane. Hystaspes 
was a prominent member of the Achaemenid royal family 
(Curt. 6,2,7), Being an uncle of Artaxerxes Ochus. By 
continuing this institution of the Achaemenids, he 
obtained hostages of the families’ loyalty. There were, 
presumably, other homotimoi who came to court But did 
not enter the agema of cavalry.
33) It was traditional for the Persian and Median nobility 
to serve their king on horseback, and I would suppose 
that they formed the bulk of the cavalry in the king’s 
royal force (see R. Frye, p.91j M.A. Dandamayev pp.54f.).
3 4 ) The Ptolemaic army did not contain units of men of mixed 
arms. Several units of mixed arms were grouped under a 
strategos, but this is quite different from one
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hipparchy containing lancers and missile-throwers. . See 
Lesquier pp.69£f. See further, Appendix IV pp , 4 - 0 0 £
35)- Arr. 7,6,4; Brunt p.44.
5 6 ) Tarn II, p.166/7. Tarn seems to allow for no
demobilisation of Companion cavalry in 324 B.C. 
c y
3 7 ) 1 Alexanders viroj^v-rj^fUTai and the World Kingdom’ JHS 
41 (1921), pp.1-17, esp. pp.6-7. Berve (I p.112) also 
thought that Hephaestion’s unit was a chiliarchy.
38) Eor this judgment, cf. Schacbermeyr, A1. in Bah. pp.31ff*
39) The term ’hazarapati’ had come to mean more than simply 
’a commander of 1,000’. Cf. Frye p . 8 8 and my discussion 
below, pp. 1 9 3 -f.
40) Arr. Diad. 38 refers to Cassander as ’chiliarch of the 
horse’, but this does not mean that his unit was a 
chiliarchy (see below, p . ). On the Ptolemaic army, 
see lesquier pp.8 7ff.
41) II pp.160-1.
42) See my discussion of the term ’hecatostyes’ above 
(Ch.III pp.82f.; Ch.IV PPJ 2 7 f . )• On the Ptolemaic ilae, 
cf. lesquier pp.9 0ff. lochos also continued as a sub­
division of ile.
4 3 ) It is repeated by Appian Syr. 5 7 .
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45) Brunt p.44.
4 6 ) See, most recently, Errington £Q 19 pp.233-42, and Seibert 
Ptol. pp.1-26, for the possibility that Ptolemy (Arrian’s 
source) may have chosen to conceal the importance of 
Perdiccas in the last years of Alexander’s life.
47) I have suggested above (Ch.III p. *fl ) that Peithon 
commanded a hipparchy in India.
48) Since the cavalry fought in the wedge or rhomboid 
formation, there were some drawbacks to adding or sub­
tracting substantial numbers to the units because these 
formations were based on lines and files of a particular 
strength (cf. Arr. Tact. 16,6; Asclepiodotus Tact. 7,9).
49) The descriptions do not vary appreciably from version to 
version, and where the differences are important, I shall 
note them in the discussion below.
50) Jacoby EGrH II C p.138. Schachermeyr A1. in Bab. p.28.
51) Ghirshman Persia p.141, PI.190, for the colourful 
apparel of the archers. On the honour of wearing., purple, 
see Xen. Cyrop. 2,4,6.
52) Schachermeyr says by 3>000(A1, d. Gr. p.489), but there 
seems.no way of checking. I have suggested that the 
hypaspists were in fact recruited from the ranks of the 
pezetairoi, in which case it may be thought that there
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were few veterans in the "body, and that it was kept full 
of men in their prime. But if Antigenes, the commander 
of the argyraspids, was a commander of hypaspists (Arr. 
6,17,3; Berve II no.83) then clearly veterans did serve 
in the hypaspists (see above Ch.IV pp. and n.62).
53) I.p.l23f. Berve had odd views about the hypaspists and 
believed that they entered the 1 royal hypaspists* only.
On Berve*s view of hypaspists, see Tarn II pp.l48ff., 
and above, Ch.IV pp. /f o-t.
54) This is the natural interpretation of Diodorus* words 
•secured replacements from the Persians equal to the 
number of those soldiers he released* (Welles* 
translation Diod.Sic. p.441). On the term »hypaspist* 
see Appendix Ilia.
55) Arrian is looking back upon Alexander's actions and 
summarising some of the things for which he had been 
criticised. This included the intermixing of the 
homotimoi into the agemata as well as this intermixture 
of melophoroi. Arrian (I suggest) is using e-yKee-rupt^au 
in a vague sense which can cover the close integration 
of Iranians into the agemata and the looser intermixture 
of melophoroi with the Macedonian units. I do not find 
Arrian incapable of such a vague usage. Cf., for instance
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Arr. 7,24,1, where is used to
describe the close integration of Persians and
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Macedonians to form mixed files, as well as the addition 
of bodies of troops alongside existing units (see below 
n.102).
56) See Appendix VI pp.^S^^ , on the use of ‘argyraspid* 
for »liypaspist* in this passage.
57) On the chariot built to transport Alexanders body, the 
Persian guards were depicted separately from the 
Macedonians (Diod. 18,27; and see above, Gh.IV p. /fT5“ ).
58) Cf. Perdiccas* hypaspists on the campaign against Ptolemy 
(Diod. 18,33,6), and those of Seleucus in opposition to 
the elephants of Demetrius (Polyaen. Strateg. 4,9,3). On 
the Macedonian origins of the hypaspists of the 
Successors, see Appendix VI, p. 4-lt-U
59) Cf. lesquier pp.93ff* on the Ptolemaic organisation.
60) The only parallel words of similar type known from the 
reign of Alexander are archikybernetes (chief helmsman), 
referred to Onesicritus (Plut. Alex. 66,3), and 
archigrammateus. used of Eumenes (Arr. 5,24,6). Even if 
the word was not in use in Alexanders time, it is 
perhaps not sufficient reason for thinking Neoptolemus 
was not actually commander of the hypaspists. Cf.
archisomatophylax (P.Teb. 79,52).
In Polyaenus* description, the agema. or some of it, is
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probably the somatophylakes surrounding the king. The 
size of the agema may well have remained unchanged at 500 
men, and I have nothing to add to my discussion in the 
preceding chapter (pp. I 4 4 - * .  ) .
62) Beloch p.345f.j Berve I pp.119-21; Schachermeyr. A1.d.Gr. 
pp.488ff.
63) Al.d.Gr. p.490.
64) Herodotus 7,41,2; Heracleides EG-rH III c no.689 E 1 
(= Athenaeus 12,5140).
65) I p.121.
66) Persian heavy infantry were inferior to the Macedonians, 
and, even when equipped like Macedonians, Persians would 
surely not have been equal to the Macedonians. See also
Ch.IV pp. 1 3 2  f.
67) Puller The Generalship of Alexander the Great p.142-3, 
refers to a passage of Asclepiodotus (Tact. 2,1), which 
describes the use of light-armed troops in battle to 
shoot over the heads of the phalanx and argues that this
passage may indicate that the sections of Alexander were 
hot fully integrated. But this argument is far from 
conclusive, especially in the face of the explicit 
description of Arrian. R. Milns Alexander the Great 
p.254, is sceptical of the value of the units.
68) I pp.120, 152.
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6 9) A1.d.G-r. pp.488f.
7 0 ) Of. Berve I pp.lllf., where he states that the Persian 
force of 'hetairoi' did not survive the reconciliation 
"between Alexander and the men.
7 1 ) lesquier p.9 2 .
72) Berve II nos.494,45,181. Alcetas and Attalus, "being of 
Perdiccas' faction, would not have associated with 
Meleager and the infantry section in the struggles after 
Alexander's death. ¥. Schwahn, 'Die Nachfolge Alexanders 
des Grossen’ Klio 24 (1931) pp.306-332, esp. p.310, 
suggests that Meleager was commander of the whole phalanx 
after Alexander's death. But it is likely that this post 
was disestablished when Parmenio was removed from it in 
330 B.C. (see above Ch.IY pp. 120-P. ).
7 5 ) Schachermeyr suggests that Holkias (Berve II no.580) may 
have been commander of an infantry unit (he believes in 
regiments of mixed arms) and Perilaus may have been an 
hypaspist officer (Al. in Bab. p,14> A1.d.Gr. p.490). 
(^erve II no.630 lists Perilaos as Perillus, saying 
Perillus is a shortened form of Perilaos, but it is more 
likely to be caused by a manuscript error.' Perilaos is 
doubtless the correct form.) The evidence used by Schach­
ermeyr to support these suggestions is flimsy and does 
not bear inspection.
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74) lesquier p.94.
75) lesquier p.96.
76) Tarn II p.160-1 takes the opposite view, that the lochoi 
refer to the infantry and the heoatostyes to the cavalry, 
hut see above, Ch.III pp. 8 2  f . and this chapter p.
77) p.39. Of. Schachermeyr A1. in Bah. p.15
78) EGrH III c no.689 F 1 (= Athenaeus 12, 514c).
79} Serve was influenced hy his view that there was a force of 
royal hypaspists, in addition to the ordinary hypaspists, 
and that these numbered 1,000 in 324 B.C., 500 being 
Macedonian and 500 Persian (I pp.122-5). On Berve*s 
views, see Tarn II pp. 148ff. and above, Ch.IV pp- /4.O*
80) FGrH IIIc no.689 P 1 (= Athen. 12,514c).
81) Herodotus 7,83,1. See also, Dandamayev, p.55.
82) Cf. Hydarnes' position in the invasion of Greece in 
480 B.C. (Herodotus 7,83,1; 8,113,2). But, in general, 
they accompanied the king (Xen. Cyrop. 7,5,68).
83) Xen. Cyrop. 7,5,68. Olmstead '(238) says that some were 
archers also, and the reliefs seem to support the view 
that some carried a bow in addition to the spear:
cf. Ghirshman Persia p.171, pi.217.
84) Curtius 3,3,13. But only the melophoroi are mentioned
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in the battle accounts, Arr. 3,11,5; Diod. 17,59,3.
85) Ghirshman Persia p.141, pi.190.
8 6 ) Schachermeyr A1. in Bab. p.28.
87) Cf., for instance, Herodotus 3,35,1; 1,136.
8 8 ) Bright dress was a mark of high honour. The Elamites 
had a privileged position among the subjects of the 
empire (OLmstead pp.6 8ff.; 163ff.).
89) The passage came from Chares, via Duris and Phylarchus 
(Jacoby FGrH IIA no.81 P41; IIC pp.l38f.). Duris and 
Phylarchus were not above using such techniques (see 
Appendix VI pp-436i).
90) Cf. Ghirshman Persia p.185, pi.232.
\91) This is perhaps implied by Polyaenus * words -rrciVTc 
Ko<rftt*i 77VyOtrjri^ w
92) Heracleides refers to peltasts in attendance at the
Achaemenid court (FGrH IIIC no.689 F2 = Athenaeus 4,145e). J
9 3 ) We may suspect that the description of them as Susians
may be merely for added colour. The splendour and variety 
of the men and animals at court is a central theme of this 
passage and the mention of another race, apart from 
Persians, may have been thought a suitable addition (see 
above, n.8 9 ).
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94) Arr. 7,6,1. The name was coined by Alexander (see above
p. 177 ).
9 5 ) On these settlements, cf. Berve I pp.291ff.
96) Cf. the imprecise usage of c ^ -r^ a irryr of Scythian 
leaders (Arr. 4,13,3); and of <rtCTj>cLtrf-ui^ , referred 
to a non-satrap, i.e. Ada of Caria (1,23,7): cf. Berve 
II no.20.
97) Eor the date of the order, Curt. 8,5,1; Diod. 17,108,2; 
Plut. Alex. 45,1: with the discussion of Hamilton Comm.
pp,128f.
98) See above, in the discussion of the pezetairoi in this 
chapter, pp. /7?f.
9 9 ) Though Diodorus* evidence at this point is unsatisfactory, 
and we need not suppose that Alexander organised the 
Epigoni because he was dissatisfied with the Macedonians
(17,108,3). Diodorus has confused the relationship 
between the arrival of the Epigoni at Susa and the out­
break of the mutiny at Opis (cf. Welles Diod.Sic. p.434).
100) Arr. 7,23,3. I would suppose that this was the satrapal 
levy called for by Alexander for the Arabian expedition. 
Berve (I p.152) says that they were mostly bowmen and 
javelin-men and this may be so because Alexander clearly 
made more use of Iranian light-infantry than heavy- 
infantry. But I do not think Arrian»s reference
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5,i:T{
ijIj
(7,23,3.4) to the mixture of twelve Persian bowmen and 
javelin-men with four Macedonians to form one section 
necessarily means that most of the Persians were so armed. 
Arrian may merely have been picking out the most 
interesting innovation for special comment, and omitted 
details of other Persian infantry reinforcements.
101) See above, discussion of the pezetairoi, pp. I 7 8 f .
102) Herod. 7,74; 7,93* Arrian 7,24,1 puts their integration
C K o tT o i\ o )(t '£ € iv ) along with the integration of the 
Persians (including the Tapurians and Cossaeans?): they 
all went €< AitfAr
I would emphasise that this is a vague expression which 
need mean no more than that they were brigaded alongside, 
not inside, the Macedonian units (see above, n.55).
103) Berve II no.508. But it must be recognised that when the 
nationality is not specified, it often means that the 
troops are Macedonian. I have, however, no confidence in 
pronouncing Menidas* cavalry as Macedonian. Berve, of 
course, does think they are Macedonian, because he 
considers they are reinforcements which Menidas was sent 
to Macedonia to fetch in 328 B.C. But see above, p. \ co .
104) On Perilaus, see n.73 above.
105) Beloch pp.345ff.; Berve I p.184.
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107) The reasoning may well he Curtius* own. It implies that 
Alexander had no other troops hut these.
108) If it is accepted, on Curtius* authority, that there were 
at least 15,000 Macedonians, then to 15,000 we may add 
the 20,000 Persian light infantry, some part of the
30,000 »Epigoni* (others being sent for duties in the 
satrapies, see above, p. /££ ), the forces under 
Menander and Philoxenus (see above, p. l& O ), as well as 
Iranian light cavalry, which must have been present in 
substantial numbers. Schachermeyr, Al.d.Gr. p.491, 
estimates 7 0 , 0 0 0  in all, which may not be far wrong, but
I do not accept the details of how this figure was made up.
109) The translation is that of R.M. Geer, Diodorus Siculus 
vol.IX (Loeb, 1947) p.147.
110) Cf. Erye p.8 8 .
111) Nepos Conon 3.2: chiliarchum qui secundum gradum imperii 
tenebat.
112) 5,21,1; 3,23,4.
113) At 3,21,1 Arrian calls him *chiliarch* of the cavalry 
with Darius, but that he was more than simply a commander 
of 1 , 0 0 0  cavalry is shown by the precedence he is given 
in Arrian 3,23,4 over Phrataphernes, satrap of Hyrcania, 
and over the satrap of Parthyaea, as well as the other 
most distinguished Persians of Darius* circle. His
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regular cavalry command may have been the 1 , 0 0 0  elite 
mentioned "by Diodorus (17,57,2) in the Persian line at I
Gaugamela (cf. Welles, Diod.Sic. p.286). On the position 
of Naharzanes, cf. Berve II no.543* The change in the j
i
nature of the command of the chiliarch is not surprising 
in view of the inferior nature of the infantry in the j
fourth century B.C. and the increased dependence upon 
Greek mercenaries. It may he that the accession of 
Darius III marked a reaction of the Persian cavalry 
class against the prominence of eunuchs and mercenary jt
leaders under Artaxerxes III. ¡1
114) Schachermeyr (Al. in Bah, pp.31f*) summarises the j
literature on the nature of the office under the ! ii I
Achaemenids and comes to this conclusion. j i;
115) Klio 33 pp.29-38.
116) See especially W. Schur, «Das Alexanderreich nach 
Alexanders Tode* RhM 83 (1934) pp.129-156, esp. pp,130f.
Cf. Tarn JHS 41 pp.6-7; Berve I p,112j Junge Klio 33 p.38. 
Contra Schachermeyr Al. in Bah. pp.35ff.
1 1 7 ) Al. in Bah. pp.34ff. and 171ff.
118) Schachermeyr (Al. in Bah. pp.l71ff.) seems over-concerned 
with the constitutional position of Perdiccas (see below,
Ch. VI pp .2 3 2 £ ) t though I accept his conclusions. For 
other discussions of Perdiccas« position after Alexander«s j
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death., cf. Wirth, Helikon 7 pp.284ff.; R.M. Errington, 
»Prom Babylon to Triparadeisos: 523-320 B.C.* JITS go 
(1 9 7 0 ) pp.49-77, esp. pp.5 0ff.
119) Diod. 18,3,4; Justin 13,4,17.
120) Diod. 18,48,4. In. 321 B.C. Antipater had appointed 
Cassander to he chiliarch to Antigonus, commander of the 
royal army (Diod. 18,39,7), a similar post to the one
he held under Polyperehon in 319 B.C. Of his position 
under Antigonus, Arrian (Diad. 38) records that 
Cassander was »chiliarch of the horse». We are not in 
a position to know what troops Cassander commanded. On 
these usages of »chiliarch» cf. Schachermeyr A1. in Bah. 
pp.l71ff.
121) A1. in Bah. pp.35ff.
122) Cf. Berve II no.606.
123) Diod. 17,17,4. Cf. Appendix II pp. 36/-£
124) This much about the Achaemenid hazarapati seems clear:
cf. Prye»s comment (cited p. ).
125) Schachermeyr (Al. in Bah, p.36) sees the very special 
relationship between Hephaestion and Alexander as an 
important aspect of the office. However, while Alexander 
obviously wanted someone he trusted, there is no evidence
319
NOTES TO CHAPTER Y
to suggest that Alexander intended the office to mark 
out the ‘other Alexander*. Schachermeyr also thinks that 
Alexander made Hephaestion hasarapati in order that he 
might effectively run the empire while Alexander was 
away in Arabia (loc.cit.)t but it must be thought likely 
that Alexander would not have wanted to leave Ilephaestion 
behind.
126) Perdiccas and Eumenes were especially prominent at the 
end of Alexander*s reign, and there was a general rise
in the prestige of cavalry at the expense of the infantry 
during the latter half of the Asian campaign (see above,
Oh.IV p .1 3 * 7 ).
127) In general on these efforts, cf. Schachermeyr A1. in Bab. 
pp.1-71*
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THE MACEDONIAN ARMY AND POLITICS
1) For instance, ¥.S. Ferguson, in a review of G-ranier*s 
Nook in Gnomon 11 {1935), pp.518-22; F. Schachermeyr,
A1.d.Or. pp.34ff.; Tarn II pp.375,579, et passim.
2) «Sur l»assemblee macédonienne1, REA 52 (1950), pp.115-137,
and M etK efo v ^ v RIDA 4 (1950), pp.61-97.
3) REA 52, pp.l27ff.
4) RIDA 4, pp.76ff.
5) Hedicke (Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1927) inserted rex,
iudicabat, but on no manuscript authority. It is not 
necessary to accept this addition to make sense of the 
text, and for our purposes here I have ignored his 
suggestion.
6) REA 52, p.127. Herodotus is our only evidence on the 
origins of the Macedonian monarchy (8,137) and his version 
was undoubtedly inspired by Argead propaganda. E. Ivanka, 
'Berghirtentum und Staatenbildung in Antike und 
Mittelalter•, Saeculum 1 (1950) pp.349ff. suggests that
it may have some historical value. But in any case it 
does not support Granier*s case. See also Hammond, Ano. 
Mac. pp.433i. and the interesting discussion of 
H. Kleinknecht, «Herodot und die makedonische 
Urgeschiehte», Hermes 94 (1966) pp.134-146. The story
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clearly must reflect what the Macedonians of the fifth 
century B.C. "believed about the Argead monarchy, "but no 
reliable account of the origin can be reconstructed.
7) Ostwald, p.32.
8 ) It should be pointed out that Aymard seems to assume that 
there was no political development in Macedonia between 
the reign of Alexander III and that of Philip V. But the 
influences upon the Macedonians in the Hellenistic world 
were great and the people, especially those in the army, 
must have become more conscious of their power.
9 ) So Granier p.49. Aymard, REA 52, pp.l31f., casts doubts 
upon the »communis opinio» that there was no civilian 
assembly, but he presents no supporting argument.
10) Tarn (II pp.106,163) argues that Curtius was reliable on 
Macedonian mores, for he used a work composed before the 
end of the 3rd century B.G. Whatever the judgment on 
Tarn»s case, we are not obliged to accept that all Curtius» 
comments about mores are reliable.
11) Eor the definition, see Ostwald, pp.20f.
12) C.A. Robinson, »Alexander the Great and Parmenio» AJA 49 
(1945), pp.422-4, suggested that this custom relieved 
Alexander of the guilt of Parmenio»s murder. But see 
Tarn II p.270 and Badian, TAPhA 91, pp.332f.
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13) Arrian (4,14,2) says that the detail about the pages« 
appearance before the army is drawn from a source other 
than Ptolemy and Aristob ül'üü, and Curtius« account
(8 ,6ff.) does not inspire confidence in its reliability.
14) REA 52, p.137.
15) See, for instance, G.H. Sabine, A history of political 
theory (London, 1961). On the political development of 
Macedonia, see in particular the excellent discussion by 
P.R. Pranke, «Geschichte, Politik, und Münzprägung
im frühen Makedonien«, JNG 3-4 (1952-3), pp.99-111. 
Comparisons between the Molossian kingship and the 
Macedonian are not valid. The Molossian kingship was of 
very different character: see P.R. Pranke, Alt Epiru3 und 
das Königtum der Molosser (Erlangen, 1954) and Hammond, 
Epirus pp.289ff., esp. p.393,479f.
16) See my discussion in Ch.II p. 5“2, On any interpretation of 
the evidence, the commoners contributed little prior to 
the mid fourth century B.C. (Griffith, G&R 12 p.128.),
17) Por the general lack of involvement of the mass of 
Macedonians in the affairs of Philip, see Demosthenes 01.
2, 16-17. The lustration in the month of Xanthos was for 
the army, but the infantry could rarely have been involved, 
if at all. Polybius (23,10,17) implies that only cavalry 
was involved, but Curtius (10,9,12) and Livy (40,6) 
suggest that the infantry did take part. por a discussion
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see EE 9, 2 (1967), 1334.
18) In fact the Olynthians seem to have been behind this 
expulsion of Amyntas, and they certainly could have 
worked only through noble factions. Most recently on 
the expulsion, see J. Ellis, *Amyntas III, Illyria and 
Olynthus* Makedonika, 9 (1969), pp.1-8.
19) There is much literature on the 'regency* of Philip. 
Diodorus (16,2,5) knows nothing of a period of regency 
for Philip and this has led J. Ellis, in *The security 
of the Macedonian throne under Philip II Ancient 
Macedonia pp.68-75, to suggest that Philip assumed the 
kingship immediately upon the death of his brother. This 
is not convincing, for while it is conceivable that a 
period of regency dropped out of the tradition, it i3 
difficult to believe that it could have slipped in.
20) See Hammond Macedonia pp,156ff., calling the place Aegeae. 
He would seem to be right against earlier identifications 
of it near Edessa: contra Schachermeyr A1.d.Gr. p.30.
21) As, most notably, Granier.
22) As, most recently, E. Schachermeyr A1. in Bab. pp.150-3 
and 1 5 8-6 2 .
23) Cf. Badian Phoenix 17 pp.248ff. Contra Bosworth, 21, 
p.103; Kraft, pp. 11-42, esp. pp.l6ff.
24) The description of thevaried reactions to Philip*s
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death in 1 1 , 1  is patently unreliable, being heavy with 
exaggeration and stylistic tricks.
25) See, for instance, Demosth. 01. 2,16-17.
26) There can be little doubt that this was made known,
' i\ .whether he actually led Alexander before the troops or 
not (Ps.Call. 1,26). See discussions of Badian and 
Bosworth, as cited n.23.
27) Justin's version is not necessarily a contradiction of 
Diodorus*. Pausanias may have been hung on the cross 
after he had been killed by the guards. No doubt every­
thing was done to direct the anger of the men against 
Pausanias. See, on the sources for Pausanias* fate, 
Bosworth CQ 21, pp.95-6.
28) Other restorations seem equally likely. See Bosworth 
loc.cit. and Jacoby*s commentary (FGrH II B p.534) for 
further discussion.
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29) As Schachermeyr, A1. in Bab. pp,152f. He believes in the 
men's consciousness of the political tradition and the 
place of the assembly of the men-in-arms within it.
30) In H. Lietzmann, Kleine Texte (Bonn, 1915) 131: poteri
A  — v yo «ÎPÎÎOV K o i t  K  Up cor
/coet A t v S f t
fy o ç  ftu y u t  A f p e i
ÿ é  V o jt  é  V oÇ  T ê ts  A c r e  e t s  K « )  t y Q iv e t c  C o /\tV S i u i .
Cf. 34 - f i * < r c \ e o s  % trto tr flk t p n v S jx }
otv flgOÿiVojJéVOÏ €@0€ t o c s  turÿocXorf ~r r p e ?rwr.
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51) G.T. Griffith, »The letter of Darius at Arrian 2.14»,
PCPhS 14 (1968) pp.33-48, takes it that the letter of 
Alexander is genuine, hut his case is not convincing.
52) The sources for the conspiracy are Arr. 5,26,1-3; Curt. 
6,7,7ff.; Diod. 17,79,Iff.; Just. 12,5,3; Str. 15,2,10;
Plut• Alex. 49. Eor discussions see the summary in Seibert 
Alex. pp.l40f.
3 3 ) The evidence is poor on this latter occasion (see Arr. 
4,14,2 and below).
3 4 ) Badian, TAPhA, 91 pp.324ff. Schachermeyr A1.d.Gr. pp.326ff 
Hamilton Alex. pp.94f.
3 5 ) Amyntas and his family will not have been the only nobles 
closely associated with Philotas» faction*
3 6 ) Berve II no.606.
3 7 ) Arr. I, 25,1. Berve II no.37.
3 8 ) Alex, p.95.
3 9 ) Berve II no.57*
4 0 ) The sources are Arr. 4,13-14; Curt. 8 ,6ff. Plut. Alex.
5 5 . For a summary of literature see Schachermeyr,
A1.d.Gr■ pp.386ff.
41) Arr. 4,14,2; Curt. 8,6,30.
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42) Curt. 8,8,20, says only the royal pages were involved, 
hut this could he invented for dramatic effect.
4 3 ) On the fate of Callisthenes, see Schachermeyr, Al.d.Gr. 
pp.390ff.
44) Schachermeyr, Al.d.Gr. p.389, accepts that the pages were 
brought before the army and that Hermolaus addressed them, 
but he offers no convincing reason for the credibility of 
the inferior source in the face of the contradictory
evidence of Ptolemy and Aristobw]irXJ. It should he noted 
that an author who wanted to compose a speech for one of 
the pages to deliver would -have naturally put the speech 
in the context of a full army assembly, as this would 
give full scope for his inventiveness and the display of 
his rhetorical skills.
45) Granier, however, seems to place some reliance upon it 
(pp.46f.).
46) Eor the sources see Arr. 5,25-8; Curt. 9,2; Diod.17,93-5, 
on the mutiny at the Hyphasis. On the mutiny at Opis, 
see Arr. 7,6,Iff.; Curt. 10,2,9ff.J Justin 12,11,If.;
Plut. 70,3f.
47) pp.34ff.
48) Al. in Bab, p.152; Al.d.Gr. pp.434ff. and pp.492ff. and 
See also E. Wüst, »Die Meuterei von Opis» Historia, 2
pp.418ff.
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49) See the comments of Badian HSPh 72 p.194.
50) A1. in Bah. pp.152-5.
51) Whatever the precise course of events (for discussion see 
Schachermeyr A1.d.Or. pp.492ff.), there can he no doubt 
that the initiative came from the ordinary soldier, and 
that Alexander unwillingly consented to return: Kraft’s 
discussion (pp.l05ff.) is not sound.
52) Arr. 7,5,1; Curt. 10,2,9f.
53) The sources are Arr. Diad. Iff.; Curt. 10,6-10; Diod. 18, 
If.; Justin 15,Iff. Por a full discussion of events,
see now Schachermeyr, A1. in Bah. For a less legalistic 
approach, see G. Wirth, »Zur Politik des Perdiccas’ 525 
’Helikon’ 7 (1967), pp.281-522, esp. pp.284f.;
R.M. Errington, ’Prom Babylon to Triparadeisos: 525-320 
B.C.* JHS 90 (1970) pp.49-77, esp. pp.50ff.
54) A1. in Bah. pp.150-5 and 168-72,
55) See the sensible discussion of Wirth, Helikon 7, pp.284f.
56) Por a good account of relations between Alexander and the 
Macedonian troops in the last years of the campaign,see 
Hamilton, Alex, ch.12 and 14.
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APPENDIX I
THEOPOMPUS AND THE HETAIROI OP PHILIP II
JacoDy, FGrH II B, 2, 115, P.224. I retain JacoDy’s page and
, x > > / y > x s >11»
I jT  e^év*"ro X ou k . * i v pc \ u t r * v  oeuru  <*a A
<t*i c^y?£ WWv-raíV’ ¿W 0pCjTTv~>o KxkicTTo? Aw v
» / y / > / > \ v \ \ C \ > /
------- y otA\e£ H.«C Ot TTep  i  « ' w T ' O VOí K O V O pO f oo pO O O V  O tvTO f
c \ ' » r I J «. > /•citrA%Mf *»u dííl" «vTwv' *jirte-r»iTo ¿y?
7
* d r
cr <v i
20 ' _  x \ V >» í’foí’ K«fc TToAurfrtij
u/r oyif
v<*#r ocfc<«i»<. t <h/ b etOrof oitT iof r jv  r t t r X y -
7 r wy.
/ C/ ~ \
rpoJ((-ipvur otrrpivTU 7r otvuv
K r w ^ v o j  *«*« S itío u f, tr -r^oCT ti^Tyr ufv X o jji^ ec réJ a e i
V / X ? i z' , y i / >TV Trp OCT CO'S To¿ K«f* TwvwAtiTAo^yrf <?£ ^rJ^vAf^v’ OWK
,  / . /  ?/ >^1 r  r  — y «. > i t - '  _.
t )o v v t iT o .  eirei'T ’U o o* e r i t p o t  c c o t o v  »roAAwv r o i r w v
"  / c X V - > * ■ ' ? ' ■ *  "  j ,  ^ cyyVV o - u v e p p u * !  K o T f f '  Ot f 4 ( - > /  e j  o t u T r j i  T ^ r  f t * * { * • * * /  0 t
2 f  $£ fK  TTu\ loiff o i S & *K  « /X X y r  'J r W x S o T ,  OUK d p i -
o -T c v f y v  e f e c X e y p e v o i ,  e c\ \ *  e ?  n r  j v  e v  T o 7 r  'fE X X -y n  v  7
roTV j3 f  X e t r T d o ^ o ?  y f& S eX u ^>«r y O yota rv?  t o v
“T ^ o TTOVj  oXtTOl (Tj^^ov Z w a tv T é r  e t f  M o tx e S o v ío e *  « Q p O l -
o - B / v - r t f  e T M lp o t  t f tX iir r ro v  ’r r j * o r y y o p  * 6  o v T o . e< * * *
J 0  j«»j T otO Q T O f T t f  { * * * }  e \ r j \ o 0 £ í f  oT O  T o o  j3 t o v  Kofi T y r
St,eccT*jf T r jr  M a in e  f o v t n y r  t  * ) ( * • * > *  e n t í o o i *  optoto?  e y i  -  
\ \ \ r /\ \ f _  - ✓  ' r* ' \y£  t o  • T o t  p e o  y  o t  tt’& A  e p o t  n m  e t i  e r r j i  m e t  * t t^  \^ 7V b e  x
1 c \ ✓ x /I -  > \ 7  /
* * 't fli* V O A U T e  Af te l t  t/j3 dO 'ex?  e tu T O V  f  f iv o 'f  iy>Of y 7 f  »TovTo
K<*¿ ^ y x / / * 7  K o cr ffio *?  ieXX*  * < r £ T w r  K«f«' T o ír  X y t a -rn iF
3 T  TTttpel TrXf jc r /w r .
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Translation taken from Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, Loeb, vciLII 
pp.257f.
Concerning the extravagance and mode of life of Philip 
and his companions Theopompus writes the following in the 
forty-ninth hook of the Histories:
»After Philip had become the possessor of a large fortune he 
did not spend it fast. Ho! he threw it outdoors and cast it 
away, being the worst manager in the world. Thi3 was true of 
his companions as well as himself. For to put it unqualifiedly, 
not one of them knew how to live uprightly or to manage an 
estate discreetly. He himself was to blame for this; being 
insatiable and extravagant, he did everything in a reckless 
manner, whether he was acquiring or giving. For as a soldier 
he had no time to count up revenues and expenditures. Add to 
this also that his companions were men who had rushed to his 
side from many quarters; some were from the land to which he 
himself belonged, others were from Thessaly, still others were 
from all the rest of Greece, selected not for their supreme 
merit; on the contrary, nearly every man in the Greek or 
barbarian world of a lecherous, loathsome, or ruffianly 
character flocked to Macedonia and won the title of »companions 
of Philip*. And even supposing that one of them was not of 
this sort when he came, he soon became like all the rest, 
under the influence of the Macedonian life and habits. It was 
partly the wars and campaigns, partly also the extravagances 
of living that incited them to be ruffians, and live, not in 
a law-abiding spirit, but prodigally and like highwaymen.«
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Jacoby IffirH II B 2 115 P.225b. I retain Jacoby*s page and 
line references. 
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Translation taken from Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae. lo«b vol. 
Ill (1929) pp.l71f.
Concerning each (sc. Dionysius and Philip) Theopompus 
writes in the forty-ninth hock as follows:
•Philip spurned those who were of decent character and 
who were careful of their property, hut he honoured with 
praise the extravagant and those who spent their lives in 
dicing and drinking. Therefore he took pains that they should 
have these amusements, and even made them competitors in every 
king of wickedness and disgusting conduct. Por what 
scandalous or apalling act was not in their programme? Or 
what honourable and upright act was not missing? Did they not 
in some cases, grown men though they were, go shaved and 
depilated, in other cases even go so far as to consort 
infamously with each other, though they were bearded? In fact 
each had in his train two or three prostitute companions, and 
they themselves granted to others the same favours. Hence one 
may rightly assume that they were not companions, but 
•mistresses*, hnd might rightly call them not soldiers, but 
harlots; for they were man-killers by nature, man-harlots by 
habit. In addition, they loved drunkenness instead of sober­
ness, they were eager to plunder and murder instead of living 
decent lives. Truth-telling and keeping promises they 
regarded as no part of their duty, whereas they readily 
assumed the odium of perjury and cheating in the most august 
sanctuary. Careless of what they had, they itched for what 
they had not, though they owned a whole section of Europe.
Por I believe that though these companions numbered at that
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time not more than eight hundred, yet they enjoyed the profits 
of as much land as any ten thousand Greeks possessing the 
richest and most extensive territory.1
These fragments of Theopompus* Philippica are the main 
evidence for the number and nature of the hetairoi of Philip 
II. I have not presented a translation of Polybius» passage 
because it does not differ significantly from that of 
Athenaeus» passage. It is clear that Athenaeus» first 
quotation came in Theopompus» text just before his second 
quotation and in fact 224 seems to end almost precisely where 
225b starts, as Polybius» quotation contains the end of one 
and the beginning of the other. Polybius was clearly much more 
selective than Athenaeus, quoting those parts which would best 
illustrate the defamatory nature of Theopompus» work, while
Athenaeus probably presents the fuller version of Theopompus»
1 * j *\ 'passage. The last part of 225a, in which ©< p*Aoc k «*c
t C ,
©c f-TUipoi of Philip are compared to beasts, came in 
Theopompus presumably somewhere after 225b had finished. The 
general agreement in the texts of Polybius and Athenaeus, 
where they run parallel, indicates that what is preserved is
preasonably close to the text of Thempompus. Some differences
3can be accounted for, as Milns suggests,' hy assuming 
differences in the manuscript tradition at the time of 
Athenaeus compared with the time of Polybius.
The date at which Theopompus* words were written cannot 
be established. As Connor points out, Book 57 was certainly 
written after 537 B.C., but how long after is unknown: 
perhaps the work was not finished until as late as 320 B C ^
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Although it cannot he established when Theopompus wrote the
passage, it is generally accepted that it appeared in the
context of the narrative of the year 340/59 B.C. This was
5first argued by St&helin, who related it to Theompompus* 
fragment P.292 (PGrH), which records that Philip acquired 700 
talents from privateering with Hiero of Soloi, and Stahelin 
suggested that this gave Theopompus his introduction to his 
criticism of Philipps extravagance, and immediately preceded 
P.224: as the privateering occurred in 340/39 B.C., P.224 
appeared in the context of that year. However, Philip 
undoubtedly came into large sums of money through questionable 
means at other times in his reign, and there can be no 
certainty that P.292 directly preceded P.224, or bore any 
relation to it at all. Jacoby assigns P.292 to Book 48 (the 
very end) or 49 (the very beginning) on the strength of 
Stahelin*s argument,^ but Polybius says that the passage 
occurred at the beginning of Book 49, which would seem to 
mean that P.292 could not have come at the beginning of Book 
49. If it occurred at the end of Book 48 then it can hardly 
be said to be closely linked to this fragment, because it 
was separated by a book division.
Whatever the chronological context in which the passage 
occurred, it takes the form of a digression and does not 
properly belong to the narrative of any year, being rather a 
general description of the conduct of Philip and his circle. 
Whether the passage was inspired by the privateering of 340/39 
B.C. or not, Theopompus did not intend his readers to take 
the impression that the conduct described was confined to
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this particular time.
The trend of the Theopompus passage is not difficult to
follow, and the theme is a familiar one to anyone acquainted
7with the fragments of Theopompus. The invective and moral 
condemnation of Philip and his associates is reminiscent of
the expressed contempt of the author for other great leaders
Rof his day, e.g. Dionysius of Syracuse. The familiarity of 
the theme predisposes scholars to suspect Theopompus of 
prejudice in his judgments of the men of his time and few 
would accept Theopompus* evidence without qualification. 
However, it must "be remembered that the life style of the 
‘barbarian* kings and chiefs must have seemed generally 
extravagant and undisciplined to the Greek from a city state 
background, and Theopompus* evidence should not be rejected 
as readily as Tarn rejects it (II p.154 n.5). Indeed it 
should be recognised that as Theopompus spent time at the
Qcourt, the background to his invective may have some 
historical value.
Theopompus was essentially an orator before he turned 
historian^0 and this passage is clearly much affected by his 
rhetorical training. It is concerned with the overall effect 
rather than detail, less with accuracy than with the 
persuasion of his readers. Yet an orator, if he could, based 
his invective upon facts and sought to obtain his end by 
selection of fact, rather than outright falsification. The 
charges levelled at Philip and his circle seem to be based on 
a foundation of fact, flimsy though it may be. It is beyond 
dispute that Philip used his revenue to the full: despite
337
the enormous income, at the end of his reign the Macedonian
treasury was nearly e m p t y h e  was known for his lavish gifts
12to favourites, for gambling and drinking. To a Greek,
unused to the flamboyance of a royal court, the extravagance
would make a very deep impression: adventurers, attracted to
the court in search of a fortune, no doubt did not improve
the general atmosphere of the place. Homosexuality was
probably no more common than in many other military situations,
but this was something Theopompus could not omit because it
gave him the opportunity to play with words, and make use of
the pun on »hetairoi1. It may have been a common joke about
the Macedonian court among the Greeks, and his readers may
have been disappointed if it had been missing from Theopompus»
account. It gave him a chance to show his rhetorical paces
in true Gorgian fashion. F o r the other charges, the
Macedonians almost certainly had more in common with the
•barbaric» Thracians than with the Greeks and did not share
the Greek moral and religious standards: Philip, for one,
was particularly noted for his single-minded and ruthless
13ambition,- which respected laws of neither men nor gods.
While we must beware of accepting all that the Greeks 
said about Philip, there seems no good reason for doubting 
that the court of Philip was no place for those with weak 
stomachs, and that most of the charges Theopompus lays against 
the men with Philip had a foundation of fact. However, the 
overall effect is not so acceptable. By selecting the more 
extravagant and outrageous elements, Theopompus has made the 
Macedonian court out to be a den of perverts without any
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standards of decency. By listing examples of the degeneracy, 
without any compensating good points, Theopompus has produced 
a very distorted and inaccurate picture, without being 
patently guilty of falsehood. Historians are, therefore, right 
to pay little attention to the overall picture portrayed by 
Theopompus: but it should be noted that the details find much 
support in other evidence upon the life style of Philip and 
his circle.
Though rejecting the rest of the passage, scholars
generally have extracted three points of information as being
worthy of serious attention: 1) Philip collected men to
himself from all over Macedonia and the Greek world and called
them his «hetairoi» 2) there were about 800 hetairoi at
the time of which Theopompus was writing;^ 3) these 800
enjoyed the fruits of an enormous area of land.^ I have
argued that the individual charges on which Theopompus builds
his invective have some foundation in fact, however misleading
the whole is. Therefore, it is very difficult to believe
that Theopompus is inaccurate on these three points which in
themselves do nothing to blacken the image of the court. It
cannot be doubted that Philip made Greeks, as well as
Macedonians.hetairoi: there is, in fact, independent evidence
that there were Greek hetairoi. ^  It might be doubted that
18there were as many men involved as Theopompus implies, and 
the criterion used in their selection may not have been that 
stated by him - though the qualities looked for by Philip 
would not necessarily have met with Theopompus* approval. 
Concerning the second point, Theopompus could have no reason
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for falsifying the number and it does not look like a wild 
guess: in the absence of contradictory evidence it should be 
accepted. The third point, namely that these 800 owned a 
large area of land need not be doubted.
Though scholars are agreed that these points have value
for the historian, they differ in their interpretation.
Plaumann considered that the first point referred to the
»hetairoi councillors*, and points (2) and (3) to the
hetairoi cavalry, ^  but most scholars since Plaumann have
..................... 20thought that all three refer to the hetairoi cavalry. The 
interpretations have considerable influence upon their 
theories about the Macedonian army and court, and the matter 
is of some importance.
All who distinguish between the two uses of the word are 
agreed that (2) and (3) must refer to the hetairoi cavalry,^ 
and this would seem to be right. The number of »hetairoi 
councillors» at any given time is not known, but few scholars 
would reckon them at many more than 100, even at the end of 
Alexander the Oreat*s reign, when it is generally assumed the 
»councillors» were at their highest number;' The names of 
rather less than 100 are known to us from Alexander»s reign 
and it seems impossible, therefore, that Theopompus could 
have meant that there were 800 »hetairoi councillors * in 
Philip’s reign. As (2) is inseparable from (3), there can be 
no doubt that Theopompus is saying that these 800 hetairoi 
cavalry were excessively rich landholders.
There is no such agreement upon (1). Plaumann argued 
that it must refer to the »hetairoi councillors* because the
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hetairoi cavalry contained no Greeks, as the territorial 
divisions show, while it is known that there were some Greeks 
among the »hetairoi councillors*. His arguments are clearly 
inadequate, for although the hetairoi cavalry was recruited 
from areas within Macedonia, there is no evidence to show 
that some of them were not Greek immigrants who had acquired, 
or were granted, enough land to qualify themselves for cavalry 
service under Philip (see above Ch.II p A s  we know 
the names of only a handful of hetairoi cavalry, and all these 
are squadron leaders, . there can he no certainty about the 
place of origin of the troopers.
On the other hand, those scholars who consider that (1)
refers to the hetairoi cavalry scarcely have a better case to«
support their contention.. It, in fact, relies on the 
assumption that Theopompus is a careful enough writer in this 
passage not to confuse the two different types of hetairoi 
in Philip*s circle, and because (2) and (3) refer to the 
hetairoi cavalry (1) also must. This hardly seems justified 
in view of the generally held opinion concerning the passage 
as a whole. Another look at the whole passage will illustrate 
what I mean. Theopompus is trying to paint the most shocking 
picture he can of Philip and his circle. To achieve this he 
selects what appear to him to be the most outrageous features 
and conflates them into a continuous descriptive passage: 
Philip named the scum of the earth his »hetairoi»; drinking 
and gambling were their main occupations; they were male 
prostitute homosexuals; they indulged in,drunkenness (again), 
lawlessness, robbery and murder, falsehood, treachery, perjury
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and sacrilege; finally, despite their enormous wealth they 
lusted after more. It seems wrong to assume that in all these 
charges Theopompus is necessarily thinking consistently of 
either the »hetairoi councillors * or the hetairoi cavalry: 
clearly he was not interested in describing the life style of 
any particular group within Philip*s circle so much as merely 
listing vices. We only have Athenaeus' word for it that the 
passage as a whole is devoted to the body described by the 
author as the »hetairoi». It is not a necessary conclusion 
from Theopompus* words and at the end of Polybius» quotation 
(P .584 1.21) the comparison made is between »the friends and 
hetairoi of Philip» and wild beasts. This implies that 
Theopompus did not actually have the hetairoi specifically 
in mind in the rest of the passage, but that he was merely 
talking in general terms about the circle of Philip, Both 
the »hetairoi councillors * and the hetairoi cavalry may have 
been seen as a part of this circle by Theopompus. I would 
suggest that the hetairoi receive specific mention only 
because they illustrate so well some of the conduct Theopompus 
is criticising. Philip»s desire to have around him debauched 
degenerates is best illustrated by reference to the hetairoi: 
the charge of homosexuality is inspired by the word hetairoi 
and they are a natural object of Theopompus» indignation. 
Pinally, the wealth of these men who senselessly lusted after 
more is best illustrated by a reference to a body of rich men 
whose number can be defined, i.e., hetairoi cavalry, and 
whose landholdings can, therefore, be described with a 
meaningful, though not necessarily precise, comparison.
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These, I suggest, are the reasons for the introduction of the 
hetairoi and Theopompus would have had no hesitation in moving 
indiscriminately from one type of hetairoi to the other in 
his search for charges against Philip and his circle. If he 
had referred to the ’hetairoi councillors’ to show how Philip 
honoured the lowest elements, hut then found that he wanted to 
use the other hetairoi for his punning reference to homo­
sexuality, and for his illustration of the wealth of these men 
who lusted after more, he would not have paused to consider 
whether he should do so, or to think that he was giving 
misleading information. There can, therefore, he no certainty 
about whether (1) refers to the «hetairoi councillors’, 
hetairoi cavalry or both, and it cannot he used to show that 
Philip brought Greeks to serve in the hetairoi cavalry.
The passage as a whole deserves more attention than it 
has generally received in the past, because the details do 
indicate that Theopompus was acquainted with the set-up at 
the Macedonian court, although he was obviously very 
prejudiced in this passage, both in his viewpoint and in his 
selection of material. At the same time, however, it must be 
recognised that the passage is heavily rhetorical, and great 
caution must be exercised by the historian in the interpretation 
of the details.^
APPENDIX II
ALEXANDER•S ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OE THE CAMPAIGN
a) The Transmitted Totals
The following table gives the more important variations
in the ancient writers concerning the total strength:1
Infantry Cavalry
Anaximenes(Plut.Mor.527 E) 43,000 5,500
Callisthenes(Polyh.12,19,1) 40,000 4,500
Ptolemy(Plut.Mor.327 D) 3 0 , 0 0 0 5,000
Arrian(l,ll,3) *not many more than 30,000* *over 5,000*
Aristobulus(Plut.Mor.327 D) 30,000 4,000’
Livy (9,19,5) 3 0 , 0 0 0 4,000
Diodorus(17,17,4) Sum of items 32,000 5,100
Total given 30,000 4,500
Justin (11,6,2) 32,000 4,500
Some of the differences in this list are minor and can he 
explained simply in terms of the ancients* carelessness in 
dealing with figures. But differences in the region of
13,000 infantry (contrast Anaximenes and Aristobulus) and 
1,500 cavalry (contrast Anaximenes and Aristobulus again) 
cannot >:• lightly he set aside. Scholars have, therefore, 
found that other causes lie at the root of the disagreements. 
Many years ago J.G. Droysen suggested that the confusion
!
among the ancient sources was caused hy an advance force joining
2Alexander when he landed in Asia. Some of the figures, he 
suggested, referred to the strength of the army prior to 
this juncture, others to the strength after it. It is
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known that a force of Macedonians and mercenaries was sent 
to Asia by Philip in 336 B.C. (Diod. 17,7,10), in preparation 
for the main invasion, and Polyaenus tells us that this force 
numbered 10,000 in 336 B.C. (5,44,4). Droysen saw that the 
difference between the highest and the lowest figures could 
be greatly reduced, in fact almost eliminated, if his theory 
was accepted.
This theory is attractive because it does allow us to 
explain the great divergences in terms which in part save the 
creditcf sources we would expect to be well informed. There 
is, however, a major problem in his approach, for while the 
explanation works all right for the infantry, it cannot 
satisfactorily explain the differences in the cavalry totals. 
Brunt has tried to solve this difficulty by supposing that 
cavalry joined Alexander ontwo separate occasions after 
Pella.^ Setting aside the lowest cavalry figure, that of 
Aristobulus and Bivy,^ he explains that Alexander actually 
left Pella with 4,500 cavalry, but that 600 Thracians joined 
on the road between Pella and the Hellespont, and another
1,000 cavalry after the main force had crossed the Hellespont, 
these latter being part of the advance force. In this way, 
he explains, the totals of 4,500, 5,100 and 5 , 5 0 0  emerged in 
the following way:o/ieosfii/ece (i.e. Callisthenes) forgot to add 
in any cavalry which joined late, while two others (Ptolemy^ 
and Anaximenes) remembered to add one reinforcement but not 
the other. He concludes that the full cavalry strength was 
6,100.
This explanation is plainly unsatisfactory. Brunt has
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to assume an unlikely degree of inconsistency on the part of 
the sources: Callisthenes remembered to add in the infantry 
reinforcement hut not the cavalry? Ptolemy remembered to add 
in one part of the cavalry but none of the infantry? and even 
Anaximenes forgot one force of cavalry. It is certainly not 
sound to reject all our cavalry totals. Further, it is in 
the highest degree unlikely that there were 1,000 cavalry in 
the force which Alexander had in Asia in 334 B.C. We are not 
told how many cavalry Philip sent over in 336 B.C., but it 
is improbable that there were more than a couple of hundred 
in 334 B.C. For, while Alexanders main force apparently 
experienced no difficulty in landing in Asia, there is no 
evidence that anything more than a bridgehead at Abydos was 
held, and cavalry could have no major role in such a garrison. 
Alexander would not have needlessly kept cavalry in service, 
because he was short of funds and it was expensive to maintain 
a cavalry force in the field. It would also have been 
difficult to feed as many as 1,000 horses in a garrison at 
Abydos.
Therefore, whatever the merits of DroysenS theory in
7explaining the divergence in the infantry totals,' it cannot 
satisfactorily be applied to the cavalry. Yet it is difficult 
to explain how something as straightforward as the number of 
cavalry in Alexanders army could have become so confused.
There must have been official records and talk must have 
circulated among the people of the time. It is most surprising 
that so many different versions exist, even among authors who 
would be expected to be reliable. However, some general 
considerations about numbers m  the ancient sources should be
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noted. Few ancient writers had any great concern about 
accuracy in dealing with figures: in particular, it was common 
for them to give rounded figures rather than the often long, 
stylistically awkward, precise numbers. In reports of the 
size of armies exaggeration was not uncommon: the drama of a 
»David* defeating a »Goliath* was attractive, and we should 
be aware of the possibility that Alexander’s forces were 
understated by some writers. Another consideration is the 
vulnerability of.numbers to corruption during the transmission 
of the text: a scribe’s eye easily slipped from one word, or 
line, to another when copying figures or read them 
incorrectly. In general it seems much more likely that the 
differences are caused by the carelessness of the sources or 
the scribes than that there were many different versions 
current at the time of the crossing to Asia. „
It seems appropriate, 'therefore, to look closely at 
the transmitted totals in an effort to establish an order of 
credibility, on the basis of the reliability of the manuscript 
tradition and the degree of accuracy to be expected from the 
source.
The figures of Anaximenes are given only by Plutarch, 
in a passage (Mor. 327 D-E) which summarises some of the totals 
given for Alexander’s army: Aristobulus recorded 30,000 infantry,
4,000 cavalry; Ptolemy 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry;
Anaximenes 43,000 infantry, 5,500 cavalry. There is no 
particular reason to suspect the manuscript tradition here. 
Ptolemy’s figures can be reliably checked against Arrian’s 
totals, which are evidently from Ptolemy:8 and as Plutarch 
seems to be giving the totals in ascending order of size,
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this also gives some kind of check. Some reference, however, 
must he made to the other passage in which Plutarch gives a 
summary of what his sources said about the size of the army.
In his Life of Alexander (ch.15,1), which is an almost 
parallel passage,"* he gives the least and the greatest figures 
he has found. But here.the text is far from good: the 
manuscripts give the lowest figures as 30,000 infantry and
5,000 cavalry; the highest are given by the majority of the 
manuscripts as 43,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, though one 
has 34,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry'?'0 In general, editors 
have felt justified in emending the text here to bring it 
more into line with the Moralia passage: Reiske suggested 
that the lowest cavalry total and the highest should be inter­
changed, and there can be no doubt that 43,000 should be read 
for the highest infantry total. If Reiske*s suggestion is 
adopted, the lowest figures in the Life are those given as 
Aristobulus* in Moralia, but the highest figures remain lower 
than those he gives for Anaximenes in Moralia. It is possible 
that Plutarch made a mistake, or the text has been corrupted, 
in the Moralia passage, but it is far more likely that the 
evidence of the patently corrupt passage of the Life is at 
fault. It does not seem sound, at any rate, to emend the 
Moralia passage on the strength of the evidence in the Life, 
or to doubt Plutarch*s report of Anaximenes* total as 43,000 
infantry and 5,500 cavalry.
The infantry figure of 43,000 is remarkably precise and 
it is difficult to believe that this is not what Anaximenes 
actually wrote, though perhaps with a qualifying »about*.
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The cavalry figure is given plainly as 5,500, which might 
represent a round number, and it may be considered likely that 
Anaximenes actually had a qualifying »almost* or »over» which 
Plutarch has omitted. As for the.reliability of Anaximenes 
himself, it must be rated very highly. He was with the 
expedition in 334 B.C. and was at the time engaged in writing 
an account of the campaign:"^ thus he was in an excellent 
position to know the size of the army and to report it 
correctly.
The figures of Callisthenes are drawn from Polybius 
12,19,1. The text of this passage is bad and great caution 
must be exercised in dealing with the numbers. The whole 
argument of the passage revolves around the number of men 
Callisthenes said were in Alexander*s army and the size of 
the battlefield at Issus; and Polybius» reasoning is so absurd, 
as it appears in this chapter, that we are led to suspect 
that several numbers have become corrupted. It is
12established beyond doubt that some mistakes have been made.
As it happens, the infantry total can be checked internally
i
and stands above suspicion: to the original 40,000 given for 
the start of the campaign Polybius adds 5,000 reinforcements 
and then allows 3,000 for wastage during the year and a half 
between the start of the compaign and the battle at Issus} 
the result is 42,000 (12,19,3). Ho such check, however, is 
possible for the cavalry total and when it is compared with 
Anaximenes* figure, we must surely be led to question its 
correctness.
Callisthenes, like Anaximenes, was with the army in
334 B.C. and was there specifically to write up the campaign.1^
His opportunities were identical to those of Anaximenes and
it would he expected that his figures were approximately the
same. This expectation is fulfilled with respect to the
infantry: Callisthenes* 40,000 (Polybius may have omitted
some qualifying word like »about*) is close enough to
Anaximenes* 43,000. But the cavalry figure is 1,000 lower
than Anaximenes* figure. It is inconceivable that Polybius
gave a much lower figure than Callisthenes actually had,
because it was in the interest of his argument to make
Callisthenes* figures high."*^ Nor are we justified in
thinking either that Callisthenes arbitrarily knocked 1,000
15off the cavalry total or that Anaximenes added 1,000. It 
might also be pointed out that a high infantry figure would 
be expected to be accompanied by a high cavalry figure.^ 
Therefore, apart from the general untrustworthiness of the 
passage, the cavalry total itself presents some cause to 
doubt it's accuracy. I would suggest,. accordingly, that the 
text of Polybius is corrupt at this point and that it should 
be emended to bring the total closer to that of Anaximenes.
It does not follow that Callisthenes was in exact agreement 
with Anaximenes on the number of cavalry: in so far as he gave 
a round figure for the infantry, compared with Anaximenes, he 
may be thought to have given a round figure of say »about 
5,000*, for the cavalry. I would conclude that Callisthenes* 
cavalry total, as recorded in Polybius,, is less reliable than 
that of Anaximenes. His infantry total must rank equal 
beside that of Anaximenes.
349
350
Ptolemy’s figures are given in the passage of Plutarch’s
Moralia (327 D) already discussed above with reference to
Anaximenes. It is generally agreed among scholars that
Arrian’s totals also are drawn from Ptolemy (1,11,3) and there
17can he no doubt that this is correct. These authors, there­
fore, agree about the figures of-Ptolemy and we may be 
confident that 3 0 , 0 0 0  and 5,000 are, at least approximately, 
what Ptolemy gave. Arrian, however, gives the more accurate 
version for he qualifies the numbers, recording ’not many 
more than 30,000’ and ’over 5,000’. It is possible that 
Ptolemy gave more precise figures and that Arrian, in 
preference'to recording what he found, rounded the numbers 
down. However, Plutarch in his passage in the Moralia 
perhaps indicates that Ptolemy did not give more precise 
numbers. He shows that he is not averse to giving precise 
figures, where he finds them, for he records 43,000 and 5,500 
for Anaximenes. It might be expected, therefore, that if 
Ptolemy did give more precise figures, Plutarch would have 
copied them. Admittedly he did omit the qualifying words 
’not many more than* and ’over*, but this, I suggest, is
different from actually changing a precise number to a round 
18one.
The transmitted totals for Ptolemy seem sound, and I 
would suggest that they were very much in the form in which 
they appear in Arrian. The reliability of Ptolemy himself 
may perhaps be rated quite highly. His evidence on the size 
of the army should not be regarded as that of a primary 
source, for he did not write until perhaps more than fifteen 
years after the start of the Asian campaign,"^ and can
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hardly "be expected to have remembered the details of the
army in 334 B.C. However, he is generally regarded as being
the best available source for military detailand he must be
ranked inferior only to Anaximenes and Callisthenes on the
matter of the size of the army. Although his infantry total
is at variance with those of Anaximenes and Callisthenes, it
20is supported by all the other versions handed down to us 
and mustYtot)therefore, be lightly set aside. His cavalry total 
does not differ significantly from that of Anaximenes: ‘over 
5,000* is close to 5,500, and it should be remembered that 
Anaximenes may have written «almost* or «about* 5,500.
Aristobulus* figures come to us only from the passage 
of Plutarch*s Moralia (327 D), But I have already argued that 
the text of this is sound. It seems that Aristobulus gave 
the lowest figures which Plutarch came across, and if this is 
right, the evidence of Plutarch*s Life of Alexander (ch.15,1) 
seems to. contradict his report in the Moralia: for in the 
Life Plutarch*s text gives the lowest figures at 30,000 and 
5,000, whereas the Moralia has Aristobulus* totals at 30,000 
and 4,000. However, editors have in general not found the 
text in the Life acceptable and the Moralia passage makes it 
certain that Aristobulus* totals were less than Ptolemy*s of
3 0 , 0 0 0  infantry and 5 , 0 0 0 cavalry (see also above pp.3 4 6 ^.).
Plutarch had no reason to falsify Aristobulus* figures, 
but I have already suggested that Plutarch probably omitted 
qualifying words like «not many more than* and «over* in 
reporting Ptolemy*s totals; it is not unlikelyihat he did the 
same with Aristobulus* figures. The reliability of
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Aristobulus himself was not highly regarded among the
ancients: he had a reputation for excessive flattery of 
21Alexander. He did not write until at least the "beginning
22of the third century B.C., in his old age, and by this 
time great debate concerning the qualities of Alexander had 
arisen: in this debate Aristobulus took the part of 
Alexander. The fact that Plutarch found that his figures 
were the lowest he came across for the army indicates that 
Aristobulus may have understated the size of the army, in 
the belief that in so doing he was' magnifying Alexanders 
greatness.  ^ His infantry total can scarcely be called into 
question because it is supported by Ptolemy and all the other 
sources except Anaximenes and Callisthenes. His cavalry 
total, however, is extraordinarily low and is corroborated * 
only by Livy: it must rank far below those of Anaximenes and 
Ptolemy.
The figures of Livy need not detain us long. He gives 
the same totals of 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (9,19,5) 
as Plutarch records for Aristobulus, which seem to be the 
lowest Plutarch found. In this passage Livy was concerned to 
argue that Alexander could not have defeated the Romans, and 
it might be expected that he would give the lowest figures 
he came across. His reliability must be rated very low and 
his totals cannot be used to support those of Aristobulus.
Justin*s totals (32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry) are 
different from those of any other source: I shall argue below 
that Diodorus» text should be emended to make the totals
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equal the sum'of the items listed, i.e. 32,000 and 5,100.
Other sources give Justin’s infantry total and,-according
to the text of Polybius (12,19,1) Callisthenes gave a cavalry
24total of 4,500, but no source gives both. I do not think 
it is sound to reason that Justin’s: figures are a collection 
from two different sources, for there is no evidence of such 
careful working in his book.^ In fact, Justin lived over 
500 years after Alexander' and wrote a mere summary of a 
general history; and it is established that he was not a 
careful worker. In particular some of his figures can readily 
be shown to be unreliable. For instance, in his treatment of 
the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, where he is evidently 
following Herodotus, he gives a total for the Asiatic 
contingent of Xerxes* army of 700,000 (2,10,18). Herodotus’ 
figure was 1,700,000 (7,184) and, outrageous as Herodotus’ 
number may. be, there can be no justification for Justin’s 
figure, which may be due to arbitrary change by Justin, or 
his source, or to corruption of the text. Again, Justin 
records that Antiochus III led 10^000 infantry and 20,000 
cavalfy against Arsaces III (41,5,7). The source of these 
figures is unknown but they have been'universally found 
unacceptable by scholars.^ Finally, an example from his 
account of Alexander also will demonstrate his unreliability. 
He records that at the battle of the Granicus, of Alexander’s 
men 9 infantry and 120 cavalry died and that Alexander set up 
statues of these men (11,6,13). This evidence is contra-
i
dieted by both Arrian and Plutarch. Arrian records that
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25 cavalry died in the first attack and their statues set up, 
and.that 60 other cavalry were killed (1,16,4). Plutarch says 
that Aristobulus recorded that 34 men were killed, of whom 9 
were infantry (Alex. 16,7f.): these were honoured with 
statues. Hamilton argues that Arrian gives the correct version
and that only 25 statues were set up: he suggests that Justin*s
‘ 27text should he emended to read 25 cavalry. * Whether this
emendation is accepted or not, it is clear that Justin*s
figures are wrong and cannot he preferred to those of Arrian
and Plutarch. Other examples could he cited hut it should, at
least,he clear that Justin*s figures cannot he relied upon,
especially when he contradicts better authorities, as he does
28on thesubject of the size of Alexanders army.
This completes my review of the transmitted totals, with
the exception of Diodorus* version. I have postponed con-
*
sideration of this to a separate section (below) because his 
evidence is not straightforward. I shall, however, argue 
that his totals should he emended to read 52,000 and 5,100, 
and as such they are in line with Ptolemy*s figures of ‘not 
many more than 5 0 ,0 0 0 * and ‘over 5,000*.
I may now summarise the result of my discussion. Two 
most reliable sources agree upon the total of about 40,000 
for the infantry: they are Anaximenes, who is reported as 
giving 43,000, and Callisthenes, whose total is given at 
40,000. It may he supposed that Anaximenes is the more 
precise, and the total of over 40,000, it cannot he doubted, 
accurately reflects the infantry strength of the army in 554 
B.C. The source which rates as the next most reliable, after 
Anaximenes and Callisthenes, namely Ptolemy, gives a total
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of ‘not many more than 30,000*, and this figure is supported 
"by all the other versions, which, although less reliable than 
Anaximenes and Callisthenes, can scarcely all be wrong. We 
are, therefore, left with two totals for the infantry, of 
over 40,000 and over 30,000. For the cavalry total, two 
reliable sources, namely Anaximenes and Ptolemy, seem to agree 
on a .total of over 5,000, Anaximenes.giving 5,500, or 
thereabouts, and Ptolemy ‘over 5,000*. Among the rest of 
the sources there is little agreement, with Aristobulus and 
Livy offering 4,000 and Justin 4,500. Callisthenes* figure 
is probably incorrectly transmitted. The other versions are 
clearly less reliable than those of Anaximenes and Ptolemy.
We may now return to lroysen*s theory which was outlined 
at the beginning of the appendix; namely that confusion has 
arisen in the sources because an advance forcé already in 
Asia in334 B.C. joined the main force when it landed there.
I have argued above that there are two reliable traditions 
concerning the infantry total, one of over 40,000, the other 
of over 30,000. Since Polyaenus gives a strength of about
10,000 for the advance force sent over in 336 B.C. (5,44,4), 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the tradition 
which supports a total of over 40,000 refers to the infantry 
strength after the advance force had joined, and-the tradition 
Which supports a total of over 30,000 refers to the infantry 
strength before that force had, joined.
It might be objected that there is no record of such a 
force joining Alexander on his arrival in Asia, but there are 
many surprising omissions in the sources, and this cannot be
. 3 5 6
seen as a conclusive argument-against this approach. The
sources are mainly concerned with Alexanders dramatic
landing at Troy, his sacrifices to the gods and the Homeric 
onheroes.  ^ They had, in fact, a reason to omit details:of the
advance force because Alexander was portrayed in the Homeric
image, dramatically throwing a spear into Asian soil. The
impact of this portrayal would have been greatly weakened by
a description of the joining of the main force with the
substantial body of men which had secured a bridgehead.
Further, it seems unlikely that such-an advance force would
have been withdrawn on the eve of the invasion;-: it would have
been lunacy to withdraw and risk opposition to the landing
troops. Nothing more than 'a bridgehead.seems to have been in
Macedonian hands in 334 B.C. and whether the force still
numbered about 10,000 men cannot be known, but there is no
reason to think that the garrison was not substantial enough
to account for the discrepancy in-the traditions concerning
30the infantry strength. '
There is less difficulty over the cavalry figures, in 
that the most reliable ones are in substantial agreement. I 
have already argued against there being any significant 
number of cavalry already in Asia in 334 B.C., and therefore 
there is no difficulty about accepting that, even though 
Ptolemy*s figure refers to the cavalry strength prior to the 
advance force joining and Anaximenes* figure to the strength 
after the juncture, they are in substantial agreement. It is, 
on the other hand, difficult to see how other totals ,for the 
cavalry could have arisen, and the other versions should, it
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seems, be explained in terms of textual corruption or by 
reference to the possibility of understatement in the reports 
of the strength of the army.
I conclude, therefore, that the most reliable figures 
which we have for Alexander's army indicate that the strength 
on its departure from Pella was over 30,000 infantry and over
5,000 cavalry. On its arrival in Asia it was joined: by an 
advance force, consisting almost entirely of infantry, and 
numbering something in the region of 10,000 men.
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. b) Diodorus 17,17,5 f.
This passage gives the only detailed list of the troops
that accompanied Alexander at the beginning of his Asian
campaign. In setting out the details in tabular form I follow
31the best manuscript tradition:
Cavalry
1.800 Macedonians
1.800 Thessalians 
600 Greeks
Infantry
12.000 Macedonians
7.000 allies
5.000 mercenaries
7.000 Odrysians, Triballians,900 Thracian prodromoi
Illyrians and Paeonians
1.000 archers and Agrianians
32.000 correct total 5,100 correct total
30.000 Diodorus* total 4,500 Diodorus’ total
The discrepancy which calls for immediate discussion is 
the difference between the sums of items and the totals as 
given in the text. Three approaches to this problem may be 
taken. It can be assumed that Diodorus, or his source, could 
not add:^ or it can be assumed, as Brunt and Marsden have 
done,*^ that Diodorus used one account for the details and 
another for the totals, and omitted to check the sum: or the 
text can be emended to make the sum of the details and the 
totals tally, as Droysen, Beloch and many editors have done.''^ 
The first explanation will hardly do. Diodorus, or his 
source, might have made a slip in one of the additions but 
it is not likely that he made a mistake in both. In any case 
it is most probable that Diodorus, or his source, did not
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reach the totals by adding up the details "but rather that
both the totals and the details were established prior to
35being put together as they appear in this list. The second 
explanation also strains belief. Diodorus hardly ever, it 
seems, used two sources simultaneously in the way in which 
we would have to assume he did if this explanation were 
accepted.^ Besides this it seems incredible that if 
Diodorus was careful enough to look to another source for 
the totals, he was not careful enough to check that the 
totals tallied with the details as he gave them. In addition 
it should be noted that no other source actually gives the 
two totals which Diodorus offers: Justin gives 32,000 
infantry and 4,500 cavalry, but I cannot believe that 
Diodorus would round down a correct 32,000 to a mistaken
3 0 , 0 0 0  when he was trying to give the sum of a detailed list 
of units. If the second explanation is to be accepted then, 
we must attribute to Diodorus a curious mixture of unusual 
carefulness combined with amazing carelessness, and assume 
that he had access to a source which gave totals nowhere else 
recorded. This I cannot accept.
We are left with the third approach, emendation. 
Emendation is clearly to some extent an open choice, but 
certain principles should be followed. The emendation should 
be as slight as possible: only one number should need emending 
in each list, either the strength of one of the items or the 
total. Also, the totals should be the same as more securely 
established totals from another source, for this provides a 
sounder basis for the emendations. Of the other totals 
recorded, the two which could be used as guides are those of
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Arrian and Justin. Justin’s totals are 32,000 for the 
infantry, which is the sum of the items in Diodorus’ list, 
and 4,500 for the cavalry, which is the total given hy 
Diodorus. Arrian records ’not many more than 30»000» for the 
infantry, which again supports emendation of the total to 
3 2 ,0 0 0 , and ’over 5,000* for the cavalry, which indicates 
that the details of the units are correct and it is Diodorus’ 
total which should he emended. These are the only 
possibilities, for while other sources give a total of 30,000 
for the infantry, they do not couple it with a cavalry total 
approximating to 4,500 or 5,100.
In choosing whether Arrian or Justin should he used as
a guide, we are naturally drawn to the better source, and I
refer to the discussion presented above. Arrian’s totals
are drawn from Ptolemy and should be regarded as among the
most reliable which we have: certainly they are drawn from a
good early tradition. On the other hand, it seems unlikely
that Justin’s totals represent a good early tradition and it
is, therefore, much less likely that Diodorus would have the
same totals as he has.-^ Beloch and Berve assumed that
Justin and Diodorus drew upon a common ultimate source here,
38as it can be shown they sometimes did.' But it is not 
difficult to show that frequently Justin and Diodorus did not 
draw upon 'a common source. Por instance, Justin gives the 
figure of 600,000 for the Persian strength at the battle of 
the Granicus (11,6,11), while Diodorus has the more 
conservative 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (17,19,4.5). 
Por the casualties at the battle of Issus, Justin has
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Persian losses at 61,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry and 
Macedonian losses at 130 infantry and 150 cavalry (11,9,10). 
Diodorus, however, has 100,000 Persian infantry and 10,000 
cavalry, and for the Macedonians 300 infantry and 150 cavalry. 
Examples could he multiplied and it is clear that frequently 
Diodorus and Justin did not draw upon a common ultimate 
source.
It is preferable, therefore, to use the figures given 
by Arrian as a guide. I conclude that the totals should be 
emended to read 32,000 and 5,100, thereby equalling the sums 
of the items and bringing them into line with the good early 
tradition attested as Ptolemy*s.^ With this settled, I move 
on to discussion of the details of the list.
The lists of Diodorus are quite remarkable and this fact 
led Droysen to dismiss them as a worthless fabrication.
He'has not, however, been followed, by any scholar, and his 
arguments against their authenticity are quite flimsy. He 
opens his attack by pointing out that the information 
concerning Parmenio*s overall command of the Macedonian and 
Greek heavy infantry is patently incorrect. Nowhere,- he 
argued, is Parmenio described as commander of these 24,000 
heavy infantry. This point has already been answered by 
Badian, who comments that official commands do not always 
coincide with the actual duties and responsibilities while 
on campaign.^ Parmenio did not actually have a command of 
a tactical unit (24,000 infantry does not amount to a 
tactical unit), but held the position of second-in-command
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to Alexander (Berve II no.606). This positionc£ the king's 
second-in-command was Bestowed upon Parmenio By making him 
officially commander in charge of all the heavy infantry.
Also on the subject of commanders, Droysen objects that 
Diodorus is wrong in saying that Erigyius (Berve II no.302) 
was commander of the Greek allied horse at the Beginning of 
the campaign, for Arrian says that Philip, son of Menelaus 
(Berve II no. 779), led these cavalry into the Battle of the 
Granicus (Arr. 1,14,3).^2 Yet Erigyius is attested as their 
commander in 331 B.C. (Arr. 3,11,10) and Berve, who also finds 
fault with Diodorus* evidence on this point, has to assume 
that Erigyius was their commander from the winter of 334/3 
B.Co It does not seem sound, in view of the explicit state­
ment of Diodorus in reference to 334 B.C. and the evidence of 
Arrian in reference to 331 B.C., to think that Philip held 
the post of commander of the Greek allied horse simply Because
A ' Zhe led them into Battle at the Granicus. We cannot know 
what Erigyius was doing when the Battle was Being fought, he 
may have Been fighting in the Band of hetairoi around the 
king (Arr. 1,15,6), or he may not have Been present at the 
Battle at all. At the Battle of Gaugamela Amyntas (Berve II 
no.57) did not lead his Battalion into Battle Because he was 
away at the time, and his place was taken By Philip (Diod, 
17,57,3; Curt. 4,13,28) or By Simmias (Arr. 3,11,9).
Droysen points out also that Diodorus* statement that 
Casander was commander of the Thracian prodromoi and Paeonians 
is inaccurate. Certainly no Casander is known to have taken
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part in the campaign, hut Beloch suggested that the name 
should he emended to read Asander, who was the nephew of 
Parmenio (p.325; Berve II no.165), and this has found support 
recently from Badian and Brunt (p.28). Such was the power 
of the family of Parmenio at the beginning of the campaign 
that there is no difficulty in accepting that another member 
of it held a prestigious command, that over the light horse.
He is not attested as actually leading them in battle but 
this should not be seen as a problemseeabove in respect 
of Parmenio*s command.
Droysen also objects that no reliance should be put upon 
Diodorus* list because it is arranged by nationality rather 
than by armament: it must therefore be drawn from a non­
military source. He criticises the list because*it does not 
give him the information which he would like, and concludes 
that it was therefore drawn from an unreliable source. He 
even suggests that Alexander would not have made an accurate 
count, because he would have known how many troops he had 
asked for. These arguments are worthless. The list is 
clearly not the work.of a staff officer but the arrangement 
of the items is borne out by the units* roles, as described in 
the accounts of the campaigning. The pezetairoi and the 
hypaspists would naturally be grouped together, being 
Macedonians and having similar arms and armour, even though' 
they had separate organisations. And the allied infantry of 
Greek hoplites and the mercenaries, hoplites or peltasts,^ 
naturally formed other separate items. The Odrysians, 
Triballians and Illyrians were probably similarly armed, as
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peltasts, and must have appeared to have "been closely related 
units: they may have been organised into one fully integrated 
•unit later.^ The Agrianians naturally are attracted to the 
archers, both being psiloi. and being very frequently used 
in conjunction (Arr. 1,1,6; 4.26.4; et passim). The 
Macedonian Companion cavalry present no problems, they were 
a clearly defined body (Serve has no evidence to support his 
contention that some were light horse) and there are 
absolutely no grounds for‘suspecting the list as regards the 
cavalry items of the Thessalians and Greek .allies. The 
Thracian prodromoi and the Paeonians naturally belong together 
because they fulfil a similar function: compare the Thracian 
infantry and the psiloi. Droysen’s case clearly fails, there­
fore, and in fact it appears that the arrangement of the 
items, though perhaps not that of an official army list, lends 
credibility to the lists rather than the reverse.
Some scholars have found that the details of the 
individual units, their content and their strength, do not 
in some cases conform to their views upon these troops. 
Droysen, for instance, wanted to alter the strength of the 
Greek allied infantry contingent and of the Greek mercenary 
infantry, ^  Kromayer and Veith (p.100) found that 1,800 was 
too small a number for so important a body as the .Macedonian 
cavalry, Berve (I p.142) found 600 too small a number for the 
Greek allied cavalry, Beloch (p.324) found 1,800 too large a 
number for the Thessalians. But all these doubts have 
received little acceptance recently among scholars, and we 
may dismiss them as having no firm basis in the ancient
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evidence and standing in need of no refutation here.^® The 
only item which continues to raise doubts is the final item of 
the cavalry, the Thracian prodromoi and Paeonians totalling 
900. This calls far a fuller treatment.
Droysen was the first-to consider that this number was
far too low and that there wererin any case Macedonian
prodromoi in Alexander’s army.^ Plutarch (Alex. 16) records
that at the Granicus Alexander with thirteen ilae of cavalry
led the attack over the river. This, Droysen suggested, was
a force comprising six ilae of Macedonian sarissophoroi. six
of Paeonian and Odrysian prodnomoi, and only one ile of
Companion cavalry. His case has been refuted, and it is now
generally held that the thirteen ilae were made up of eight
................. 50of Companion cavalry and only five prodromoi.^  But the view 
that the prodromoi numbered more than 900 in334 B.C. and that 
some were Macedonian has persisted and has been reargued by 
Brunt.'51
Brunt argued that Arrian never specifies the nationality
of the prodromoi, oust as he does not specify the
nationality of the pezetairoi and the hypaspists: we may
therefore assume that the prodromoi also are Macedonian. His
second argument is that they were frequently used in
conjunction with the Companion cavalry, which also indicates
50that they were Macedonian. These arguments can carry no 
weight. The archers in Alexander’s army only rarely receive 
a description according to nationality, and the same applies 
also to the hippakontistae and hippotoxotae: and on each 
occasion Arrian uses the description only to distinguish them
366
from another unit of the same type.  ^ As for the argument 
from the frequent mention of prodromoi being used in connection 
with the Companion cavalry, surely function, not nationality, 
was the overriding consideration in Alexander's deployment 
of troops. If it were known that there were both Macedonian 
and non-Macedonian prodromoi in the army, then it might 
perhaps be expected that Alexander would have used Macedonians 
in conjunction with Macedonian's, but such an argument cannot 
prove that there were any Macedonian prodromoi.
Because it was thought that there were Macedonian
prodromoi, some scholars have adjusted Dio*/orus» list
accordingly. Beloch (p.325) thought that the reference to
the Macedonian prodromoi had dropped out; Berve (I p.129/30)
thought that there were only Macedonian prodromoi and
Paeonian -prodromoi and therefore suggested that the
Macedonians were included in the 1,800 Macedonians listed and
that should be transposed after S e  . Brunt
adopted Berve*s emendation but did not accept the other part
of Berve's suggestion^but rather suggested that the prodromoi
54of the Macedonians were already in Asia in 334 B.C. Milns 
thought that the list did oontain Macedonian prodromoi, and 
therefore suggested the most improbable emendation of 
inserting a to read Kott ir^ o S p o p o L #c«*t
y  c c
ITctt o-^ef Such emendations are quite unnecessary, once
it is accepted that Diodorus* evidence, the only evidence which 
we possess on the prodromoi*s nationality, is accurate.
Arrian mentions a unit of Thracian cavalry under Agathon 
at the Granicus : it was stationed on the left wing between 
the Greek allied cavalry and the Macedonian phalanx (1 ,1 4 ,3 ).
53
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At Gaugamela it was on the extreme left wing, beside the
56Greek allied cavalry. Those scholars who consider that
there were no Thracian prodromoi in the army have argued that
these are the Thracians whom Diodorus refers to in his list
and that there is evidence in Arr¿4n that they were not 
5 7
prodromoi. It is indeed clear that for Arrian the cavalry 
under Agathon is not part of the force which he calls 
»prodromoi1, or »sarissophoroi». for at the Granicus and at 
Gaugamela he names the prodromoi as quite distinct from the 
cavalry of Agathon, and they are not stationed side hy side 
as are the Paeonians and the prodromoi.58 It would perhaps 
seem to follow that either Berve»s emendating is to be 
accepted, and the Thracians of Diodorus are Agathon*s unit, 
or the unit of Agathon is omitted altogether.
This is not, however, a necessary conclusion. Por it • 
is not established that Arrian used the term »prodromoi» in 
the same way as Diodorus. It may be that Diodorus used'it 
to describe the unit of Agathon, while Arrian gave the term 
a more restricted■meaning, Arrian seems to use the term in 
two sensesj to designate a unit also called sarissophoroi. 
which received its name from its function, that is scouting 
or skirmishing: this is similar to his usé of the term 
»archers*, which names the unit from its function. But in 
addition to this use of the term Arrian uses it as an 
adjective to describe the function of another unit, the 
Paeonians, because they also scouted and skirmished. There 
were many other units whose main function was skirmishing 
and in fact it could be argued that it could refer to any 
missile-tearing cavalry, e.g. hlppafrontista» or hippotoxotae.59
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It seems quite feasible that the word in Diodorus’ list may- 
have been used in this broader meaning rather than in the 
one which Arrian generally gives to the term-. Berve (I p.134) 
suggested that Agathon’s unit was heavy cavalry, in which 
case it could not be described as ’prodromoi». He argues that 
Arrian, in his description of the battle of Gaugamela, 
places the cavalry under Agathon with the Thracians under 
Sitalces and the Greek allied cavalry, expressly separate from 
the prodromoi and Paeonians (3,12,3.4). He concludes that 
they must be heavy cavalry, because they are drawn up with 
heavy cavalry. However, nothing certain can be determined 
about the nature c£ a unit merely from its position in a 
battle-line. Alexander often mixed light-armed and heavy-armed
t
troops. Milns has pointed out that, in fact, the unit of 
Agathon fulfilled the same function on the.left wing as the 
sarissophoroi, or prodromoi, fulfilled on the right, namely 
the protection of the exposed flank of the heavy oavalry.*^
This seems to be by far the more likely-interpretation of the 
evidence, especially as the Thracians were traditionally light 
skirmishing cavalry. The Triballians were, at least in part, 
sarissophoroi (Didymus Comm. 13,3) and the Thracian cavalry 
which invaded Macedonia in 429 B.C. were hippotoxotae (Thuc. 
2,96,1). There is, therefore, a strong likelihood that the 
cavalry under Agathon was of prodromoi type.
It might also be argued that if three separate units are 
included in the total of 9 0 0, the size of each is not credible. 
However^ this is a purely subjective judgment and one which I 
do not share: there seems to me to be no difficulty in 
assuming that the prodromoi (in the narrow sense of the word),
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the Paeonians and the cavalry under Agathon should have 
averaged only 300 each.61 My argument is of course not con- 
elusive, hut there is a strong possibility that Agathon*s 
horse was of prodromoi type. In view of the general 
reliability of the lists of Diodorus it seems probable that 
Agathon * s cavalry is included within one of the items rather 
than that it was by accident omitted,62 and if it was included 
it would naturally belong with the other Thracian light 
cavalry.
I' have argued that the details of the lists cannot be 
shown to be in error in any particular. In addition, they 
agree with totals which I have argued are likely to be the 
most accurate transmitted for the strength of the army at the 
time of its departure from Pella.65. The only sound procedure, 
therefore, is to accept the details and apply them to our 
discussion of the army.
The source of these lists had an intimate knowledge of 
the organisation of the army in 534 B.C. and would seem to 
have had access to official sources of information. The 
actual strength of the army leaving Pella,. however, may not 
have been exactly 52,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry, for it 
seems clear that the infantry figures are given in round 
thousands and the cavalry in round hundreds.64 There can be 
no certainty that Ptolemy really meant 52,000 and 5,100 by
his reported figures of »not many more than 50,000* and »over
5,000*.65
The other most reliable figures are those of Anaximenes, 
4 5 , 0 0 0  infantry and 5,500 cavalry, which, I have argued above,
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refer to the strength of the army after the joining of the 
advance force. I have proposed above that this advance force 
consisted of about 10,000 men and contained no significant 
number of cavalry. It might be argued that there is some 
indication that about 400 cavalry were part of this fo.rce, 
on the grounds that Diodorus* cavalry total differs from that 
of Anaximenes by this number. There can, however, be no 
certainty that this discrepancy was caused in this way. It 
is likely that the cavalry did not number precisely 5,100 at 
the departure from Pella, and it is also likely that 5,500 
was not a precise figure for the strength after the joining 
of the advance force: indeed, Anaximenes may well have written 
»almost 5,500* (see above). In any case, when dealing with 
numbers in the ancient sources, we are not justified in making 
fine distinctions of a hundred or two.
No attempt to determine the content of the advance force 
can be successful. As I have argued above, the details of 
Diodorus* lists cannot be shown to be lacking in any particular. 
It is not sound to use details drawn from the battle of 
Gaugamela for a discussion of the content of the army in 534 
B.C.^ because so little is known of reinforcements and troop 
movements during the years 534 and 531 B.,C. In 336 B.C. the 
advance force consisted of Macedonians and mercenaries,6  ^and 
perhaps we may assume a similar content in 334 B.C., but it 
is impossible to be more specific than this.
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APPENDIX III
ADRIAN*S TERMINOLOGY
a) Military Terminology
The question of the accuracy of Arrian*s military
terminology is of some importance in-any discussion of the
organisation of Alexander<s army. It has been touched upon
by many scholars in the course of their discussions of specific
problems, and Tarn devoted a couple of pages to the subject
(II pp.l35ff*)» "but a further treatment will be useful.
Arrian was a man of military experience and has shown his
interest in military terminology by writing the Tactica, which
he intended as a handbook of military terms for people reading
history. The definitions of military terms given there are
not, however, intended to be applicable to his history of
Alexander,1 and according to a recent study it was written
... pmany years after the Anabasis. Nevertheless, it might be 
expected that Arrian would show some interest in military 
terminology in his accounts of Alexander*s campaigning.
However, although he is better than other Alexander historians, 
there is a degree of inconsistency and carelessness in his 
usage of terms which has not been fully recognised by many 
scholars. Analysis of his employment of six important terms 
will illustrate this.
Somatophylax
Tarn (II p.l39ff.) held the view that the term 
«somatophylax1 in the Macedonian state had two meanings. It
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could refer to the agema of the hypaspists, and it described
‘Alexander*s personal staff’s1
At the time of Alexander it seems to have had a technical
meaning, describing those holding a post of great honour in
the Argead court (as Tarn). There weienever more than eight
men holding this title and it denoted a position of especial
closeness to the king. The duties of these men are not
entirely clear, but they remained always close to the king,
even sleeping outside his bedroom (Curt. 9,6,4), unless, as
they often did, they held some command which necessitated their
presence elsewhere. There is no reason.for doubting that
‘somatophylax* was the correct term for these men and that
this was their official name. In this meaning Arrian uses the
word thirty times, out of a total of thirty six occurrences in
the Anabasis and Indica. Of the other six usages, one refers
to the bodyguards of a satrap,^- three refer to the agema of
the hypaspists (3,17,2; 4,3,2; 4,30,3), and two are of
uncertain meaning (1,6,5; 4,8,8). Tarn‘s view is that the
usage in reference to thè àgema of the hypaspists is a survival
5of an ancient meaning, used sometimes by Ptolemy. However, 
Ptolemy was himself a somatophylax and he is not likely to have 
used the term in any meaning other than the narrow one for his
t r
office: he was always keen, to play up his rank and honours.
Nor is it justifiable to argue that Arrian used the term in 
a technical meaning in applying it to the agema. when he uses 
it also to describe the bodyguards of a satrap. The word is 
common in Greek authors of the second century B.O. and later 
in the meaning of ‘bodyguard», and has a very general
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significance: this usage would certainly he applicable to the
7agema of Alexander.' I suggest, therefore, that Arrian 
occasionally uses a word with a precise technical meaning in 
the context of Alexander's army, in a general sense, thereby 
creating confusion in the minds of his readers. That either 
through an oversight or because he did not care, he sometimes 
used the term in its wider functional meaning, is made clear 
by his application of it to a satrap's bodyguards.
Some mention of the two usages of uncertain meaning must 
be made. At 4,8,8, during the quarrel leading to the death 
of Cleitus, Alexander, some said, snatched a lonche from one 
of the Somatophylakes and killed Cleitus. But others say, 
Arrian reports, that he took a sarissa from one of the phylake3. 
Because of the distinction made between a somatophylax and an 
ordinary phylax, it seems probable that here Arrian is using
..... O
the word in its technical sense. It would be expected that 
the somatophylakes proper carried their weapons at all times.
At 1,6,5, on the expedition against.the‘Taulantians, Alexander 
gave the order to the ;'somatophylakes and' the hetairoi around 
him' to take up their shields, mount their horses and ride 
against the enemy. There were enough of these two groups of 
men to divide into two parts and for one part to dismount and 
fight on foot. In such circumstances it seems odd to mention 
a mere handful of men, which the somatophylakes were; it is 
just conceivable that the royal ile of Companion cavalry is 
referred to, hut that would be a solitary usage. The meaning 
must remain in doubt, hut I incline to think that Arrian is
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here using -the word in a loose meaning, to apply generally to 
men around Alexander at this time (cf. Diodorus* usage at 17, 
61,4, and Ch.lM pp.Uf.S'-f. ) .
The usages of the term * somatophylax * show Arrian to be 
lax in his use of the word, in that he occasionally uses it 
in a loose general meaning of ‘bodyguard*, while using it 
mostly in its narrow technical meaning.
Hypaspist
Tarn did not discuss Arrian*s usage of this term. Like 
»somatophylax*, ‘hypaspist* has a loose general meaning as 
well as the technical one applicable only to the Macedonian 
army. It means ‘armour bearer* and then comes to mean ‘guard*
Qin general usage •, but in the Macedonian army, and then in 
Seleucus* army, the plural takes on the technical meaning of 
a ‘body of royal guardsmen*.10 Of sixty seven occasions on 
which it occurs (in Arrian), sixty four times it has the 
technical meaning of members of the royal guardsmen of 
Alexander. Of the other three usages there is no doubt that 
all have the more general meaning. At 1,5,2 Langarus, king 
of the Agrianes, is said to have had ‘hypaspists*; clearly 
the term here means ‘bodyguards*, whose functions may have 
made them approximately equivalent to the Macedonian hypaspists, 
and may for this reason have attracted the name to themselves.
At 4,24,3, "the term is used of the men around an Indian chief 
in battle: here also, it seems,'it must mean »a group of 
personal bodyguards*, who, on account of their function, 
attracted the word to themselves. 'Finally, in the same passage, 
the term occurs with reference to some men around the officer
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Ptolemy. Arrian relates that Ptolemy pursued the Indian chief 
on horseback until he came to a hill which the horse could 
not climb, and he then handed the horse to one of the 
«hypaspists«. The troops Ptolemy had with him on this occasion 
are not detailed, but it is unlikely that the hypaspists 
referred-to here are the royal guardsmen* because they were 
infantry troops, whereas Ptolemy«s «hypaspists* must have been 
cavalry to keep up with him in the pursuit. It follows that 
here Arrian is using the term to mean «the personal bodyguard* 
of Ptolemy, which was on this occasion mounted.
Again it is clear that, while Arrian mostly uses the 
term in its strictly technical sense, on rare occasions he use3 
it in a looser general meaning of »bodyguard*.
Phalanx
Tarn states (II p.142) that there was no such formation 
in Alexander*s army as «the phalanx« but that it was a 
convenient expression for the sum total of the battalions of 
the pezetairoi. It was also, however, he said, referred to a 
single battalion of the phalanx, or the hypaspists, or was 
used in the meaning of «battle-line«.
This word is more common in Greek than either of those 
preceding, and shows clearly Arrian*s lack of precision in 
his use of technical terms. I agree with Tarn that there was 
no such formation as «the phalanx*, but the word describes a 
formation of troops, and then comes to mean the troops in that 
formation. Arrian sticks to these very wide general meanings 
of the word in his work, hut such are his standards of precision 
that phalanx can become almost a description of any troops in
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any circumstances. The word appears ninety seven times in
all in the Anabasis and the Indioa. In its most general use
it describes a kind of formation, be it composed of Greeks
or non-Greeks, infantry or cavalry, heavy or light-armed.
The formation it describes seems to have been without strict
definition, so that the word can be used for a column on the
march or for a battle-line; indeed, for any mass of troops
11drawn up in order.
It is in the meaning of the troops in the formation that 
the confusion arises. I shall demonstrate this with a few 
examples. As Tarn points out, it is a convenient term for 
the sum total of the pezetairoi, that force which formed the 
basis of the Macedonian battle-line and always fought in a 
tight-order formation, with the sarissae of the first few 
ranks projecting in front of the front rank of the phalanx 
(e.g. 3,14,3). This is true, and clearly in places Arrian 
uses it in this way: at:3,23,3, for instance, he refers to 
the pezetairoi with this term; and in this passage the 
hypaspists are clearly separate from those described as the 
'phalanx'. It is equally clear, however, that elsewhere the 
hypaspists are included in » the phalanx*j for instance at 
3,11,9. So when Arrian uses 'the phalanx1 we cannot be sure 
whether he intends to include the hypaspists or not. It is 
interesting to notice the different meanings assigned to 
«phalanx* in Arrian»s description of the battle of Gaugamela. 
In the description of the prelude to the battle (3,9,6) 
Alexander is said to have told the hegemones of the infantry 
each to urge on the phalanx assigned to him. It is clear
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from this and other passages that »phalanx« in this context 
means the individual "battalions of the pezetairoi:12 
presumably, this is because when they are marching, or being 
arranged for battle, they are sometimes organised as 
individual units. So at times Arrian calls the pezetairol 
one phalanx, and at other times many phalanxes (six or seven)^ 
At 5,11,4, Arrian describes the battle-line of fariusj 
he details cavalry and infantry (mostly cavalry) and then
This implies that the whole of the Persian line was a phalanx, 
infantry and cavalry, chariots and elephants, archers and 
heavy—armed. Yet later in the same chapter (Sec.7) Arrian 
states that Darius stationed the Greek mercenaries and the 
Persians opposite the Macedonian phalanx because they were the 
only troops capable of withstanding the phalanx: so here he 
is using «phalanx« i.n the narrower sense of the heavy infantry. 
In section 9 of the same chapter he again uses the word to 
refer to the heavy infantry of the Macedonians, Including the 
hypaspists, drawn up in battle formation:14 and it appears 
again in this meaning in section 10. Arrian uses the word 
mostly in the meaning of the heavy-armed infantry in formation, 
but it is clear from this passage that he is. not careful to 
confine the usage to this meaning and has little regard for 
consistency and accuracy in his terminology, even when his 
meaning is seriously obscured by this laxness.
writes <uvT^rj p e v  i  Tou eufaivi/ t^oc Kfj»wy eirrif £-rrt
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Taxis
Tarn states (II p.136) that Arrian uses »taxis» as »maid 
of all work», it mostly meant a battalion of the phalanx, but 
also could apply to archers, javelin-men and units of cavalry. 
It also has its general meaning of »formation».
This word appears one hundred and seven times in the
Indica and Anabasis, and in seven different meanings, but it
is not always possible.to distinguish the meaning. Its most
common meaning is that of a battalion of the pezetairoi. a
unit which on four occasions he calls »phalanx.*. This is a
specific unit and probably »taxis» was the official term for
it in Alexander»s day, for it appears over forty times in this 
. 1 5  -meaning. but Arrian also uses the word in its most general 
meaning of any »military unit*, infantry or cavalry: it occurs 
in this meaning over twenty times.16 Arrian also uses it 
frequently (over twenty times) in the meaning »battle-line« 
and on eight occasions it seems to mean simply »formation», with 
out any hint of the type. On two occasions it means a »part» 
rather than a «formation« (5,29,1; 4,16,2): finally, twice 
(both times at 3,4,2) it means »order* or teequence*. Some 
may object that it is unreasonable to expect consistency in 
the usage of a word like »taxis». but given that it has this 
technical meaning of a battalion, or unit, of the pezetairoi. 
of standard size and composition, it is to be expected that 
a careful writer would not use it for other units of very 
different size and composition, without some qualification.
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Ile
This -term is not discussed by Tarn. It occurs, in all, 
thirty one times in the .Anabasis and Indica. Of these usages, 
twenty five probably refer to divisions of, the Companion 
cavalry, theoretically of standard size;17 on two occasions to 
squadrons of light-armed cavalry (podromoi)18 and once to 
squadrons of Thessalian cavalry. ^  Twice it refers to 
squadrons of Darius« cavalry:4^  once it refers to unspecified 
squadrons of Alexander«s cavalry.21 Clearly Arrian uses the 
term to apply to a squadron of any cavalry, Macedonian, Greek,
or Persian, heavy-armed or light, the size of which undoubtedly 
varied considerably: but Arrian also uses it to describe a 
formation. At 5,17,4 -  c <v >a \ r '  r* f ' rreiroL j  tmroÇ / }  U* bfHf
J l^oCV L A 1J\S y  àyj f V V y ÿ  *J p ev v j...  TfjU £ *
T<* j*(v K*.roca-Toftroi. ...
kel:,e ,Ü ê.* certainly means a massed body, formed into one
block, and has no close connection with the meaning of 
22«squadron*. There are other similar usages, which may or
may not be of the same type: at 5,13,4, the emphasis is upon
c  ^ )the formation used in the attack; ot A I —  K«rr
ytjioirTTUi t o v t c S (also 5,15,2). At 4,4,7 C °foror
T*JV X o c r r r j y /  trrr io v  C v e f i o L  A^v Totes’
it seems likely that Arrian did not have the meaning of 
squadron in mind when he wrote this, but rather used it as 
part of an idiomatic expression, which in his day had come to 
mean a special type of cavalry formation (see below, p. 3 S E  ) 
In support of this, I cite 3,15,2, where ? \ ^ v is used 
to describe the formation of the Persian cavalry arranged
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in column, rather than on a "broad front. Certainly at 5,17,4, 
and perhaps at the three other places mentioned Arrian uses 
*ile* not in the meaning of a ‘squadron* "but as part of an 
idiomatic expression for a tactical formation. Again then, 
Arrian is convicted of using a term which in his works mostly 
has one meaning (perhaps the technical one), also in another 
meaning.
Hipparch/Hipparchy
Tarn (II pp.l56f.) saw this term as properly referring to 
the divisions of cavalry into which the Companion cavalry 
was divided in India. But he thought that it was also a 
‘popular variant* for *ile*.
The term ‘hipparch* in fifth century B»C. Greece was
applied to the commander of the state levy of cavalry. At
Athens, for instance, a hipparch was elected annually: when
the state levy "became so large that it was decided to divide
it into two parts, each part was placed under a hipparch, and
hence in the fourth century there were two hipparchs.^ In
the federal", armies of Greece in the third century B.C., e.g.
the Aetolian and Achaean, the contribution of each state was
24under the elected hipparch of that*state. ^ And the overall 
commander of the cavalry of the league was a hipparch (Plut. 
Philop. 7,5)* One of the essential features of the post of 
hipparch was that it was an independent cavalry command, the 
hipparch was subordinate to no officer but the commander of 
the state, or federal army. In the Ptolemaic army, which, 
though not federal, was of considerable size and divided into 
many independent commands, the hipparchs were the officers
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in command of the independent bodies of cavalry.2^
The term »hipparchy* originally referred to the office of 
hipparch, just as the term »strategia» was applied to the 
office of strategos. It does not appear in any meaning but 
this prior to the time of Alexander; but after this it 
broadened to refer also to the body of troops under the 
command of the hipparch.26 This was a natural development, 
as the armies became larger and it was necessary to divide the 
cavalry into several large independent bodies of horse: a term 
was needed for these and »hipparchy* was an almost inevitable 
choice. Thus in the Ptolemaic army the hipparchy became the 
basic cavalry division and the cavalry forces of the kingdom 
were often referred to as »hipparchy no.l», etc., or as 
hipparchy of »so and so (the officer in command)».27
The terms »hipparch» and »hipparchy» were, at least at 
some time, part of the official usage of the army of 
Alexander, and one would expect them to fit into the general 
development just outlined. Arrian uses the term »hipparch» 
seven times. Calas, the commander of the levy of the 
Thessalian horse is called »hipparch* (1,25,2); and so is 
Erigyius, commander of the Greek allies (3,6,3); also the 
commander of each part of the Companion cavalry, when that 
body was divided into two independent parts (3,27,4); when it 
was divided further, into seven parts,28 the commander of one 
of the parts is called »hipparch» on two occasions (4 ,2 7 ,5 ; 
6,8,2). All these usages seem to conform with what would be 
expected to be the meaning of the term in the light of the 
development outlined above. A comparison between the use of
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the term «hipparch* at Athens, for instance, and that at
reveals a close parallel, and the Thessalian and Greek 
allied cavalry can be compared with state levies in federal 
armies. We may conclude, therefore, that on these five 
occasions Arrian uses the term in a precise official meaning 
current in Alexander's army.
There are two instances, however, of a less precise 
usage in Arrian. At 5,18,2 he uses it of Indian cavalry 
commanders of high rank, a usage clearly not conforming to 
the official technical meaning. More important than this 
usage is the occurrence of the word at 4,5,7, applied to 
Caranus, one of the commanders'of a detachment from the main 
army. It is not clear precisely what cavalry he had under 
his command, but it would appear that directly under him was 
a mixed force of sixty Companions and some few hundred 
mercenaries. Such a body of cavalry is plainly not a 
regular unit and Caranus could not have held the rank of 
»hipparch* in the same way as, for instance, Calas held it 
by virtue of his command of the Thessalian cavalry.50 In 
the light of the proven tendency of Arrian to use official 
technical terminology in a loose general way, I would conclude 
that he applied the term to Oaranus, simply because he held 
command of some cavalry, without regard to the precise 
meaning in the context of Alexander’s army.
Closely related to the term «hipparch* is ‘hipparchy*. 
Arrian uses this word on sixteen occasions, and'on eleven" 
of these it appears in a precise official meaning current in 
Alexanders army; that is in reference to the independent
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"bodies into which the Companion cavalry was divided at the
31end of 328 B.C. These independent "bodies, of which there were 
seven, lore the title of »hipparchy», except for the royal 
guard, which took the title »agema*. This is the first 
attested usage of the term »hipparchy» in the meaning of a body F 
of troops, rather than the office of a hipparch The F
commander of only one of the hipparchies is actually called a 
»hipparch* by Arrian, namely Demetrius (see above); the other F 
five known commanders were of higher rank than Demetrius,
often commanding detachments of independent strategic armies i
!;(i.e. Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Craterus) or in command of F
an infantry force as well as a cavalry one (i.e. Coenus and I
Cleitus).^ But whether these men were called »hipparchs» or F
not, the important feature of the hipparchies was that they j
j
were independent bodies of cavalry. j
s'
Arrian uses the term also in a loose general meaning,
not in line with official usage, in Arrian*s day »hipparchy* j
j
was a word applied by authors to any large body of cavalry,
and he states explicitly in Taotica 18,3 that what the Romans 1 ;
call a »hipparchy*, the Greeks call an »ile». It is clear
that much confusion had developed: Diodorus, for instance, j
uses »hipparchy* for »ile» at 17,57,3, and we have already seen \
Ithat Arrian uses »hipparch* of a commander of any body of |
cavalry. Griffith has tried to save Arrian*s credit as an i
accurate user of terminology by suggesting a more loose meaning I 
for the official usage: he argues that a »hipparchy* was a 
convenient term for a body of cavalry made up of jlae of 
different types of cavalry, e.g. ilae of light-armed cavalry
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joined with ilae of heavy-armed, or ilae of Macedonian with 
ilae of Iranian.^ The general level of accuracy of Arrian is 
not high enough to require us to accept Griffiths case, which 
is, in any case, in itself implausible. The meaning which 
Griffith wishes to assign to the term is not known from else­
where, and it is inherently unlikely because it has a subtlety 
out of keeping with the usual unsophisticated.terminology 
used by the ancients.
let us look at the usages of Arrian which clearly do 
not conform to the official teohnical meaning which I have 
suggested for the term, in an effort to see how Arrian uses 
the term in its loose general sense. At 1,24,3, Arrian says 
that Alexander sent Parmenio towards Sardis, giving him a 
hipparchy of Companions and other troops, while he himself 
proceeded around the coast of Asia Minor. This was in late 
334 B.C. We cannot know precisely what proportion of 
Companion cavalry was sent with Parmenio but it cannot have 
been all of them. Alexander certainly kept some cavalry with 
him (Arr. 1,28,4) and these must have been Companions. The 
Companion cavalry, were under one commander (Philotas) at this 
time, and the division into hipparchies had not taken place. 
What then did Arrian mean by the term here? Tarn (II p.136 
n.4) suggested that Arrian.was referring to an lie. Griffith
9
(JHS 83 p.70) argued against Tarn that an lie is far too small 
a detachment for Alexander to send and that Arrian actually 
referred to a grouping of ilae. Both are the victims of too 
rigid a view of Arrian1s usage. Tarn is convinced that 
wherever Arrian uses the term in a meaning other than the
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official one it is in the meaning of *ile'. Griffith believes 
that Arrian always uses the term in the same meaning and, 
therefore, has to ascribe to the word meaning whichis accept­
able for all its usages. It would certainly seem to be right 
that Parmenio was given more than just an ile of Companions, 
for 'Alexander was campaigning in rough country and a large
body of cavalry would have been an embarrassment:^^ one would 
expect rather that Alexander kept only a couple of ilae with 
himself. On the other hand, Griffith's view that Arrian 
wanted to emphasise that Parmenio took a group of ilae seems 
most unlikely. It is probable enough that the Companions with 
Parmenio did consist of several ilae, but surely he is not 
justified in concluding that Arrian used 'hipparchy* in some 
precise meaning of *a grouping of ilae«. It seems that it is 
most in keeping with Arrian's general approach to terminology 
to accept that he is here using 'hipparchy' in its most
general meaning of 'a body of cavalry* or simply 'some cavalry». 
This makes the most satisfactory sense and the simplicity 
of this interpretation is a strong recommendation.
The next usage, at 3>29,7, also does not conform to the 
official meaning of the term as set out above. Alexander is 
said to have sent Ptolemy after Bessus in March/April of 329 
B.C. placing under his command, among other troops, three 
hipparchies of Companion cavalry. The Companion cavalry, 
however, was divided into only two bodies, the further division 
into hipparchies had not yet taken place: there were not 
three hipparchies in existence. Griffith suggests that Arrian 
is using the term in his correct meaning, to describe three
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groups of ilae, containing mostly Companions, tut also some 
non-Companion cavalry. There is an obvious problem in this 
interpretation, in that Arrian says that the hipparchies were 
Companions, not partly Companions and partly some other 
cavalry. Griffith is, therefore, convicting Arrian of one 
imprecision in order to acquit him of another. Tarn, on the 
other hand, thinks once more that Arrian is using »hipparchy* 
for »ile»i. In this case Arrian cannot be using the term 
»hipparchy* in a vague meaning of »some cavalry» because he 
is precise about the number of hipparchies involved. It may 
appear, therefore, that Arrian is using the term for »ile».
However, the veracity of the passage must be doubted.
Welles has pointed out that it is in the highest degree unlikely 
that Alexander actually sent Ptolemy after Bessus in the 
manner described in Arrian, with the huge detachment detailed 
(for if three ilae of Companions were involved, they alone
•ZH
numbered about 800). For, as Welles points out, Ptolemy has 
scarcely had a mention through the whole campaign up until this 
time: he was an inexperienced officer who owed his position to 
his friendship with Alexander rather than to any competence 
he had shown. To send him as sole commander of such an 
important mission would have been a risk to no purpose. Since 
Aristobulus directly contradicts Ptolemy in the most important 
part of the story, serious doubts must be cast upon the 
historicity of the mission of Ptolemy. It is unlikely, then, 
that Alexander actually sent Ptolemy and the troops detailed 
on this mission, and we may see the episode as an invention of 
Ptolemy with no basis of fact. If it is assumed that there
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was no basis of fact to the episode, we might explain that 
Ptolemy said »hipparchies of Companion cavalry* because he 
thought in terms of the hipparchy being the basic division of 
cavalry, as it had been in Alexander*s army from 328 B.C., and 
was in his own army. It may, of course, still be true, even 
if Ptolemy did invent the episode, that Arrian found *ilae* 
in the source and decided to change it to *hipparchies*, but 
I think this is a highly unlikely explanation, especially 
since there was really no reason for him to do so.
The next instance of the term ‘hipparchy* is at 4,4,6, 
where Arrian refers to one hipparchy of mercenaries and four 
ilae of sarissophoroi leading an attack against the Scythians 
(329 B.C.O» There is no mention elsewhere of any ‘hipparchies* 
of mercenaries in Alexander*s army, and even in the Ptolemaic 
army the term does not seem to have been applied to mercenary 
cavalry.^ There were, of course, independent bodies of 
mercenary cavalry in Alexander*s army^ but we cannot assume, 
merely on this evidence, that Alexander applied the term to 
any but the units of Companion cavalry organised in 328 B.C.
The usage here, therefore, would appear to be not the official 
one. Tarn (II p.136) thought that Arrian was again using 
»hipparchy* for *ile*. Griffith (JHS 83 pp.71f.) argues that 
Arrian was using the term correctly because the body of 
mercenaries contained ilae of different types of cavalry. 
Griffith would certainly seem to be right in his criticism of 
Tarn*s suggestion, for it is unlikely that Alexander sent 
only one ile of mercenaries on this attack. It does not, 
however, follow that Arrian was using the term to describe 
a group of ilae of different types. As we have seen above,
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Arrian uses the term simply in the meaning of ‘some cavalry«.
It is impossible to know what Arrian found in his source here, 
it could have been simply ‘some mercenary cavalry« or ‘the 
mercenaries under Menidas (or some other commander)'.
In 4 ,4 , 7  three hipparchies of Companion cavalry appear, 
in the context of the same engagement between Alexander's 
troops and some Scythians in 329 B.C, Again, the Companion 
cavalry was still divided into only two independent commands, 
and there were not yet three hipparchies of Companions in 
Alexanders army. Griffith and Tarn advance their respective 
explanations: namely, that Arrian is referring to three groups 
of ilae, some Companions, some non-Companions; that Arrian is 
simply using 'hipparchy* for ‘ile‘. The same criticisms 
apply to Griffith's case in this instance as applied to hi3 
interpretation of the other usages: it is most unlikely that 
such a subtle and refined use of the term would be understood, 
and he has to convict Arrian of error in referring to 
'hipparchies of Companions'. . Tarn's case here has more weight, 
however, because Arrian uses 'ile' in the next line, and Tarn 
argues that Arrian was unwilling to use «ile« twice in the 
space of a couple of lines and therefore substituted hipparchy 
in one of the instances.^ This is particularly attractive 
in this case because Arrian's usage epO ceti? Totes 
is an idiomatic expression used by writers on tactics to 
describe a particular formation, that is, «in column* (see 
above p. 377). If Arrian had used «ile» in the preceding line, 
as well as in this idiomatic expression, to indicate the 
number of units of cavalry involved, the meaning of his
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description of the formation might have "been obscured. For •
in that idiomatic expression the meaning of ’ile> is rather
different from the meaning of the word when it simply describes
a squadron of cavalry of fixed size. This is best indicated by
reference to Arrian’s description of the cavalry at the battle
of the Hydaspes forming into one ile, with ’ile’ clearly being
used here to describe the formation and containing no reference
4-2to the size of the body of cavalry concerned. In these 
circumstances, Arrian had good reason to substitute ’hipparchy’ 
for ’ile’, using the ’Roman* terminology for the ’Greek* (see 
Tactica 18,3)* I therefore follow Tarn’s interpretation of 
this passage.
Before concluding this discussion we should notice the
odd usage of the term at Arrian 7»11,6»
kaf r t f  xZriZ* k «.Q* re Keel {Cav tjst
VrrTtoo v ^ r  o o k  ............ T o t « r i > 7 V  ¿ i r r ^ v .
Callines is said to have been distinguished by reason of his 
age and his hipparchy of Companion cavalry. It is certain 
that Callines was not commander of a hipparchy, for he is 
completely unknown, apart from this one reference. Berve (II 
no.405) suggests that he held a minor command position in 
the Companion cavalry, or that Arrian’s text should be taken 
to mean that Callines was distinguished because he belonged 
to the most distinguished hipparc/jy of Hephaestion (see above, 
Ch.^Vf pf>./67£ ). Tarn (II p.136) suggests that here again 
Arrian'is using ’hipparchy’ for ’ile’, and that Callines was 
a commander of an ile of Companions. It seems impossible to 
decide how Arrian uses the term here. In so far as Arrian uses
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the term -hipparch,. to apply to allloat a„y bo(Jy ^
“  ma7 te thSt h6 U3ed “  here <* the command of an lie or ’ 
loohoe. But It seems equally possible that Serve.s second
explanation is correct, that Oallines was distinguished simply 
because he was an ordinary trooper in Hephaestion-s hipparchy.
Conclusion
There are many other examples of similar lack of 
precision in the Anabasis and M i c a ,  some of which have led 
to serious confusion over the organisation of the army of
Alexander. These are better dealt with when the unit involved
in the confusion is bein^ diqpnQOQ  ^ rmscussed. I merely briefly
mention one more example, which maVp* * + v •, wuicn makes it obvious that Arrian
either has no interest in making the military organisation 
of Alexander clear, or has not the necessary knowledge to do 
so. in the course of the battle of the Granicus, Arrian (1 
12,7) says, Amyntas led forward four ilai of those called 
-Hodromoi.. In 1,14,1, however, Amyntas is said to have 
with him the sarissophoroi. This has been explained by
supposing that the Hodromoi and sarissophoroY were the same 
troops, but called by different names:« ^  ^  oertainly
right, but were Arrian-s readers (second century A,D. Greeks 
and educated Homans) in a position to know this? x very nuoh I 
doubt that they were, if they were not, Arrian, who uses 
-Hodrosol' ten times and 'carisgcrhoroi. three times is i
guilty, either through ignorance or through lack of M e r e s t  I
Of seriously misleading his readers. *
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To) Hetairos
It lias long "been noticed that this term has two distinct
meanings with reference to institutions of the Macedonian
state.^ It describes a member of a body of men chosen
individually by the king to be his personal followers, for
4-5whom I have used the term •councillors*. Its other meaning
in the time of Alexander, is that of thebody of Macedonian
^eayy-armed cavalry who served under the king.^8 There can
be no doubt that this double meaning of the term existed in
Alexander*s day in the usage of the Macedonian court and that
47the historians are not responsible for the confusion.
Therefore, bearir^/nmind the double meaning of the term, let
us consider the accuracy with which Arrian applies the word.
It appears one hundred and sixteen times in the Anabasis
and Indica, and on fifty five-occasions it can with confidence
be said to apply to the »councillors*: e.g. 1,25,4; 2,6,1; 3,5,
3. On fifty-four occasions it seems to refer to the cavalry:
e.g. 1,14,1; 1,18,1. This leaves us with seven usages which
are either doubtful in meaning, or certainly not of these two
meanings. In general, «hetairos * means simply «friend*,
•companion* or «lover*, and Arrian may use the word in this
way.^8 It is not possible to be categorical in asserting
that the word is used in this meaning by Arrian because it
can always be argued that it really means »if>pfaiVof ;
counc«/lott* However, in one place in particular, the
* * *
context makes it highly likely that' it is being used in its 
more general meaning. At 7,14,3, at the death of Hephaestion, 
Alexander is said to have lamented, throwing himself on to
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.......50the body of his hetairos; the word occurs in similar 
circumstances at 7,14,6. It would be most out of place to 
use it here in the formal way, and it can only mean »very 
dear friend».
It certainly is used in other than the formal meaning 
at 4,21,8. Here Chorienes, a tribal chief of the Pareitacae, 
is.said to have submitted to Alexander, coming to Alexander, 
along with some of his kinsmen (oikeioi) and some of hi3 
hetairoi. It is possible that here »hetairos» is being used 
to describe the equivalent of the »councillors» in a non-
51Macedonian environment. Arrian seems to do this elsewhere. 4 
It could, on the other hand, be a use of the word in a 
general way. I incline to the former.
At Indica 8,1 the term refers to the select body of the 
devotees of the god »Dionysus*. Clearly this is a conscious 
transference of the term for »councillors* to the company 
of’Dionysus', part of the attempt to place Alexander on a 
level with the god.^
There are, in addition to these irregular usages, some
occurrences which cannot easily be explained. In the Granicus
battle-line, Arrian (2,14,2) details a body he calls »the
hypaspists of the hetairoi»; this is a solitary usage, the
hypaspists being nowhere else described as »hetairoi». They
were, in a way, in a position similar to the cavalry of the
hetairoi and perhaps the term was attracted to them for this
reason, but whatever the explanation, it is a very loose use
53of the term »hetairos».
Other difficulties occur at 2,23,4 and 1,6,5. At 2,23,4 
Arrian is describing the storming of Tyre and tells how the
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hypaspists climbed the wall, led hy Alexander: the part of 
the wall where Alexander was fighting was captured first and 
Alexander is said to have climbed it with his hetairoi. It 
is self-evident that the cavalry had no part to play in the 
ascent of a wall: that this refers again to the hypaspists is 
possible, in view of the description of this body at 1,14,2 
as 'the hypaspists of the hetairoi'♦ It is, however, a big 
step from calling them 'hypaspists of the hetairoi' to calling 
them simply 'hetairoi'. I therefore reject the explanation 
that the .hetairoi here are the hypaspists. Another explanation 
is that Arrian here uses the word in a loose meaning of 'those 
who were with him at the time', but Arrian does not seem to 
use the word in this meaning and it would be better to 
establish a meaning for it which is in keeping with one of 
Arrian's normal usages. The meaning which has not so far 
been considered is that of 'councillors'. Tarn writes »he is 
only once recorded to have called on them (or those who were 
with him) to fight as a body, and that was before he crossed 
to Asia and in very special circumstances».^ This refers to 
the 'councillors', and the occasion when they were called on 
to fight'as a body' was against the Taulantians during the 
campaigns in the north in 335 (1,6,5). Tarn does not explain 
why the circumstances were special and it is not obvious to 
me that they were: and it is difficult to see what he had in 
mind when he wrote »in a body»: presumably it means only that 
several (those with Alexander) fought side by side rather 
than independently in different parts of the battle ares. 
Certainly there cannot have been any military unit of the 
«councillors» because individual 'councillors' were often
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put in charge of units, or sent on independent assignments: 
therefore their number and composition always varied. The 
fact that they were not a military unit, however, does not 
mean that they did not fight in the battles unless assigned 
especially to a command. It cannot be believed that they did 
not fight in every battle in which the king fought, and not
fight beside him, along with the somatophylakes, together in 
a body. That they are not often mentioned in our source is 
not a valid argument against this, and can be explained by
c c
the relative smallness of their numbers. I consider it as 
certain that they accompanied the king in battle just as they 
accompanied him on hunting expeditions or at banquets, 
provided that they were not occupied elsewhere on the king’s 
business. It seems possible therefore that the hetairoi at 
2,23,4 were the »councillors* and that Arrian is using the
egword in an official technical sense.
We might, therefore, consider whether the usage at 1,6,5 
also refers to the »councillors* or to cavalry. Tarn 
presents no arguments to show that they were »councillors», 
and no significance can be attached to the description of
y . t c  \ e sthem as 'ro<S ’ e iu 'r o v  f  f*
This need mean no more than that they were with him and not
somewhere else. Plaumann and Berve consider that the
expression was an official one to distinguish »councillors»
57  c 7 j  'from cavalry, ' but ©< et[<pi is often used by Arrian
58simply to mean »those around*. In this engagement Arrian 
(1,6,1) implies that Alexander had only four hundred of his 
cavalry and it is, therefore, a natural expression, if they 
are Companion cavalry.
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There is, in fact, reason to suppose that these hetairoi
are cavalry. In the description of the ensuing fight between
Alexander with his somatophylakes and hetairoi and the enemy
on the hill, Arrian says that Alexander gave orders to his
men to mount their horses and for half to dismount when they
reached the enemy position and fight on foot. This implies
to me that there were a fairly large number involved (see
above, p. 373 ). It is not of course known how many
•councillors* Alexander had with him at the time, but it
would only be a matter of tens, not enough to make them,
together with the somatophylakes, worth dividing into two
parts. On the approach of Alexander, the enemy (there were
not many of them Arrian tells us, 1,6,5) fled and Alexander
captured the hill ‘with the hetairoi»: then he called up the
rest of his troops. There is no mention of any cavalry among
the rest of the troops, which leaves the four hundred cavalry
totally unaccounted for if they are not ‘the hetairoi with
Alexander* of 1,6,5 and *the hetairoi» of 1,6,6. This
argument is certainly not conclusive, but it does seem that it
is more likely that the hetairoi here are the cavalry rather
than the 'councillors*. Little can be said concerning the
other doubtful usages: they certainly refer either to
59•councillors* or to cavalry. An instance of such a 
doubtful usage occurs at 1,15,6; when Alexander breaks his 
spear during the battle of the Granicus, Demaratos of Corinth, 
one of the 'hetairoi around him*, gave to Alexander his own
spear as a replacement. Droysen considered him to be a
finmember of the *agema of the hetairoi*, and it is 
conceivable that he was. However, in consideration of his
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age and position at the Macedonian court, it seems to me much 
more likely that he was a 1 councillor *.
This brief consideration of Arrian's use of 'hetairos' 
reveals that on rare occasions only does he use the word in 
other than one of the two technical Macedonian court meanings. 
»Hetairos' clearly was not a word which Arrian regularly used 
outside of the subject of the Macedonian army and court, and 
therefore it did not often creep into his history. That it 
was not care on his part which accounted for this is clear, 
not only from his careless use of other terms, but also from 
the few non-technical uses in the Anabasis and the Indica, 
which, had he really wished to, he could easily have
excluded from his work, even if he found them in his source. 62
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APPENDIX IV
IRANIANS IN THE COMPANION CAVALRY
The only evidence which refers directly to reforms of 
the Companion cavalry in the period following 331 B.C. is 
contained in Arrian, where two passages (7,6,3; 8,2) refer 
retrospectively to some unpopular developments concerning the 
Companion cavalry. I have decided to devote an appendix to
discussion of these passages because of the complexity of
the subject and the importance of the evidence.
The first passage is introduced by the arrival of the 
Epigoni at Susa in 324 B.C. The arrival of these Iranians,
armed in Macedonian fashion, annoyed the Macedonians,making 
them think that Alexander was planning to dispense with their
services in future. This leads on to a summary of their 
other grievances: Jtvtit ° Kai‘ T7y ^
« T T o V ^ V  o l  trp tK foV  M K K c S o r i V  k k i  r c £ < c  $ * H ou C _
€ v  TW Vofyus Tip TTeptrcKUt TToc^  f ou v p o £  O lif io Z  fitv& a& dU  Toif
T T o \ \ o ir  o il rO jY x y p Z v r s t *  & c rT i  is o ( r y k *. ' to i t *) iaroT*)r<.
• r ij  fV  T o v  f io ie 'iX e r t  o*S T t - T L y i jp e v o iT .  TTecfiiecrToir T f -* o
7TffU
OC fid K T fk w v  d (  /Cmî Ot K.OLC ¥}l><Kj(ujrujv
Z xpolV X ^ v  S e 7Ty Oucit<*>* K<xi ¿ k^ JTtfoZ
' vntXntufi /oi  lrrrr^(Ç K utol\ oX t frô e ^ T é ^  «
v/ ^  ^ f V> /* / ^  l % (/ I 1 * S J * _ /y ^
rreurTTij i-m to v t o iÇ tnxroepy^Coc t o y  fiot^ p ot^ iKy y Tr*owf
Î<XX<* C ir U o Ç n û Ç v T O f  UXPtou TToCv7oV tfMUKov K o C ie X f ÿ j t r x v  é-ç
cfÙTo  T “ »» RctpÔoipUtv . ^fCù T f  T 7 fo & K o tT o c A fy é V T fÇ  r\ y ' VP
o ><oèX efSoîy®V^ ç K*? '>/} p T * f lo k ,J ?  a ï  rJoL^aïaV  Kou
î t t r iv i j y  K o ù ^ p ^ o io - ^ y ^  oi^ ^ cC T pi^ eP vu  roZ  Jlîetp O
i  V Ai/ a/ a *  M  S *  f  lf/V f fA i  , W/Jl O  l/«*<r ' ( j Ç a  M  M  /) T a  ai l«A  . fr* y. A
O / V V M 7 V  «  P e / y O S  r ' H V K V ü d i w i  fV«*l  7  7 /  I w v  f  w i i  % MI IT » 3
Y V ^ o it f - ir ^ c  ^  f iu K T p iO f  K«ft T e > v T o lŸ  M  X K e S o v tK à  ic y T i T w /
f i  ¿ p f i o t p l  KVUS ^ f ( r » ^ K ü A w v  So& €-y/To l) T V f 7 V  TTaiy/ Tat <rA U ITf-( TOuT  
MelKeSovotS, ....
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'For the sight of Alexander in Median clothes was no small 
sorrow to the Macedonians; the marriages conducted in Persian 
fashion had not been to the liking of most, not even for some 
of those married, although they had been greatly honoured by 
being put on the same level as the king. They were aggrieved 
by Peucestas, satrap of the Persians, who was adopting Persian 
dress and language, because Alexander delighted in his 
Orientalism: also by the Bactrian, Sogdian and Arachosian 
cavalry, and the horsemen of the Zarangians, Areians, 
Parthyaeans, and among the Persians the so-called Euacae, who 
had been brigaded in the Companion cavalry, in so far as any 
of them seemed to be distinguished by rank, physical beauty or 
any other merit, and by a fifth hipparchy which had been added
to these ----  it was not wholly barbarian, but when the whole
cavalry force had been augmented, some barbarians had been 
enrolled into that force, and by these men who had been added 
to the role of the agema: Cophen, the son of Artabazus, 
Hydarnes and Artiboles, the sons of Mazaeus, Sisines and 
Phradasmenes, the sons of Phrataphernes, the satrap of 
Parthyaea and Hyrcania; Histanes, the son of Oxyartes and 
brother of Eoxane, the wife of Alexander; Autobares and his 
brother Mithrobaeus; Hystaspes the Bactrian, who had been 
appointed as their leader; and by the Macedonian spears which 
had been given to them in place of Oriental javelins, by all 
these things the Macedonians were aggrieved.*^
Two chapters later (7,8,2), in the context of the mutiny 
at Opis, Macedonian grievances are again listed. The 
introductory issue in this instance is the discharge of 
Macedonian veterans and, once more, the Macedonians* feeling
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of "being excluded is mentioned. They were annoyed at
Alexander's words, 7-yv trrpetYiaiy/ t «'
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•having been aggrieved throughout the whole of this campaign 
for many other reasons, for frequently before this his 
(Alexander's) Persian dress, which pointed the same way, was 
a source of grievance to them, and the Macedonian equipment 
of the barbarian Epigoni, and the introduction of cavalry of 
other nations into the units of the Companions.*
Badian has shown conclusively that these two passages 
cover the same ground, refer to the same set of grievances, 
and that Arrian has been led into repeating himself by
2insufficient care in following two different traditions.
The first passage is drawn from a source other than Ptolemy
and Aristobulus, which places the mutiny of the Macedonians
at Susa and, therefore, recounts the reasons for the mutiny
in the context of events at Susa. Ptolemy places the mutiny
at Opis and, therefore, lists the grievances of the
xMacedonians in the context of events at Opis.'' The two 
passages must, therefore, be taken together, and the one may 
be used to complement the other. Since the second passage is 
a summary of the first in many respects, it will be 
convenient to base our discussion on the text of the first 
passage, using the second to elucidate the first where 
necessary.
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The parts of the passages which directly concern us are 
those dealing with the grievances connected with the service 
of the Iranians within the Companion cavalry. In the second
hut in the first passage it is covered in much more detail 
and the subject may he divided into three parts. The first 
part concerns the Bactrians and other Iranians 'who had been
pretation of this is that Iranian cavalry of the tribes listed 
was integrated into the Companion cavalry body. Some modern 
scholars, however, have been reluctant to accept this 
interpretation, but have taken it to mean that the Iranians 
were brigaded with the Companion cavalry but remained in 
separate troops, not becoming Companions. It will be useful 
to look into the history of this view.
The idea that the Iranians were grouped with Companion 
cavalry into tactical units, i.e. hipparchies, while remaining 
distinct from the Companions, was proposed by Berve (I pp,107f.). 
He was led to this view by his interpretation of Arrian 3,30,6
t  TT TT ftA JV  ......................
He believed that this was evidence that Alexander introduced 
Iranian cavalry into the Companion cavalry in 329 B.C.: but 
in the passage of Arrian we are discussing, there is also 
evidence that Alexander introduced Iranians into the 
Companion body. Berve believed that this evidence referred 
not to an action of 329 B.C., but rather to 324 B.C., and he
brigaded with the Companion cavalry* C
The natural inter-
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was led to the conclusion that the introduction of the 
Iranian cavalry to the Companions was done in two stages: 
in 329 B.C. Iranian cavalry was grouped loosely with Companion 
cavalry within the hipparchies; and in 324 B.C. they were 
fully integrated into the ranks of Companion cavalry and took 
the name of »Companions*. Berve's interpretation of Arrian 
3,30,6 was recognised as Being wrong:^ what Arrian is saying 
is that horse losses, not cavalry losses, were made up, hut 
his idea that Iranians and Companions were grouped into 
heterogeneous tactical units was more attractive. Tarn (II 
p.164-5), although he Believed there was only one 
reorganisation of the Companions after 330 B.C., adopted this 
idea of Berve in his interpretation of Arrian 7,6,3, and he 
has recently Been followed By Brunt (pp.43f.). Griffith 
concurred with Berve in the Belief that there were two stages 
in the »Iranisation» of the Companion Body, though he presents 
different arguments in support (JHS 83 p.68 n.2).
The view that there were ever heterogeneous tactical 
units of Macedonian Companion cavalry and Iranian cavalry is 
immediately suspect Because of the fundamental flaw in Berve's 
interpretation of Arrian 3,30,6. However, Griffith (art.cit. 
pp.68ff.), found another argument in favour of such units, in 
a comparison Between Arrian 7,8,3 and 7,6,3. He suggested 
that these two passages referred to two separate sets of 
grievances, and that those described in chapter eight were 
of longer standing than those of chapter six. He argued from 
this Belief that in chapter eight described the
Brigading of Iranians with Companions in tactical units, while 
( r & e v T & f (chapter six) described the full
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integration, which was the later development. But his 
arguments fail. Badian (JHS 85 p.160) has shown that the 
two passages refer to the same set of grievances, which makes
from it. In addition, Griffith has not shown that it is
justified to find such subtle shades of meaning in Arrian*s
usage of the two words. Tarn is much more likely to he
right (II p.165) in thinking that the two words mean
precisely the same and that Arrian is not using them to
describe two different procedures. The other arguments that
Arrian's use of the term 'hipparchy* shows that the -unit so
5called was heterogeneous are quite inadequate.
Brunt does not argue specifically against the natural 
interpretation of Arrian*s evidence, i.e. that there was full 
integration, but he implies that Arrian'7,11»3> makes the 
interpretation impossible (p.44 n.55).^ In this passage 
Arrian describes how a Companion troop of Iranians was formed 
to replace the mutinous one. Brunt seems to assume that the 
strong reaction of the Macedonians to this move makes it 
impossible that any Iranians, except for the few in the 
agema, could have been full Companions before this date.
This assumption is not justifiable, however, as there is a 
great difference between selected Iranians being enrolled 
into an essentially Macedonian body, and a new and totally 
Iranian body being formed.
In short, there is no evidence that there were ever 
Iranians loosely brigaded with Companion cavalry while not 
being Companions themselves. There is no contemporary
describes an earlier
and one different
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analogy for such units of a heterogeneous nature"^ and there 
can he no doubt that the natural interpretation of the 
passages of Arrian is that Iranians became full members of 
the Companion cavalry body (cf. Badian, art.cit. p.161). It 
is not helpful to search out differences in shades of meaning 
between the wording of 7»6,3 and 7>8,2.
The date to which this part of Arrian*s text refers has
also been the subject of disagreement: the different datings
suggested are 326 B.C., 324 B.C., and a period running from
328 B.C.to 324 B.C. The case for dating it to 326 B.C. was
presented by Tarn (II p.l63ff.). He was convinced that the
Iranians, did not become full Companions, but were brigaded
within the hipparchies with the Companions. He based his
argument for the dating, therefore, on his dating of the
8organisation of the Companions into hipparchies: this he 
dated to 326 B.C. His reasons for this have been adequately 
refuted by Brunt (p.29).
Brunt presents the fullest case in favour of the dating 
324 B.C.^ He finds that all the causes of grievance listed 
in chapter six, except for the Median dress of Alexander, 
were new: the Epigoni had just arrived, the marriages were 
recent, the satrap of Persis had been only recently 
appointed, and the Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans had 
joined1 the ‘Grand Army* only at the end of 325 B„C., the 
Evacae even later. The reduction in the number of 
hipparchies to four, he suggested, was done after the march 
through the Gedrosian desert, and, therefore, the addition of 
the fifth hipparchy was also recent. This, he argues, points 
to the conclusion that the addition of the Iranians to the
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Companion cavalry was done .recently, i.e. in 324 B.C.
Badian (art.cit. p.160) has argued against the view of 
Brunt. He points out that the parallel passage in chapter 
eight states that the grievances had "been in the air »through­
out the whole of this campaign»: further, this is borne out 
by what is known of the details of the complaints. Median 
dress had been adopted by Alexander in the winter of 328/7 
B.C. and the order to train the Epigoni in Macedonian fighting 
methods had been issued at about the same time. He argues 
also that the campaign to which reference is made can only be 
the whole Asian campaign, not, as Griffith supposed, the 
Indian campaign,^ which was formally ended in 324 B.C. at 
Susa (Arr. 7,5) and, therefore, could not be referred to as 
if it were continuing. There seems to be no doubt that Badian 
is right in thinking that there is no indication in the text 
of Arrian that the causes of the grievances were recent.
Brunt’s case is undermined by his own concession that 
Alexander»s Median dress was not new. If one of the grievances 
was not new, why not another also? The passage in chapter 
eight implies that the grievances listed there are of long 
standing"^ and if it proves nothing positive about the 
dating of the introduction of Iranians to the Companion 
cavalry, at least it shows that the evidence of chapter six 
cannot be used to indicate that it was a recent development.
Badian suggests a different approach to dating the 
start of Alexander*s use of Iranians within the Companion 
cavalry. He argues that Arrian lists the peoples in chapter 
six in the order in which they joined Alexander’s main army 
and that this indicates that selected men from the peoples
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mentioned were introduced into the Companion cavalry as 
whole units of those peoples joined the main army. He points 
out that the first two peoples mentioned "by Arrian, namely 
Bactrians and Sogdians, are the first to appear in the service 
of Alexander, that is in 528 B.C. (Arr. 4,17,3); and in India 
a cavalry unit of Arachosians appears Beside them (Arr. 5,11,3). 
The Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans are not, however, 
mentioned as serving in India, and Badian suggests that they 
did not join the main army until Alexander had returned from 
India, when Arrian records that the satraps of Areia and of 
Zarangia, and the son of the satrap of Parthyaea and Hyrcania 
came to him in Carmania in 525 B.C. (Arr. 6,27,3)* Finally, 
those Persians called the Evacae joined in 524 B.C. while 
Alexander was marching through Persis (this follows Brunt 
p.45). Arrian is, therefore, referring to a development 
which started in 528 B.C. and was continuing through the years 
right down to 524 B.C.
His case clearly rests upon the Belief that Arrian 
actually listed the peoples in the order in which they joined 
the army. It was Brunt (p.43) who first suggested that the 
Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans did not join until 325 
B.C., pointing to Arrian*s reference to the arrival of the 
satraps or their representatives (6,27,3). However, there 
is no more indication that the satraps Brought troops to joih 
the army in 525 B.C. than there is that they did in 528/7 
B.C. at Nautaca in Sogdiana, for Arrian records that the 
satrap of the Parthyaeans and the satrap of the Areians also 
came to Alexander there (4,18,1). I am inclined to think 
that the satraps Brought troops to Alexander in Carmania in
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325 B.C., even, though, the Indian campaign was drawing to a 
12close, hut I am convinced that the satraps brought 
Parthyaeans and Areians for service in the army in 328/7 B.C., 
when Alexander was preparing his forces for the Indian 
campaign. Granted there is no mention of any Parthyaean or 
Areian cavalry during the course of the Indian campaign, but 
this is scarcely a difficulty. The sources were not much 
interested in Iranian units and nobody would claim that we 
hear of all the cavalry units.which Alexander took to India.  ^
I am disposed to believe that the Parthyaeans and Areians, 
and, indeed, the Zarangrianss also,^ though their satrap is 
not specified as coming to Alexander just before the Indian 
campaign, entered service in Alexanders army before the 
start of the Indian campaign, probably at the same time as 
the Arachosians.
The Bactrians and Sogdians, Badian argues, served in 
Alexander's, army by the time of Cleitus* death, i.e. autumn 
328' B.C. The text which is used in support of this is Arrian 
4,17,3» which says that Amyntas was appointed satrap of 
Bactria in place of Artabazus and that Alexander left Goenus 
in Sogdiana with his own battalion, Meleager's, about 400 
Companion cavalry, all the mounted archers 'and of the 
Bactrians and Sogdians such as had been placed under Amyntas*. 
This indicates not that the Bactrians and Sogdians were 
serving in Alexander's main army but that they were a part of 
Amyntas* satrapal army, which was put temporarily under 
Coenus* overall command. This distinction must be made: 
there can be no doubt that the satraps made extensive use of
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native tribes for their forces from as early as 3 3 0  
The first appearance of the Bactrians and Sogdians in the main 
army is therefore at the "battle of the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,12,2). 
It seems likely that they too, along with the Areians, 
Parthyaeans and Zarangians, were levied for the main army for 
the first time in 328/7 B.C. for the Indian campaign.
I turn finally to the Evacae, who appear last in Arrian*s 
list. These men were Persian, Arrian tells us, and Brunt, 
followed "by Badian, concludes that they could have joined only 
when Alexander was returning through Persis in 324 B.O. It 
is by no means clear who these Evacae were. It seems 
unlikely that they could have been a tribal group for, whenever 
they were recruited, Alexander surely can have had no reason 
to draw only upon one tribe of the Persians and none of the 
others. Nor does it seem probable that it refers to a 
particular age group, like the Ephebes at Athens, for, though 
Alexander clearly wanted men in their prime, their precise age 
can hardly have been a consideration worth mentioning. I 
shall refer to the problem again below, but on any view it 
seems that the Persians called Evacae must have been something 
of a special group, not drawn from the cavalry class as a 
whole. I do not believe that Alexander drew upon a select 
section of the Persians in 324 B.C. for service as a cavalry 
force. He was returning after leading a campaign into India 
as the king of the Persians: in a couple of months he was to 
be at Susa demobilising troops of the campaign army and 
proclaiming a policy of harmony and co-operation between the 
Macedonians and Greeks, and the Persian and Median nobility.
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A part of this policy consisted of bringing substantial
numbers of Persian and Median nobility into the cavalry, as
1 ftI have argued. It would surely have made no sense to 
select a few Persians of some special group when a much more 
substantial levy of Persians was being called at the same 
time. The Evacae, I am sure, were called upon no later than 
the beginning of the Indian expedition.
I cannot follow Badian's interpretation, therefore, that 
Arrian lists the peoples in the order in which they joined 
the main army and must look for another method of dating the 
introduction of Iranian peoples into the Companion cavalry. 
Griffith (JHS 83 pp.68ff.) argues that Arrian's reference to 
the intermixture of Barbarians and Companion cavalry in 
chapter eight looked back as far as 329 B.C. He was 
particularly concerned about the lack of any mention of 
Western and Central Iranian people serving as cavalry in 
Alexander's main army and, accordingly, suggests that they 
served within the hipparchies, thereby achieving anonymity.
I have already argued against his view of hipparchies of 
mixed cavalry, and I would maintain that Alexander did not 
recruit substantial numbers of Western and Central Iranian 
peoples for service against their eastern neighbours because 
he did not trust their loyalty. However, I join him in his 
concern about the total absence of any Persian cavalry in 
the main army.
Alexander used several top-ranking Persian nobles in 
administrative posts; Diodorus (17,77,4) tells us that he 
appointed Persians as doryphoroi at his court, and he made 
efforts generally to be accepted as the successor of Darius III«
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As Griffith points out, one of the mainstays of the relation­
ship "between the Persian king and his nohles was cavalry service, 
and it is difficult to believe that Alexander called upon no 
Persian nobility to serve in his main army. In substantial 
numbers, perhaps, Alexander could not trust them, but a small 
select group of sons of prominent nobles, sons of men whom 
Alexander had drawn into posts of responsibility, would be 
no threat but rather a surety of good conduct on the part of 
their families, and their service might even bind them to the 
king.^ I would suggest, therefore, that Alexander did draw 
upon a few Persians for cavalry service, perhaps in 330 B.C., 
at the, same time as he appointed doryphoroi. It would have 
been most suitable for Persian nobles to serve in the
Companion cavalry and I suggest that it was these who bore the
20name, perhaps applied to them by Alexander himself, of 
Evacae. They may have served as a separate body at first, 
though we hear nothing of them, but I am sure that they 
became a part of the body of Companion cavalry no later than 
the representatives of the tribes of Eastern Iran.
The peoples of Eastern Iran are first known to have
served in the main army in the Indian campaign. It is,
therefore, likely that they were called upon first in the
winter of 328/7 B.C., when Alexander was preparing the force
21for the invasion. Now, I have suggested that the Persians 
were probably called upon to serve as cavalry for political 
reasons and that their number was small, but there were 
urgent military reasons for Alexander to build up his cavalry 
forces for the invasion of India, because the enemy were 
famous for their cavalry. I have suggested (Ch.III pp. SAV- )
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that no reinforcements reached Alexander from Macedonia after
331 B.C. and, therefore, the Companion cavalry must have
fallen below strength. The Bactrians, Sogdians, and other
Eastern Iranian peoples were fine horsemen and Alexander
trusted them sufficiently to use whole -units of them in his
army. I have little doubt, therefore, that selected
representatives of these Eastern Iranian peoples entered the
22Companion cavalry on the eve of the Indian expedition. The
political advantages of involving Eastern Iranian peoples in
the military undertakings were much less than in the case of
the Persians. It was, of course, important for Alexander
to win the allegiance of the chiefs of the tribal groups, but
there is no indication that Alexander needed to make extensive
use of the nobility of Eastern Iran for running the empire,
nor was it so important to win from them acceptance of his
23claim to be successor to Darius. ^
If I am right that Alexander was looking primarily to 
military objectives in enrolling the Eastern Iranians, the 
obvious time for their enlistment is the eve of the Indian 
campaign. Alexander would scarcely have been in a position 
to use them earlier than this, for he was involved in putting 
down rebellions and may not have employed Eastern Iranian 
horse for the same reason he had not used Western Iranian 
horse for his campaigning during the years 330-328 B.C.
After the Indian campaign was over there was little need for 
substantial reinforcement of the campaign army and I find it 
difficult to believe that the entry of any of the peoples 
into the Companion cavalry mentioned could have occurred
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after Alexander*a return from India. Certainly troops came
24to Alexander in Carmania and later, ^ "but if Arrian was
referring to Iranian peoples who had entered the Companion
cavalry at the end of 325 or the beginning of 324 B-C., the.
omission of any referenoe to Persians (except the special
group of Evacae) and to Medes needs some good explanation.
If Alexander was collecting together Eastern Iranian nobles
in' Carmania and introducing them to the Companion cavalry
body at this time, it is scarcely credible that Persians and
Medes would not also have been involved. Leaders came to him
from Media as well as from Parthyaea, Areia and Zarangia.
If the latter brought men for inclusion in the Companion
cavalry, surely the former did also. It seems probable that
Alexander-did not introduce any men into the Companion cavalry
after his return from India until after he had closed the
25expedition and demobilised the campaign army at Susa.
I would conclude that the Eastern Iranian peoples 
mentioned by Arrian in chapter six as entering the Companion 
cavalry had been introduced- to that body on the eve of the 
Indian campaign, when Alexander was preparing his campaign 
army (see Ch.Ill pp. 8 6 -P. ) . The entry of the Evacae cannot 
be firmly dated, but it should be put no later than this and, 
of course, no earlier than 330 B.C, They may have served as 
a small separate force, more as a mounted escort, as the 
doryphoroi served as an infantry escort, until the 
preparations for the Indian campaign were made. They were 
then, along with the Eastern Iranians, integrated into the 
Companion cavalry. The precise form of the integration 
cannot be known, but I have argued against any suggestion of
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heterogeneous units being grouped together to form 
hipparchies. It follows, therefore, that they were armed and
within the ilae, but in purely Iranian files and under
We may now move on to the next clause of Arrian*s text:
Tarn believed that this referred to the same reorganisation 
as the preceding clause; at the same-time as selected 
barbarians were enlisted into the Companion cavalry, i.e. 
at Taxilia in 326 B.C., a fifth hipparchy was added. This 
fifth hipparchy, Tarn added, contained a higher.proportion 
of barbarians than the other four. He wrote (II p.165):
*The fifth hipparchy, Arrian says, differed somewhat from 
the others, but still was not ‘wholly barbarian*; this must 
mean that it had a much smaller Macedonian squadron.' Brunt 
(pp.43ff.) argues that Arrian*s text must be emended in order 
to have the sense that the fifth hipparchy was the agema, and 
in order to make this clause run into the next one, in which 
details concerning the inclusion of barbarians into the
agema are given: he proposes to read km* TreHTrr-n e irc
^  c  , x  ■ sTowrot? c r r r r t l T T£>o <r j / e v o t t e y / Y l  j ou p t  K rt
TTKO-oLy e lA A t *  t f f v r o y  T O U  'r r o< '\ /T O T  iT rT r tK Q V
Koi'r&Kefijo-oiv e* t **** k t \.
* * U J KUTO Cs aeuTljv ^  &T
T T ^ o c r  t C M 'r o l *  1 "  f  f
2 Sfought as Macedonian heavy cavalry: they probably served
27Iranian leaders.
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The text referred, lie suggests, to a development which took 
place shortly after the introduction of selected Iranians 
which is described in the preceding clause, that is in 324 B.C. 
Badian (JHS 85 p.161) agrees with Brunt that the text must 
be emended, because it makes no sense for Arrian to say that 
the fifth hipparchy was not wholly barbarian without his 
specifying exactly how it differed from the other four 
hipparchies. He proposes that should be added
before ou o{ ^  fi c f <■ K*J rj 7TedOV ^
and that e r r « u f a  ~rou m x v T o s
c r m C K O U  croLyS 2 ?  ZrTQ T * * * *
be considered a parenthesis. On this reading the text 
would translate *and in addition a fifth hipparchy added, 
almost wholly barbarian (but in fact barbarians had been 
selectively added to the whole cavalry when it was increased 
in numbers).* The words in-the bracket refer back to the 
inclusion of Iranians in the other four hipparchies as well 
as in the fifth. On the date of the addition of the »almost 
wholly barbarian* fifth hipparchy Badian follows Brunt.
Considering the emendations first, I find Brunt<s 
proposal a too violent approach, he has to suppose an unusual 
degree of inaccuracy in the manuscript tradition of Arrian.
In addition, he has to assume that the agema could be 
referred to as a hipparchy (which is nowhere attested) and 
that it was possible to think in terms of the agema being 
added to the Companion cavalry, whereas it was in fact the 
very nucleus of that body. Badian*s emendation is much less 
violent, but difficulties remain in his interpretation. The
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fifth hipparchy clearly could not have "been added before 
Alexanders return from India because in India, as I hope I 
have shown, there were six hipparchies. Now if, as I have 
argued, the Iranians were first introduced into the Companion 
cavalry in the winter of 328/7 B.C. and this is referred to 
in the preceding clause, the content of the parenthesis, on 
33adian*s interpretation, refers to developments which covered 
about three years. The meaning of the bracket on Badian*s 
interpretation would have to be * during the reinforcement of 
the Companion cavalry over two or three years, barbarians had 
been selectively brought into it (sc. the Companion cavalry)*
difficult to interpret the Greek in this meaning: for, 
strictly, the action of the verb in the participle is past 
in relation to the action of the main verb. A present 
participle would be needed rather to accommodate Badian*s 
emendation. The natural interpretation of the text, as it 
appears in Arrian, is that the reinforcement happened at one 
point in time and that as a result a fifth hipparchy was
28added to the Companion cavalry and some barbarians introduced.
The difficulty of emendation, therefore, is great and, 
as Brunt recognises, the whole thing really needs rewriting 
to obtain satisfactory sense. The major difficulty is to find 
a reason for the singling out for special mention of the 
addition of the fifth hipparchy, and the apparently redundant 
repetition of the information that barbarians were introduced 
into the Companion cavalry* Tarn suggested that what Arrian 
was saying was that the Macedonians were particularly annoyed 
about the fifth hipparchy because it contained more Iranians
The aorist participle makes it
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than the other four hipparchies. Certainly this would
explain why it deserved special mention, hut it does not
explain why Arrian repeated the information about barbarians
being brought into the Companion cavalry. I might also
point out that Arrian does not say that the Macedonians were
annoyed about the higher proportion of Iranians in the fifth
29hipparchy than in the other four.
It must, of course', be admitted that there is nothing
in Arrian*s detail about the addition of the fifth hipparchy
which indicates why it should have been an aggravating
factor in the Macedonians* breaking out into open mutiny at
Opis in 524 B.C,, and this is the reason for the emendations
being suggested. It seems, however, that the reason for the
Macedonians* annoyance cannot be supplied by an acceptable
emendation and I would prefer to suppose that either Arrian
did not understand what he found in his source, or he did
"50not express clearly what he found. I would, therefore, 
offer another interpretation of the text involving no 
emendation, but rather relying on the assumption that Arrian 
did not express himself clearly.
I suggest that mention of the addition of the fifth 
hipparchy, and the repetition of the information that 
barbarians were introduced to the Companion cavalry, were 
caused by these changes in the Companion cavalry being 
carried through quite separately from the introduction of 
selected Iranians into the Companion cavalry. The context 
of the explanation of the Macedonian discontent is Opis in 
the summer of 524 B.C.: Beloch (p.521) suggested June at the 
earliest. ¥ow; it is generally assumed that when Alexander
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returned from India and ended the campaign at Susa in the 
spring of 324 B.C., he made great efforts to win the 
cooperation of the Persian and Median nobility, most 
spectacularly by means of the wedding oelebrations, but also 
by putting them on an equal level as soldiers, that is, as 
cavalry. Many scholars are of the opinion that Alexander 
introduced many Persians and Medes into the Companion cavalry 
when he was at Susa.^1 The case is presented more fully in 
Ch.V pp./5“7fi , but here I would say simply that after the 
close of the Indian campaign at Susa in spring 324 B.C. 
Alexander disbanded much of the army which had fought in 
India, including most of the Companion cavalry. He then 
reorganised the army, the Companion cavalry being built up 
out of fresh recruits from Macedonia and out of Iranians, in 
particular the Persian and Median nobility. If the Macedonians 
were concerned about the use of selected Iranians within the 
Companion cavalry during the Indian campaign, they surely 
were more concerned about the new-style Companion cavalry 
which was present before their eyes at Opis. It would be 
surprising, considering that the list is so full on the 
subject of the Companion cavalry, if no reference were made 
to the outrageous new Companion cavalry. Yet the only mention 
of Persians and Medes in the Companion cavalry in the list 
is the reference to the Persians called Evacae, who, I have 
argued, could only have been a small group.
I would suggest, therefore, that mention of the addition 
of the fifth hipparchy, when the whole cavalry force was 
reinforced and when some barbarians were brought into the 
Companion cavalry, is a reference to the formation of this
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new-style Companion cavalry which, was carried out at Susa 
a few months "before. Surely one would expect some mention 
of such a reform in the list. It is difficult to see how the 
addition of the fifth hipparchy and the general reinforcement 
of the cavalry could have taken place at any other time than 
at Susa in spring 324 B.C. I have argued that in India there 
were six hipparchies (Ch.III pp.7tff) and, therefore, a fifth 
hipparchy could not have "been added in India, or at any time 
before the number of hipparchies had been reduced to four.
The precise date of the reduction of the number of 
hipparchies is not important for our present purpose. Some 
scholars put it at the very end of 325 B.C., I would make it
•XOa few months earlier, but the point is that no reinforcements
could have reached Alexander before the very end of 325 B.C.^
By this time, Alexander certainly knew that he would have no
more fighting to do during the remainder of the Indian
campaign and that he would end the campaign and disband much
of the army at Susa three or four months later. It is
recorded that troops came to him in Carmania at the end of 
34325 B.C., but I find it incredible that Alexander could 
have integrated these forces into the army of the Indian 
campaign at this time, knowing that a thorough reorganisation 
was going to be needed in a very short time. I would suppose 
that the troops which came to him in Carmania simply made 
their way to Susa organised separately from the army of the 
Indian campaign, and when they reached Susa some of them were 
sent home, some put on duty in the satrapies, and some 
integrated into the new central army,*^ I find it impossible 
to believe that any additions to the Companion cavalry were
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made during the last three or four months of the Indian 
campaign.
It seems most likely, therefore, that the addition of 
the fifth hipparchy and the introduction of "barbarians into 
the Companion cavalry, which is mentioned in this part of 
Arrian’s text, were important facets of the reform of the 
Companion cavalry which Alexander undertook at Susa in the 
spring of J24 B.C. We cannot know what was in the original 
version of the explanation of the men’s complaints, hut an 
adequate description of their reaction looking hack to the 
sort of reform I have outlined might have been: ’then again 
there are those barbarians brought in when the fifth 
hipparchy was added’.• If someone was writing out the sort 
of list which appears in Arrian, and was not really sensitive 
to the fact that there were two quite separate enrolments 
of barbarians into the Companion cavalry, he might easily 
be led into emphasising the addition of the fifth hipparchy, 
instead of the important part about the introduction of the 
barbarians, which he thought had already been covered in 
detail.
>If this interpretation is accepted, the words ou
whatever interpretation is adopted. I would suggest that 
they were introduced by Arrian, or his source, as a gloss. 
The passage has the theme of the Macedonians* outrage at 
barbarians being enrolled into the Companion cavalry: the 
preceding detail was that various Iranian tribes had been 
introduced to the Companion cavalry; this detail, as it
appears in this version, is that a fifth hipparchy had been
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added, the next item was that Iranians had been introduced 
into the agema« I would suggest that Arrian, or his source, 
aware that the.theme of the passage might suggest to the 
reader that the addition of the fifth hipparchy meant the 
addition of a whole hipparchy of Iranians, and knowing that 
this was not what he had read in his source, decided to 
explain that the hipparchy was *not wholly barbarian*.
I deal with the details of the reform described in this 
part of the text in Chapter Y pp./^ S'-f. and now move on to 
the next part, which gives a list of the prominent Iranians 
added to the agema of the Companions. This is relatively 
straightforward. The Macedonians would naturally single 
out the agema of the Companion cavalry for special mention, 
because it held a particularly honoured position in the army 
and it was particularly outrageous that Alexander should have 
brought Iranians even into that unit. It is generally 
assumed that this took place at Susa, at the same time as 
Alexander*s other measures aimed at securing the cooperation 
of the Persian and Median nobility.^ It, undoubtedly, was 
part of the reorganisation described, partially, in the 
preceding clause about the addition of the fifth hipparchy.
The last section of this passage concerns the arming of 
Iranians in Macedonian fashion. Brunt (p.44) referred this 
to the Iranians who were enrolled in the agema. and not to 
any other Iranians in the Companion cavalry. This is a 
possible interpretation but by no means the necessary one; 
t o u Toc9 could easily be taken to refer to all the Iranians 
mentioned as being introduced to the Companion cavalry. The 
whole passage is so loosely constructed that such an
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interpretation is quite likely. In fact, since I have-argued 
that all the Iranians in the Companion cavalry were armed in 
Macedonian manner and fully integrated into that body,^ this 
interpretation becomes obligatory; for there is no reason 
for the Macedonians to be particularly upset about the 
Macedonian arms of a handful of Iranians within the agema, 
when the rest of the Companion cavalry contained many more, 
similarly armed.
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APPENDIX V 
LOSSES IN GEDROSIA
Estimates of these losses have varied enormously, from 
60,000, as proposed recently by Green, to almost nothing, as 
Tarn believed.1 It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the 
march in order to determine the effects upon army strength.
The fullest case in favour of the view that casualties
were in the region of 50,000 is presented by Strasburger,who
contended that less than 15,000 survived out of 60,000 to 70,000
who started the march. He argues (pp.456-486) that the
details of the suffering of the army contained in the accounts
of Arrian 6, 25-26 and Strabo 15,2,5f. (C.722) are taken from
Nearchus. They are, therefore, likely to be reliable and are
in any case corroborated by modern accounts of the difficulties
■5involved in crossing that desert. Strasburger concludes that 
Alexander *s.army suffered enormous losses. He reaches his 
absolute figures on the following basis (pp.486ff.).
Plutarch (Alex.66,4 ) states that Alexander lost so many men 
in the march through the land of the Oreitae that he brought 
back less than one quarter of his fighting force from India, 
yet this force had numbered 120,000 infantry and 15,000 
cavalry. Plutarch then describes in general terms the 
suffering encountered by the army in Gedrosia. The plain 
implication of Plutarch’s evidence is that almost the whole 
of the enormous loss sustained by the Indiancampaign army was 
due to the hardships of the march through the desert. That 
such losses were sustained is strongly suggested, in 
Strasburger»s view, by the other evidence concerning the
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severity of the conditions. He also cites the estimates 
of Beloch and Berve independent of these figures, that put 
Alexanders force on his return to Susa at around 30,000.^ 
Since casualties on the return journey from India can have 
"been only light, except in the march through the desert, 
Strashurger (pp.486ff.) concludes that 45,000 men died in 
Gedrosia.
Strasburger»s demonstration that the evidence concerning 
the details of the march is reliable and that the men went 
through immense hardship is quite convincing and needs no 
discussion, hut his attempts to calculate the numbers involved 
will not stand up to scrutiny. Plutarch’s evidence is not 
from Hearchus, as Strasburger admits (p.487), and the figures 
given by him are not applicable'to those entering the desert 
nor -to the proportion which survived the ordeal. 135,000 
men did not enter the Gedrosian desert. Strasburger in fact 
suggests, rather arbitrarily, that only one half this total 
was actually involved. It seems inconsistent then to use 
Plutarch’s evidence in settling thatover three-quarters of 
‘the men were lost. Plutarch’s evidence is of unknown origin 
and seems unlikely to be reliable. Ho scholar can accept 
that 135,000 men actually left India, nor that 100,000 died 
on-the way. The details seem to have been inserted merely 
to emphasise the horrors of the march, with little regard
5for any factual basis. It should not be used, therefore, to 
indicate the toll taken by the Gedrosian desert.
The other argument of Strasburger is based on the belief 
that Alexander returned to Susa with only about 30,000 men 
out of the force of 120,000, or 135,000, which left India.
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Thè figure for the strength of the force which left India 
is based upon the evidence of Arrian (Ind. 19,5), Curtius
(8,5,4) and Plutarch (Alex. 66,5). The evidence of these 
sources, however, does not establish the strength of the 
force which left India for Susa. Arrian says that at the 
time of the beginning of his voyage down the Hydaspes !
Alexander had 120,000 troops around him, those he had brought 
from Macedonia and many others of different races who had 
joined him. This is almost certainly from Hearchus and it 
is the most reliable figure. Plutarch*s figure has already ;
been discussed. It is probable that it is meant to give the 
highest total which Alexanders force ever reached, but it
ji
cannot be preferred to Uearchus* evidence and should be set
i
aside. 'Curtius repeats the total of 120,000 but refers it to !I
the force which left Bactria in 327 B.C. It is unlikely that i
the total of 120,000 accurately reflects the strength of the j
army at the start of the campaign. This total is given by |!
Hearchus for late autumn of 326 B.C., when many more troops, j:
Ì6 5of Indian princes and chiefs, had collected around Alexander. j 
It is likely that the army led into India by Alexander was ;
very much smaller and that Curtius has applied Nearchus* j
total anachronistically. Schachermeyr has suggested that an ; 
army of only 45,000 - 50,000 entered India^ and this may not ]
j
be much too low. At any rate it is likely that many less 
than 120,000 men set out from India to Susa, if Indians are# # iI;
included in Nearchus* total; for although there are no specific ! 
references to their detachment from the main army, it is almost j 
certain that Alexander left the Indian troops with their leaders^ 
or.as mercenaries on duty in India. j
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As for the number which arrived at Susa, the estimate 
of about 30,000 is equally ill-founded. This figure is based 
upon Beloch's interpretation of the evidence of Curtius.8 
Curtius (10,2,8)^states that in 324 B.C. Alexander wanted to 
keep 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for the occupation of 
Asia. Beloch considered that this represented the number of 
European veterans of the Indian campaign whom Alexander did 
not discharge. By adding to this figure the number who were 
discharged, that is 11,500,  ^he reached a figure of 26,500.
I have argued in Ch.V p. l°tl that Beloch’s is not the most 
likely interpretation of Curtius* evidence: there are great 
difficulties involved in his case. Further, Beloch maintained 
that only European troops can be included in this figurej it 
is, therefore, not sound to compare it with a total for the 
whole Indian campaign force, which includes a great many non- 
Europeans.
Strasburger*s arguments to show by calculations that tens 
of thousands of men died in the Gedrosian desert fail. The 
fullest case against Strasburger is presented by Kraft.10 He 
agrees with Strasburger*s assessment of the evidence of 
Arrian and Strabo, and accepts that conditions on the march 
were very hard. But he argues that, far from supporting a 
figure of 45,000 for the losses, the accounts make it most 
unlikely that anything like that number died. The references 
to the »many* dying in every case concern only a part of a 
small part of the army and do not imply that the majority of 
those with Alexander did die.11 He argues that the general 
tenor of the accounts makes it unlikely that more troops
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died than survived, as the emphasis in the descriptions is 
upon the sufferings of the living rather than the agony of 
the dying. They were so thirsty that some died of over­
drinking; they were so hungry that some,died of eating had 
food,; they were so tired that some fell asleep and could not
catch up with the main group. The detail about the sick
\
being left behind and about the illicit slaughter of the 
baggage animals would have been ludicrous bathos if the 
disaster and suffering reached the proportions suggested by 
Strasburger. In general, then, the sources show an awareness 
of great suffering but not of near annihilation. Arrian can 
say that the army suffered more in this desert than through 
the whole of the rest of the;expedition (6,24,1; Ind. 26,2), 
but this is different from saying that three-quarters of the 
army died. He can even make Alexander boast of his leadership 
in bringing the men through the desert (7,10,7)* Kraft also 
makes the point that if anything like 45,000 men had died, 
some officers prominent enough to be named in the sources 
would surely have been included and their deaths duly 
recorded. We have no such record.
There can be no doubt that Kraft is right. If there 
was a catastrophe of the proportions suggested by Strasburger, 
there would be clearer evidence of it in the sources. If the 
number of dead troops had been even near the 45,000 mark - 
not to mention the camp followers - surely some explicit 
reference to the enormous death toll would have appeared.
The apparent survival of all top-ranking officers is also a 
strong indication that the death toll was not so high.
Another indication that over three-quarters of the men
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did not die can "be found in the relatively low overall death
toll among the Macedonians who served in Asia between 354 and
324 B.C. It is.generally accepted that the veterans sent
home from Opis under Craterus1 leadership were all
Macedonian and that they numbered 10,000 infantry and 1,500
cavalry.12 It is certain that at least 3,000 veteran heavy
infantry were retained (they later became the argyraspids),1^
and we may perhaps assume that a few others also were
retained, though perhaps not very many. In any case, I would
su g g e st, we are left with a total of not less than 15,000
for the Macedonians who survived the campaigning down to the
middle of 324 B.C. The total number of Macedonians who
participated in the Asian campaigning was about 21,000
infantry and 2,500 cavalry.14 It follows that no less than
15,000 out of fewer than 24,000 men survived the
campaigning, and that the death rate was little more than
one third. It is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with
the hypothesis that three-quarters of the Macedonians who
went into the Gedrosian desert never came out. It can be
explained that some of the Macedonians discharged by Alexander
in 324 B.C. were drawn from garrison duty ' and did not,
therefore, see Gedrosia; others went on an alternative route
with Craterus and avoided the desert.1  ^ But almost 12,000
17did go through the desert with Alexander, and these were 
the large majority of the Macedonians in Alexander*s service 
at the time. We must conclude that three-quarters of these 
did not die in Gedrosia. Although there may be some 
justification for.the view that the non-Macedonian troops in 
the column suffered more heavily than.the Macedonians,18
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overall losses in Gedrosia surely must have "been less than 
half of the total force.
It seems most likely that, although the troops suffered 
greatly, the majority survived. The extent of the disaster 
has been exaggerated in modern accounts because the size of 
the force attested as following Alexander in India is so much 
greater than that with which he is thought to have arrived at 
Susa. But, as I have argued, there is no evidence that
120,000 troops under Alexanders command left India, nor is 
there any evidence that he arrived at Susa with only 30,000.
Any,' discussion of the precise extent of the losses can 
only be in the most general terms. Strasburger has shown 
that if Alexander had taken the huge number of 60,000 into 
the desert the percentage lost would have been in the range 
of seventy-five. It follows that if the majority actually 
survived, and the evidence strongly indicates that they did, 
a much smaller number followed Alexander into the desert.
The smaller the division, the less would be the strain on the 
limited resources of the land and the less the proportion 
which succumbed to the hardships. Precise figures are 
impossible to determine, but perhaps it is reasonable to 
assume that if the army was half the size of the one 
Strasburger based his calculations on, then the proportion of 
that army lost would have been reduced by more than a half, I 
would estimate that an army of 3 0 , 0 0 0  would have lost about 
one quarter of its number.
It may be thought by some scholars that Alexander must 
have had many more than 30,000 men. For Alexander can 
scarcely have set out from India with many less than half of
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the number with him on the Hydaspes, and the force sent
with Craterus on the easier inland route consisted of only a
few thousand Macedonians according to Arrian (6,17,3). He'
records that Alexander sent Craterus through Arachosia and
Drangiana to Carmania with two pezetairoi battalions, one
ehiliarchy of hypaspists, some.archers and those of the
Companion cavalry and other Macedonians (presumably infantry)
which he had already decided to discharge. These could
21scarcely have numbered more than 10,000. Thus Alexander
seems to be left with 40,000 r- 50,000 men. But there is some
reason to think: that Arrian does not give a complete list of
the troops with Craterus. Alexander could have expected
little resistance along his route to Carmania when he detached
Craterus1 force in the summer of 325 B.C. And he must have
known that his route around the coast was difficult and that
the physical conditions might make a very large army an 
22embarrassment. It would be not at all surprising if
Alexander sent roughly as many men inland by the easier route
as he planned to take around the coast. It is noticeable that,
25with the exception of the archers, ' the only troops 
specified by Arrian are Macedonian. It might be expected 
that some mercenaries and Iranians also went with Craterus.^ 
In particular Craterus1 force, as detailed by Arrian, is ill 
equipped with light cavalry; it included only a few veteran 
Companions. Light cavalry was very important in the sort of 
fighting practised on the Iranian plateau: it is most odd 
that Craterus should have had none. Bor the route of 
Craterus did not take him through territory fully hubdued 
and Alexander must have sent him with a balanced effective
20
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force. As it turned out, Craterus met with and suppressed
25a revolt in Drangiana.
It seems probable, therefore, that Arrian's list is not 
complete and that Craterus had a stronger detachment, perhaps 
as large as Alexander's own. In this case there is no 
difficulty in accepting that Alexander had little more than
50.000 troops when he left Pattala. If we assume that a 
little under 60,000 troops in all set out west from India, 
which is a reasonable assumption, we may suggest that about
25.000 went with Craterus while slightly more remained with 
Alexander.
Kraft argued that fewer than 15,000 men went into the 
desert (p.117). He considered that Arrian could be relied 
upon to give a full account of the troops with Alexander.
Prom the chapters of Arrian describing troop movements 
immediately preceding the march (6,21,22), he reconstructed 
the total force with Alexander. The result is a force of the 
Companion cavalry, the pezetairoi. the hypaspists, mounted 
archers, Agrianes, archers, Greek mercenary cavalry and 
infantry. Of these the Agrianes, archers and Greek 
mercenaries were left behind with leomatus in the territory 
of the Oreitae (Arr. 6,22,5). However, Arrian cannot be 
relied upon to give full details of troop movements.
Hamilton has recently pointed out that on his sortie along 
the coast from the River Arabius Alexander had almost all 
the Macedonians, as well as the Agrianes and mounted archers 
(Arr. 6,21,5), n total of about 11,000, While Alexander 
was away with this force, Hephaestion was left at a base 
camp, and it must be thought likely that he had at least as
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many troops left with him as Alexander had taken. Hamilton 
concludes that the full force with which Alexander left 
Pattala in the late summer of 525 B.O. could not have been 
less than 25,000. This seems likely to he right. It is 
hardly possible that Alexander did not have several thousand 
Iranian cavalry with him, as well as mercenaries, in addition 
to those troops mentioned by Arrian.
And the majority of troops which left Pattala with 
Alexander went through the desert. Arrian (6,22,5) says 
that leonnatus was left in the territory of the Oreitae with 
Agrianes, archers, cavalry and Greek mercenary cavalry and 
infantry. But it is clear that the mass of the army did go 
into the desert with Alexander. Arrian (6,22,5) states 
explicitly that he took most of the army with him, for 
Hephaestion had come up with him. The force which stayed 
with Leonnatus could have numbered no more than a few 
thousand.2"^ Kraft (p.117) argues that the nature of the 
mission through the desert called for no more men than the 
similar mission which Alexander had undertaken around the 
coast from the River Arabius (Arr. 6,21,5)i that is the 
Macedonians, the Agrianes and the mounted archers. But 
Alexander certainly took most of the troops with him, whatever 
the numbers necessary for the fulfilment of the practical 
purposes of the mission. Nearchus states specifically that 
Alexander wanted to outdo Semiramis and Cyrus in leading a 
large army successfully through the desert (Arr. 6,24,2;
Str. 15,2,5). Kraft (pp.l06ff.) argued that this sense of 
rivalry in fact had no influence over Alexander's conduct,
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trut he fails to carry his point in the face of the emphatic
no
statement of Nearchus.
Kraft*s estimate of the number of men which Alexander led 
into the desert is too low and it is likely that that total 
was nearer to the maximum which, I have argued, is consistent 
with the general indications in the sources, that is 30,000. 
It, in fact, seems; certain that over 20,000 men entered the 
desert. Precision is impossible. The indications in the 
sources are only of the most general nature and it is possible 
to fix the size of the losses only within quite wide limits. 
These limits should perhaps be fixed at about 5,000 at 
the lower end and about 10,000 at the upper end.
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APPENDIX VI
THE ARG-YRASPIDS
There is a widely held belief that the argyraspids were
formed in 327 B.C., as part of the hypaspist force. This was
the view of Droysen and was developed "by Berve, who argued
that Alexander created the force of argyraspids on the eve of
the Indian campaign out of veteran hypaspists, to he a unit
parallel to a chiliarchy of hypaspists.^ Tarn dismissed
Berve*s arguments and explained that there was no such unit
as the argyraspids during Alexander's lifetime hut that the
2term was simply confused with 'hypaspists'. Scholars 
generally have agreed with one or other of these views.5
The argyraspids appear first in the accounts of 
Diodorus (17,57,2) and Gurtius (4/13,27) of the battle of 
G-augamela, where under Nicanor's command they held the right 
flanking position of the Macedonian phalanx. In Arrian's 
account (3,11,9) these argyraspids are hypaspists under 
Nicanor's command, and there has been no hesitation among 
scholars in dismissing this appearance of the term as a 
mistake, or as an alternative to the more correct hypaspists.^ 
This establishes the important point that the terms argyraspid 
and hypaspist were sometimes confused. The evidence which 
led Berve to believe that the corps was formed in 327 B.C. is 
contained in Justin 12,7,5: on the eve of the Indian campaign, 
in order to make the equipment of the army equal to the 
occasion, Alexander decorated it with silver and named the 
army »argyraspids', from their silver shields.5 The term 
appears again in the description in Arrian of the mutiny at
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Opis (7,11,3): after Alexander had dismissed the Macedonians 
he formed Persian units to take their place; a Persian agema, 
Persian pezetairoi, a Persian body of argyraspids, and even 
hetairoi cavalry and a royal agema of these. The term 
appears also in the descriptions of the splendour of 
Alexander's court, given with reasonable correspondence hy 
three different authors, Athenaeus (12,539 e), Aelian (VH 9,3) 
and Polyaenus (Strateg. 4,3,24).6 First, standing inside 
around the tent came 500 Persian melophoroi, then an equal 
number of archers (as Polyaenus, according to Athenaeus and 
Aelian there were 1,000 archers), and standing in front of 
these were 500 argyraspids of outstanding physical stature.
There is no further reference to the corps during 
Alexander's lifetime and the first mention of it, or rather 
of its commander, after Alexander's death is in Photius* 
epitome of Arrian's Piadochft (35). Here it is recorded that 
Antigenes, who had led the assassins in their attack on 
Perdicoas, and who commanded the Macedonian argyraspids, was 
rewarded by Antipater with command over all Susiana. This 
can be dated to 321 B.C. Antipater, however, then ordered him 
to transport the treasury at Susa to the west, and gave him 
about 3,000 of the Macedonians who had stirred up trouble 
(38) 7  Antigenes turns up next in Cilicia, in 317 B.C., sharing 
the command over the 3,000 argyraspids with Teutamus, and 
joining the army of Eumenes, who is preparing to fight 
Antigonus. Antigenes and Teutamushad received letters from 
the kings instructing them to do this (Diod. 18,59,3; Plut.
Eum. 13,2-3; Justxn 14,2,6f.). These troops are pre-eminent 
among Eumenes* army and their commanders lead not only the
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argyraspids "but also over 3,000 hypaspists, who are 
stationed next to them (Diod. 19,28,1). The nature of the 
argyraspids is made clearer in Diodorus (19,41,If.), Plutarch 
(Eum. 16,4) and Justin (14,2,6ff.): they are said to have 
heen all over 60 years old and to'have served gloriously 
under Philip and Alexander. Eumenes was defeated in the 
second "battle against Antigonus and the argyraspids went over 
to Antigonus, who sent them off to waste them3elve3 in the 
service of the satrap of Arachosia to prevent their seeing 
their home ever again (Plut. Eum. 19,2; Diod. 19,48,4).
This force clearly ceased to exist at this time, "but 
later, "by the battle of Magnesia in 189 B.C. at the latest, 
the equivalent of Alexander's force of hypaspi3 ts was called 
argyraspids, according to Livy (37,40,7), who states that 
the ‘royal cohort* were called the argyraspida from the type 
of arms they carried. It also became a description of a 
particular category of soldier appearing beside the 
chalcaspids in the procession at Daphne in 167 B.C. (Polyb. 
30,25,5)..
This is the full evidence relating to the argyraspids 
during and after Alexander*s lifetime. Berve was led by 
Justin’s evidence (12,7,5) to' the view that Alexander formed 
the argyraspids early in 327 B.C. and on the strength of 
character of Antigenes* and Teutamus* force, suggested that 
they were veteran hypaspists whom Alexander formed into a 
chiliarchy under Antigenes and attached to the hypaspist 
force. I shall discuss Berve*s'case at some length in my 
treatment of the source material (below). Tarn’s beliefs 
about the argyraspids were influenced by his view of the
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relationships between the sources, in particular his contempt 
for Justin and much of Diodorus (see especially II pp.123-125). 
He argues that Hieronymus called Alexanders hypaspi3 ts 
•argyraspids* when they entered Eumenes* service, and the 
familiarity of the sources with this usage led them to 
introduce the identification too early, all usages prior to 
317 B.C. being anachronistic (II pp.l51f.). His argument is 
poor, as is shown conclusively by Strasburger in his review 
of Tarn (BO 9 p.210). Berve's case is based more closely on 
the'individual instances of the term and we must now look at 
these.
The evidence of Justin is not good. It is certainly 
wrong that Alexander called his whole army argyraspids, and 
the context of the evidence which Berve would use to establish 
the date of the formation of the argyraspids is hardly such
as to inspire confidence. The wealth of India was legendary
*
and there was a tradition, clearly reflected in Curtiu3 (8,5»
4 ) and Justin (12,7»5), that Alexander's army matohed the 
fabulous splendour of the Indians. It is not difficult to see 
how this tradition could become related to the famed 
argyraspids of Alexander. That this connection was not made 
by the ultimate source of Justin and Curtius (there is no 
doubt that a common source lies at the root of their accounts) 
is indicated by Curtius* omission of any reference to the
formation of that.body..... There can.be no doubt that Justin*s
evidence should not be used to support a date of 327 B.C. for 
the institution of the argyraspids (cf. Tarn II pp.l23f.).
That Berve*s interpretation of the Justin passage is 
unacceptable, is also indicated by the absence of any reference
436
to the corps during the course of the campaigning of 327-323 
B.C. This seems to me quite decisive support for the view 
that the argyraspids did.not exist at this time, especially 
when the prominence of the unit after Alexander*s death is 
considered. The other reference Berve uses to indicate the 
existence of the argyraspids from 327 B.C. is Arrian 7*11,3, 
in which the formation of a replacement unit of Persian 
argyraspids is described.^ Tarn has criticised Berve»s inter­
pretation, arguing that this is a clear case of confusion 
between the terms »argyraspid» and »hypaspist», and points 
out that the absence of any reference to the most important 
hypaspist body makes it certain that Arrian has here used 
»argyraspid* where he should have used »hypaspist*. Tarn 
seems to have a very good case in that there should have been 
a unit of Persian hypaspists beside the pezetairoi and the 
Companion cavalry, whereas the argyraspids, who receive no 
mention up to this time, apart from the highly suspect 
reference in Justin, seem to have no claim to inclusion here.
I find little difficulty in accepting that »argyraspid» in 
this passage is a mistake for »hypaspist», and the evidence 
is certainly not sufficient to support a case for the 
existence of a unit of argyraspids from 327 B.C.
The other evidence used by Berve is the description of 
Alexander*s court. Although Polyaenus says that he is 
describing the court which Alexander held among the Bactrians, 
Hyrcanians and Indians, it cannot be believed that Alexander 
had a force of 10,000 Persian guards at any time before the 
return to the heartland of Persia in 324 B.C., for it wa3 
only then that Alexander made extensive use of Persian
4-37
soldiers and fully adopted the.court ceremony (see Ch. T  pp.
1 7 2 £  )• The details of the description make it clear that 
the scene is taken from the last year of Alexanders life.
This passage cannot, therefore, he used to indicate that the 
argyraspids were formed before 324 B.C.
However, it may he thought that the evidence of the 
description clearly indicates that Alexander formed the 
argyraspids when he returned from India in 324 B.G. That he 
established an elaborate and colourful court at this time 
nobody would deny, but this is the only evidence that the 
formation of the argyraspids is attributable to Alexander 
himself and, in view of the established tendency to confuse 
the terms Srgyraspid* and »hypaspist*, we must discuss its 
reliability. *
The survival of the hypaspists after Alexanders death 
is well attested. Eumenes copied Alexanders unit in his 
elite guard of 3,000 in.the struggles with Antigonus and |
fcalled them hypaspists; Perdiccas in his invasion of Egypt |
used hypaspists in precisely the same way as Alexander had i
done, as did Seleucus in his fight against Demetrius.10 j
i:There is no doubt, therefore, that the hypaspist body survived j
I.
and kept its traditional role up until Alexanders death and |f
beyond. The hypaspists were Alexanders guards andas such 1
one might expect them.to appear in the description of the !■•f.
court scene, especially since the melophoroi. who are 
Alexanders Persian guards and who (we are told) had an equal
!
share with the Macedonians in the guarding of the king, do I
appear in the description. We may be justifiably suspicious
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of the term »argyraspid* here, for much the same reason that 
we were suspicious of it in its appearance in Arrian 7,11,3.
There is further reason for suspicion. The known-nature 
of the corps of argyraspids which fought under Eumenes is not 
such as to make it credible that it was this force, or part 
of it, which*.formed a dazzling spectacle at the court of 
Alexander in 324 B.C.: for despite Tarn’s rejection of the 
evidence about the age of the argyraspids,^ there seems little 
doubt that one of the most characteristic features of the unit 
was its veteran quality. Now, even if we were to assume for 
the purposes of argument that the average age of the 
argyraspids was in the 40’s and not the 60*s, as Diodorus and 
Plutarch say, it is impossible to believe that Alexander 
would have ranged them beside the young and handsome Persians 
in his court in 324 B.C., tfhen at least some would have been
1 Oin their forties. To claim that there were two separate 
units of argyraspids, that which appears in the description 
of the court and another which served Eumenes, would require 
special pleading. It seems impossible to relate the 
argyraspids of Eumenes to the argyraspids of Alexander as 
they appear in the description of the court. Therefore, since 
it is established that »argyraspid* is often mistakenly used 
for ’hypaspist’, and ’hypaspist* would fit the context, there 
can be little doubt that in the descriptions of Polyaenus, 
Aelian and Athenaeus the use of ’argyraspid’ should be viewed 
as an anachronistic one for 'hypaspist».
It appears likely that the passages derived ultimately 
from Chares, who should have known his terminology well 
enough not to have made such a mistake, but Athenaeus tells
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us that he took his quotation from Phylarchus, and Phylarchus
certainly took it from Duris:  ^Polyaenus and Aelian do not
quote their source hut their versions are so similar that
they certainly came from Duris, if not from Phylarchus.
Neither Duris nor Phylarchus is notable for his accuracy,
14writing rather with an eye to sensationalism. It is by no 
means unlikely that one of them decided to use the more 
interesting word ’argyraspid’ for the ’hypaspist’ which he :j
found in the source. The emphasis in the descriptions is I
upon the colour and splendour of the scene, and it would i
have been particularly tempting to an author of the stamp of !j 
Duris or Phylarchus to introduce another colour by 
substituting a synonym for the word ’hypaspist’. We do not, 
of course, know when it was that the term ’argyraspid* began ,
n
to be used by the Seleucids to describe their ’hypaspists’, 
but since it was certainly before 1 8 9 B«0 . there is no real 
difficulty in supposing that this meaning of the term was
j!
current in Phylarchus * time, i.e. the last quarter of the 
3rd century B.C., or even in Duris * day, the mid-3rd oentury.^
I conclude that there is no evidence that the
i-5;.
argyraspids were formed during Alexander’s lifetime. The 
evidence indicates rather that they were a product of the ;
years of conflict following Alexander’s death. Photius* [
epitome of Arrian’s Diadoohi (38) would seem to give a clear 
indication of the origin of the unit. Antipater sent Antigenes
i
\
from Susa, giving him 3,000 troublesome Macedonians to escort Ii
the treasure. That these troops were veterans of Alexander’s 
campaigning needs no demonstration (id. 3 4 ); that Antipater 
was actually sending them home at this time is also most
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likely; and the troops which turn up under Antigenes» and
Teutamus* command in Cilicia, 3,000 in number, can be none
other than those troublemakers which Antipater had sent away.
It seems to me most probable that in between the time of
their departure from Susa in 321 B.C, and their appearance in
Cilicia in 317 B.C. they had been formed by Antigenes and
Teutamus into a freelance semi-mercenary unit, proclaiming
their close connection with Alexander by decorating their
shields with silver. This interpretation requires that the
description of Antigenes in Photius (id_. 35) is anachronistic;
Antigenes was not yet leader of the argyraspids when he led
the attack upon Perdiccas. There is no real difficulty in
this, however, because Antigenes was clearly best known for
his connection with the argyraspids and anyone wanting to
distinguish this Antigenes from others would be tempted
naturally to use this connection, even if he were not- yet
17commander of them.
This explanation of the background of the argyraspid 
force seems to fit their character as revealed in the battles 
between Eumenes and Antigonus. The mercenary nature of the 
men and the very extreme reaction of Antigonus to their
"I Q
betrayal of Eumenes can best be explained if they had a
background of stirring up trouble to obtain money from
Antipater in 321 B.C. and of four years of adventuring and
19unruly plundering. It is not, of course, likely that 
precisely the same 3,000 men who left Susa served in the army 
of Eumenes, some of these would have left or died and others 
joined the force, but I have no doubt that these formed the 
majority of those in the unit.
16
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The argyraspids have been connected with Alexander's
hypaspists by scholars "because of the confusion "between the
two terms. I have argued, however, that the confusion was
caused not "by a connection "between the argyraspids and
Alexander's hypaspists, "but "by a connection "between the
argyraspids and the Seleucid hypaspists. That such a
connection existed is clear enough: Livy states explicitly
20that the royal elite infantry were called »argyraspids».
It is also evident that the royal elite infantry were called
hypaspists (Polybius 7»16>2; Zeno 16,18,7; FGrH 257 F 36).
Some explanation of the connection should be offered. The
original argyraspids boasted of their association with
Alexander and used the distinctive shield to mark their
heritage, and the unit clearly caught the imagination of the
people, as a force carrying on the tradition of Alexander's
21invincible Macedonian army. This idea of continuity was of
paramount importance to the leaders in the years following
Alexander's death and it is quite understandable that someone
adopted the distinctive marking to proclaim the connection
with Alexander's army and the invincibility of his royal
infantry force. This force would, of course, necessarily be
Macedonian, in theory at least, and it gave rise to another
development: an argyraspid's armour was a claim to be of
22Macedonian descent. One can only guess at the date of the 
adoption of this term for the royal force of elite infantry, 
but it would have more point if it were taken to be before 
the memory of what the argyraspids had stood for faded. 
Therefore, I would suggest that already by the beginning of
442
the 3 rd century B.C. ‘argyraspid* began to be used of what 
was the equivalent of Alexander^ hypaspists.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX I
THEOPOMPHS AND THE HETAIROI
Notes on the text
I do not wish to discuss all the textual variants 
recorded "by Jacoby, but two are more tmP°rtant than the 
others.
4 . 8 ^ 7V<y»*^contained in Va should be read as Jacoby, 
although it is lacking in both Polybius and Athenaeus, for 
clearly it is needed for the pun which is obviously intended.
rTpeCTiw m f  is clearly wrong because it does not 
present a jingle as the other two pairs do, and it is such a 
colourless word that it is difficult to believe that 
Theopompus could have used it: also it is more likely to be 
a gloss. Meineke‘s suggestion ^ * ^ 4  #coir*< f* is likely
and should be accepted; ‘those who sleep on the ground* 
could have been a popular description of soldiers on campaign.
1) Even so, Athenaeus may have omitted parts without telling 
us. The fragments have been discussed by R.D, Milns, 
‘Theopompus Pragments 225A and B Jacoby*, i.. La Parola 
del Passato 23 (1968) pp.361-4. His conclusions seem 
beyond dispute.
2) Eor the accuracy of the quotations of Athenaeus, see 
W.R. Connor, Theopompus and fifth-century Athens, p.9 
and n.27.
3 ) loc.oit. 
p.5.4)
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5 ) »Die griechischen Historiker-Pragmente Dei Didymus*
Klio 5 (1905) pp.141-154» esp. p.149. He has been 
followed by, for instance, Jacoby 2 B D Kommentar p.3 8 7 , 
Momigliano p.14.
6 ) Little progress has been made in deciding which book 
covered which years and so there can be no confidence in 
the assignment of the events of Book 49 to the year 
540/39 B.C.
7 ) See Connor, pp.l3ff.
8 ) e.g., E.134, 186, 187.
9 ) Connor, p.3.
1 0 ) ibid. p.2f.
11) According to Arrian (7,9,6) less than sixty talents 
remained. The exact figure is variously given.
12) Plut. Alex. 9,3ff.5 Athen. Deipn. 6,260. Although the 
evidence may be influenced somewhat by the prejudice of 
the Greek sources, there can be little doubt that Philip 
was not moderate in his habits.
1 5 ) See, for instance, Demosth. Philipp. I and III.
14) PGrH IIB 2, p.582,11.23ff.; p.583,11.lOff.
15) ibid. p.584 P.225 b.1.28.
1 6 ) ibid, p.584 P.225 b.1.32. The figure of 10,000 has no 
particular significance (see Ch.II n.22).
1 7 ) See Berve II no.253» 302; 4 6 4 . These were Alexander*s 
hetairoi of course, but this nevertheless supports
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Theopompus* evidence that Philip made Greeks his 
hetairoi though it does not prove it.
18) Whether the hetairoi referred to are hetairoi councillors 
(for a definition see Ch.I n.l9a), hetairoi cavalry, or 
both (see below), there were hetairoi already existing 
"before Philip*s expansion, and the numbers collected 
from all over the Greek world cannot have been large.
At the very most only the names of about a dozen Greek 
hetairoi councillors are known. See Berve I p.31, and 
Carrata Thornes p.44.
19) 1375f.
20) Momigliano pp.l2ff.; Griffith G&R 12 p.135; Milns ha 
Parola del Passato 23 p.363 n.2.
21) Edson states that the »hetairoi- councillors* numbered 
800 under Philip (»Early Macedonia* p.30 n.78)» but he 
seems to be the only exception to my generalisation.
22) P.R. E r a n k e Gnomon 30 (1958),p.207)estimates »well over
100*.
23) Berve I p.107.
24) See Connor*s general comments, pp.117-129, esp. p.119,
127/8 .
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NOTES TO APPENDIX II
AT/ffYANDE.'R »8 ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OE THE CAMPAIGN
1) F o r a fuller list, cf. Walbahk Commentary II p.3 7 1 .
2) In Hellenismus I (1836) p.165 n.2. He recanted . this 
view in Hermes 12, p.229, but the idea has found wide 
acceptance: e.g. by Judeich, »Die Schlacht am Granikos'. 
Klio 8 (1908), pp.372-397, esp. p.376, n.2; Griffith 
Mercenaries, pp.l3ff.
3) JHB 83 pp.32ff.
4 ) He explains that it was rounded down from Callisthene3 * 
4 , 5 0 0 (p.33).
5 ) He is-' led to the view that Arrian*s »over 5,000* is 
5,100 by the assumption that Arrian's cavalry figure 
referred to the same number as that of Diodorus: but on 
this, see below, *».
6 ) The figures of Arrian he rightly sees as being drawn 
from Ptolemy.
7 ) On this, see below, p.35”5~
8 ) Arrian preferred to follow Ptolemy for such details and 
scholars generally have assumed that his figures are 
taken from him (cf. for instance, Berve I p.177; Brunt 
p.33).
9 ) In both passages he discussed Alexander's financial 
resources and then his manpower.
10) Cf. the text and apparatus oriticus of Ziegler in 
Plutarchus Vitae Parallelae II 2 (Teubner 1968).
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11) Cf., for instance, Jacoby EGrH Commentary II C, p.105.
12) In section 3 of the chapter, the figures of the cavalry 
are omitted altogether. See, in general, Walbank*s 
discussion, Commentary II pp.371ff.
13) Cf., for instance, I. Pearson, The lost histories, pp. 
22ff.
14) He is arguing that Callisthenes* account of the battle 
of Issus is impossible, for the area of the battlefield 
was too small for the number of troops he says were 
involved.
15) Callisthenes was the »official historian*, and although 
he clearly magnified Alexander*s achievements, such an 
alteration is not likely. Anaximenes could have had no 
cause to add 1,000.
16) Callisthenes* cavalry figure appears also in Justin (I 
shall argue below that Diodorus* total was 5,100), but 
there is much less reason to think that Callisthenes 
had the same cavalry total as Justin than that he had 
the same as Anaximenes. Justin, it should be noted, does 
not share Callisthenes* infantry total (see also below).
17) Cf. n.8 above.
18) Brunt (p.33) seems to assume that Ptolemy actually had 
the same totals as Diodorus, but see below p.3é^c
1 9 ) Eor a date of a little after 320 B.C., cf. Errington C£ 
1 9 , p.241, following a suggestion of Badian Gnomon 3 3  
pp.665f•
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2 0 ) Differences of a thousand or two can "be ignored.
21) Ducian Quomodo hist, conscrib. 12. Cf. Badian Gnomon 
33 p.664.
22) (Lucian) Macrob 22 = EG-rH IT B no.139, T 3«
23) If he. could make Alexander meet Porus•in single combat, 
he must be thought capable of understating the 3ize of 
Alexanders army (Lucian Quomodo hist, conscrib.12).
24) See above, for an argument against the accuracy of the 
report of Callisthenes' cavalry figure.
25) In general, it should not be assumed that writers of 
general histories used several sources together for any 
particular passage. F o r a discussion of Pompeius Trogus* 
sources, see RR 2 1 (1 9 5 2 ) 2300-2313 esp. 2305ff.
26) Of., for instance, N.C. Debevoise A political history 
of Parthia (Chicago, 1938) p.17 n.69; Walbank,
Commentary II p.236.
27) Comm, p.42.
28) Justin frequently has numbers not contained in any other 
source, and it seems possible that they are simply 
invented. Eor instance, Epaminondas in a raid on Sparta 
before the battle at Mantinea in 362 B.C. is said to 
have had 15,000 men with himtodtohare been opposed by 
100 (6,7,4). Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus has such 
figures, and it is difficult to believe they are trust­
worthy. On Justin*s reliability see in general RE 21 
(1952) 2300-13, esp. 2304f.
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29) Arr. l,ll,6ff.; Diod. 17,17,6f.
50) Given the tendency of ancient writers to use round 
numbers, 7 , 0 0 0  to 8 , 0 0 0 would be sufficient to produce 
the difference between ‘over 5 0 ,0 0 0 » and »over 40,000*.
5 1 ) Cf. the text and apparatus criticus in Fischer's edition, 
Diodorus Siculus (Teubner, 3rd edition, 1906).
3 2 ) Welles (Diod. Sic, p.164) oddly prints 32,000 a3 the 
infantry total without question, thereby changing 
Diodorus' text, but for the cavalry be retains the 
numbers in the items and the total of Diodorus without 
comment. One can only assume that Welles did think that 
Diodorus could not add.
3 3 ) Brunt, pp.28 n.9 and 35; Marsden, pp.24ff. They are 
followed by Milns »Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry and 
Diodorus XVII W  in JHS 8 6 '(1966) pp.167-8.
3 4 ) J. Droysen Hermes 12 pp.230ff.j Beloch pp.323ff.
Cf. Fischer, cited n.31. This can itself be done in 
different ways, see below, pp. 364-6
3 5 ) The details appear to have come from some official 
source (see below) and it is difficult to believe he 
had to rely upon his own powers of addition.
3 6 ) Cf., for instance, Welles Diod. Sio. pp.6ff.
3 7 ) I shall argue below that the details of Diodorus* list 
show an accuracy which could only be achieved by someone 
writing near the event, with access to official sources 
of information.
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38) Beloch, pp.323f.j Berve I p.177.
39) Of. Fischer*s text for the emendation of the infantry- 
total (cited n.3l)*
40) Hermes 12 pp.230ff.
41) TAPhA 41, p.328.
42) Schachermeyr (Al.d.Gr. p.139) thinks that Diodorus» list 
is mistaken on this point.
43) Badian and Brunt have already suggested that Philip may 
have led them in this Battle only (Brunt p.28 n.9).
44) He was soon removed from service with the main army to 
he satrap of Lydia (Berve II no.164).
45) Parke Mercenaries p.188 thought that they were hoplite3 , 
hut Griffith Mercenaries p.17, is more cautious, 
suggesting that they may have been peltasto. I do not 
see how the matter can he settled.
46) They were prohahly all akontistae. see Best pp.3ff. For-, 
the later organisation, see Berve I p.139.
47) Hermes 12 p.251.
48) See, for instance, Brunt pp.28f. and Marsden pp.24ff.
49) Hermes 12, pp.238-40.
50) See, for instance, Berve I p.130; Brunt p.27.
51) Brunt pp.27f.
52) A common additional argument is that the sarissa was a 
peculiarly Macedonian weapon (cf., for instance, Berve
I p.129); hut see Tarn*s refutation (II p.157), based on 
Didymus Commentary on Demosthenes 13,5, and above Ch.I.
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53) For the rare occasions, see Arr. 2,9,5; 5,12,2; 5,12,2.
The hippakontistae >s nationality is never given.
54) Brunt p.27f.
55) The prodromoi, if they were Macedonian, would not have 
been listed between the Thracians and Paeonians with 
no indication of their nationality.
56) Arr. 3,12,4. The Thracian cavalry tinder Agathon at the 
Granicus, must be the same unit as the Odrysian cavalry 
under Agathon at Gaugamela. Cf. Berve I p.134 and II no.8 .
57) Berve I p.134; Brunt pp.27f.
58) Arr. 1,14,1; 14,5; 5,12,5; 12,4. Arrian uses prodromoi 
and sarissophoroi as interchangeable terms: see Appendix 
III p.370
5 9 ) On prodromoi in general, see HE 23 (1957) 102-4, article 
by Pauli. Originally »prodromoi» wa3 an adjective to 
describe a. group of men, or in the singular a man, who 
went ahead of the main body: it could be a herald (Herod. 
1,60), or it could apply to an advance force (Herod. 9,14). 
At Athens in the fourth century B.C. it applied to a 
special type of cavalry, citizens who were used to
escort a hipparch, to forage, to scout or to skirmish: 
they were armed with javelins (Xen.Eq.Mag. 1,25; Arist. 
Ath.Pol. 49,5).
6 0) JHS 8 6 , p.168.
61) On this view, the command of Asander was rather the over­
command of three independent tactical units; the Thracian
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skirmishing cavalry under Agathon; the prodromoi unit, 
which was under Hegelochus at the Granicus (Arr. 1,13,1), 
under Protomachus at Issue (Arr. 2,9,2), and under Aretes 
at G^ugamela (Arr. 3,12,3); and the Paeonians who were 
under Ariston (Arr. 1,14,1» Berve II no.138). We never 
hear of all these units operating in concert and it 
would appear, therefore, that Asander»s command was an 
organisational rather than a tactical command.
62) There has been a tendency to assume that units were 
omitted from Diodorus* list "because they were already in 
Asia when the main force left Pella, e.g. Brunt p.34, 
Milns, JHS 86 p.168. But there can "be no oertainty 
about what troops were in the advance force (see below) 
and I have shown (I hope) that it cannot be shown 
conclusively that any particular unit which fought under 
Alexander in 334 B.C. was omitted by Diodorus* list.
6 3 ) That is Ptolemy*s figures of *not many more than 30,000* 
and ‘over 5,000*. See above.
6 4) A few hundreds over in each infantry item and a few 
tens in each cavalry item would affect the total.
6 5) Marsden (p.24) assumes that Diodorus used Ptolemy for his 
detailed list and on p.27 he says »Diodorus certainly 
did not use Ptolemy as a general rule, but the Army List 
is more probably one of the very few exceptions.* There 
seems to be no case for thinking that Diodorus used 
Ptolemy, and in view of the probability that Ptolemy 
used an existing account for his totals, if there is a
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direct link "between Diodorus and Ptolemy, it is more 
likely that Ptolemy used Diodorus» source. This is made 
more probable because Ptolemy appears to have given 
round numbers, Diodorus» source precise one3 . Brunt 
thought that Ptolemy»s total for the cavalry was exactly 
5,100 (p.33). However, there is no particular reason to 
see a direct link between Ptolemy and Diodorus* source.
6 6) As Brunt pp.33f.
67) Diod. 17,7,10.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX III 
ARRI AN * s' TERMINOLO GY
1) Eor instance, Tactica 18,2 ile = 64 cavalrymen, clearly 
too small to correspond to Alexander’s ile.
2) A.B. Bosworth ’Arrian’s Literary Development’, N.S. 22 
(1972), pp.l63ff. argues that Arrian wrote the Anabasis 
not late in his life, as is usually held, but early, in 
his youth, before he had had any military experience.
If correct, and the case is not proven, this would make 
Arrian’s carelessness more understandable.
3 ) Arrian 6,9,5» Leonnatos (Berve II no.466) was beside 
Alexander during the storming of the town held by the 
Malli, but Ptolemy (Curtius 9,5,21) was not there, 
although he was a somatophylax (Arrian 3,27,5, Berve II 
no.6 6 8).
4 ) The Biomat ophy lakes of Philip (Berve II no.780), satrap 
of the Indians, killed his assassins (6,27,2).
5 ) Berve I p.26 anticipated Tarn in this opinion.
6 ) Cf. Welles Misc. Aless. pp.lOlff. Errington pp.235ff.
7 ) The word appears first in extant literature in Polybius. 
It always applies to a man, or men, closely attached to 
the person of one of the Diadochi kings, and it seems 
likely that it describes holders of a position similar 
to that of Alexander’s ’personal staff’, or 
somatophylakes in the strict sense. Walbank Commentary 
II p.95 describes them as *a group of high ranking 
officers who remain close to the king day and night,’
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and he uses them for special confidential missions. It 
is clear that the somatophylakes do survive into the 
Diadochi kingdoms and retain their name. Compare 
Hegesander (EHG IV, 416 E.15) on somatophylakes under 
Antiochus I (Müller considers he was writing about the 
time of Perseus, king of Macedon). While it cannot 
definitely be shown that all the usages of Polybius are 
in this strict meaning, it cannot be shown that they are 
not, and the likelihood is that they are. The usages of 
the word are at 8,20,8; 1 5 ,2 7 ,6 ; 50,7; 51,4; 51 6 ; 5 2 6 ;
5 2 8 ; 28,8,9. Diodorus uses the word with reference to 
the time of Philip II, when the institution was 
certainly in existence (cf. Berve I p.26). At 16,95,5 
Pausanias, the assassin of Philip, is called a 
»somatophylax1, and at 9 5 , 9  is said to be a member of the 
»somatophylakia». This may be the strictly technical 
usage, but in 16,94,4 he uses it in a looser meaning of 
»bodyguards*, being a synonym for »doryphoroi» (sec. 5 ). 
As Welles (Diod. Sic, p.101 n.2) points out, it cannot 
here be used in its narrow meaning, but I cannot agree 
that probably it refers to the guard of Alexander: it 
must surely refer to the royal guard of Philip. If this 
is correct, this is the first usage extant of 
»somatophylax» being used definitely in the loose meaning 
of »bodyguard*. At 14,45,5, however, Diodorus uses the 
verb »somatophylakein* of a mercenary bodyguard of 
Dionysius of Syracuse. Later Josephus uses 
»somatophylax» in this meaning (Life 17. 18), referring 
to his own guards. This shows that by the time of
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Arrian the word had "become just another word for »guard1, 
and it seems likely that on occasion he uses it in this 
way. Diodorus* use of it in 16,94,4 may well refer to 
the »royal agema» (Berve I p.26), "but this is not proof 
that the Macedonians of Alexander»s day also referred to 
it so. The usages in Alanika of Arrian (sec.22) can 
only support this view.
8 ) Cf. the distinction "between somatophylakes and hypaspi3 tae 
in Plutarch Alex. 51.
9) Nor instance, Herodotus 5»111» Euripides Phoenissae 1213, 
Xenophon Anab. 4,2,20.
10) For its use in Seleucid army, see Walbank Commentary II p.,i
482 .
11) For instance, 3,20,1 on the march; 5,16,4 of the 
cavalry of an Indian king in "battle; of heavy infantry 
in "battle formation 2,9,3» 3,23,3. I have tried to sort 
out the number of times Arrian uses the word in the 
meaning of the formation, as opposed to the troops 
themselves, but in so many cases it is impossible to 
decide with any certainty.
12) 1,14,2.3; 3,14,4; 5,20,3; 21,5. In Tactica 10 Arrian 
explains the infantry division; though he describes 
many intermediate divisions, the main ones are lochos, 
taxis and phalanx. The use of »phalanx» for a 
battalion of pezetairoi may well be Arrian's own idea. 
•Phalanx» does not appear in the papyri records of 
Ptolemaic armies. In the Alanika it is used of the 
main tactical formations of heavy cavalry ;(sec.5, 6, 7,
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15,24.)» as well as for the whole "body of infantry (sec. 
5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26.). It is worth noting that 
• taxis.* is not used as meaning a 'battalion* or 'unit* 
in the Alanika, perhaps indicating that Arrian found 
•taxis* in this meaning in his sources (see below n.16).
15) Eor the number of units^see Ch.IV pp. *75"^
14) At 5,25,5 and many other places the hypaspists are 
clearly not included in *the phalanx*.
15) e.g. 1,6,6; 1,6,9; et passim. See above Ch.IV pp. 1 0 0 - f ,
"While in the Tactica (10,2) «taxis * is given a fixed 
strength (128 men), in the Alanika, although it occurs 
fifteen times, it means always either the 'ranks' of the 
battle-line (sec. 16, 17, 18, 26, 27), or the »formation* 
or the »troops in the formation* (in this meaning it is 
sometimes a synonym for »phalanx*, e.g. sec. V i r u s ’ 
TrXeupeer T-rjr ). an(j j_3 often difficult
to distinguish between the latter two meanings (e.g. 
sec. 4; 10; 12).
16) taxis is used of hetairoi at 5,27,4 and 7,8,2; of light 
infantry at 6,8,7.
1 7 ) 1,18,5; 12,9,5, et passim. See Ch.III pp
18) 1,12,7; 4,4,6.
19) 2,12,2.
20) 1,14,4; 5,11,6.
21) 5,9,6.
22) Cf. the usage in Xenophon Anab. 1,2,16, where **r'tX*r
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\ //*is equivalent to K oct»l ToLietST 
25) Xen. Ath. 1,3« RE 8 (1913) 1683 s.v. Hipparchos (20).
24) ONI I '(.1884) 414, 420, 424. See in general, Kromayer and 
Veith, p.131, R. Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford, 1969) 
pp.50ff.
2 5 ) lesquier, pp.8 3ff.
26) RE 8 (1913) 1662. Liddell and Scott, Lexicon s.v.
c ^
CTTVoi^COi
27) Lesquier, pp.77f.
28) See Ch.III pp.
29) The accounts are confused and the positions of the 
commanders, Menedemus, Andromachus, Caranus and 
Pharnuches, are not clear. Cf. Berve II no.412.
5 0 ) Commanders of mercenary cavalry are not known to have 
held the title of ‘hipparch*.
3 1 ) 4,24,1; 5,11,3; 5,12,2; 5,13,4; 5,16,3; 5,21,5; 5,22,6; 
6,6,4; 6,7,2; 6,21,3; 7,6,4. cf. Tarn. See my 
discussion above, Ch.III pp.69’'£
32) BE 8 (1913). 1662 suggests that Alexander was the first 
to put such a meaning on the term.
3 3 ) I have suggested above (Ch.III pp .8 0 f .) that these top 
army commanders had organisational rather than tactical 
command over their hipparchies.
3 4 ) JHS 83, pp.69ff.
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35) Niod. 17,17,4.
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3 6 ) Cf. P. Stark, * Alexanders march from Miletus to 
Phrygia», JHS 78 (1958) pp.102-120.
37) Misc♦ Aless. pp.lOlff. See further Ch.III pp.
38) Arr. 3,30,5.
3 9 ) Lesquier pp.8 8f.
40) Cf. Berve I pp.l48f.; Parke pp.l92f.; Griffith pp.27f.
/  j  / i  7 >  v _  * " *  <  y41) IXeLxrttc e K e A e o r e v  e s  « \ rro u r t w v  -t*  - r o e t r
c  / \ f / v
itrtW a ^ iM C  Keec T~ouc r t  &  t v  r  >  u r t t r u v r u s *  K -fc
> \ \ » \ </ ) /  f / - i
x u T o r  b €  T i j v '  A o c v t j v  n r i r o v  » o 'w v  o 'y ro t /o f j e v e f fo fA & V
p n s  _ — pr\ ' ^ 4 '
- r t i t f  c A  a¿ty.
42) Arr. 5,17,4; cf. /c<*t 3,13,4; 5,15,2 and Xen.
Anab. 1,2,16.
4 3 ) Cf. Berve I p.129; Brunt p.27.
44) Por instance, Berve I p.30. Plaumann 1375.
4 5 ) See Ch.I n,19a for a definition.
46) See above, Ch.II pp.
4 7 ) Iheopompus (PGrH 115 E.224) and Anaximenes (PGrH 72 P.4), 
both contemporaries of Philip, use the term of the 
cavalry, and Theopompus may use it in its other meaning 
(see Appendix I pp. 33 t t ) .
48) Por the general meaning, Xen. Cyrop. 2,2,5 »companions»; 
Aristoph. Ecc. 912 »lover*; Plato Gorg. 482a »friend» as 
a term of address.
4 9 ) An instance of this comes at 7,29,4. Arrian reports that
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Aristobulus explained that Alexander sat long over his 
banquets not to drink a lot of wine, but out of 
affectionate feeling towards the hetairoi. »hetairos» 
is often used of companions at a feast (e.g. Xen. Cyrop. 
2,2,5, Theognis 115), hut because Alexander usually ate 
and drank with the »councillors* quite possibly the word 
is here being used with a technical meaning.
50) Hephaestion (Berve no.357) was certainly a »councillor*.
51) Por instance, hypaspists of langarus at 1,5,2, royal »ile» 
of Darius at 5,11,6: Appendix Iip/>. 3 3 & £
52) See, for instance, Allan Dahlquist, Megasthenes and 
Indian Religion, (Stockholm, 1962) esp. pp.29ff.
53) See above, p. 3  74-
54) II p.138. In this he contradicts Berve I p.31, who 
considers Demaratos of Corinth, who is fighting beside 
the king at the Granicus (1,15,6), to be a »councillor* 
(II no.253). Plaumann (1375) is in no doubt that they 
fought beside the king in all the battles.
55) There were more than 80 in 324 B.C. (Susa marriages,
Arr. 7,4,7). See also Ch.I n. 19a.
5 6 ) Plaumann (1377) assumed that they were the »councillors*
5 7 ) Plaumann 1577; Berve I p.30.
58) Cf. 1,6,7; 4,24,3. <*c i t p y f * e ti~ ro v  ¿ 'T a ffp o i
appears only at 1,6,5; 1,15,6; 7,11,2; 7,24,2: these 
four usages cannot prove that ,i£ has some special 
significance. Cf. the expression at 3,21,2 f e u ?
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c s/  /  ? / ) c \
¿ T c^ c^ oujt f i o v o u r  u f t r  ^  0,7-0 v ?
where the hetairoi cavalry are certainly referred to
59) At 5,2,6, for instance, Alexander is said to have gone to 
Mt. Merus with the hetairoi cavalry and the infantry 
agema, and there he sacrificed to Dionysius and ‘conducted 
a festivity with the hetairoi». I would suspect that 
these were ‘councillors* rather than cavalry, "but it 
cannot he easily decided.
60) Hermes 12 p.236 n.2. By ‘agema* Droysen means the 
‘royal ile*.
61) Cf. Berve II no.253; Plaumann 1376.
62) I have not considered Arrian‘s use of »philoi* as a 
synonym for ‘hetairoi* (‘councillors*). This usage is 
regular in Diodorus (17,72,1; -100,1) and also occurs in 
Plutarch (Hamilton Comm, p.37). It occurs only rarely 
in Arrian, 1,25,5; 6,13,4; 7,24,4 (perhaps). ‘Philoi* 
also occurs in connection with the circle of Philip in 
the fragments of Theopompus as quoted hy Polybius and
. Demetrius Rhet. (FGrH 115, E.225a and c respectively) 
(See Appendix I, above).
«j
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IRANIANS IN THE COMPANION CAVALRY - ARRIAN 7.6.8
1 ) I have followed the translation of Brunt (p.43) except 
for the first sentence, which Brunt did not include.
2) JHS 85 pp.160-1.
3 ) It is generally accepted that the mutiny did, in fact, 
take place at Opis in the summer of 324 B,C. The 
complaints, therefore, properly have the context of Opis. 
Cf., for instance, Tarn I p.115 and Hamilton Comm, p.197.
4 ) Cf., for instance, Tarn II p.163 n.4.
5) Tarn II p.164 sees proof that the Iranians were 
Brigaded separately from the Companions within the 
hipparchies in the fact that Arrian lists Iranian 
casualties separately (5,18,3)« This argument is based 
on the mistaken belief that no Iranians other than those 
within the hipparchies served in the army. Berve*s 
arguments that the hipparchies comprised ilae of 
Macedonians and hecatostyes of Iranians has already been 
touched upon. He argued from Arrian 6,27,6, where 
Alexander is said to have distributed baggage animals by 
ilae and hecatostyes, that each hipparchy of Companions 
contained an ile of Macedonians and hecatostyes of 
Iranians. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Ch.III 
P . B 3  ), Iranian cavalry served outside the 
hipparchies of Companion cavalry at this time and it 
seems most probable that it is to these cavalry that 
the »hecatostyes» refer. Griffith (JHS 83 pp.71f.)
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argues from certain passages in Arrian (5,13,4; 7,8,2) 
that there is an implication that the Iranians did 
serve within the hipparchies in separate squadrons, but 
his arguments are weak and the plain inference of 
Arrian's use of the term »hipparchy' is that all the men 
in these units were Companions (for instance 5,16,4, 
which even Tarn admitted has this implication, II p.185). 
Cf. the arguments of Brunt (pp.44ff.) on Arrian's use 
of 'hipparchy* and also Badian, JHS 85 p.161. See 
further, Appendix III p f>‘ 38Z-P.
6 ) This point is developed with more clarity by Griffith, 
art.cit.p.71«
7) The view of Schachermeyr (Al.d.Gr. p.358) is that the
hipparchies contained squadrons of light horse and 
mercenary horse as well as Companion cavalry. He 
presents neither evidence nor argument, and has never 
developed his ideas on the army organisation (see 
further, Ch.III pn.3(y ).
8 ) Tarn, of course, believed that the Iranians could not 
have served with the Companion cavalry until the 
hipparchies were formed. Since I have already argued 
against Tarn's views on the form of the hipparchy and 
these views are basic to his dating, his case needs 
little attention here (see Ch.III pp. W . ).
g) Brunt, p.43. Berve I p.lll and Griffith, art.cit. p . 6 8  
also refer it to 324 B.C.
10) Griffith loo.oit. As Badian pointed out, exaggeration
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in such a passage is nothing remarkable.
11) The adoption of Persian dress by Alexander as early as
329 B.C. is attested in the sources (Arr. 4,7,4; Curt. 6 ,6 , 
4j Plut. Alex. 45,1). Bor a discussion see Hamilton,
Comm, p.120. The training of the Epigoni started in 
328/7 B.C. (Curt. 8,5,1; Mod. 17,108,2; Plut. 47,6): 
see Hamilton Comm. pp,128f. The results of the training 
however, weienot fully clear: - to the men until 324 B.C., 
when the 30»000 Iranians arrived at Susa (Arr. 7,6,1).
12) But they were not integrated into the Indian campaign
army (see below and Ch.III p. 7 3  ) .
1 3 ) Cf. Brunt, pp.42f., who also assumes that many Oriental 
cavalry served in India.
14) Zarangia bordered Areia and Arachosia on the south west.
15) The satrap of Susiana was a Persian (Abulites, Arr. 3,16,9; 
Berve II no.5) and presumably had a force of Iranians or 
Elamites under him. The satrap of the Medes also was 
Iranian (Atropates, Arr. 4,18,3; Berve no.180) and 
therefore probably had some Iranians as a satrapal force.
16) The Parapamisadae also served in India (Arr. 5,11,3) 
and one would expect them to be treated in the same way
as the other Eastern Iranian horse. Arrian may have 
omitted them from his list in Ch. 6 out of carelessness 
or they may have been classed with the Bactrians. They 
were situated between Arachosia and Bactria and were a 
small group, but they had their own satrap (Arr. 4,22,5;
NOTES TO APPENDIX IY
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Berve I p.266).
17) Berve (I p.lll) and Tarn (II p.164) are "both at a loss 
to suggest who or what they were.
18) See Ch.V pp.l&rf-p. “Whatever the precise significance of 
the actions at Susa, there can he no doubt that 
Alexander intended to take the Persian and Median 
nobility into his administrative and military machine.
19) Mazaeus (Berve no.484) and Phrataphernes (no. 814) 
immediately come to mind; there were many more. I would 
point to the appointment of Oxyathres (no.586) as a 
doryphoros to support my contention that Alexander may 
have formed such a cavalry force. The parallel', of the 
Macedonian ‘royal pages1 suggests itself.
20) Cf. Alexander's name for the 50,000 Iranians in 
Macedonian dress (Arr. 7,6,1). I can find only
meaning ‘well-pointed', used by Homer II. 
2 2 .5 1 9 , of a spear as a possible source for such a 
coinage. It is most odd that the name is totally 
•unknown from elsewhere, if it was an established 
traditional term for some special group of Persians.
21) Tarn II p.165 thought that these Eastern Iranians did 
not join Alexander's army until Taxila in 526 B.C., but 
it is hardly likely that Alexander would have waited 
until he had crossed the Indus before levying them.
22) I would agree with Badian on this point, that
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• representatives of the people entered the Companion
cavalry when whole units of the same people were levied.
23) Alexander's marriage to Roxane may have been directed 
towards attaching Oxyartes to Alexander*s cause, but 
Alexander claimed to be king of the Persians, not of the 
Bactrians etc., and it was the Persian empire, 
administered traditionally by the Persian and Median 
nobility, that he had taken over. Of the Iranians who 
entered the cavalry agema in 324 B.C., only Hystaspes 
(Berve II no.763), who was related to the Achaemenid 
family (Curt. 6,2,7) and Itanes (no.392), who was 
Roxane*s brother, are known to have been other than 
Persian (Arr. 7,6,5). See further, Ch.V pp.
24) Arr. 6,27,3 and Ch. V pp./S'9'-f.
25) Arr. 7,5; see below and Ch.V pp./5" 7 -p.
26) Some Iranians traditionally served as lancers, and not 
as missile bearers, and there is no need to assume that 
a difficult retraining programme had to be conducted 
(see Dandamayev p.55); though Arrian in Ch. 6 refers
to the Iranians exchanging their H € < ru y K u \ u
27) This is how the Iranians within the agema were arranged 
(Arr. 7,6,5). See Ch.V pp.
28) Although I have suggested that the aorist participle 
implies that the action of the verb in the participle is 
past in relation to that of the main verb, the
for Macedonian
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introduction of "barbarians to the Companion cavalry may 
properly be viewed as a result of the general reinforce­
ment of the whole cavalry.
29) It seems most unlikely that the Macedonians would have 
been particularly concerned about the precise details of 
the deployment of the Iranians within the Companion 
cavalry, whether there were more in one hipparchy than 
in another. It also seems unlikely that Alexander would 
have ever wanted to make one of the hipparchiea of the 
Companion cavalry different from the others, inferior
in fact, in the eyes of the Macedonians.
30) Arrian was not drawing upon Ptolemy or Aristobulus, 
see Badian, JHS 85 p.160.
31) Cf., for instance, Berve I p.lllf. Griffith JHS 83 pp. 
72ff.
32) Berve I p.lll; Brunt p.45« See further, Ch.III pp.97-£
33) Alexander seems to have had very little contact with the 
west until he reached Carmania.
3 4 ) Arr. 6,27,3« The Median commanders certainly "brought 
troops and probably the satraps of Drangiana and Areia 
also did, as well as the son of the satrap of Parthyaea 
and Hyrcania.
35) See my discussion, Ch.V pp./62£
3 6 ) Cf. Berve I, p.lll; Schachermeyr, A1.d.Gr. pp.489.
See also Ch.V pp.
57) See above.
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BOSSES IN GEDROSIA
1) P. Green Alexander the Great (London, 1970) p.237*
Tarn I p.107* Eor a fuller summary of the literature, 
see Kraft p.109 and J. Seibert Alex. pp.l62f.
2) Hermes 80, pp.456-93. Green offers no supporting 
arguments and his precise figures do not differ 
significantly from those of Strasburger.
3) for details of modemaccounts, see Strasburger Hermes 80 
pp.481f.
4) Beloch p.344; Berve I pp,183f.
5) Of. Tarn I p.84; Schachermeyr Al.d.Gr. p.466; Hamilton 
Comm, p.184; Kraft pp.lllff.
6) Beloch p.344, and Tarn I p.84, suggested that the figure 
includes camp followers, but this cannot be right (so 
Berve I, p.180). No account of such people would have 
existed and the sources specify armed men.
7) Al.d.Gr. p.404.
8) pp.345f.
9) Diod. 18,16,4. This number is generally accepted, 
cf. Brunt p.38 and my discussion Ch.V pp.
10) pp.l08ff. Tarn I pp.l06f. does not present arguments 
but simply states that casualties were negligible.
11) pp.lllf. Eor the details in the ancient sources, see 
Arrian 6,24-5 and Strabo 15,2,5 (c.722).
So Brunt p.38, and see above, Ch.V pp. t S 7  ^12 )
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13) Arr. Diad. 38 (see also ¡7ppe/>«//x V/ ).
14) These figures are reached by adding the reinforcements 
of 9,000 infantry and 800 cavalry to the force which 
crossed with Alexander (Diod. 17,17,3f.J Arr. 1,29,4;
Curt. 5,1,39; Diod. 17,65,1). See in general, Milns 
GRBS 7 pp.l62f. on reinforcements down to the end of 
331 B.C., and my discussions above, Ch.III'pp.
and IV pp. I 3 0 f .
15) Beloch p.346 and see above Ch.V p./5~8.
16) Arr. 6,17,3^ and see above, Ch.III pp. 7/-A
17) Alexander had all the Companion cavalry, except for 
those ready for discharge, who had been sent with 
Craterus. The number cannot be precisely determined, 
but if the force was reduced by two hipparchies (see 
Appendix IV pp.^7^. above), we may not be too far wrong 
in estimating that Alexander had little under 1,500 
Companion cavalry with him, of whom the vast majority.were 
Macedonians. One chiliarchy of hypaspists went with 
Craterus, leaving Alexander with 2,500, all Macedonian.
Two pezetairoi battalions (about 4,000 men) went with 
Craterus, and a few other Macedonians designated for 
discharge: but surely no fewer than 8,000 Macedonian 
pezetairoi were with Alexander. Eor further discussion 
of numbers, see above, Ch.III pp. w ,  and IV pp.
18) Cf. Strasburger Hermes 80 p.490.
19) See, for instance, Hamilton Comm, p.184.
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20) If Schachermeyr*s estimate that Alexander took only
45,000 to 50,000 men into India (Al.d.Gr. p.404) is 
accepted, then it seems likely that no more than this 
number were "brought out. But we should perhaps assume 
that Schachermeyr*s estimate is somewhat low.
21) The pezetairoi and hypaspists numbered about 5,000 (n.17) 
and it is hardly possible that the other troops mentioned 
by Arrian amounted to many thousand more.
22) The presence of the less fit Macedonians and the 
elephants in Craterus* force (Arr. 6,17,3) indicates that 
Alexander knew his route was the more difficult.
23) These archers may have been Iranian: cf. the force of 
Iranian archers and slingers which Craterus took on h i 3 
march to Macedonia in 324 B.C. (Diod. 18,16,4).
24) Tarn I p.106 asserted that all the Iranians, except for 
the mounted archers, were discharged before Alexander 
left India. He has no evidence for this and it is 
unlikely that any large number of Iranians were 
discharged before the Indian campaign officially ended, 
at Susa in 324 B.C. See Ch. V pp./5“7*A
25) Arr. 6,27,3; Curt. 9,10,19.
26) Alex, p.126.
27) In any case it was not a major detachment. This much 
is clear, though there is no chance of determining its 
size.
28) See, for instance, Hamilton*s judgment (Alex, p.126).
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THE ARGYRASPIDS
1) Droysen RE 2 (1895) 800f.; Berve I p.128.
2) II p.151.
3) Launey (p.297) follows Berve, as does Schachermeyr A1.d.Or. 
p.14 n.10. Milns Historia 20 p.189 follows Tarn.
Beloch (p.347) "believed they were formed in 327 B.C.
4) Cf., for instance, Berve I p.128 n.3> Droysen RE 2,800.
5) Cui gloriae ut etiam exercitus ornamenta convenirent. 
•phaleras equorum et arma militum argento inducit 
exercitumque suum ab argenteis clipeis Argyraspidaa 
appellavit.
6) Eor a fuller discussion of.these passages, Ch.V pp./7/^,
7) The trouble had been over some pay which Alexander had 
promised them but which they had not received (id. 32-3).
8) See also, Walbank Commentary I, p.608; II p.64; and 
Weissenborn and MUller*s edition of livy (Berlin,1910).
9) launey (p.319) follows Berve on this.
10) Diod. 19,28,1; 18,33,6; Polyaenus Strateg. 4,9,3.
11) II, p.151 n.4: followed by Brunt n.39.
12) There can be little doubt that Alexander was conscious of 
the appearance of his court and would not have wanted 
there as guards men past their prime.
13) Jacoby FGrH II c p.138.
14) See, for instance, Walbank, »History and Tracje^y*,
Historia 9 pp.216ff.
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15) The very poor evidence for the history of the 3rd 
century makes it not at all difficult to accept that 
the term *argyraspid* was used extensively earlier than 
189, B.C. without our reading about it.
16) The veterans were difficult to control and were scarcely 
an asset to the force (id. 32-3)*
17) We might compare Arrian*s description of Ptolemy a3 
•King* in his Preface of the Anabasis, even though 
Ptolemy wrote the work Arrian was drawing upon many 
years before he became king (Cf. Errington pp.241f.).
18) Piod. 19,48,3; Plut. Eum. 19,2. This would be 
surprising, I think, if they had been Alexander*s 
hypaspists (contra Tarn II pp.l51f.).
19) Schachermeyr A1. in Bab. p.14 has the argyraspids follow 
some very elaborate patterns of movement between 324 B.C., 
when he believes they were discharged by Alexander, and 
317 B.C. Antigenes does seem to have been discharged at 
Opis (Just. 12,12,8), but there is no evidence that 
those who later became the argyraspids were.
20) Livy 37,40,7; cf. Walbank Commentary II p.64*
21) Cf. the speech and description, Diod. 19,41.
22) The term later meant simply that the troops wore a 
certain style of armour (Launey pp.319f.).
